3
July 2007
2. "Turkey has prepared plans to strike into N Iraq: Gul", Egemen Bagis, the foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said Sunday that Turkey did not need to seek the approval of anyone if it deemed a military intervention into northern Iraq necessary.
3. "Trial of Turkish-Armenian journalist's murder opens amid protests", eighteen suspects went on trial here Monday for the January murder of ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, which sparked fears of rising nationalist and anti-minority violence in Turkey.
4. "AK Party, DTP-affiliated independents vie in eastern Anatolian provinces", the Kurds are more unified than ever in support of the independent candidates. Whereas some hold that this tendency will be the end of the PKK, others assert that the July 22 elections will be the initial phase for the politicization of the rebel organization.
5. "Kurds rely on Turkey for workers, goods", grrowing tensions between Turkey and Kurds in control of northern Iraq belie a deepening cooperation, as Turkish companies, workers and goods flock to a market enriched by 17 percent of Iraq's oil revenues.
6. "Kurds advance plan to increase oil and gas production", the semi-autonomous government in northern Iraq will offer 40 oil and natural gas blocks for exploration as part of plans to increase daily output to one million barrels in the next five years.
1. - The Daily Star - "Backing the wrong horse in Turkey":
3 July 2007 / by Howard Eissenstat
At first glance, it seems hard to fathom the logic of recent American policy in Turkey. Not for the first time, the United States has chosen to back anti-democratic forces against an elected and popular government. This time around, however, the choice seems at odds with both America's narrow strategic interests and its broader ideals.
On one side is a popularly elected government deeply committed to increased integration with the European Union and the liberal political reforms that this entails; that has shown remarkable - even unprecedented - successes in economic reform; that has shown a willingness to reach out to Kurdish moderates as it fights militants of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the southeast and Kurdish attacks in the cities; and that has demonstrated a clear understanding of political realities and American strategic concerns as it has lobbied for more direct action against the PKK in northern Iraq.
On the other side is a military establishment that seems progressively more volatile. It is a military establishment that has long-since given up on political reform and, indeed, seems to have largely concluded that the promise of EU membership is merely a clever ruse by Turkey's enemies to weaken the military's hold on power and perhaps to destroy the country entirely. It is a military establishment that reacts to criticism with threats, veiled and unveiled, hinting at the possibility at a military coup and that charges journalists who have the temerity to investigate corruption and misuse of power. Most recently, successive raids on Nokta, one of Turkey's most well-established and respected news magazines, resulted in the magazine being closing down and two of Turkey's most respected journalists finding themselves in the dock.
The military's "strategy" in the face of Kurdish unrest is an iron fist in Turkey and the broadening of the war into northern Iraq, even at the cost of Turkey's 52-year alliance with the US. Indeed, with surprising regularity, in speeches and newspaper interviews, former generals wonder aloud about the possibility of a general realignment of Turkey's foreign policy and an alliance with Russia or Iran - countries that would, presumably, be less demanding when it comes to political reform in Turkey. Implausible as these scenarios might be, they point to both the hubris and panic of an old guard that has started losing its grip on power.
Given this tableau, it would seem clear that it is both strategically and morally appropriate for the US to voice its support for the elected government and declare strongly that the military must remain where it belongs: out of public debates and in the barracks. There are two reasons that Washington has not done so. The first is simple inertia: ties between American officialdom and the Turkish military establishment are long-standing and deep. At the same time, American relations with the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party are recent and have been marred by misunderstandings and clumsiness on both sides.
The most important factor, however, is that many in the US government apparently cannot bring themselves to trust a government with Islamist roots, even when that Islamism is self-consciously and consistently framed in the context of a democratic and secular state.
The costs of this policy are diverse and far-reaching. Perversely, America finds itself shunning a version of political Islam that it has often argued in favor of elsewhere: a model that emphasizes the liberal and tolerant traditions within Islam and does not see the divide between East and West as significant or even particularly relevant.
In taking such a position, Washington finds itself effectively supporting undemocratic and retrograde elements within Turkey against a popular and largely successful government, while giving courage to an interventionist military elite whose political allies, by all accounts, will fare even more poorly in the coming election than they did in the last. American policy thereby increases the possibility of a tragic and self-destructive coup d'etat. Even within the cold framework of realpolitik, this policy makes little sense: the Turkish military establishment has responded to the crisis in Iraq with a panic that could plunge the country into war, that could unravel the only part of the American occupation that could be reasonably described as a "success," and that heightens the risk of the Iraqi conflict metastasizing into a wider regional conflict. The Turkish moves are both morally and politically wrong.
The AK Party is not a perfect ally. It has made a fair share of strategic mistakes and, like any "big tent" party, represent a diverse set of ideas, not all of which can be seen as either "democratic" or "liberal." That being said, the party leadership has done more to liberalize and democratize Turkey than any government since Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast, the military and its allies seem to have run out of ideas, relying increasingly on scare tactics, base populism, and a brittle and violent nationalism as keys to maintaining power.
Between the two, it is clear where American ideals and interests lie. Unfortunately, the weight of Washington's support appears to be pulling in the opposite direction.
* Howard Eissenstat is an assistant professor of Middle
Eastern history at Seton Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey.
He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR. 
2. - NTV/MSNBC - "Turkey has prepared plans to strike into N Iraq: Gul":
Egemen Bagis, the foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said Sunday that Turkey did not need to seek the approval of anyone if it deemed a military intervention into northern Iraq necessary.
KAYSERI / 2 July 2007
Plans for a possible military strike into northern Iraq to hit at terrorist bases in the region have been prepared and approved by the government, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said Sunday. Haberin devami
Speaking in the central Anatolian city of Kayseri while campaigning for the July 22 general election, Gul said Turkey was keeping its options open in regard to a military intervention into northern Iraq.
“Anything is possible in regard to a cross-border operation into north of Iraq,” Gul said.
All plans and programs for a possible cross-border operation have been prepared by the Turkish General Staff and have been approved by the government, he said.
“Mr Prime Minister has approved all plans of a would
be cross-border operation,” said Gul.
3. - AFP - "Trial of Turkish-Armenian journalist's murder opens amid protests":
ISTANBUL / 2 July 2007 / by Nicolas Cheviron
Eighteen suspects went on trial here Monday for the January murder of ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, which sparked fears of rising nationalist and anti-minority violence in Turkey.
The trial behind closed doors began as Dink's family said the procedure was flawed because it excludes security officials who knew as early as 2006 of plans to kill Dink, but failed to act.
Police in Istanbul and the northern city of Trabzon, home to most of the suspects, are responsible for "extremely grave mistakes and almost intentional negligence," family lawyer Ergin Cinmen said outside the courthouse.
The defendants "are just the tip of the iceberg," he said. "If public servants are not put on trial, the ruling will never satisfy justice and public conscience."
In an emotional written statements, Dink's widow Rakel and his brother Hosrof appealed to the court to shed light on the involvement of officials.
"Have the courage to challenge them... Let the justice of God work through you so that the trial may become a point of enlightenment for Turkey," Rakel said.
"This trial is between those who defend the legal system and those who claim they are the law and the state," Hosrof said. "It will be a turning point for Turkey if the trial sheds light on the truth."
As police sealed off the street leading to the courthouse, about 2,500 demonstrators, most of them dressed in black, gathered at a nearby square and unfurled a large banner that read: "We are all witnesses. We want justice."
"We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians," they chanted.
Dink, 52, a prominent member of Turkey's tiny Armenian minority, was gunned down on January 19 outside the offices of his bilingual Turkish-Armenian weekly Agos, in central Istanbul.
Although he campaigned for reconciliation, nationalists hated Dink for calling the killing hundreds of thousands of Armenians under Ottoman rule during World War I genocide, a label most Turks despise and Ankara officially rejects.
The suspected gunman, 17-year-old Ogun Samast, has admitted to shooting Dink because he was an "enemy of the Turks," the indictment says.
Samast faces 18 to 24 years for the murder and a further eight-and-a-half to 18 for belonging to a terrorist organisation.
The prosecution did not seek a life sentence because he is a minor, which is also why the trial is closed to the public.
Samast refused to speak at Monday's hearing, Dink family lawyer Fethiye Cetin told reporters.
Two other key figures -- Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel, both 26 -- are accused of leading the ultra-nationalist group Samast belonged to and masterminding the murder.
They could be jailed for life without the possibility of parole if found guilty.
The indictment says Tuncel was a police informer who twice told officials in 2006 that Hayal was plotting to kill Dink, but deliberately concealed the fact that someone else would pull the trigger because Tuncel himself was part of the plot.
Hayal had earlier served 11 months for the 2004 bombing in Trabzon of a McDonalds restaurant, in which six people were injured, to protest against the US-led invasion of Iraq.
He is also accused of threatening Turkey's 2006 Nobel Literature laureate Orhan Pamuk, who has also contested the official line on the Armenian killings.
Hayal and Tuncel traded accusations before the judge, lawyer Oguz Ugur Olca said.
Tuncel rejected any involvement in the murder, saying he was a simple informer who did his "duty" by tipping off the police about the plot.
Hayal said Tuncel masterminded both the Dink assassination and the McDonalds bombing; Tuncel called Hayal a "schizophrenic," Olca said.
The 15 other suspects face sentences of seven-and-a-half
to 35 years.
4. - Zaman - "AK Party, DTP-affiliated independents vie in eastern Anatolian provinces":
2 July 2007
Unlike the western districts, people in the East are excited by the election atmosphere. Religious and ethnic structure and identities seem to be the most important factors that will determine the election results in the eastern provinces of Erzurum and Kars.
Pre-election estimates indicate that the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has traditionally relied on a mixture of Alevi, Kurdish and social democrat bases, will suffer from loss of support in the upcoming elections because of its ultranationalist orientation. It is almost impossible to find a Kurdish voter willing to support the CHP. For this reason, analysts note that the race in the eastern part of Turkey will be between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Democratic Society Party (DTP)-affiliated independents.
Erzurum appears to be a city committed city to the rightist parties; the city electorate hasn't voted for a leftist candidate since the 1980 coup. That being said, the AK Party is criticized for nominating an "imported" candidate, Fazilet D. Çiglik, the party's transfer from Switzerland who will be the city's first female deputy in awhile if elected.
In the 2002 elections, the AK Party received the support of 54 percent -- winning all seven seats allotted to the district. For the voters of the city, what happened during the presidential elections was enough; they hold that preventing Abdullah Gül from becoming the president is an unfair indication of hostility to the headscarf and Islam.
In Erzurum, the MHP is the alternative to the AK Party because of dominant nationalist sentiments, yet the support bases of the two are not proportionate. Most voters predict that the MHP will form a coalition government with the CHP if the two win a fair number of seats. Considering the yet-to-be-officiated rapprochement between the MHP and the CHP, voters in Erzurum are hesitant to support the first despite its emphasis on nationalism.
Even the MHP members estimate that the party will be able to win two seats at most. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli promised to execute PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is currently serving life in prison. However, Bahçeli makes a condition of the execution being enough to form a single-party government. His messages do not include any original and concrete proposals or promises. Bahçeli's campaign seems to be based on strong opposition to Prime Minister Erdogan and a bitter nationalist discourse.
In consideration of the large Kurdish population in some districts of Erzurum, analysts note that the DTP-affiliated independent candidate Bedri Firat may become a deputy. Despite their preference for the conservative parties instead of pro-Kurdish parties in the past, the Kurds of Erzurum are determined this time to send Firat to Parliament. The chances of his election increase because of his relation to renowned Kurdish rebel Sheik Said, who was executed due to the insurgence he led against the republic.
Ethnic identity is determinative in Kars
Kars was a stronghold of the left prior to 1980; however the voting tendencies based on left-right distinction were replaced with references to ethnic identities and sectarian affiliation. It is almost certain that the Kurds, which constitute 40 percent of the population, will vote for the independent Mahmut Alinak.
The Turks are divided into two, maybe three parts. It seems that the AK Party's Kurdish candidate Zeki Karabayir will pull at least some of the Kurds from their unified bloc. The Turkish-Azeri population is divided as Azeris and Terekemes -- distinct groups in terms of religious affiliation. The distance between the two groups also affects their political preferences. Sunni-Terekemes will most likely vote for the MHP, with the remaining thought to prefer the AK Party. This analysis suggests that the AK Party, the MHP and the DTP will win one seat apiece.
In Erzurum and Kars, the Kurds are more unified than ever
in support of the independent candidates. Whereas some hold that this
tendency will be the end of the PKK, others assert that the July 22
elections will be the initial phase for the politicization of the rebel
organization.
5. - The Washington Times - "Kurds rely on Turkey for workers, goods":
IRBIL / 2 July 2007 / by Nicholas Birch
Growing tensions between Turkey and Kurds in control of northern Iraq belie a deepening cooperation, as Turkish companies, workers and goods flock to a market enriched by 17 percent of Iraq's oil revenues.
Stocked almost entirely with Turkish brands, upmarket Iraqi Kurdish supermarkets only differ from their counterparts north of the border in their taste for gaudy decoration.
Once the preserve of two-story family houses, the suburbs of Iraqi Kurdish cities are increasingly home to the high-rise blocks characteristic of Turkey.
"Turkey is by far and away our most important trading partner," says Aziz Ibrahim Abdo, general director at the Ministry of Trade in the Iraqi Kurdish capital Irbil. "You can see that by looking around you."
The statistics back him up, too. In Irbil, 380 out of 500 foreign companies are Turkish. In Dohuk, a city farther west, 65 percent of contracts worth about $350 million so far this year have gone to Turkish companies.
Worth another $350 million and $300 million, respectively, brand new airports in Irbil and Sulaimaniyah are Turkish products.
Another Turkish company won a $260 million bid to build a new university campus in Sulaimaniyah.
"The quality of Turkish work is good, and they're much more trustworthy than the Iranians," said Ibrahim Sofy, deputy head of Irbil's Chamber of Commerce.
The brisk trade and investment contrasts sharply with recent threats by Turkey to send its armed forces into northern Iraq to hunt down rebels seeking their own state in southeastern Turkey.
The militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has staged a violent campaign against Turkey since the late 1970s, in which more than 30,000 people have been killed.
Turkey says PKK is conducting raids inside Turkey from hidden bases in northern Iraq.
Turkish trade with Iraq reached $3 billion in 2006 and "could top $5 billion this year," Turkey's trade minister, Kursad Tuzmen, told about 500 Turkish and Iraqi businessmen at an Iraqi trade fair last month.
Much of that money is flowing to Turkey's mainly Kurdish southeast, a region impoverished by two decades of war against separatist Kurds.
"This border is our lifeline," says Abdulkadir Sir, a taxi driver who used to make a living as a smuggler.
A builder from the Turkish Kurdish town of Bitlis, now in Irbil, Faysal Ozdemir is another one whose bank account has benefited.
"Back home, I'd be lucky to earn [$460] a month," he said. Here, he earns $2,000.
Qualified Turkish engineers working in northern Iraq can expect monthly salaries of at least $5,000, more than twice what they would earn in Turkey.
"It's hard being away from home, but the money makes it worthwhile," says Seyhmus Gurbuz, a waiter at one of the Turkish-run restaurants.
He's one of an estimated 15,000 Turkish citizens — most of them Kurds — working in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Not everything about the new Turkish-Kurdish economic relationship is rosy.
An Irbil resident for three years, Faysal Ozdemir estimates at least 10 percent of Turkish companies have left northern Iraq in the past month.
"All this talk of invasions scared them away,"
he says.
6. - Bloomberg - "Kurds advance plan to increase oil and gas production":
DUBAI / 1 July 2007
The semi-autonomous government in northern Iraq will offer 40 oil and natural gas blocks for exploration as part of plans to increase daily output to one million barrels in the next five years.
The Kurdistan Representative Government plans to organize conferences in London, Houston and Irbil, Iraq, to clarify the process, Ashti Hawrami, the regional minister for natural resources, said in a statement. Its Parliament must first ratify a new energy law, including a framework for oil production sharing agreements.
Iraq has been unable to pass a federal energy law because of regional disagreements over sharing oil export revenue and the role of the Iraqi National Oil in managing national oil resources. Iraq has an estimated 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third-largest in the world behind Saudi Arabia and Iran, according to BP.
"Last week an agreement was reached with Baghdad on the draft revenue sharing law, and secondly we have now resumed our discussions on the INOC and we are confident that this will be agreed on soon," Hawrami said.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdish leaders have pursued an independent energy policy and has awarded DNO, a Norwegian oil company, an exploration contract and the company, based in Oslo, started drilling in northern Iraq in November 2005.
As the rest of Iraq has plunged into a downward spiral, the Kurdish zone has had relative political stability and limited violence, in part owing to its sectarian and political homogeneity.