29 June 2007

1. "When the Kurds enter the Turkish Parliament", Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the Kurds should enter Parliament and say whatever they have to say there instead of trying to create discord. This really sounds great but can it work in practice remains to be seen.

2. "Turkish Army Raises Pressure as Election Approaches", Turkey's military is increasing pressure on the government, which faces a national election next month, to allow soldiers to enter Iraq and attack Kurdish guerrilla bases used for cross-border raids.

3. "Turkey: Armed Forces obliged to adopt a "wait and see" strategy in political matters", the fact that Ankara cannot intervene in the North of Iraq is paradoxically giving the army a further chance to re-launch itself. Following the Presidential elections and on the eve of the legislative elections, the Armed Forces find themselves as having two different means of influencing Turkish politics.

4. "Kurdish: A different language", without a doubt, the Kurdish issue is one of the most important political problems in Turkey.

5. "French move bodes ill for Turkey's EU hopes", France's move to block European Union negotiations with Turkey on economic and monetary policy could spell the beginning of the end for Turkey's hopes of full membership. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has long said Muslim Turkey does not belong in the EU, but Turkish diplomats had hoped he would prove more pragmatic after taking power in May, just as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, another Ankara foe, has done.

6. "TURKEY: What chance for religious freedom in Turkey's elections?", Turks who want to see genuine freedom of thought, conscience and religion have little expectation that either the parliamentary or presidential election will bring any improvement. No political party with any chance of gaining real power wants either to tackle the dangerous media intolerance of religious minorities or to take the dramatic changes necessary to usher in genuine religious freedom.

1. - The New Anatolian - "When the Kurds enter the Turkish Parliament":

28 June 2007 / by Ilnur Cevik

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the Kurds should enter Parliament and say whatever they have to say there instead of trying to create discord. This really sounds great but can it work in practice remains to be seen.

The prime minister does not have to wait too long for this. The Kurdish deputies who are all independents will soon win parliamentary seats in several eastern and southeastern provinces and will be in Parliament to voice their views freely…

In the past Kurdish deputies entered the Parliament and acted like activists… In the end they were all thrown out of the Parliament. Some like Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak were imprisoned while others went into exile in Europe and still cannot come back to Turkey.

The Kurds agree that mistakes were made on both sides during that period. However, when we look at the atmosphere in Turkey where tolerance and goodwill are at a all time low thanks to PKK we see with sadness that the future does not look too promising.

The prime minister means well but what he says is not practical.

There is a serious anti-Kurdish campaign going on in Turkey fanned by the nationalists and unfortunately by the Republican People's Party (CHP). The more the PKK kills our soldiers the more this campaign is picking up pace. What is critical is that the media is also being used in this anti-Kurdish campaign. Every funeral for a soldier is blown out of proportion thus turning the Turkish public against the Kurds in general.

An American friend who was visiting Turkey recently said she was shocked by the way the Turkish press is publishing these stories on a daily basis. She said the Americans who are losing dozens of soldiers in Iraq everyday are controlling the media and are not allowing the funerals to be promoted in such a way…

The Kurds will enter the Parliament and unfortunately because of the elections system they may end up being the kingmakers in case a coalition is needed. Their support will also be needed in the election of the new president simply because the secularists of Turkey who actually hate these deputies have created their own mess through constitutional court verdicts.

What we are very concerned is that these deputies will be under pressure from their constituents to voice some views that may further alienate the Turkish masses let alone become the kingmakers in politics.

The elections were to have further enhanced our stable political environment thanks to the majority rule of the Justice and Development (AK) Party but it seems the way things are going the elections will not contribute to this.

Let us hope the Kurdish deputies who will enter this Parliament will not get carried away with activism and do not push Turkey into new adventures.

2. - Bloomberg - "Turkish Army Raises Pressure as Election Approaches":

28 June 2007 / by Louis Meixler

Turkey's military is increasing pressure on the government, which faces a national election next month, to allow soldiers to enter Iraq and attack Kurdish guerrilla bases used for cross-border raids.

The head of the military, General Yasar Buyukanit, who's called for mass protests against the guerrillas, repeated a demand yesterday for the government to approve an operation in Iraq -- a request Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has so far opposed.

The army and government are already at loggerheads over claims that the ruling party is trying to increase the role of Islam in the country. Military officers created the secular Turkish republic on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and the armed forces have ousted four governments since 1960. Now the army says Erdogan is not doing enough to fight Kurdish rebels in a conflict that has left 40,000 dead since 1984 - - a charge that may cost the prime minister votes in the July 22 election.

``This is one issue that hits the party close to home,'' Soner Cagaptay, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said in an interview. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's ``inability to deliver security against terror will hurt it'' in the balloting.

Earlier this month angry mourners at a funeral for one of the more than 60 soldiers killed fighting the rebels this year booed Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Police had to protect Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc from a crowd at another soldier's funeral in Arinc's hometown of Manisa.

On the Border

The army has moved tens of thousands of soldiers to the border in preparation for a raid against guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK, whose main bases are in the remote mountains of northern Iraq. Clashes have recently escalated in Turkey's overwhelmingly Kurdish southeast. In the most recent fighting, soldiers killed eight PKK militants in the mountains of Sirnak province near Iraq, the military reported yesterday on its Web site.

``We are sure that a cross-border operation will produce results,'' Buyukanit said yesterday. He repeated his earlier insistence that ``a political decision is needed'' to authorize the move.

The army called on the public on June 8 to display its ``mass opposition'' to the PKK. Former generals have begun publicly accusing the government of not doing enough to fight terrorism.

`Boundary of Respect'

Government officials had no immediate reaction to Buyukanit's demand. Earlier this month, Erdogan criticized the military claims that his government wasn't taking sufficient action to fight the rebels.

``Some retired generals are wandering from television station to television station making statements against the government that cross the boundary of respect, as if they're trying to create a negative psychological atmosphere in the country,'' the prime minister told reporters on June 12.

Erdogan also said the army's priority should be fighting the thousands of PKK militants within Turkey -- and not attacking their bases in Iraq.

U.S. officials have cautioned Turkey against sending troops into northern Iraq, one of the few relatively quiet areas of the country.

So far, neither Erdogan, the country's most popular politician, nor the army, Turkey's most respected institution, are budging in their conflict.

Eternal Guardian

``Irresistible force versus immovable object,'' said Bulent Aliriza, head of the Turkey program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. ``People like the military, but they also like Erdogan.''

The military, which regards itself as the state's eternal guardian, has been wary of Erdogan's party, which has its roots in the banned pro-Islamic Welfare Party.

Erdogan called early elections after the military objected to his nomination of Gul as president. The generals warned in an April 27 statement that ``it must not be forgotten that the armed forces are the determined defenders of secularism.''

Meanwhile, Turkish newspapers and television stations have been filled with images of tanks heading for the Iraqi border, helicopter gunships on patrol and military exercises.

In southeast Turkey, armored personnel carriers painted in dark green and sand colored camouflage could be seen this month patrolling the main highways with mounted machine guns.

Erdogan's party is leading in all polls in the run-up to next month's vote, though the surveys don't agree on whether it has enough support to keep its majority or whether it will be forced into a coalition.

``The military is interested in this government not having a clear-cut majority'' after the election, said Ilter Turan, a political science professor at Istanbul Bilgi University. Erdogan ``is in an uncomfortable position.''

3. - Equilibri.net - "Turkey: Armed Forces obliged to adopt a "wait and see" strategy in political matters":

The fact that Ankara cannot intervene in the North of Iraq is paradoxically giving the army a further chance to re-launch itself. Following the Presidential elections and on the eve of the legislative elections, the Armed Forces find themselves as having two different means of influencing Turkish politics.

28 June 2007 / by Alessio Orlando

The reasons for not intervening in Iraqi Kurdistan

According to Ankara the threat level of Iraqi Kurdistan has been growing since the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the USA. The Turkish government believes that at least 3,800 PKK soldiers, 2,300 of which operative in Turkey, are present in the Iraqi provinces (Ebril, Suleimaniyya, and Dohuk) that make up the Kurdistan Regional Government.For Ankara Iraqi Kurdistan is a major issue for national security, it is believed that the dangers posed by the PKK and the Kurdistan Regional Government are destined to increase over the coming months. Ankara's concerns are not only linked to strategic military issues but also to the interaction these have with political developments. As concerns strategic military issues it has been proved that the Kurdistan Regional Government and the mountainous regions in the North of Iraq are the hiding-places the PKK guerrilla prefer. The Kurdistan Workers Party can now count on the support of some Iraqi Kurdish political leaders, such as Massoud Barzani, and the militias loyal to them.

As concerns political issues Ankara is very concerned by the referendum to be held in Kirkuk next autumn. The population of the Iraqi city will in fact have to vote on its willingness to be part of the Kurdistan Regional Government. If Kirkuk were annexed to Kurdistan, the population in the latter would increase and Kurdistan would own the huge oil reserves located near the city; from a political point of view such annexation could open the way for the creation of the "Greater Kurdistan" which could become a potential catalyst and promote nationalist movements.

Even though Ankara perceives the danger of the PKK and, in perspective, of the Kurdistan Regional Government more intensely, it finds itself in a diplomatic, strategic and political position that prevents it from taking significant actions to safeguard its interests. As concerns the diplomatic situation some of the factors that helped re-launch Turkey over the last few years are turning out to be the very elements that limit its autonomy, first and foremost the alliance with the USA.

Washington is committed to helping stabilise Iraq and it is the only government involved in such a process, including the Iraqi's, that could politically legitimate an action by Turkey. If Ankara's army acted in a too invasive way in Iraq it would cause the opening of a new front in the already intricate scenario in Iraq and would also have serious political consequences, for example the breaking of the Kurdish alliance not only with Washington but also with the Shiites in Baghdad's Parliament. It is thus superfluous to state that, even though the US officially considers the PKK a terrorist group, they would be against any actions being taken within Iraqi borders and they would appeal to NATO, of which Turkey is a member; NATO thus represents another bond to Turkey's military freedom of action.

A third factor is the European Union, that had already criticised Ankara's non-respect of the Kurdish communities' human rights. Turkey's membership application seems moreover far from being accepted. Turkey would thus seem unlikely to manage to bear the diplomatic pressure that could be applied as this would put at risk military relations with Washington, NATO and the US' willingness to keep on supporting the process of liberalisation of Turkey's economy with huge investments.

From the strategic point of view there are a number of issues concerning the effectiveness of any eventual military action. The instability of the Turkish borders would worsen and fighting would not only involve the Kurdish army and the PKK guerrillas but also Kurdish militias and the Peshmerga - historically well equipped and trained - would participate in any fighting. The geographical context and the fighting methods and tactics of the participants would bring about a long guerrilla conflict with a high danger of 'terrorist attacks'. Any Turkish attack would moreover cause resentment and would create a hotbed for both armed and political extremism that would have negative consequences in the medium and long term even in the event that Ankara managed, which is almost an impossible outcome, to eliminate the most imminent PKK threats.

The current political situation in Turkey would seem to implicate not taking any demanding actions at least before July's political elections take place. Ankara is thus following a strategy of "diplomatic legitimacy" of the government's concerns. From this point of view Turkey has already prepared a memorandum to be handed over to the United Nations where it explains why its intervention would be a matter of self-defence. There have been several meetings between Ankara and the US Ambassador Wilson, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has pressured Washington to induce the Leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government, who are close to the US, to isolate PKK members.

In order to speed up the political-strategic "negotiations" with Washington, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has more than once displayed his contacts with the Iranian leader Ahmadinejad, thus underlining a convergence of interests - especially on the Kurdish threat. The only thing Ankara can do is use Washington's political weight to put pressure on Kurdish leaders so that they isolate extremists. What's more, since the US is a major allies to both the Turks and the Iraqi Kurds, they could play the role of mediator but it is important to stress that the process might be seriously hindered since both the parties, Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government, could use important elements (such as relations with Iran for Ankara and the referendum in Kirkuk for the KRG) as leverage in obtaining a better deal for their consensus.

The Armed Forces' influence on politics: two different approaches

As has been mentioned previously, Turkey is currently going through a delicate phase from the political point of view as well. After the withdrawal of the candidacy of Abdullah Gul as President of the Republic, who the opposition judged as being too close to the Islamic political environment, and after the bipartisan proposal of a constitutional reform that provides for the direct election of the President – something required in order to get over the current impasse - Turkey has a new challenge to face: the 22nd July political elections. The scenario in which the July elections and the discussions on constitutional reform will take place will be characterised by the new role of the army as the supervisor of political events and the protector of the State's religious neutrality; this is what the military hierarchy have stated during the period of political debate surrounding Gul's candidacy as President.

It is important to stress that the mixture, the political and military ties and the influence of the latter on institutional events, was of considerable importance even before the Gul case burst out and the consequent army statement was presented. Currently the opposition's "proclamations" about the threats to the State's religious neutrality, the imminent elections and the events on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan have had no other outcome than putting the role of the military in the spotlight. During the political processes that will lead to July's legislative elections, the traditional "bargaining" between politicians and the army's members is being proposed. In order to safeguard his position and that of his party from the military the Premier has rejected the applications of the AK party members of Parliament that have had contrasts with the army. In trying to influence the political events the military have divided themselves in two factions that cut across their power or grade of service, following different approaches.

The first faction, a minority which is growing, prefers to intervene in the political environment from within. This implies looking for political power by entering the parties and is the one favoured by retired military. The latter are not only composed of former army members that believe in the State's religious neutrality but also of convinced nationalists (that have more than once criticised the process of admission to the EU) and former military that have been accused by the same Turkish Armed Forces of having ties with Islamic-fundamentalist environments. It is necessary to point out that, if we exclude the rare cases of administrative electoral successes, these former military do not raise considerable consensus not even among the parties' leaders that often disapprove of their launching their own political career. Both the AK party and the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), do not consider former military as being crucial to raising consensus. Besides this reason there is another one linked to the influence of the military in political events and to the different approach that most of the army's members follow to influence the institutions.

Most of the Armed Forces members in fact prefer to have less visibility in political events even though they continue to significantly influence them. Military who directly enter the political world are thwarted by the other Armed Forces' members as they could jeopardise the privileged status of military. Those who decide to propose themselves as candidates do not respect the image of a neutral army, one that keeps a distance from political debate and one that would intervene to safeguard religious neutrality or Turkish interests from external threats.

The army has been, and still is, committing to evidencing its secular status, for example with the declaration following Gul's candidacy. In addition General Buyukanit, the leader of the Armed Forces, has pressured Parliament in order to obtain approval for carrying out operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. Even though aware that it is a difficult mission that implies strategic risks and from which their image may suffer, the army leaders are equally aware of the impossibility of obtaining any such authorisation for the political and strategic issues mentioned above. However, the image of an army that defends at all costs the Turkish population's interests and which is faithful to Ataturk's maxim "peace at home, peace abroad" continues to be nourished and nobody seems to be willing to bear responsibility for a lack of action on the part of the political class.

Conclusions

Even though the army’s role has been re-launched, the Armed Forces are unlikely to adopt an attitude aimed at discrediting the party in government and at favouring the opposition. Such a low profile seems to be confirmed both by the absence of incisive proclamations following the Gul's case and by the fact that responsibilities for a lack of intervention in Kurdistan have been discharged on Parliament as a whole and not only on the government. The military's "wait and see" strategy is justified, besides remaining faithful to the aforementioned policy towards political debate, also by the need not to risk the consensus of the population: the latter seems to rely on the AK party which has brought about a level of economic well-being never experienced before. The results of 22nd July legislative elections and the solution to the Presidential issue will thus be crucial for the determination of a more considerable intervention of the Armed Forces in political issues.

4. - Zaman - "Kurdish: A different language":

28 June 2007 / by Joost Lagendijk*

Without a doubt, the Kurdish issue is one of the most important political problems in Turkey.

The problem is not only a bloody political issue involving the deaths of more than 30,000 people, but at the same time a crisis felt at all the layers of the system from local governments to the Parliament. Although the former policy of the republic, which was founded on the practice of denying Kurds, is about to completely rot, the “Kurdish reality” as articulated by politicians such as Demirel, Özal, Erdogan and others cannot be said to have been appreciated well enough.
The most recent example of this is a decision reached by the Eighth Chamber of the Council of the State on June 14, 2007 to remove the mayor of the Sur district of Diyarbakir, Abdullah Demirbas, and the members of the municipal council. Endorsing the decision made by the interior minister, the high court ruled in October 2006 that giving information on various municipal services such as culture, art, environment, city cleaning and health in languages other than Turkish is against the Constitution, removing the people in question from office. However, the above-mentioned municipality conducted research and discovered that 24 percent of people spoke Turkish in their daily lives, 72 percent Kurdish, 1 percent Arabic and 3 percent Syrian and Armenian, resulting in the decision to give services in these languages to reach all the people benefiting from them. As a matter of fact, even though one wouldn’t need to conduct a study to find out that the majority of people in Diyarbakir speak Kurdish -- not Turkish -- it turned out a useful one in terms of revealing the exact figures.

The Interior Ministry described this decision as a political one and determined that Article 222 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) was violated. The high court agreed with the ministry’s view and also came to the opinion that “a quality has formed that exceeds the exercising of the fundamental rights and liberties defined and secured by the Constitution and international conventions and that is against the purpose and implications of these rules” and decided to remove the mayor from office and depose the municipal council. This decision of the Council of the State indubitably reflects the laws in Turkey and the constitutional realities and also clearly defines the boundaries of Kurdish. While it is a necessity to be respectful toward the decisions of the high court, doing so is giving rise to dismaying results. The mayor and the members of the municipal council will not be able to stand for the elections to be renewed in two months’ time and, what’s more, they will stand trial because they committed a “crime.”

The mayor of the Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir, is being subjected to a similar set of interrogations and judicial process. Most of these issues taken to court relate to using Kurdish, as was the case with the problematic celebration cards used in 2006 and 2007. These cards, containing nothing more than good wishes for the new year in Turkish, English and Kurdish, were taken by the prosecutor as enough evidence to launch an investigation. The prosecutor, who seems to have spent little time on the indictment, cut it very short and wrote: “It was determined that the suspect used a Kurdish sentence in the celebration card, ‘Sersela We Piroz Be’ (Happy New Year). I, on behalf of the public, demand that he be punished under Article 222/1 of the Turkish Penal Code.” So, it will benefit us to look at this article of the penal code a bit closer.

Law on protection of the Turkish alphabet

Article 222 of the TCK was put into effect in the 1920s. The young republic, which decided to stop using Arabic letters and write Turkish with the Latin alphabet, made a very radical move in regard to written communication. The scholars who oversaw judicial and religious matters in the society -- and whose command of Arabic was perfect -- were not only divested of their positions in the state with this move, but were also thrust outside the chain of communication between people and the state. Through crash courses on the new alphabet, the founders tried to generate new “elites” and made it an obligation to use the Latin alphabet. This article, as well as the law that obliged the wearing of the felt hat by every male citizen and the ban on wearing the fez and similar “old” clothes outside mosques, bluntly illustrates the purpose of the lawmaker. With this article, the scholars all over Turkey were reduced to invisibility in society.

However legally surprising it may be to see this article used against communication in Kurdish, the practice fits with the article’s history and purpose. The Latin alphabet is also used to write Kurdish in Turkey, but it has letters like “î” and “w,” which are not used in Turkish. Legally speaking, the penal code’s article in question should have been directed against using these extra letters, which are not used in Turkish. The prosecutor did not even take the trouble to find a link between this article and the “crime.” According to him, Mayor Baydemir used a Kurdish sentence to celebrate the new year and therefore committed a “crime.” Maybe the prosecutor did not want to delve into details as the English version of the celebration, Happy New Year, also contains the letter “w.” In fact the letter “w” constituting a crime in Kurdish but not in English would be pushing it a little in the legal and political sense.

Kurdish still a forbidden language

Similar things happened and are still happening to Kurdish names. These letters used to write Kurdish names are still not accepted in Turkey, and families are forced to write such names using the Turkish alphabet. The increasingly widespread execution of laws against speaking Kurdish similar to Article 222 in recent years makes the issue politically significant. Human rights defenders perceive this development as a new means of pressure against Kurdish people. In election campaigns, the investigations launched into the use of Kurdish did not produce any results and, to reach voters, the courts that settled the matters defined the use of local tongues as a fundamental right to be exercised and did not see any element of guilt. The newly launched investigations and lawsuits filed give the impression that a political will has come into the play to prevent Kurdish from being spoken as a language of communication. The purpose appears to be the prevention of using Kurdish in communication between institutions and associations. What is feared, perhaps, is that Kurdish may gradually become a normal means of daily communication in provinces like Diyarbakir where the majority of people speak Kurdish.

Looking at the matter from a broader perspective tells us that the decisions made by the local government of the Sur district and similar places to use Kurdish as a means of social communication also has a political dimension to it, thus it would be naïve to overlook the fact that the issue goes beyond being merely linguistics. However, the base of the problem is still whether the Kurdish language should be used for communication or not. After issuing a press release, the mayors went into details in their statements and stressed that they would continue using Kurdish whether or not it constituted a crime. The high-tension line in Turkey related to the Kurdish issue is thus laid down. This line is dividing people into two parties based on a question of whether using a simple Kurdish sentence like “Sersela We Piroz Be” means separatism -- therefore constituting a “crime” -- and the opinion that Kurdish is a very normal means of communication in a city comprising predominantly Kurds.

There are strong legal grounds supporting our view. As part of reforms made in harmonization with the EU, it has become possible to use “languages other than Turkish,” thanks to a change in Article 26 of the Constitution. These reforms include the right to learn Kurdish and broadcast and publish in this language. If these reforms have any meaning at all, Kurdish should allowed use in Diyarbakir. We see that the mayors, who must be listened to, also put forward strong arguments.

The Turkish Law on Municipalities, just as with all democratic countries, charges municipal administrations with being the first to give various information and services, envisaging that people will participate in the decision-making process when it comes to cultural, environmental, health and other local issues. The mayors in return state that to be able to give those services, they must use Kurdish as it is spoken by the majority. They also point out that a certain segment of the population either doesn’t know Turkish at a necessary level or can’t speak it at all. It will probably be beneficial to allow the use of Kurdish in order to reach as much of society as possible for important issues such as, say, cleanliness. We deem it unnecessary to stress once again that the language is indispensable to cultural matters. Moreover, the European Human Rights Bill -- very applicable considering Turkey is a founding member of the European Council -- declares it a fundamental right of individuals to use their mother language and receive information in that language, making it compulsory to respect to this right.

As a consequence, we believe it is high time that Turkey starts implementing a truly modern democracy and leave behind the practice of finding an element of guilt in every Kurdish sentence written on a simple celebration card. Unless a line can be drawn between violence and terrorism and the exercising of fundamental rights such as communicating in one’s native tongue, people’s rights and the law will continue being vague concepts. Finding a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue is only possible with the supremacy of rights and law.

* Joost Lagendijk is a member of the European Parliament

5. - Reuters - "French move bodes ill for Turkey's EU hopes":

28 June 2007 / by Gareth Jones

France's move to block European Union negotiations with Turkey on economic and monetary policy could spell the beginning of the end for Turkey's hopes of full membership. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has long said Muslim Turkey does not belong in the EU, but Turkish diplomats had hoped he would prove more pragmatic after taking power in May, just as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, another Ankara foe, has done. Financial markets took the French move calmly and investors show no sign of losing their appetite for Turkish assets. But analysts say Turkey is economically and politically vulnerable if a perception grows that Turkey's EU bid is ultimately doomed.

"This is a crisis. We cannot pretend that it is business as usual. France is giving a clear signal it wants to redirect Turkey's EU talks, probably with Germany's complicity," said Cengiz Aktar, an EU expert at Istanbul's Bahcesehir University. "By doing this now, when Turkey is in a difficult election period, France is also showing it does not care what might happen in Turkey to the EU's image or to the pro-EU government."

Turkey elects a new parliament on July 22. The centre-right, Islamist-rooted AK Party, which secured the historic launch of EU membership talks in October 2005, is expected to remain the biggest party, but nationalists are also seen performing well. The EU extended talks to two new minor policy areas on Tuesday - statistics and financial control - but economic and monetary policy is politically much more significant.

Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan, who is also his country's chief EU negotiator, criticized the decision, reiterating Ankara's view it is technically ready for the talks. Analysts predict further blocking of negotiations by France and other sceptics, which will boost nationalists in Turkey and erode already declining Turkish public support for the EU.

"The December EU summit, when Sarkozy wants to review Turkey's candidacy, and 2008 look like being very difficult," said Ahmet Akarli, an economist at Goldman Sachs in London. "The markets are not pricing in the risks." Turkey's opponents say the country of 74 million people is too big, too poor and too culturally different to join the bloc. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan told Reuters last week he would speed up EU-linked reforms if re-elected next month. "But it takes two to tango. It will not be enough for one side to kick-start the process," said Aktar.

Turkey has always had a rocky, off-on relationship with the EU and has been at odds over many issues, including human rights, the role of the army and the divided island of Cyprus. But now two of the EU's biggest members, France and Germany, have leaders publicly opposed to Turkish membership. Many others from Austria to the Netherlands are hostile or sceptical. In another setback for Ankara, its strongest advocate in the EU, Britain's Tony Blair, will step down as prime minister on Wednesday. His successor, Gordon Brown, has other priorities and is not expected to plead Turkey's case as vigorously.

Few expect a complete suspension of Turkey's EU bid - this would need unanimity among 27 member states - but obstruction by just one country can trigger an effective freeze of talks. Analysts say they expect a re-elected AK Party to press on with monetary and fiscal policies that should help Turkey weather political turbulence sparked by its EU disputes. "But the EU anchor does matter," said Wolfango Piccoli, a Turkey expert at Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy.

"The incentive for reforms comes only from the EU. The EU's importance is all the greater now that Turkey's ($10 billion standby) deal with the IMF is due to expire next May. My concern is that inertia will end up prevailing. And Turkey is a country that cannot afford this. It needs annually to create one million jobs and to achieve seven percent growth (because of its rising population)," Piccoli said.

Some analysts saw the risks as more political than economic. Akarli said the EU accession process was driving the democratization of Turkish society, helping it to better manage deep-seated tensions over religion and ethnicity. The AK Party needs the EU to keep at bay powerful critics in the secular establishment, including the army, who accuse it of using the EU reforms as a screen to boost the role of religion. The army ousted a government it saw as too Islamist only 10 years ago. It recently intervened in a row over Turkey's presidential election, showing it remains a key political actor. "There are many layers of potential conflict and the EU anchor could help Turkey to reconcile them," said Akarli.

6. - Forum 18 - "TURKEY: What chance for religious freedom in Turkey's elections?":

28 June 2007 / by Dr. Otmar Oehring

Turkey is due to hold parliamentary elections on 22 July, which will have a crucial impact on the presidential election due in autumn. Both elections will strongly influence the chances of greater freedom of thought, conscience and belief, Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio notes. Turkish religious minorities Forum 18 News Service has spoken to are highly concerned about the outcome of the elections. For, as Dr Oehring observes in this personal commentary for Forum 18 , Turks who want to see genuine freedom of thought, conscience and religion have little expectation that either the parliamentary or presidential election will bring any improvement. No political party with any chance of gaining real power wants either to tackle the dangerous media intolerance of religious minorities or to take the dramatic changes necessary to usher in genuine religious freedom.

No Turkish presidential candidate has been found who is acceptable to both parliament and the "deep state," the nationalist circles in the army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police and state administration which regard themselves as the custodians of the Ataturkist legacy. Turkey is now due to hold parliamentary elections on 22 July, which may have crucial impact on the presidential election. A presidential election is due in autumn 2007, but no firm date for this has been set. At the time of the failed presidential election earlier this year, debate was fierce on what role Islam should play in the state. This debate remains unresolved, with both sides as far apart as ever.

Politicians have been preoccupied with the political crisis over the failure of parliament and the "deep state" to agree a new president, leaving President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to continue until a new candidate is agreed, most probably in September. No senior politicians have shown any interest in granting greater freedom of thought, conscience and belief to non-Muslim religious minorities. Debate has instead focused on whether the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a party in line with Turkey's interpretation of secularism.

Religious minorities face increasing threats of physical violence. Murders of religious minority leaders have been increasing – one Catholic priest in 2006 and three Protestants in April 2007. Turkish Christians have told Forum 18 that a key factor in these murders is the overt intolerance of non-Muslim minorities promoted by the media – and that unless this is tackled, more murders will take place. Politicians have made no serious attempt to tackle this serious threat to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The one major religious minority that has not suffered violence or been excluded from the political process are the Alevi Muslims, who make up about 20 per cent of the population. However, they have faced discrimination over recent years and their right to be accepted as a religious community independent of the state-run Sunni Muslim majority community has never been accepted by the Turkish state.

Several political parties of differing views are trying to recruit Alevis as candidates in the forthcoming election. The governing AKP has tried to entice leading members of the Cem Foundation, the Alevi body closest to the government, to become candidates. Most of the main parties view the Alevis not as a religious minority whose right to religious freedom should be respected, but as a source of votes.

The optimism that many in Turkey and Europe had in 2006 and earlier that the political establishment was ready to begin tackling the discrimination against non-Muslim minorities has disappeared. Why has nothing happened?

It could be because of the election campaign – no-one has the time or the interest to promote the rights of people in religious minorities. Even AKP politicians, who might be in favour of EU accession despite the freedoms for non-Muslim communities this may bring, see EU accession – if it happens - as taking place in the distant future. During the election campaign the AKP has behaved as nationalistically as other parties, so it will not commit itself to doing anything for non-Muslim minorities. These are seen by many Turks – and are depicted in the mass media - as traitors or as alien people in Turkey.

Religious minorities Forum 18 has spoken to are highly concerned about what the outcome of the parliamentary elections will be – and about who will also take over as President. This is because the outcome of the elections will be a major factor in determining the chances of greater freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Turkey. Opinion polls currently put the AKP ahead of the other parties. Indeed, all the major parties likely to get seats in the new parliament are nationalistic, with varying levels of hostility to non-Muslims.

If the AKP wins the parliamentary elections, this could mean that it held two-thirds of seats in parliament, which would give it the power to pass changes to the Constitution in an Islamist direction. Whoever becomes the President might veto these changes, which makes the election of a new President another major factor in determining the chances of greater freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Turkey.

The way the new President will be elected has proved highly controversial. According to the law passed by parliament with AKP backing on 31 May 2007, this should be by popular vote but President Sezer rejected this. With parliament and president at a stand-off, the issue is now to be put to a referendum, though no date has been set. If the AKP wins the parliamentary elections, they will probably present Abdullah Gül again as their candidate for President. If an AKP candidate is elected President, this would allow the AKP to introduce constitutional changes, in the knowledge that an AKP President would not veto them. Nobody however knows what the army and wider "deep state" would do, if that happened.

The "deep state" has a well-known commitment to "defending" the Ataturkist "secularist" heritage, as it sees it. And in Turkey, "secularism" means Islam being a branch of the state and no other religious community – including Muslim minorities – having legal status as a religious community.

When the army General Staff issued a statement in late April 2007 defending Turkey's "secular" system and describing itself as the "absolute defender of secularism" this was interpreted as a "cold coup". However, it was also a sign of its weakness – it seems the army no longer felt able to launch a real coup. The AKP government led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan merely carried on as before. It presents itself as no longer being afraid of anyone and ready to do what it wants without looking over its shoulder.

In reality, Erdogan has shown that he has heard the army's warning that it wants to decide on matters it considers vital for Turkey. On two occasions Erdogan stated that politicians would not oppose the army, if it decided to invade Iraq. After stating this for the first time, he denied saying it – but then said it again. Erdogan has also indicated that his fellow politicians would not oppose other decisions of the army leadership.

The mass demonstrations against the AKP in April and May 2007 did not necessarily show that large parts of the population wanted Turkey to become more open and democratic. Many of the demonstrators were supporters of rival parties, some of them just as nationalist in outlook as the AKP. Indeed, it seems the Republican People's Party (CHP) stirred up many of the protests. Party members see themselves as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's heirs, even if it is doubtful that he would recognise them as such.

Some of the protest organisers and demonstrators certainly did want Turkey to be less nationalist and more open and democratic, including the small minority who want Turkey to have genuine freedom of thought, conscience and belief. But those who demonstrated consisted of people who had no one unified goal: old Kemalists who are anti-EU and xenophobic to varying degrees; secularists who are afraid of any Islamist project; intellectuals who do not share a Kemalist worldview; anti-AKP and anti-Islamist Westernisers.

Turkey's Western-oriented intellectuals think that if Turkey continues with negotiations over EU accession, this will not only benefit them but will help promote democratic change. However, they are acutely aware that they are becoming an ever dwindling minority.

If the AKP does take over both the parliament and the presidency, it is still unknown how it will behave. Will it go down the Islamist road or carry on with the European project? It seems that Erdogan and his current foreign minister (and AKP presidential candidate) Abdullah Gul have both moved away from their Islamist background. Yet this still remains unknown. And even if the AKP does not take over the parliament and presidency, the majority of those who oppose the AKP are – apart from the true democrats - mainly xenophobic nationalists.

If other parties come to power in the elections, the already tight controls and restrictions on religious minorities (and indeed on Islam) are highly unlikely to be loosened. The other parties are more nationalistic than the AKP and so even less willing to do anything to improve conditions for non-Muslim minorities. If they were willing to ease the restrictions on non-Muslim minorities, there would be pressure for them to also loosen the subordination in law and practice of Islam to the state. These parties certainly do not want this.

The AKP has done little practical to help non-Muslim communities since it came to power But some in Turkey, including the head of the Armenian Church, Patriarch Mesrop, still see a new AKP government - theoretically committed to pursuing the EU application - as the only hope within Turkish politics for even slight improvements.

Those Turks who want to see genuine freedom of thought, conscience and religion have little expectation that either the parliamentary or presidential election will bring any improvement. No political party with any chance of gaining real power wants either to tackle the dangerous media intolerance of religious minorities or to take the dramatic changes necessary to usher in genuine religious freedom.

- Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio, a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

More analyses and commentaries on religious freedom in Turkey can be found at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?query=&religion=all&country=68

Dr. Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio <http://www.missio.de>, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.