30
March 2007
1. "Kurdish leaders see Turkey as their strategic depth", Iraqi Kurdish leaders are not too sure about the determination of Turkey to fight the PKK. They don’t see Turkey taking any risks and are suspicious about it asking them to do so. The reason why they feel this way is the apparent ease with which jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, incarcerated in the Imrali Island in Marmara Sea, can manage the group.
2. "Strategic depth concerning northern Iraq", however, before saying anything on the subject let us look at the results of a non-scientific (not based on random sampling) poll taken by a newspaper (Hürriyet) last week using electronic media. To the question “Should the Turkish army enter Iraq?” 302,135 people responded. Of these 34 percent said “Yes” and 58.8 percent said “No, it would be hazardous.” Another 7.2 percent wanted a diplomatic solution. This figure boosts those who do not want a military option to 76 percent. This is not a reliable survey but it gives an impression of popular leanings, particularly because it was conducted by a daily known for its nationalistic credentials. Yet the Turkish establishment wants to go ahead with the military option against the PKK. Why?
3. "Turkey: On elections and electioneering", election year is always a good time to review past policies and announce new campaigns and strategies. The need to win over undecided voters and to reclaim floating voters of yesteryear compels party strategists to think anew things that have recently gone wrong or turned sour. Where the matter is something as important as progressing toward membership of a, sometimes hostile, neighbouring union while fighting to retain unilateral control of parliament in the face of a rising nationalism at home, a ‘new strategy’ might indeed seem just the ticket to an assured electoral victory.
4. "U.S. vote on Turkey casts shadow on relations", a planned vote in the U.S. Congress that would classify the widespread killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Army as a genocide is threatening to make relations with Turkey unusually tense.
5. "Turkey chides Senate panel over Dink resolution", Turkey chided a Senate panel on Thursday for backing a resolution condemning the murder in January of prominent Turkish Armenian editor Hrant Dink, saying the bill was politically motivated.
6. "Turkey fans EU hopes with promises of reform", Turkey yesterday promised an ambitious domestic reform programme which will equip the country to meet EU standards in most walks of life by 2013, whatever happens to its official talks on joining the bloc.
1. - Turquie Européenne - "Kurdish leaders see Turkey as their strategic depth":
29 March 2007 / by Cengiz Candar
Jalal Talabani Suleimania airport, its surroundings and the roads leading to it are crowded with people in anticipation for the arrival of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani from his medical treatment that lasted over two weeks.In the absence of Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, who was away in Saudi Arabia as an official guest of the king, the prime minister of the regional administration, Nechervan Barzani leads the reception committee.
After seeing us, he asks, "How huge a priority are the elections for the Turkish government?" I say, “It is the top priority. There is nothing more important.” "Don’t you think there will be some progress on problems that concern us in the near future?" The way he asks the question gives me the impression that he desires some sort of dialog between them and Turkey as soon as possible.The failure to hold the meeting between Nechervan Barzani and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, or more appropriately its suspension for the foreseeable future left a bitter taste among Kurdish leaders here. I had listened to both Nechervan Barzani and Massoud Barzani’s foreign policy advisor the day before on how much importance they had attached to the meeting. I had learned that Nechervan Barzani had prepared for the meeting with no strings attached and an open mind. It was said that at the meeting, Barzani was supposed to present a "very interesting" package full of concrete proposals. The details were kept from us and probably no one will know until the meeting actually takes place.
However, we have an idea about what the priority of Barzani was. Instead of the expected Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kirkuk issue, we know the Kurdish administration has a higher priority.The reason why the PKK is not a priority is that if Turkey asks them to fight against it, they’ll want nothing to do with it. Kurdish Parliament Spokesman Adnan Mufti said: "We won’t fight the PKK but we don’t help them either." When we remind Mufti that pesmerga forces linked to both Talabani and Barzani had helped the Turkish military in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s, he says, "The reason why we fought against the PKK then was its efforts to dominate the entire region." In other words, as long as the PKK doesn’t form a threat to the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq, they’ll have no urge to strike at them. One person who has been following the developments in the region for some time said, "If the PKK had been a threat to them, northern Iraqi Kurds wouldn’t have wasted a second going after them," noting that he believed the PKK was too weak to constitute a threat.
There are also other reasons why Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq don’t go after the PKK. According to the information we collected in the region:
1. Iraqi Kurdish leaders are not too sure about the determination
of Turkey to fight the PKK. They don’t see Turkey taking any risks
and are suspicious about it asking them to do so. The reason why they
feel this way is the apparent ease with which jailed PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan,
2. While not openly voiced, they want to keep the PKK as a trump card
against Turkey as long as the bilateral relations remain aggressive.
3. The most important reason is their fear of the PKK. While the PKK
is not a threat to their authority in northern Iraq, it still has the
capability to create instability in the region if attacked.
4. Iraqi Kurdistan is not immune to the rising nationalist fervor dominating
the region, especially Turkey. In this context, the PKK is perceived
as part of the "national political structure," and Kurdish
leaders don’t want to be seen divided at a time when Iraq is dominated
by a Sunni-Shiite clash.
So what would have Barzani offered to Gül if they had met? Massoud Barzani’s political advisor said, "All Kurdish leaders know that Turkey provides them with a strategic depth." This can be understood as: "Sunni Arabs have the Arab world, Shiites have Iran and Kurds have Turkey." No matter how suspicious Turkey is of Iraqi Kurds, this is a geo-political fact.It appears what Nechervan Barzani really wanted to discuss with Gül was what would happen if Iraq is divided and Iraqi Kurdistan suddenly found itself on Turkey’s lap. Barzani was then going to make an "interesting proposal," depending on the way the discussion went. Despite the current focus on the election, Turkey needs to make time to deal with its "strategic problems." While doing this, we should be careful not to deceive ourselves and see facts as they are.
The Iraqi region neighboring Turkey is called Kurdistan.
But it is also northern Iraq. Northern Iraq also includes Mahmur, Mosul
and even Kirkuk, but these provinces are not Kurdistan. Kurdistan, according
to the Iraqi constitution, is formed of the provinces of Dohuk, Arbil
and Suleimania. It is not the "so-called Kurdistan." It is
truly Kurdistan with its institutions, border controls, flag and most
importantly its right to make agreements on oil exploration and exploitation.
If Turkey does not create links to Kurdistan via north Iraq, it won’t
have any reach to the rest of the Middle East and will find it hard
to maintain internal stability. 
2. - Today's Zaman - "Strategic depth concerning northern Iraq":
29 March 2007
After a meeting of retired Gen. Joseph Ralston, US special
envoy on countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) -- a title
that the Turkish press has transformed into “special envoy for
counterterrorism” -- held on Jan. 29 with Massoud Barzani, the
president of the Kurdistan regional government, and his vice president,
Kosrat Rasul, Turkey has reportedly been given a green light from the
US to attack PKK positions on the Kandil Mountain.
The same sources say that the military invasion will start in the beginning
of April 2007. This was critical news that both the Turkish establishment
and a part of the public have long been anticipating.
Will it bring relief as expected? Or will the operations get rid of the gangrene that is referred to as the “Kurdish problem”? That remains to be seen. However both the Americans and the Turkish establishment must be quite relieved to have convinced the Kurdish leaders of Iraq to give the green light to a Turkish military operation on Kandil, where the PKK contingency camps are and from which it conducts armed forays into Turkish soil.
The consent of the Kurdish leadership has been wrought out by the Americans after a convoluted process lasting nearly half a year. The American command in Iraq did not want to lose the support of their only ally in this hostile country. And the Iraqi Kurdish leadership wanted to keep the PKK in their territory as a trump card against the belligerent attitude of the Turkish government and military toward the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration. As the prospects of a civil war and eventual dissolution of Iraq came into sight, the worries of the Turkish establishment concerning the evolution of Kurdish autonomy into a fully fledged independent Kurdish state grew stronger. As Turkish worries mounted so did its antagonistic rhetoric against Iraqi Kurdish leaders, who then turned callous to PKK presence on their territory.
In the past both the Barzani and Talabani peshmerga fought alongside or provided logistic support for Turkish forces chasing PKK militia on Iraqi soil. After all the PKK was a Turkish (or better, Turkey’s) phenomenon and its armed existence was also a threat to the authority of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership who did not want to share their sovereignty, newly won from the Saddam government in the 1990s.
Today’s result must be due to a mixture of the Turkish military’s constant pressure on the US authorities and the complaints of an ally’s unfaithfulness in dire times. The other factor must definitely be the soft approach of the Turkish government concerning talks with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and winning their hearts.
Now that the green light is in sight what are the chances of success of the expected military operations to quell the PKK and end the “Kurdish problem” once and for all? However, before saying anything on the subject let us look at the results of a non-scientific (not based on random sampling) poll taken by a newspaper (Hürriyet) last week using electronic media.
To the question “Should the Turkish army enter Iraq?” 302,135 people responded. Of these 34 percent said “Yes” and 58.8 percent said “No, it would be hazardous.” Another 7.2 percent wanted a diplomatic solution. This figure boosts those who do not want a military option to 76 percent. This is not a reliable survey but it gives an impression of popular leanings, particularly because it was conducted by a daily known for its nationalistic credentials. Yet the Turkish establishment wants to go ahead with the military option. Why?
First of all, the Turkish ruling elite cannot abandon the basic tenets of the nationalist ethos that says any group other than the Turkish one is a potential danger to the national unity of Turkey. So Kurds in general are suspect of separatist inclinations. Of course the PKK’s campaign helps to keep this suspicion fresh and warm for all times. However the thought of severing the tie that links millions of Kurdish citizens in Turkey with this armed organization never occurred to the Turkish ruling elite.
The security concept of Turkey has always evaded the human nature of this concept. The methods realized by the armed forces on the forefront have been harsh, whereas human measures to win the people have been neglected. Hence the problem of any cultural or political demand, no matter how reasonable, has been repressed on the grounds of security, further widening the boundaries of opposition to the system.
The trajectory of opposition, slowly evolving into resistance and from resistance to armed conflict has not been fully grasped. A problem that could be solved at the social-economic-political level (peacefully) has evolved into armed confrontation further hiding the true nature of the issue. That is why the Kurdish problem and violence are intertwined, making one indiscernible from the other.
The US infatuation with dealing with terrorism through military means has reinforced the traditional Turkish attitude and allows no other option than organizing cross-border operations as if the root cause of the problem lies in Iraq. Granted the impending operations will be the litmus test of the correctness of the method employed so far. Yet there are a few questions that beg to be answered.
1- There are about 1,000 to 1,500 PKK militants in Turkey and 3,500 to 4,000 in camps and caves on Kandil in northern Iraq. How come those in Turkey have not been eradicated? Will those hiding in the mountain, well entrenched in the caves and labyrinths of tunnels they have built in previous years, be smoked out?
2- Now that the word is out that Turkey will attack them, will they sit there like ducks or disperse to safer locations given the leniency of the local Kurdish administration and the US command that see the possibility of using this organization’s influence on the Kurdish opposition movements in Syria and Iraq, the notorious members of the axis of evil?
3- The Kandil Mountain is not that close to Turkey. An infantry operation is out of question for logistical reasons and the possible hostility of local Kurds. Hence an air and helicopter attack must be planned. How effective would that be, given the territorial affinity of the militia in the area? If this is the case, is this whole scheme a way of letting off steam to ease the mounting political pressure on the Turkish government and the military? Even that may ease the increasing radicalizing nationalist surge in Turkey and increase the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) electoral chances, just as helping the military to ease its frustration vis-à-vis US intransigence that hampered relations between Turkey and the US to a great extent.
4- What if local Kurds are hurt or scenarios to that effect are hatched which may bring the Kurdish armed forces, who have improved their capabilities in the past decade thanks to their US patrons, in contact with the Turkish armed forces? From what we read from the press the cross-border operation will be carried out by approximately 40,000 men. According to international news sources, Kurdish brigades have been sent to take part in the new Baghdad security plan. “Kurdish brigades are well-trained to fight inside cities and neighborhoods, and they will contribute vigorously in cleansing Baghdad’s suburbs of armed men and outlaws,” (Gulf News). Amer Al Hussaini, a prominent figure in the Shiite Sadr group, told Gulf News: “The Kurdish peshmerga forces which most of the Iraqi army brigades are formed from, stationed in Dohuk, Arbil and Suleimaniyah, amount to 80,000. This might rise to 120,000 because of the escalation of security threats in Baghdad and also Turkey’s threats to the federal Kurdistan region regarding ownership of Kirkuk.” Given this assessment, could there be an “accident” that may turn the whole affair into a local bloody entanglement?
These are necessary questions that must be asked before an operation that will yield more psychological results than actual is carried. But there are two practical initiatives that must be considered if Turkey must really rid itself of this problem that has reached the level of a gangrene poisoning the country.
1- It must distinguish between the Kurdish problem that will and must be settled within Turkey and political violence perpetrated by the PKK with the excuse that the Kurdish problem is not yet solved.
2- Despite the existing suspicions and tensions, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds need each other. A Kurdish entity in northern Iraq could become a buffer between Turkey and the turmoil to the south while Turkey could become the business partner and protector of a Kurdish entity that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively cut loose from a Baghdad if a united Iraq becomes an impossibility.
To realize this Turkey must remember that not foes but
the relatives of its citizens are living across its southern borders
and the Iraqi Kurds must convince the suspicious Turks that their existence
is more of a boon to Turkey in all respects rather than plotting to
provoke their brethren in Turkey to created a bonfire that may consume
them as well during the fight to extinguish it.
3. - The Muslim News - "On elections and electioneering":
29 March 2007 / by Elif Aydin
Election year is always a good time to review past policies and announce new campaigns and strategies. The need to win over undecided voters and to reclaim floating voters of yesteryear compels party strategists to think anew things that have recently gone wrong or turned sour. Where the matter is something as important as progressing toward membership of a, sometimes hostile, neighbouring union while fighting to retain unilateral control of parliament in the face of a rising nationalism at home, a ‘new strategy’ might indeed seem just the ticket to an assured electoral victory.
Ali Babacan, Turkey’s Chief EU Negotiator, told a European Policy Centre gathering on March 2, that Turkey would henceforth embark on a rather different footing than previous in its relations with the EU. Babacan, in detailing the ‘new strategy’, developed in response to the EU’s decision to suspend eight of the 35 negotiating chapters last December, announced a marked pivotal shift in relations between Brussels and Ankara.
“We can’t let our children drink bacteria-tainted milk, or let our industries pollute the environment,” he said, referring to the suspended chapters regulating these standards in the EU, from which Turkey is exempt barring compliance with the requirement that it open its ports to Cyprus. The shift in the axis of the relationship between Turkey and the EU will now take the form of the accessor proceeding on the path of reform dependent on “its own priorities and its own deadlines,” and irrespective of any formal progress in the state of negotiations with Brussels, Babacan stated.
He spoke of the “strong feeling of frustration and huge disappointment” felt by the Turks at the EU’s insistence that Ankara open its ports to Cyprus or face the consequences. Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, who at the formal opening of negotiations in Brussels in December 2004, almost left the city empty handed, despite his government’s enormous progress in the pace of reforms to get to the negotiating point, decrying that the EU appeared to favour “600 000 Greeks to 70 million Turks.” It’s a feeling that persists with Babacan claiming that the Turks were experiencing “a feeling of being unwanted.”
While the Chief Negotiator is right to claim that the reform process in Turkey would only truly reflect the country’s determination to be a member of the EU, and thus emulate it in every sphere; the supremacy of civilian government and the rule of law and respect for minorities, to name but a few contentious areas, if the process was ‘owned’ by the country and its people, the new strategy should be seen as more than just the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government’s reflection of popular disenchantment with the EU and a desire to hit back over the Cyprus stalemate.
Of course one can’t blame them. Turkey’s EU
project has always seemed more of an elite driven exercise than a populist
one. At least in Europe, where polls have regularly exposed the difference
in opinion between the EU’s various governing bodies and the member
states’ respective populations on attitudes towards Turkey’s
membership.
The divergence is perhaps less apparent in Turkey with popular zeal
for the likelihood of a net transfer of EU structural funds into the
country clouding cold rationalism of what membership will actually mean
for the strongly nationalist, sovereign Muslim state.
It’s this rationality that’s now coming closer to the fore in this election year. The December decision of the EU is one of the many cumulative episodes adding to nationalist appeal.
Popular distress at the French Parliament’s adoption
of a law criminalising denial of the (strongly contested) Armenian genocide,
and the prospect, despite severe lobbying, of a Democrat dominated Congress
doing the same some time in 2007, are just the mild forms of this virulent
disorder.
The reformed penal code, which under article 301 makes a crime of ‘insulting
Turkishness’, is a somewhat more aggressive manifestation. Its
application has seen numerous well known and out spoken Turkish editors,
journalists and writers hauled before the courts to defend what in most
countries would be deemed ‘freedom of expression’. They include
some of the most well known of Turkey’s novelists, Nobel prizewinner,
Orhan Pamuk and Elif ªafak; the latter charged for comments made
by a character in her latest novel.
While EU pressure to drop legal proceedings against some of the accused has kept Turkey from falling entirely off the EU train track, the shooting of the Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, in the ªiºli district of Istanbul on Jan 19, has raised deeper concerns of the more troubling strains of this growing problem.
Turkey’s frustration at the lack of progress by the US over renewed activity of the Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and the Foreign Minister being snubbed during his recent visit to Washington by the Democrat Leader of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi - known to be supportive of Resolution 106 on the Armenian Genocide, due to be tabled in the House later this spring - is stoking anti American sentiment concomitant with the already growing aversion to the EU.
Although the AKP is widely expected to win the parliamentary elections in late 2007, according to all current polls, the electoral challenge posed by the MHP, (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - Nationalist Movement Party), though perhaps minor, would still cause some complications to the AKP’s hope of forming a second term one party majority government with a vanquished opposition.
The MHP was one of the governing parties in the coalition government whose miserable track record brought the AKP to power in 2002, as voters revolted against the coalition, and other established parties, and cast their ballot for the then new kid on the block. This time around, the AKP will be fighting to retain the votes it attracted from the centre right and former coalition parties of 2002 and hoping to keep the vote count of these other parties below the 10% threshold needed to take up seats in Parliament. A dispersal of votes across right wing parties would make this probable, as in 2002. But the concentration of the appeal of extreme nationalism is driving much of the younger voting public towards one party, the MHP.
The anti EU and anti American sentiments of late run the risk of creating problems for the AKP beyond taking ‘ownership’ of the EU project and formulating directives in Ankara, rather than receive them from Brussels. No serious solution to the problem of the suspended chapters, and Cyprus, can be entertained, or negotiations properly reinstated if the AKP fearing electoral failure up ahead, diverts its course now.
The courage shown by the governing party in taking steps that have been vastly unpopular but necessary, particularly on Cyprus, seem to have backfired thus far. The Government had always hoped its overtures on southern Cyprus would be reciprocated with a willingness from Europe to begin direct trade with the impoverished north. Such would certainly have weakened the nationalists’ anti-EU harangues.
With an election to plan for and a rising nationalist tide, the AKP Government is fearful of losing further popular support. It is unlikely to run noticeable risks in the present climate, which will only bolster nationalist strength. This includes revising the penal code responsible for much of the current bifurcation into those that want Turkey’s freedom of expression to encompass all expression, including the right to express a different reading of Turkish history, and those prepared to resort to violence to keep Turkish sensitivities intact.
It is a bitter irony that while Turkey battles to keep its EU dream afloat, even if this means anchoring reforms closer to home, the factor driving its change of heart, a rampant nationalism, is mirrored in the concurrent rise of right wing parties in most of Europe. The tyranny of the nationalist minority, that threatens the creation of a more plural and tolerant society, is a problem for more than just Turkey it seems.
As the Turkish Government struggles to chart a course
for progress in raising living standards and further deepening democratic
consolidation, whilst fighting the appeal of the xenophobic demon within
and without, Muslim communities in the rest of Europe will be able to
empathise with its sad predica.
4. - The International Tribune - "U.S. vote on Turkey casts shadow on relations":
ISTANBUL/WASHINGTON / 29 March 2007 / By Sebnem Arsu and Brian Knowlton
A planned vote in the U.S. Congress that would classify the widespread killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Army as a genocide is threatening to make relations with Turkey unusually tense.
The speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, backs the resolution and at first wanted a vote in April. But under Turkish pressure, Bush administration figures have lobbied for the Democrats in charge of Congress to drop the measure.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates sent strong letters of protest to her and to Representative Tom Lantos, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which has not set a date for the vote.
"That's had an impact," said Lynn Weil, a Lantos spokeswoman, referring to the letters.
Turkey vehemently denies that the deaths of some 1.5 million Armenians from 1915 to 1923 constituted genocide. It contends that they occurred in the chaos of war, as the Ottoman Empire was falling apart, and that many Turks were also killed when Armenians sided with Russian forces in the hope of claiming territory in eastern Turkey.
But many Armenians have made it a point of honor to secure an acknowledgment from nations around the world that the deaths amounted to systematic genocide at Ottoman hands. So far, parliaments of more than 15 countries have done so. France and Switzerland went further and called for criminal charges against those who deny it.
A vote in Congress would be purely symbolic, but Turks have warned that it would be felt as a bitter slap and could cause enormous public pressure on the government in Ankara to chill its cooperation with Washington. The United States has strong military ties to Turkey, a NATO member.
In an effort to highlight Turkey's opposition to a congressional resolution, many high-ranking Turkish officials visited Washington in recent months. One of them, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, believes that the damage would be very deep if the resolution passed - an option, he said, that he did not even want to think about.
"It is only natural that the Turkish public who closely follow the issue would also react to this strongly," Gul said. "As the elected government of democratic Turkey we would not be able to remain indifferent. However, I am confident that common sense would prevail at the Congress."
Gates and Rice, in identical letters, spoke sympathetically of "the horrendous suffering that ethnic Armenians endured" and called for more study of the events. But they also noted that when the French National Assembly voted last year, the Turkish military responded by deciding to "cut all contacts with the French military and terminated defense contracts under negotiation."
A similar reaction now by the Turkish government, Gates and Rice warned, "could harm American troops in the field" and constrain the U.S. military in any number of ways.
Gates chose a meeting of the American-Turkish Council in Washington to make a major policy speech on Tuesday. Not only did he describe Turkey as an ally that "I have long believed to be undervalued and underappreciated," but he also made a point of arguing against the genocide resolution.
"Our two nations should oppose measures and rhetoric that needlessly and destructively antagonize each other," Gates said Tuesday.
Asked about the warnings from Rice and Gates, Representative Adam Schiff, Democrat of California and a lead sponsor of the House resolution, said, "I don't see how we can have the moral authority that we need to condemn the genocide going in Darfur if we're unwilling to recognize other genocides that have taken place."
Similar congressional votes have been deferred in the past after intense lobbying. But with strong support for the resolution from Pelosi, and lingering resentments in Congress over Turkey's refusal to let U.S. forces use Turkish soil for the invasion of Iraq, the bill's prospects may have grown.
"It has 183 sponsors," Elizabeth Chouldjian of the Armenian National Committee of America said. "It is very likely that if it came up for a vote right now it would pass."
But Turks say they have taken steps to face their past. Last year, after court challenges to a law that made it a criminal offense to discuss the Armenian killings, Turkish intellectuals finally managed to gather to discuss the events. The conference was considered a breakthrough.
Fueled partly by anger over the Iraq war, American popularity in Turkey plunged from 52 percent in 2000 to a historic low of 12 percent last year, according to a Pew Global Attitudes survey published this month.
In Istanbul, Etyen Mahcupyan, an intellectual of Armenian descent who succeeded the assassinated editor Hrant Dink at the weekly Agos, said that foreign pressure on Turkey would only fuel extreme nationalism.
"Turkish people are just beginning to realize that there are things they were not taught in schools, so we are curious and willing to talk about not only the Armenian issue but also other things freely," Mahcupyan said. "It is not fair to expect a society to accept the truths of other societies without having the chance to discuss them first."
Other Turkish Armenians said they agreed.
"None of these resolutions," said Hosyar Koletavitoglu,
a business consultant, "would bring back our grandparents."
5. - Reuters - "Turkey chides Senate panel over Dink resolution":
ANKARA / 29 March 2007
Turkey chided a Senate panel on Thursday for backing a resolution condemning the murder in January of prominent Turkish Armenian editor Hrant Dink, saying the bill was politically motivated.
The mainly symbolic resolution, which can now pass to the floor of the Senate for a vote, has angered Ankara as it makes a reference to the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 and mentions that Dink had faced legal action for writing about them.
The resolution, backed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, took place as the U.S. Congress weighs whether to debate and back a much more explosive bill that would recognize the Armenian massacres by Ottoman Turks as genocide.
"It is clear that bringing this resolution (on Dink's killing) to the agenda of the Senate serves only to exploit the loathsome murder for political aims by referring to the events of 1915," Turkey's Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
The ministry noted the government had strongly condemned Dink's murder and that large numbers of Turks had taken to the streets of Istanbul at his funeral to show their revulsion.
Dink was shot dead outside his Istanbul office by a young Turkish ultra-nationalist, who later said he had killed Dink for "insulting" Turkey. Several other men have been arrested in connection with the killing.
Before his death, Dink had been prosecuted under a controversial law for his writings on the Armenian massacres, a highly sensitive subject in Turkey.
Turkey denies Ottoman forces committed a systematic genocide against Armenians during World War One. It says large numbers of both Christian Armenians and Muslim Turks died in inter-ethnic fighting as the Ottoman Empire collapsed.
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has warned of serious damage to U.S.-Turkish relations if Congress backed the genocide resolution next month.
Many other parliaments around the world have passed similar
resolutions acknowledging the Armenian killings as genocide.
6. - The Independent - "Turkey fans EU hopes with promises of reform":
BRUSSELS / 30 March 2007 / by Stephen Castle
Turkey yesterday promised an ambitious domestic reform programme which will equip the country to meet EU standards in most walks of life by 2013, whatever happens to its official talks on joining the bloc.
The pledge came at the start of a new set of negotiations which kept alive Ankara's distant prospects of membership of the club.
Diplomats in Brussels opened detailed discussions on one new area of policy and said they expect to start talks on three more before the end of June. Significantly Cyprus - which is not recognised by Turkey - did not seek to block the talks.
However almost one-quarter of the membership negotiations remain frozen because of a row over Turkey's refusal to open its ports to vessels from Cyprus which is part of the EU.
And even the discussions on industry and enterprise, launched yesterday, cannot be completed until the dispute over Cyprus is resolved.
Speaking after the talks Turkey's chief EU negotiator, Ali Babacan, welcomed the new discussions saying that is was "crucial to show to the citizens of Turkey that the accession process is moving forward".
However he added that the government had "decided to separate, to a certain extent, the formal progress on negotiations from domestic reform efforts".
A package of measures across the entire range of domestic policy will be announced next month, Mr Babacan said.
The idea is to put Ankara in a position to join the EU in 2014 if the political blockage over Cyprus can be resolved by then. The strategy is to ensure that Ankara does not waste time in its membership bid because of the political deadlock.
Mr Babacan said: "Just because we have the problem of Cyprus does not mean we will continue to allow our children to drink milk with bacteria in it."
One element which will not be addressed in the measures to be outlined next month is article 301 of the Turkish constitution which makes it an offence to insult Turkishness and has been used to prosecute the Nobel-prize-winner writer Orhan Pamuk.
Mr Babacan said this was not included because the focus of the new measures in on meeting technical standards in areas such as food hygiene.
However he said that the government has "made quite clear that things have to change", adding that "parliamentarians have suffered because of a lack of personal freedoms and we have every reason to want to make progress".
Until yesterday Turkey had opened only one of the 35 sets of negotiations on membership, that which relates to research.
In addition to industry and enterprise, three more are likely to be started by the end of June which marks the end of the current EU presidency which is held by Germany.
The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier,
said the "talks with Turkey are back on the rails".