12 June 2007

1. "Funerals of soldiers killed by Kurds turns into anti-government protests", many Turks are becoming increasingly angry over the mounting military death toll from attacks by Kurdish rebels, some of whom are believed to be launching incursions from across the border in northern Iraq.

2. "Iraqi cleric warns Turkey against Kurdish bombardments", powerful Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Sunday warned Turkey over its bombardments of Iraqi villages in the northern region of Kurdistan aimed at flushing out Kurdish rebels.

3. "Army Calls for Mass Reaction to 'Terror'", after the "e-warning" of 27 April this year, the General Staff has again published a controversial article on its website. Again late at night, and this time the website called on the "noble Turkish people" to take part in a "mass reflex against terror".

4. "Turkey Prepares for Battle - with Iraq?", another potential war could be brewing in Iraq. For weeks, Turkey has been building up its military presence on its south-eastern border with Iraq.

5. "Bombing in Turkey: Usual Suspects or Military Action?", a small bomb detonated in the Bakirkoy district of Istanbul, Turkey, on June 10, injuring at least 14 people. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, though the bombing bears the earmarks of the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), a separatist splinter group that most often attacks during the summer months.

6. "Turkey: A Struggle Between the Old and New Centers?", the principal threat to democracy in Turkey comes not from the Islamic-tied Justice and Development Party but from its secular opponents.

1. - AP - "Funerals of soldiers killed by Kurds turns into anti-government protests":

ANKARA / 11 June 2007

Many Turks are becoming increasingly angry over the mounting military death toll from attacks by Kurdish rebels, some of whom are believed to be launching incursions from across the border in northern Iraq.

The three soldiers a lieutenant colonel, a major and a private were killed Saturday in an attack in the southeastern province of Sirnak and were buried in separate funerals in Istanbul, Ankara and Manisa.

Thousands attended the ceremonies, carrying Turkish flags, shouting anti-government slogans and booing ministers and other government officials who were present. Military officials were greeted with applause.

Relations between the Islamic-rooted government and the military, the self-declared guardian of Turkey's secular ideals, are already tense over the role of Islam in politics. The government called general elections for July 22 to defuse the dispute.

In Ankara, an estimated 10,000 gathered in and around the city's largest mosque for the funeral of Maj. Ramazan Armutcuoglu, shouting: "government resign!" as ministers, including Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul arrived. Police prevented a group from approaching Kursad Tuzmen, the trade minister. In Manisa protesters booed Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc. The protesters also denounced the United States, Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.

The guerrillas have recently stepped up attacks and many in the country are growing frustrated with the government's perceived inability to convince the United States and Iraqi Kurds to crackdown on the rebels in Iraq. The United States is reluctant to engage in a conflict against the rebels in northern Iraq one of that country's most stable areas.

Guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, have killed at least dozens of soldiers or pro-government village guards in several attacks since May 24. More than dozens of soldiers have also been wounded. The latest was a soldier killed in fighting late Sunday in the province of Erzincan.

Turkish troops have killed 25 guerrillas during the same period, according to a count by the military, which has launched several offensives inside Turkey and has massed troops along the border with Iraq. The military last week also established "temporary security zones" in several areas close to the border with Iraq amid increasing activity there.

A human rights official on Monday expressed concern about civilians in areas of conflict.

2. - AFP - "Iraqi cleric warns Turkey against Kurdish bombardments":

NAJAF / 10 June 2007

Powerful Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Sunday warned Turkey over its bombardments of Iraqi villages in the northern region of Kurdistan aimed at flushing out Kurdish rebels.

"We will not be silent in front of this threat," the cleric warned in a statement issued by his office in the holy city of Najaf.

Vowing to defend the people of Kurdistan, Sadr called on the people of Turkey to stop their armed forces from carrying out cross-border shellings in Iraq.

"We are ready to mediate with Turkey to end this crisis. Turkish people have to reject such actions and help to stamp out the fire between the two Muslim nations," Sadr said.

"I hope Turkey will not repeat such bombardments of Iraqi territory. It has no right to do it."

Sadr commands the Mahdi Army, a militia of tens of thousands of young, impoverished Shiites, who are accused of spearheading a sectarian conflict against Iraq's minority Sunnis.

On Saturday, Iraq lodged an official complaint with Turkey claiming it had bombarded the northern Kurdish region.

A Kurdish security official told AFP that Turkish forces had shelled villages in the northern Dohuk province of Iraq early Saturday to flush out rebels from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Turkey says the PKK, whose two-decade-old insurgency in eastern and southeastern Turkey has claimed more than 37,000 lives, is acting under the protection of Iraqi Kurds of Kurdistan.

Violence increased with the spring thaw as rebels hiding in the rugged mountains of northern Iraq slipped back across the border to attack Turkish troops, effectively ending a unilateral ceasefire the PKK declared in October 2006.

Turkey maintains a 1,500-strong troop presence several kilometres (miles) inside Iraq to try to stem the flow of PKK fighters across the mountainous 384-kilometre (240-mile) border.

It has repeatedly demanded tougher action from Iraq and the United States against the rebels and refuses to rule out acting unilaterally if its demands are not heeded.

3. - Bianet - "Army Calls for Mass Reaction to 'Terror'":

After the "e-warning" of 27 April this year, the General Staff has again published a controversial article on its website. Again late at night, and this time the website called on the "noble Turkish people" to take part in a "mass reflex against terror".

ANKARA / 11 June 2007

In a press statement published on its website in the night from 7 June to 8 June, the Turkish General Staff has commented on 'terrorism' in Turkey. "The Turkish Armed Forces expect the noble Turkish people to show a mass reflex against terrorist activities". Like the "e-coup" of 27 April, this statement carried no signature, was published at night and on the Internet.

In the statement the readers were reminded that as early as 12 April 2007, the Chief of General Staff Yasar Büyükanit had predicted an escalation of terror in May 2007, and claimed that current events had proven him right.

The statement also denounced people and organizations who were using shared human values such as peace, freedom and democracy both abroad and at home as a smoke screen for 'terrorist organizations'.

"Unshakeable determination"

The statement continued by saying that "the Turkish Republic's national and unitary structure is faced with an attitude which considers this structure to be outmoded. Our nation needs to recognize this dangerous attitude." Recent 'terrorist' events were cited as proof for this attitude.

The General Staff reiterated its "unshakeable determination" to fight against terror.

Militarist discourse being strengthened

In an evaluation of the Internet statement, political analyst Kenan Kalyon claimed that as well as an escalation of violence, there was a militarist discourse growing in strength. He called on not only pacifists, but "everone in their right mind" to resist as follows:

* A democratic election process needed to be safeguarded in July

* Military operations in Northern Iraq should be opposed openly.

* The hegemony of civil politics and democracy needed to be defended.

Not only PKK considered a threat

According to Kalyon, the army now sees not only the PKK but a "united Kurdish area" as a threat, with the government of Iraqi Kurdistan as a focal point.

He also commented on the end of the PKK ceasefire, saying that the army was never held to account for not ending its operations during the ceasefire period.

Reactions to General Staff

Human rights activists and parties of the left have reacted strongly against the internet statement of the General Staff.

The Human Rights Common Platform (IHOP) said that the press release targeted democracy and human rights activists. Furthermore, it evaluated the call for a "mass reflex" as an incitement to lynching and other attacks.

The IHOP also asked: "If the army was aware of an escalation of terrorist attacks, why did it do nothing to prevent them?" and questioned how proponents of democracy, freedom and peace had ever hindered the "war on terror".

Increase in nationalism

Kemal Okuyan, General Secretary of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) also feared an escalation of lynching attempts and violence. He deplored the increase in nationalism among both Turks and Kurds. He called on the General Staff to retract its statement.

4. - CBN News - "Turkey Prepares for Battle - with Iraq?":

BAMARNY / 11 June 2007 / By George Thomas

Another potential war could be brewing in Iraq. For weeks, Turkey has been building up its military presence on its south-eastern border with Iraq.

Turkey has accused Iraq and the U.S. military of failing to crack down on a rebel group that is taking refuge in Northern Iraq.

Click the player to watch George Thomas' report from northern Iraq and Pat Robertson's comments concerning the possibility of an independent Kurdish state.

Preparing For War

Some Iraqi Kurdish villages near the Turkish border are preparing for war.

In the small community of Barmany, home to about 15,000 Kurds last 30 to 40 days have been a nerve-racking experience for the residents of the small community.

That is because about 30 miles to the northeast the nation of Turkey has been massing thousands of troops along the Iraqi-Turkish border, threatening to launch attacks inside Iraq.

They have been chasing the PKK, a group that has been labeled by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization.

The PKK is a Kurdish group fighting for a separate Kurdish nation in southeast Turkey. They are believed to be using the mountains in northern Iraq to hide, plan, and launch their attacks.

In recent weeks, Turkey's military struck back, reportedly hitting several Kurdish rebel positions inside Iraq.

Since 1995, the Turks have maintained some 1,500 troops several miles inside Iraq to try to stop the PKK fighters from crossing the border into Turkey.

In Bamarny, also home to some 300 Turkish soldiers, there is growing anger at the foreigners.

Turkey To America: "Help Us"

One resident said, "Every day we are rebuilding our country and trying to make us stronger. Here now come the Turks from the North trying to destroy our dream of having our own homeland."

Another resident said, "America, you have been our friends in the past. Please help us now as we face the threat from the Turks."

But that would mean putting an overstretched U.S. military in the middle of a fight between two crucial U.S. allies: the Turks and the Iraqi Kurds.

On Sunday, the governor of a major province, Dhouk, close to the Turkish border, called for diplomacy and not war.

"The United States has a close relationship with Turkey, so we are asking the U.S. to step in and talk to the Turks and ask them to cool things down," he said.

If not, some analysts warn that a major military operation by the Turks in northern Iraq could spark a series of regional wars.

All of this is being watched very closely by the United States because the last thing they need is for war to open up on the northern front of Iraq.

5. - Stratfor - "Bombing in Turkey: Usual Suspects or Military Action?":

11 June 2007

A small bomb detonated in the Bakirkoy district of Istanbul, Turkey, on June 10, injuring at least 14 people. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, though the bombing bears the earmarks of the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), a separatist splinter group that most often attacks during the summer months.

Regardless of the perpetrator, however, the attack plays directly into the hands of the Turkish military and the country's ultra-secularist political forces, which can point to the incident as further proof of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party's failure to bring Kurdish militants under control. The blast, therefore, will intensify the struggle between the AK and its opponents ahead of the planned July 22 general election.

The improvised explosive device (IED), which was planted under a bench, reportedly detonated around 3:30 p.m. local time near shops in the Bakirkoy district, on Istanbul's European side. The device appeared to be a percussion bomb, an IED intended to create a loud noise -- and thus send a message. Because they do not have added shrapnel, percussion bombs are not necessarily meant to kill or maim. Most of the victims were injured by shards of flying glass from store windows.

The attack was similar to other bombings carried out by the TAK, an offshoot of Turkey's main militant group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has led a separatist movement from the Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey since 1984. The TAK, which carried out its first attacks in summer 2005, most often places small bombs in tourist towns along Turkey's Mediterranean and Aegean coasts, as well as in Istanbul. Although a few deaths have resulted, the TAK bombs are not meant to claim mass casualties, but rather to damage Turkey's tourism industry, which brings in billions of dollars to state coffers each year. During its first summer in action, the TAK carried out four attacks; in 2006, the group carried out nine between June and August.

The Istanbul bombing comes less than three weeks after a May 22 suicide bombing at a shopping center in Turkey's capital, Ankara. Turkish authorities blamed the PKK for that attack, which killed eight people, but the group has denied involvement. Typically, both the PKK and its splinter group claim responsibility for their bombings within a few days.

Fighting between the Turkish military and PKK militants has increased in eastern Turkey in recent months, with both sides suffering casualties. There is some possibility, therefore, that the bombing was the work of the military, which could use the incident to strengthen its case for an armed incursion into northern Iraq, where it believes the PKK receives sanctuary and support.

With these factors in play, any bombing in Turkey this summer will more profoundly affect domestic politics than last summer's attacks, since Turkey's security apparatus will want to blame any bombings on Kurdish groups or jihadists in order to undermine the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of the elections.

Given the approaching elections and the increased fighting between the Turkish military and the PKK, tensions already are high in Turkey. If the TAK has indeed kicked off its annual bombing campaign, the situation will only get worse.

6. - Alternet - "Turkey: A Struggle Between the Old and New Centers?":

The principal threat to democracy in Turkey comes not from the Islamic-tied Justice and Development Party but from its secular opponents.

11 June / by By Dogu Ergil*, MIT Center for International Studies

Mass demonstrations in late April brought out hundreds of thousands of people in Ankara and perhaps a million people one week later in Istanbul, an awesome scene on both occasions. Demonstrations of lesser scale are underway in smaller cities like Canakkale and Manisa-a trend to continue until early elections scheduled for July 22. The demonstrations were comprised of mainly women and middle-class urban people who chanted their allegiance to secularism and a modern way of life, which they believed to be endangered by the religious leanings of the incumbent government. But is this a legitimate fear?

The same government, led by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP), has been in place since its electoral victory in 2002 and no substantial alteration took place in the basic tenets of the regime. Now, with the prospect of the election of the first Turkish president from this party, anxieties are high. The fear that such a danger is imminent has to be sociologically accounted for.

Fear and Loathing in the Old Center

Looking at the banners carried by the crowds at the demonstrations, one can see considerable resentment against the United States and the European Union. This could be indicative of the frustration of the Turkish middle classes, which feel left out of the global process. If so, their wrath is misguided because it is the AKP that has brought Turkey closer to western organizations and legal and economic standards than any "secular" government in recent Turkish history.

Then could it be a power struggle between the new center and the old center? Indeed the AKP has been instrumental in conveying peripheral social groups to the political and economic center in recent years. In contrast, the old and mainly bureaucratic center became obsolete and increasingly dysfunctional because they could not read internal and global changes. Now, the old center wants to gain back its hold on politics as well as its waning privileged position. Within this context, the old center perceived a great danger to its power and privilege (you can read this as "raison d'etre") and took the opportunity to exert itself through the military manifesto (the veiled threats of the strong military to intervene again in politics to prevent AKP from electing a president) and drawing on the fears of the middle class, which feels unrepresented, unguided, and increasingly uninfluential in politics. For the old center, which identifies itself as "secularists," monopolization of all state positions (presidency of the parliament, the prime minister, and the presidency of the republic) by AKP was too much. The AKP has a majority in the parliament and the prime ministry; only the post of president of the republic remains unattained.

The demonstrations that have mobilized considerable urban masses supported by the declaration of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) made three things unequivocally clear:

1) The AKP may have the parliamentary majority but it draws on a minority popu- lar support that has been artificially inflated because of the flawed election system. A party that does not gain 10 percent of the vote is not represented in parliament, and this election threshold not only squanders an enormous amount of votes (45 percent overall in the latest election) but also adds more weight to the proportionate gains of those parties that surpass the threshold.

2) Drawing on this exaggerated gain, the AKP had translated its electoral success to having two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Given the constitutional rule that the parliament elects the president, the AKP came to the brink of adding the presi- dency to its spoils. They would have controlled the legislature, the government (executive) and if they had acquired the presidency (who selects members of high courts and the board of higher education as well), they could not be stopped or chal- lenged. Because parliament elects the president, AKP would take complete control of the state apparatus. Given the weakness of civil society and the incomplete division of powers, there would be no way of containing the "onslaught" of the "Islamist" party.

3) It is no secret that the AKP started out representing the conservative peripheral social cohorts. Religiosity is at the core of conservatism. When AKP moved to the center by means of the electoral process, religiosity and symbols associated with it- like the head scarf-became more visible in the public sphere. This visibility was met with panic by the old center and charged as a danger to the secular regime. None of the old guard explained or asked themselves where these people came from.

Some of the AKP members displayed childish power wielding, making rash statements like "democracy is not an end but only a means" or "secularism must be debated" in the early phases of their public appearance. This was enough to keep them under surveillance and to fuel the fears of the secular urban classes. The AKP government did nothing significant to kindle this suspicion except perhaps appointing like-minded officials to important government posts and uttering sporadic statements like, "a president must be democratic, bipartisan and religious." But then every government in Turkey has been accused of partisanship and nepotism.

For these reasons, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's most powerful and popular politician, could not break through the widespread opposition (including bureaucratic officials) to be a presidential candidate. Instead he nominated Abdullah Gul, the current minister of foreign affairs whose candidacy was also challenged by the military for the same reasons. An amiable person and a successful foreign minister, he had a better chance than most candidates of all leanings.

Two things sparked the public uproar. One was the Turkish military, which has always seen itself as the guardian of the secular system in Turkey and intervened with no concern to democratic principles. For the military, the "integrity" of the state was more important than democracy. Ironically, democracy is perceived equally instrumental by TAF as the putative challengers of the secular system.

Another reason was the way in which Gul was announced as a candidate-no prior consultation with other political forces was pursued, nor was his name popularly sounded. The AKP left the nomination of the presidential candidate to its leader, Prime Minister Erdogan. He exercised this unorthodox prerogative as virtually choosing the next president.

The Deeper Issues

Now that the political crisis created around the presidential elections has been halted by calling for early national elections, we can analyze what happened in Turkey as a shining example of reconciling a predominantly Muslim population with a secular state. An alternative question may be: How easily could forces, which have no political accountability to the electorate, interrupt the democratic process?

These questions gained urgency especially after the two mass demonstrations and the threatening memorandum of the army, which made it obvious that the generals will not tolerate the AKP's full grip on the state apparatus if the party elects the president. This means, no matter how democratic the election process is and how diligently legal procedures are abided by, the army as the voice of the secular establishment is not willing to tolerate a president elected by the AKP that is suspected of harboring a fundamentalist agenda and waiting for an opportune time to implement it. Otherwise, in a fully mature democracy where souls and minds would not be so polluted, the election of the candidate of the AKP would be a foregone conclusion.

Is this really a concrete danger to the secular way of life? This way of life has not actually been directly challenged by the AKP in its four-year government. Or is the current tension due to the power struggle between the elected and the appointed? The bureaucracy in Turkey has always felt to be the self-appointed protector of the state, which is mainly defined by two tenets: republican and secular. If even the theocratic regime of Iran is a republic, then it is not the republic that is under threat.

If less than 10 percent (in fact 9 percent) of the populace see the sharia law as a better legal system and a government that has adopted it as a better way of governance, as a 2006 survey (by the think tank, TESEV) indicated, there can be no near and clear danger in this respect as well. Then signs and symbols of religious preferences such as the turban, piety, and religious rhetoric are conveniently used as bogeys to scare the whole nation for an imminent takeover of fundamentalists. Could this be a cunning excuse to "call in the cavalry" to save the endangered nation, or a privileged position in the social hierarchy that is otherwise waning?

More seriously, can it be a coincidence that following the statements of the highest ranking public figures of this country (the president and the chief of the general staff), which warned us that the republic has never been in so much danger, the military refused to accept the results of a presidential election that will end with an AKP member becoming the next president of the republic? Fortunately, the US government and the EU have both issued statements of support for the democratic process and cautioned the army to stay out of politics. Such a firm message should also be delivered privately to the General Staff.

There are other critical questions to be considered. The election laws, with their 10 percent election threshold, which leaves out 45 percent of the electorate and exaggerates the gains of the winner, was the doing of the Consultative Assembly, which was handpicked by the military junta after its 1980 coup. It is the same Assembly under the watchful eyes of the generals that laid out the procedures for electing the president of the republic and codified the Party Law that created satrapies rather than the democratic institutions, which would have been the midwife of a full fledged pluralist democracy. Now the same institution that has led to so much regime damage is rejecting the outcome of the laws of its own making. Ironically, those demonstrating on the streets look up to this institution as their savior to ward off anti-secular forces, which are made to believe threaten their lifestyles.

There are some fanatics and fundamentalist around who threaten people with their obscurantist deeds and rhetoric. But how big is this group? Moreover, who has put an end to elective religious training in the middle-level school system? Unfortunately it was the choice of the military to initiate obligatory religious education in junior and high schools as a bulwark against the growing leftist movement that was the bogey of the Cold War era. It is now the same institution that is complaining about encroachment of religion on the secular way of life.

The more conservative, parochial, and peripheral groups found their way to the political and economic center by AKP's (and its predecessors like Refah/Welfare Party's) success in government. By and large they found a voice and a place for themselves in the system. They used a different vocabulary and acted different. For those secularist demonstrators of middle and upper middle-class people, their political parties and leaders became dysfunctional and obsolete, and have failed. This time around the more modern urban classes feel that they are devoid of representation, leadership, and a political party or platform that can offer them a future they can believe in. That is why their protest misses the target, because the AKP is not the reason for their insecurity but merely the lucky winner of the system that the masses protest for not representing them and endangering their way of life. That is why the principal threat to democracy in Turkey comes not from the AKP but from its opponents.

Now we can expect the healing effect of the national elections. We can only hope that it will be accompanied by the election of the president by popular vote and under the guidance of a new constitution that will not allow extra-legal and extra-democratic forces to intervene in the will of the populace any more.

* Dogu Ergil is professor of political science at Ankara University, and a frequent commentator on Turkish affairs. He is most recently coauthor of Terror, Insurgency and the State (Penn Press).