23
April 2007
1. "Amed Mayor's Kurdish Greeting Card Case Starts", pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party's (DTP) controversial Diyarbakir Mayor Osman Baydemir's trial regarding the greeting cards he sends in Kurdish to deputies, representatives of non-governmental organizations and citizens, started yesterday.
2. "Turkey at a Crossroads, as Always", there is no choice but to take the road to EU integration. It is the only way to bring freedom of expression, minority rights and democracy to Turkey. For Turkish-Armenians, too, it is crucial. The Kurdish issue is a very key one.
3. "Decision time looms for Erdogan in Turkey", Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey will decide this week whether to ignore pressure from the military and run for president, a move that could also hurt his party's chances in parliamentary elections and slow reforms urged by the EU.
4. "Turkish ruling party to announce candidate for next president this week", Turkey's ruling party will announce its candidate for president this week, with the prime minister saying that the choice will be a "surprise" after speculation he might run for the position himself.
5. "Turkish soldier killed in clash with Kurdish rebels", a Turkish soldier has been killed in a clash with rebels from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey, officials said Sunday.
6. "Turkey intensified PKK offensive near Iraq", Turkey has intensified its offensive against the Kurdish insurgency near the border with Iraq.
7. "Washington, Ankara face Kurdistan dilemma", any military action by Turkey in northern Iraq would significantly affect the political situation in the region.
8. "Fighting the Next War", Syria's economic weakness undermines the regime's political stability. Another factor undermining that stability is the restive Kurdish minority in northeast Syria. The Kurds, who comprise twenty percent of Syria's overall population, already staged an uprising against the regime in May 2004.
1. - The New Anatolian - "Amed Mayor's Kurdish Greeting Card Case Starts":
ANKARA / 20 April 2007
Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party's (DTP) controversial Diyarbakir Mayor Osman Baydemir's trial regarding the greeting cards he sends in Kurdish to deputies, representatives of non-governmental organizations and citizens, started yesterday.
The court ruled to discontinue the case on grounds that permission was not taken from the Interior Ministry to put Baydemir on trial.
Baydemir stated that he has been sending greeting cards written in English, Turkish and Kurdish as well to citizens, politicians and representatives of institutions since 2004.
Claiming that the criminal charge he faced was prepared with the spirit of 1926, Baydemir stated that things have been changed in 80 years. "Filing a suit because of a cultural activity, a gesture is quite meaningful," said Baydemir. "The law regarding the acceptance of Turkish letters rooted back to 1926 and set out the transition from Arabic letters to Latin letters. There is no passage or expression concerning Kurdish in the law."
Baydemir stated that neither in national or international law is there an article banning the use of Kurdish. "People using or spreading their mother language is quite natural," he said. "Sending cards also to those who don't know Kurdish was just a cultural gesture to show that our country has such cultural richness. Using Kurdish in greeting cards, billboards and meetings shouldn't be interpreted as putting Turkish aside."
Diyarbakir mayor claimed that the fundamental problem is the use of "W" letter. "According to the law, using letter "W" is not a crime. When you enter the website of the Justice Ministry they use "W" as well," said Baydemir.
The court decided to send the case to Diyarbakir Chief Public Prosecutor's Office.
Joost Lagendijk, co-chair of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliament Commission, Diyarbakir's Sur Mayor Abdullah Demirtas and Kayapinar Mayor Zulkuf Karatekin followed the trial.
"Such court cases violate the spirit of the reforms
legislated by the Turkish Parliament," Lagendijk later told reporters.
2. - Znet - "Turkey at a Crossroads, as Always":
21 April 2007 / by Khatchig Mouradian
“Turkey is always at a crossroads,” I said. “That’s what we have been reading in the newspapers in Turkey and in the West for years now. It seems it is convenient to stay at a crossroads.”
There is no choice but to take the road to EU integration, he insisted. It is the only way to bring freedom of expression, minority rights and democracy to Turkey. For Turkish-Armenians, too, it is crucial. “There are people in this country who—if given the chance—would slaughter us again,” he told me.
This was in June 2005 in Istanbul.
On Jan. 19, 2007, I woke up from a phone call from Turkey. “It is all over Turkish TV,” I was told. “They killed him.”
Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was slaughtered in front of the editorial offices of his newspaper Agos. He had met one of the people who was “given the chance” and acted upon it.
Three months have passed since Dink’s murder, and—you guessed it—the country is still at a crossroads. I talked about today’s Turkey with Amberin Zaman, Turkey correspondent for The Economist.
“Even I, as a journalist, have to measure my words
very very carefully, because I don’t know when some extremist will
consider what I said to be ‘insulting Turkishness’ and take
me to court on that,” Zaman says in this interview. “ It’s
a very nefarious, poisonous atmosphere that we live in today, and all
the more so because we really can’t pinpoint where the danger is
coming from. And what’s really obscene about it is that these people
use Turkish law to attack intellectuals,” she adds.
***
Khatchig Mouradian—How does an election year differ from typical
years in Turkey? What makes this election year special?
Amberin Zaman—In a typical election year, you have all of the issues in the country being debated and politicians claiming that they have the solutions to these problems. There’s a lot of noise, a lot of propaganda. But this is a quite unique year because we have both presidential and parliamentary elections.
For the presidential elections, the government is in a position to elect its own candidate, because the ruling party has a majority in the parliament. We haven’t seen this for a long time in Turkey, not since former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal managed to elevate himself to the presidency back in the early 90s.
The ruling AK [Justice and Development] party has brought political Islam closer to the political center; and despite all the scare mongering that’s going on, it will win the next election. People don’t buy the Islamist bogeyman stories anymore. That is not to say that the forces that oppose democracy won’t keep pulling deadly tricks out of their bag. But I truly believe their days are numbered. The real threat to Turkey in my opinion comes from instability on its southern border. The worst thing that could happen would be for Turkey to intervene militarily in Iraq, and there is no dearth of hotheads calling for this. The other big issue is corruption and sadly the AK party is not as “white” as its name claims. The parallel economy, which accounts for roughly half of the economy by the Economy Minister’s own admission, is sucking up huge resources that could help alleviate poverty in the southeast, for instance.
This time around, the issue has taken a particular significance because the secular camp, led by the military, is arguing that if the AK party manages to elect its own candidate, and particularly if this candidate happens to be Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s secularism, its westward orientation, will be at stake.
On the other hand, there are liberals who argue that if Turkey is a democracy and if a party has a majority, then it is perfectly legitimate for it to have its own candidate—be it the Prime Minister or somebody else—and elevate him to the presidency.
In this case, there is the added twist of the Islamic style headscarf. Critics argue that the scarf, worn by more than half the spouses of members of Erdogan’s cabinet, is a sign of Islamic militancy and not just an expression of personal piety. So there is incredible debate revolving around, I must say, a woman’s head.
K.M. —It has become a cliché to say that Turkey is torn between the East and the West, Islam and secularism, totalitarianism and democracy, etc. What are your thoughts on this duality paradigm?
A.Z. —I disagree with that paradigm because over the past few years, and particularly with the AK party’s rise to power, modern democracy, rule of law and human rights have all found expression in ways that have also captured the imagination of pious people in this country. I think the people who tend to portray overtly pious politicians as Islamic fundamentalists are just afraid of losing power. They are scared of change. They don’t want a Turkey that’s open and transparent.
K.M.—Does the ruling party push the democracy project because it is aware that this is the only way it can survive?
A.Z.—Yes, they fully understand that democracy is the only way forward for the country and indeed for their own survival, because the forces that oppose them can only be countered through democracy and the EU project.
Let us also not forget about market forces. The market economy has also played a big role in helping cement democracy in this country. The average Turk can now project 4-5 years into the future, something they were unable to do just a few years ago. The Turkish lira is now stable and inflation has been brought under control The Turkish consumer is rather happy and does not want to see any of that threatened by political tension. And I think that lesson has been taken on board by the Turkish military, especially after the huge financial crisis in 2001 when everyone woke up to the reality of globalization—that what happens in Turkey has an impact abroad and vice versa.
K.M. —What are the main challenges Turkey faces on its path to democracy?
A.Z. —The Kurdish issue is a very key one. Being able to deal honestly with the past—the Armenian issue—is another key challenge. Accommodating Turkey’s non-Muslims, non-Turks and non-Sunni Muslims is also a big challenge facing Turkey. And we still have quite a long way to go before finding solutions to all of these problems.
K.M.—You use the term democracy quite frequently when you talk about Turkey. How loosely are you using this term? How much of a democracy is Turkey?
A.Z. —If Turkey is to become a full democracy, there are several things that need to be fixed. First of all, it needs to reduce the role of the military. Unless you do that, it’s pretty hard to fix the other problems.
K.M.—During Hrant Dink’s funeral, tens of thousands of mourners chanted, “We are all Hrants, We are all Armenian.” Yet, a nationalist backlash was also evident in the aftermath of the killing. What has changed in Turkey after January 19 [the day Dink was assassinated]?
A.Z. —I don’t know if anything changed. I think it is a question of what emerged. I think what emerged during Hrant’s funeral was that a lot of Turkish people—despite all this nationalism, despite all this fear of the other—were able to empathize with the Armenians who have been portrayed as the enemy even though they happen to be Turkish citizens and have lived on these lands for thousands of year. This is an extremely important development.
Yes, there has been a backlash, but the very fact that over 100,000 Turks took to the streets raising placards saying they were all Hrant, were all Armenians is something quite extraordinary. At Hrant Dink’s funeral, the mourners—mostly middle-class Turks—felt horribly guilty, horribly ashamed. I think the forces that are opposed to change in this country were quite shocked and disturbed by that.
Yes, we have all these weird, creepy ultra-nationalists organizing across the country, but there is a parallel protest by an increasing number of Turks who want a more democratic, less paranoid country for themselves.
Regarding the Armenian issue, people are just trying to
block what they suspect might have happened. There is “collective
amnesia,” as Elif Shafak calls it, carried down from generation
to generation. I don’t think it’s a conscious denial. It’s
buried in the people’s collective memory and now, finally, self-questioning
has started in this country.
You also have to give credit to popular culture in this regard. A widely
popular series called the “Valley of the Wolves,” which appealed
to all of our worst nationalistic instincts, has been taken off the
air. This didn’t happen because the EU told us to do so, but because
hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens believed that this was very
harmful. And I think that Hrant’s tragic death helped us realize
this. And it was probably one of the very few instances as a journalist
in this country that I ever saw this kind of spontaneous civic reaction
actually materializing to something concrete.
We have this explosion of TV series that depict love affairs between Greeks and Turks. Indeed, one piece of extraordinary news emerged in the past few days that the very same production company that put out “Valley of the Wolves” also has a project to air a show about a love affair between a Turk and an Armenian. Popular culture is a very effective way to overcome stereotypes and taboos. It is not overtly political so people are much open to accept messages through popular culture than through the voices of various politicians and Western countries that lecture Turkey. I do believe civil society is really taking root in this country.
Still, there is this great resistance on the part of certain great forces to deal honestly with the past, because in fact it will challenge some of the notions on which the republic was founded. There is this almost existential fear about the issue—a siege mentality, a sense that these Western forces are using these “local collaborators” (Armenians, Kurds, non-Muslims) to dismember Turkey. Eighty years on, we still seem to be immersed in that sort of paranoia, which is very recklessly exploited not just by the army but by politicians as well.
It is my firm conviction that until Turkey deals honestly with its past, it will not be able to move forward. And I believe it is now all coming to a head with Hrant’s death. There is a collective malaise in this country born of the knowledge buried somewhere deep in the Turkish psyche that some pretty horrendous things happened before the Republic was formed. That is what propelled so many to take part in Hrant’s funeral. It’s almost as if they were trying to say, “We aren’t all murderers.” But then, so many other horrible things followed, though they were far from being on the same scale, that people didn’t really have a chance to take stock. It’s only now, after 6 years of largely uninterrupted democracy and a cooling down of the violence in the southeast, that we can reflect on the past. There has been a profusion of films and TV series questioning military interventions. Despite the intimidation campaign unleashed by the ultra nationalist thugs and their mentors, I think it’s only a matter of time before the Armenian issue is debated in its proper context as it should be.
K.M.—But most people are still afraid to speak out in Turkey…
A.Z. —Even I, as a journalist, have to measure my words very very carefully, because I don’t know when some extremist will consider what I said to be “insulting Turkishness” and take me to court on that. It’s a very nefarious, poisonous atmosphere that we live in today, and all the more so because we really can’t pinpoint where the danger is coming from. And what’s really obscene about it is that these people use Turkish law to attack intellectuals.
K.M. —What are the prospects of Article 301 being removed?
A.Z. —The Prime Minister keeps saying that he is open to the idea of amending it, certainly not scrapping it altogether. It is an election year and like all politicians, the Prime Minister is very wary of losing nationalist votes. I frankly can’t say with any certainty that we will see change in that law, but even if we amend Article 301, there are other laws out there that extremists can use to continue attacking intellectuals. What really needs to change as much as the law is the mentality in the country.
K.M. —How do you envision this change? Will it come from civil society, or are the powers that be so strong that change will only happen when they are ready to allow it?
A.Z. —I think it’s a two-way process. There is a civil society that seems to be bearing fruit and at the same time there is some readiness to change at the top.
What makes the Turkish military very unique when you compare it to other militaries in developing countries is that it has always drawn much of its popularity from the Turkish people. Let us not forget that it continues to be the most popular institution in this country and I think Turkish officers and generals would never want to lose that support. They understand that as Turkey becomes more open and democratic in this global world, people’s perceptions are changing and that they, too, have to change. Reasonable people in the military fully appreciate and understand that their actions now have a very direct impact on the economy, and that there’s no better way to antagonize your citizens than to make them poor.
K.M.—Let us talk about the Kurdish issue. What does the average Kurd suffer from in Turkey?
A.Z. —First of all, there are the very real problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in the regions of Turkey mainly populated by Kurds. That is a very big challenge. Also, if you are an ordinary Kurd living in the southeast and you want to express yourself on the basis of your very distinct ethnic and cultural identity, you still run into problems. I’ve been down to that region countless times. I can give you the example of a private radio station in the province of Hakkari, where the owner told me that he is constantly in trouble with Turkish authorities because he plays Kurdish music on his channel, even though the lyrics of the songs are in no way offensive or threatening.
There are so many other examples that I can give you. In recent weeks, we have seen an enormous amount of pressure brought to bear on the leaders of the largest pro-Kurdish party. The president and co-president of the party were sentenced to six months in jail because they had handed out flyers in the Kurdish language.
Also, you still need to have 10 percent of the national vote in order to make it into parliament. This needs to be lowered to a reasonable level because it automatically excludes pro-Kurdish parties. A Kurdish politician cannot go to parliament and represent the cultural demands of the Kurds. Until you allow this people to be a part of the political system and empower them in that way, there will always be non-political actors such as the PKK who continue to advance these goals on behalf of the Kurdish people.
K.M.—How is the U.S. intervention in Iraq viewed in Turkey?
A.Z. —I think that everyone—from the leftists to the centrists to the rightists to the Islamists—is pretty much opposed to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Insofar as how they view Turkey’s interests in light of the situation there, you have different voices, but the strongest one says that the emergence of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq is being encouraged by the U.S., and that this poses an existential threat to Turkey. The strongest evidence of this, they argue, is the fact that the U.S. has not taken military action against the PKK. The common perception is that the U.S. favors Iraqi-Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jelal Talabani over the Turks, and that this is partly due to Turkey’s refusal to allow U.S. troops to open a second front against Saddam Hussein using Turkish territory in 2003.
There is this tunnel vision on Iraq. They see everything
through the PKK lens.
K.M.—What about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? On one hand,
there is popular support for the Palestinian cause, and, on the other,
there is the strategic alliance with Israel…
A.Z. —There seems to be a contradiction between Turkey’s strategic
alliance with Israel and this huge wave of support and sympathy for
the Palestinians. But that contradiction in many ways exposes broader
contradictions in the way Turkey thinks about itself and the world.
Because on the one hand, they believe that the alliance with Israel
will make Turkey stronger in the region. Before the Iraq war, it helped
Turkey gain favor in Washington and gave it a lot of maneuvering space,
certainly vis-à-vis the EU. You had that sort of structure in
place, that sort of idea that if you have good relations with Israel
then America will always be behind you and you can flex your muscles
more effectively vis-à-vis the EU, Iran even, and the entire
region. Certainly, that whole paradigm has shifted following the U.S.
occupation of Iraq. It’s one that was already beginning to unravel
after the first Gulf War. I think that we are now seeing significant
realignment of that power equation.
K.M.—Talk about Turkey’s relations with Iran, especially in the context of the nuclear issue.
A.Z.—Turkey is increasingly seeing this as an opportunity to exercise its regional power and influence. It seems to have portrayed itself as an honest broker in this crisis. As a Muslim, pro-Western country and a member of NATO, Turkey has credibility on both sides, and certainly its credibility in the Muslim world has been greatly enhanced by the AK party. There are many examples of Turkish behavior that suggest it wants to embrace the Muslim world in a way that none of its predecessors did. I think the Turks see all of it as more of an opportunity than a problem.
K.M.—If the confrontation deepens, will Turkey be forced to choose sides?
A.Z. —I think Turkey will be on the side of European governments and the U.S. as long as it’s confined to non-military measures. But beyond that, Turkey will remain decidedly neutral. In my opinion, Turkey will not allow the U.S. to use its territory or airspace to launch attacks against Iran.
K.M. —Where do you see Turkey going? Will we witness more EU integration or will extreme nationalist feelings and growing pressure from the EU will take the country in another direction?
A.Z. —I like to remain optimistic and hopeful that
Turkey’s general direction will be towards a modern democratic
society. There is going to be plenty of towing and throwing along the
way. That’s what we are witnessing now, strong nationalist pressure.
But you have to look at the historical perspective. Turkey has been
trying to modernize since the 19th century and from that time until
today we have had reactions and counter reactions.
Today, the military enjoys more influence than it should in a democratic
society but I think the winds are blowing in the direction of more democracy
and not less.
* Khatchig Mouradian is a Lebanese-Armenian journalist,
writer and translator. He is the editor of The Armenian Weekly (www.armenianweekly.com),
published in Boston, MA.
3. - Reuters - "Decision time looms for Erdogan in Turkey":
ANKARA / 22 April 2007
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey will decide this week whether to ignore pressure from the military and run for president, a move that could also hurt his party's chances in parliamentary elections and slow reforms urged by the EU.
Both the Turkish military, which has ousted four governments in 50 years, and the traditional political elite are worried about Erdogan's Islamist views and want to ensure that state and religion remain strictly separate.
Erdogan has kept Turkey guessing about his intentions, but must choose a candidate for his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, known by the Turkish acronym AKP, by Wednesday.
If he is a candidate when Parliament elects the president of the predominantly Muslim country in May - a vote his party is sure to win - Erdogan would become the first Turkish president with an Islamist past, a sign of huge change for this fast-growing country of 74 million people.
Elections for Parliament, where the party of Erdogan holds a large majority, are due in November. The Constitution says that the president must remain impartial and cannot get involved in national politics, which would prevent Erdogan from campaigning.
"There would be a risk if Erdogan decides to make himself president," said William Hale of Sabanci University in Istanbul. "He's the AK Party's biggest vote gainer. The AK Party would be at a disadvantage in the general election campaign and could miss out on another term as a single party government."
Under Erdogan, Turkey has achieved strong economic growth and secured the start in 2005 of talks on entry to the European Union.
Some analysts said that Erdogan, a charismatic man from a humble background, would be more effective as prime minister in pushing his ambitious reform program to meet EU conditions for membership.
In Turkey, the government holds most power but the president can veto laws, veto appointments of officials, appoint judges and is commander in chief of the military.
As successor to modern the revered found of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the president also carries great moral weight.
Some AKP members say that Erdogan is tempted to pursue the post because it is his party's democratic right, it may not be so easily offered to him in the future and it would considerably weaken the power of the secular elite in Turkey.
The secular establishment, including the army, judiciary, education and business elite, fear that Erdogan would turn back the clock to Ottoman times when Islam was more prominent in society.
Erdogan is accused of undermining secularism by, for example, trying to ease restrictions on the wearing of head scarves in government jobs and universities and promoting religiously minded supporters in the bureaucracy.
Erdogan rejects claims that he has an Islamist agenda.
The armed forces chief general, Yasar Buyukanit, recently issued a warning to Erdogan, saying that the next president must be secular not just in words but in his actions. The outgoing president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, followed a day later, saying that the republic faced its gravest danger since its foundation in 1923.
This month, more than 350,000 people gathered in Ankara, the capital, to protest an Erdogan presidency. More rallies were planned. If Erdogan runs, the main opposition Republican People's Party has threatened to appeal to the Constitutional Court to annul his election.
Were Erdogan "to stay on as prime minister,"
said Mehmet Ali Birand, a Turkish commentator, "it would give the
image to me that this guy means business, that this guy is not doing
it for selfish ideas."
4. - AP - "Turkish ruling party to announce candidate for next president this week":
ANKARA / 22 April 2007
Turkey's ruling party will announce its candidate for president this week, with the prime minister saying that the choice will be a "surprise" after speculation he might run for the position himself.
The country's secular establishment, including the powerful military, has been uneasy over the possibility of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was once jailed for inciting religious hatred, rising to the symbolic but prestigious post.
Erdogan has not said whether he or a political ally will run, but an announcement from his ruling party is expected Tuesday or Wednesday. Some of his party members oppose Erdogan's candidacy, arguing that he should stay in his current post.
"This country still needs the prime minister to remain as prime minister," Saban Disli, deputy chairman of Erdogan's Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party, said Sunday.
Parliament is expected to hold a first round of voting to replace President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on April 26 or May 3. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party dominates the 550-member Parliament, and so whoever it nominates is expected to win.
The pro-secular main opposition Republican People's Party might also announce its own candidate, although that candidate is unlikely to win the parliamentary vote.
But Erdogan's comment last week that Turks would be shocked by the selection triggered a new round of theories in the media Sunday that the candidate might be female State Minister Nimet Cubukcu, a candidate possibly designed to appease Turkey's divided secular and Islamic camps.
"We will make a shock decision, everyone will be surprised," Erdogan said.
More than 300,000 people demonstrated last week in Ankara to protest a possible run by Erdogan, whom many secularist Turks suspect of having an Islamist agenda. Erdogan rejects the label "Islamist" and has not said whether he would run for president.
Cubukcu, who heads the government's portfolio for family and women, does not cover her hair with an Islamic-style head scarf — which is illegal to wear in public offices or schools — but she is considered a conservative politician.
The Hurriyet newspaper said in its Sunday edition that announcing Cubukcu as the ruling party's presidential candidate would not only shock the secular establishment but boost the popularity of Erdogan ahead of general elections in November.
Speculation about possible candidates has also included Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul or even Nevzat Karatas, a key lawmaker from Erdogan's Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party.
Ersonmez Yarbay, a legislator from Erdogan's party, became the first to formally announce his bid for the presidency Saturday, saying he was disturbed that no other candidate had yet emerged. Yarbay said he might withdraw later.
"Democracy Shame," headlined liberal daily Radikal on Sunday, criticizing Erdogan's party for not announcing its candidate until the last minute. The deadline to announce bids for the presidency is midnight on Wednesday.
Although the presidency is largely ceremonial, the head
of state does have power to veto legislation. Sezer, whose seven-year
term comes to an end on May 16, used his term to put a brake on the
Islamic-rooted government by rejecting a record number of bills and
appointments of officials deemed to be supporters of an Islamic agenda.
5. - AFP - "Turkish soldier killed in clash with Kurdish rebels":
DIYARBAKIR / 22 April 2007
A Turkish soldier has been killed in a clash with rebels from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey, officials said Sunday.
The clash occurred in a mountainous area in Bingol province, the governor's office said in a statement, without specifying when it took place.
Another soldier was injured in the same area when he stepped on a landmine, believed to have been planted by the PKK.
The army said earlier this month that it had launched "large-scale" operations against the PKK with the arrival of spring, when the rebels step up attacks as snow melts in the mountains, facilitating their movement.
The PKK took up arms for self-rule in the Kurdish-majority
southeast in 1984. The conflict has claimed more than 37,000 lives.
6. - MENL - "Turkey intensified PKK offensive near Iraq":
ANKARA / 22 April 2007
Turkey has intensified its offensive against the Kurdish insurgency near the border with Iraq.
Officials said the military has taken advantage of a spring thaw to launch operations in the mountains along the Iraqi border. They said air and ground forces have repeatedly found and eliminated squads of the Kurdish Workers Party in southeastern Turkey.
The Turkish offensive has consisted of 10,000 troops as well as hundreds of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles. The ground force has been supported by attack helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft.
Over the last three days, about 20 people, most of them
PKK operatives, were killed in clashes near the Iraqi-Turkish border.
Much of the fighting has taken place in Turkey's Sirt and Tunceli provinces,
inhabitated by Kurds.
7. - MNA - "Washington, Ankara face Kurdistan dilemma":
TEHRAN / 22 April 2007
Middle Eastern affairs expert Hossein Ruyvaran said here on Saturday that any military action by Turkey in northern Iraq would significantly affect the political situation in the region.
“Turkey is currently on alert because of the vast activities of the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) in northern Iraq. The Kurds efforts to have Kirkuk Province ceded to Iraqi Kurdistan increase the sensitivities of Turkey. As the PKK activities increase and as the time to decide the future of Kirkuk approaches, the possibility of Turkish intervention increases,” he told the Mehr News Agency.
The Mehr News Agency spoke to several other analysts on Saturday to learn their views on the issue.
Middle Eastern affairs expert Sadeq Maleki said, “Many factors are preventing an incursion into Iraq by the Turkish Army, including the disapproval of the United States and the illegality of such action according to international law. Also, regarding the international community, given that there is a government in Iraq, the Turkish military action would be considered an act of a war.”
“Before the fall of Saddam (Hussein), Washington used to support Turkey’s stance on Kurdistan, but over the past few years Kurds have closely cooperated with the U.S. and in practice Washington is just as inclined toward the Kurds,” he added.
Middle Eastern affairs expert Mohammad Ali Mohtadi believes that the U.S. is undecided due to the stances of Turkey and Israel on the Kurdistan problem.
“On the one hand, the U.S. must consider the interests of Turkey because it is an important NATO member and the U.S. counts on NATO and Turkey’s role in it. On the other hand, the Israelis have long been attempting to prepare the prerequisites for the independence of Kurdistan, and because of Israel’s influence on the White House, the U.S. seems to be caught in a difficult situation,” he added.
Arzu Celalifer, a researcher at the International Strategic
Research Organization (ISRO) in Ankara, said, “To this day, Ankara
has been waiting for U.S. help on the Kurdistan problem, but since the
U.S. has not taken any practical steps in this regard, Turkey is determined
to confront the Kurds’ threats directly.”
8. - Jerusalem Post - "Fighting the Next War":
20 April 2007 / by Caroline Glick
Last Friday, Haaretz's military commentator Ze'ev Schiff accused the Barak and Sharon governments of responsibility for last summer's war. As Schiff put it, since the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, "a threatening system [comprised of Hizbullah, Syria and Iran] arose [on Israel's northern border], which required a preemptive strike. The aversion to conducting such a strike eventually caused the war."
Schiff's analysis is correct. But since it stops short of drawing lessons for the present dangers, it is largely useless. Today, due to the Olmert-Livni-Peretz government's failure in the last war, we stand at the brink of the next one. And in the next war, the main enemy will be Syria, which will fight in coordination with Hizbullah and the Palestinians and under Iranian guidance.
Syria has been openly preparing for war since the last summer. And in the space of the past week alone, the Syrians twice announced their intention to attack Israel. On Monday, Syria's Propaganda Minister Moshen Bilal threatened that if Israel doesn't fully implement the Arab plan which calls for its retreat to the 1949 armistice lines and acceptance of millions of Arab immigrants, Syria will go to war. On Wednesday, Syrian dictator Bashar Assad said, "We always prepare ourselves. Israel is a fierce enemy. We have seen nothing from it but harm."
A constructive Israeli policy for contending with Syria must be based on a clear understanding of both Syria's interests and our own.
First there are Syria's war preparations. Many note optimistically that Syria has not moved its tanks to the border. But why would it?
Syria has no intention of fighting a conventional war against Israel. The war that Syria is planning will bear greater similarity to the insurgency in Iraq and Hizbullah's war last summer than to Syria's previous wars with Israel.
In the midst of last summer's war, Assad announced the formation of a new terror force tasked with infiltrating and attacking targets on the Golan Heights. The Syrian order of battle also includes a highly trained commando division; a massive artillery force capable of wreaking destruction on the Golan Heights and the Galilee; Scud ballistic missiles with ranges covering all of Israel; and chemical warheads that can be fitted on the Scuds.
This week CBN broadcast satellite footage of three hardened Syrian missile facilities outside of Homs and Hama. Syria aims to bleed Israel in order to force subsequent Israeli political concessions.
Syria has good reasons to go to war with Israel. Its forced departure from Lebanon in 2005 humiliated and weakened the regime both politically and economically. The regime views an achievement on the Golan Heights as a way to make up for the shame.
Moreover, Hizbullah's achievements in last summer's war challenge Syria to demonstrate that it too can humiliate Israel. It is also notable that June 11 will mark the fortieth anniversary of Israel's liberation of the Golan Heights.
Rather than contend with the Syrian challenge, the Olmert-Livni-Peretz government has opted to ignore it. In his appearance before the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Wednesday, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, "We have no intention of attacking Syria."
He added, "The assessment of all of Israel's assessment bodies is that Syria is deploying defensively in line with a scenario of an attack against them. But we are also preparing for a situation where we are surprised."
The gist of Olmert's statements is that he is unwilling to decide how to deal with the Syrian threat. He would rather be "surprised" by the Syrians than prevent surprises by crafting an Israeli policy that would defend Israel's interests and preempt Syrian aggression.
The Israeli Left maintains that the only way to prevent war is by holding peace talks with Syria that will lead to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. But former national security adviser Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland explained in a recent lecture at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs that under current conditions, in contrast to the Left's protestations, an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, even in return for a peace treaty, would increase the chance of war with Syria, and decrease Israel's chances of winning the war. Syria would have little reason to abide by the agreement after an Israeli withdrawal and Israel would lack international support to enforce the agreement after Syria breached it.
Rather than preemptively surrendering, Israel's strategic aims should be to degrade Syria's capacity to harm it and to change the Syrian regime's assessment of the attractiveness of attacking Israel.
Any plan to reduce Syria's capacity for aggression against Israel should properly begin with Schiff's analysis of last summer's war in Lebanon. Given the nature of the gathering threat, it makes sense to consider a preemptive strike on Syria's terror training camps, its missile sites and artillery bases. Such a strike should be guided by the lessons from the last war regarding the limitations of air power. Air strikes had limited results against hardened targets and they exposed Israel's flank to anti-Israel propagandists in the media war.
Changing Syria's cost-benefit analysis of war with Israel involves going beyond the military realm. To impact Syria's decision-making loop, Israel must also consider the economic and political realities facing the Assad regime.
Syria is an economic basket case. In a study of the Syrian economy published this week, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) noted that since the US-led invasion of Iraq, some one million Iraqis have fled to Syria. Rather than stimulate economic growth, due to the corruption and economic incompetence of the regime, the population inflow has simply caused massive inflation. Aside from this, Syria's oil revenues are steadily declining. US and EU economic sanctions instituted in recent years have made it impossible for Syria to receive financial credits or significantly expand its international trade. Today the regime can barely provide basic services to the population.
Syria's economic weakness undermines the regime's political stability. Another factor undermining that stability is the restive Kurdish minority in northeast Syria. The Kurds, who comprise twenty percent of Syria's overall population, already staged an uprising against the regime in May 2004.
Today, Syria's Kurds are inspired by their brethren in Iraq to work to achieve their rights. Like the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian Kurds, who have good relations with their Arab compatriots, do not demand independence. Rather they seek to transform Syria from a centralized totalitarian state into a federated democracy.
Two weeks ago a conference of Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish and Iranian Kurds took place in Irbil, Iraq. Massoud Barzani, the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, spelled out the Kurdish view of Israel in an interview with Al Arabiya.
In his words, "If [Iraq] establish[es] relations [with Israel] we will do so publicly. There is no reason for these relations to be kept secret, because we are neither afraid nor ashamed of such relations."
Barzani attacked the Iranians, Hizbullah and Palestinians for supporting Israel's destruction, explaining, "I am against driving Israel into the sea…. This policy is wrong, illogical, and unreasonable. Why annihilate a people?"
Sherkoh Abbas, who heads the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria from his home in the US, participated in the conference. In a recent conversation he explained, "Most Syrian Kurds…have views similar to President Barzani. As Kurds we can say that we have no issues with Israel; in fact we are against the desire of the Ba'ath party, the Muslim Brotherhood or terrorists to destroy Israel…
"The Kurds did not suffer by the hands of Israelis or Jews. All or most of their sufferings were caused by Arabs, Persians and Turks. In Syria, the Ba'ath regime Arabized the Kurdish region, stripped 300,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, and killed many Kurds.…. We do not want to fight for the Syrian regime."
The Kurds' desire to replace the current regime with a democratic federal government is backed by the Syrian Reform Party, an exile group with strong ties to the population in Syria. Farid Ghadry, a Washington-based Syrian exile who heads the party, believes that the Kurdish federal plan is the best way to bring freedom to Syria.
The interests of the Kurds and the other regime opponents align with Israel's interests in many ways. First, Israel will benefit greatly if they achieve their aim of democratizing Syria and protecting minority rights by decentralizing authority while maintaining the territorial integrity of the country.
Centralized governments throughout the Arab world are the primary fulminators of Arab hatred of Israel. These regimes require a constant drumbeat of incitement against Israel to deflect their people's attention from their failure to provide basic services. Decentralized governments would have difficulty blaming the Jews for their failures.
There is widespread fear in Israel that if Assad's regime is overthrown, it will be replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood. This makes sense given that for the past 30 years, the Ba'athists ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only other force in the country with organizational and financial means. But even so, strengthening the Kurds - who oppose jihad - will counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood, whether or not the regime falls.
Turkey, too, fears Kurdish separatism. But Israeli support for the advancement of legitimate Syrian Kurdish rights through the cultivation of democratic federalism rather than secession, should not concern Ankara.
One of the reasons the Olmert-Livni-Peretz government is taking the Arab "peace plan" seriously in spite of the fact that it is inherently hostile to Israel is because the government is desperate to find allies against the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah axis. The trouble with this gambit is that the Sunni countries involved in the initiative act as the Iranian-Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian axis's support network against Israel. The Saudis and their colleagues have no interest in helping Israel.
In contrast, the Kurds are natural allies for Israel with overlapping interests and values. They would be happy to receive Israeli media and financial support. And, if at the same time as Israel helped broadcast Kurdish language television and radio into Syria, it also provided the Kurds with arms to defend themselves against Syrian aggression, the move could potentially alter Syria's cost-benefit analysis of war with Israel.
Even if the Syrians open hostilities, arming the Kurds would likely muddy the waters in a manner that would cause serious harm to Syria's war-making capacity. How well would Syria contend with the IDF if it were simultaneously trying to put down a popular rebellion? And how long would the regime survive in the aftermath of such a war?
Studying past wars is always worthwhile. But today we must prepare for the next one.
There is an Israeli strategy for victory. If we conduct a military strike that degrades Syria's ability to harm us while economically weakening the regime still further and politically supporting an oppressed, large, pro-Israel minority, perhaps we could avert war altogether.
At the very least, if war comes, we would win.