5 May 2006

1. "Iraqi Kurds caught between rebels, foreign forces", Kurdish villagers are fleeing their homes in northern Iraq after shelling and incursions by Iranian forces and a massive build-up of Turkish troops as both militaries move to crush separatist guerrillas.

2. "EU eyes on Turkey as officers' trial starts", two Turkish military intelligence officers appeared in court in the southern city of Van yesterday facing life sentences in a case seen as a test of the country's worthiness to join the European Union while the army dominates the political system.

3. "Turkey and Europe: Coming apart?", it is time to start worrying about Turkey—and looking for ways to revive its European hopes.

4. "Allies and Enemies", god defend me from my friends; from my enemies I can defend myself.

5. "ECHR fines Turkey in former DEP deputies' case", the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) yesterday ruled against Turkey in a case filed against the state by former deputies of the now defunct pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP).

6. "Appeals Court Quashes Dink Verdict", Court of Appeals overrules verdict deferring 6 months jail term for bilingual Armenian Turkish Agos newspaper editor Hrank Dink. Journalist-writer may be retried on charges of insulting Turkish identity.

1. - Reuters - "Iraqi Kurds caught between rebels, foreign forces":

RAZAGA / 5 May 2006 / by Sherko Raouf

Kurdish villagers are fleeing their homes in northern Iraq after shelling and incursions by Iranian forces and a massive build-up of Turkish troops as both militaries move to crush separatist guerrillas.

Government leaders in Iraq's Kurdistan say Iran has attacked Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas in Iraq three times in the past two weeks, and Turkey insists it has the right under military law to carry out cross-border operations if need be.

The PKK, seeking a Kurdish homeland including southeastern Turkey, accuses Ankara and Tehran of mounting coordinated operations against the group and its Iranian wing, PJAK.

About 60 of the 70 families in the village of Razaga, 6 miles) from the Iranian border, fled after almost four hours of shelling on Monday, local people told visiting reporters later in the week. Iran denies hitting targets inside Iraq.

"We were sleeping and a shell landed behind our house," said 53-year-old shopkeeper Van Hama Ameen, speaking in a nearby village where she had sought shelter.

"We woke up in horror and ran away screaming ...

"The shelling was random and we left our house without taking even a scrap of spare clothing. Then we walked three hours to reach another, safer village."

SPRING OFFENSIVE

Turkey, which traditionally launches a spring offensive against the rebels, has sent 40,000 troops to its own Kurdish areas to reinforce the 220,000 already there, the biggest build-up in years after an increase in PKK attacks.

NATO member Turkey also has 1,500 special forces troops at stationed in northern Iraq.

On Wednesday, a senior rebel commander threatened to retaliate if Turkey or Iran attacked PKK bases.

The president of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, has also warned of a tough response if outsiders move in.

"If some people imagine they can threaten us in Kurdistan, let them know we will disturb their peace in their regions -- and I mean what I say," he told al-Arabiya television. Barzani enjoys widespread sympathy among Turkey's Kurds.

More than 30,000 people have been killed since the PKK began its fight in 1984. It has in the past launched bomb attacks in Turkish cities and tourist resorts as well as fighting troops.

Turkey and Iran are wary of the autonomy Iraqi Kurds have consolidated since the 2003 Iraq war and fear it might lead to more unrest among their own large Kurdish populations.

About 5,000 PKK fighters are believed to be operating out of camps in Iraq's Kurdistan.

Turkey has voiced concern the conflict in Iraq is allowing the PKK to be more active and has asked the United States, which has more than 130,000 troops in Iraq, to do more.

Some analysts say the massing of Turkish troops on the border is partly aimed at putting pressure on Washington.

A senior official with the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq warned the fighting could destabilize the region.

"Any fight that may erupt in Kurdistan because of the Turkish or the Iranian army will cause financial losses, as well as psychological damage to the people and to stability in the region for years." said Mohammed Qadhi.

In Razaga after the shelling, Sham Kuthir, a 45-year-old mother of eight, was staying put after the bombardment but was fearful and distraught.

"We live off the cattle my husband has. Now most of them have been killed by the shelling. But where can we go to earn our living?" she asked.

"I have no relatives to go to, what can I do? I am afraid of more shelling, so I have dug a shelter to protect my children if it starts again."

2. - The Scotsman - "EU eyes on Turkey as officers' trial starts":

ISTANBUL / 5 May 2006 / by Nichola Birch

TWO Turkish military intelligence officers appeared in court in the southern city of Van yesterday facing life sentences in a case seen as a test of the country's worthiness to join the European Union while the army dominates the political system.

Together with a Kurdish rebel turned informer, the officers were arrested last November seconds after a grenade exploded in a bookshop in Semdinli, a town close to Iraq, killing one man.

The car they had tried to flee in contained grenades identical to the one used in the attack, and a sketch map of the scene.

The prosecution has accused them of being part of an execution squad targeting suspected Kurdish insurgents. The judge must decide whether they were working on their own or under orders.

The incident has increased tensions between the fiercely pro-secular military and the Islamic-rooted government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which has vowed to punish those responsible.

But it has also underscored the influence of the generals, which the EU and rights groups have repeatedly said needs to be reduced.

A prosecutor who suggested that the army's top general helped form groups that carried out such attacks was sacked and disbarred. The police intelligence chief, who reportedly hinted that soldiers were behind the attack, was transferred to a different post.

At the trial's opening yesterday, lawyers for the Kurdish bookstore owner requested the removal of the presiding judge from the case, saying he was under the influence of powers outside the judiciary, the Anatolia news agency reported. The lawyers also objected to the judge's reading of a summary of the indictment, rather than the entire 100-page document.

3. - The Economist - "Turkey and Europe: Coming apart?":

It is time to start worrying about Turkey—and looking for ways to revive its European hopes

5 May 2006

ONLY last year, things were going so well for Turkey that even its best friends could hardly believe their eyes. The promise of European Union membership had led to an investment boom. A party with Islamist roots was showing that Muslim piety and liberal democracy were compatible. The prospect of joining the EU had spurred reform, with happy results for civil liberty and free speech. Although Turko-scepticism persisted in parts of Europe, there were grounds for hoping that Turkey would become more palatable to the EU, even as the union grew more attractive to the Turks.

Above all, it seemed that demons that had plagued Turkey were being exorcised. One was inflation, now decisively beaten back. Another was the assumption that only a vigilant army—wielding power quietly, but ready to do so openly—could keep a secular republic intact. So it has been good to see devout politicians and republican generals co-existing.

Sadly, some of the euphoria over Turkey's march towards Europe has now evaporated. One European commissioner fears a possible “train wreck” in Turkey's relations with the EU, with Cyprus as the most likely obstacle on the track. The ruling Justice and Development (AK) party is no longer such a good advertisement for moderate Islam. By tolerating corruption and nominating cronies to top jobs, it has fuelled suspicions that it wants to concentrate power in a clique. Also worrying—to those who liked the AK party's caution—is a new leaning towards a more openly Islamist foreign policy.

Meanwhile, a resurgence of Kurdish uprising has drawn a heavy-handed response. Reforms that helped to win Turkey its date with Europe have been reversed (see article). Only months after it became possible to make speeches or broadcasts in Kurdish without fear of prosecution, Turkey may be slipping back to the bad old days, when people were jailed, or worse, because of the language they spoke or the ideas they aired, however peacefully.

A fork in the road

The struggle to combat terror has certainly forced plenty of Western countries to sacrifice some liberties in the name of security. But in Turkey combating "terror" has often been an excuse to repress peaceful representatives of any cause or culture that a few extremists promote through violence: the equivalent, in western European terms, of locking up anybody who advocates a united Ireland or Basque independence, even if they eschew violence.

Last year's optimism about Turkey may have been overblown. But the positive energy generated by the surge in Turkey's European hopes has not been completely exhausted. Those hopes can still be fulfilled if everybody with an interest in a European future for Turkey acts responsibly. The AK party, in particular, has a choice: it can slide backwards and perhaps flirt more openly with Islamism; or it can play the European card even harder, pressing on with reforms and demanding that its European partners show similar goodwill.

For this second choice to work, the EU's leaders must be readier to reward Turkey when it takes political risks. Instead, too many are making clear that they do not really want Turkey ever to join. A particular bugbear is Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriots took a risk by accepting, in 2004, the UN plan to re-unify Cyprus. It galls them to see the Greek-Cypriots, who rejected the plan, enjoying the fruits of EU membership when Turkish-Cypriots remain isolated. Besides their blunt insistence on Turkey ending its ban on Greek-Cypriot ships and aircraft, EU governments should look for ways to reassure the Turks—and to bring the Turkish-Cypriots out of the cold.

Turks fear that too many in the EU would rejoice if Turkey were to stumble on its way to Europe. That fear encourages them to look in other directions. Yet the risk of losing Turkey as a prime example of a liberal, Western-oriented, Muslim democracy that works is huge. Europe's leaders must do whatever they can to bring Turkey back on course.

4. - Kurdish Media - "Allies and Enemies":

4 May 2006 / by Mizgin Yilmaz

"God defend me from my friends; from my enemies I can defend myself." - Anonymous.

One of the most accurate assessments of the current situation in Kurdistan seems to be coming from Russia. There is no doubt that Russia is a regional player and has been heavily involved with the Middle East lately, particularly with Turkey and Iran, as well as the rest of the Arab/Muslim world. During the Cold War, Russia cultivated relationships in this part of the world, and they seem to be at work to renew those relationships. As a result, it should be no surprise that the Russians are carefully watching the military moves of Turkey and Iran. Add to all that the energy resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and there is something to sweeten the pot.

A Regnum News Agency article accurately relates the build up of recent events, seen in the light of Condoleeza Rice's recent trip to the region at the end of April, a trip that coincided, coincidentally, at the same time that Turkey and Iran began to mass their security forces up to, and into, South Kurdistan.

We are reminded of the flurry of activity between Washington and Ankara back in December, 2005, when the CIA, FBI, and ATC met with a number of officials of the Ankara regime. The Ankara visits were reciprocated, also in December, 2005, by Yasar Buyukanit's 6-day visit to Washington, as a guest of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Buyukanit is scheduled to become chief of the Turkish General Staff this August, which means that he will become the de facto ruler of Turkey. Throughout the winter, officials from both governments continued to visit and meet, and this activity, all in preparation for Rice's visit, was capped by the March, 2006, visit of General Peter Pace to Ankara, to meet with the current chief of the Turkish General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok. In all of these meetings, the same themes were discussed: PKK, Iraq, and Iran.

The result? A new relationship defined by something called a Common Strategic Vision, in which, as Rice said in Ankara, "Turkey is the US' key partner":

The brief few-page Common Strategic Vision will consist of three main chapters: (1) fight with terrorism, (2) relations with the EU, (3) Big Middle East project and addenda concerning Cyprus, PKK, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East peace process and relations with Russia. To date, the US has a similar document only with India.

The Turkish public, steeped as it is in anti-Americanism, was properly groomed to accept Rice's visit by massive propaganda efforts by the Turkish media. This is the same media that was grooming the same public for violence during Newroz, a grooming that should have also served to propagandize Washington about the grave threat of the PKK (i.e. the Kurds). Unfortunately for the pashas, Kurds did not respond according to propaganda. This resulted in the need to provoke the Kurds in a much more visceral way, which Turkish security forces did by firing on Kurds who had attended funerals of four PKK gerîlas in Amed, at the end of March. This provocation, and the propaganda campaign that followed, paved the way for Rice's visit and helped to secure US approval of the use of Turkish military force against Kurds:

. . . Rice did not give a specific yes to Turkey’s request to stifle PKK’s positions in Northern Iraq or to let it do it itself. At the same time, she hinted that the US may close its eyes on this, i.e. on a forthcoming Turkish military operation in Northern Iraq. It’s noteworthy that Turkey launched this operation while Rice was still in its territory. So, we can say that the US has, in fact, given a sanction to it.

[ . . . ]

Yet one more interesting point of fact is that Turkey had launched its all-time big anti-Kurdish military campaign exactly by the time of Rice’s Ankara visit. Fearing Europe’s anger, Turkey had, thereby, tried to “legitimize” its action. Turkey’s goal is to curb the activity of Kurds in its south-eastern regions, to provoke them into counter-action and, with US acquiescence, to track the fighters down to Northern Iraq and to put an end to them there. This is, in fact, a repetition of campaigns it used to hold in Saddam times.

According to the article at Regnum, this renewed military cooperation between the US and Turkey may also mean that the US has bought Ankara's arguments about Kerkuk, thereby effectively handing over this Kurdish city to future Turkish control. At the same time that Turkish and Iranian security forces began attacking Kurds, Ankara's current proxies, Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, began moving into Kerkuk. This arrangement was most likely made by al-Ja'afari during his trip to Ankara in February, 2006. In al-Ja'afari's entourage, Kurds were conspicuous by their absence. This might also explain the coincidental formation of an Iraqi Turkmen group in Kerkuk last month, whose goal is an autonomous Turkmen region in Iraq. Since the US has returned to its pattern of betrayal, will the US secure an autonomous Turkmen region in Kerkuk?

The speculation is that the US is using the Kurds, dangling independence before them, but always just out of reach, in an attempt to guarantee Kurdish cooperation with Washington's plans, especially regarding Iran. If this is the game, the Kurds should cease all cooperation with the US, particularly since it has approved the bombing of Kurds. There should also be no cooperation with the US as regards its plans for Iran, especially if those plans will call for the use of gerîla or insurgent forces. Already, the Kurds in PJAK have been fighting the mullah regime, but the US has also given approval, most likely through Turkey, for Iran to cross the Iraqi border and bomb Kurds. Is it any coincidence that the Turkish Transport Minister managed to arrive back from Iran in time to meet with Erdogan, after his MGK meeting on 27 April?

Since the US approves of the attacks on the only Kurdish "insurgents" who have been attacking the mullah regime, how does the US think it will use Kurds to "break stability in Iran through local Kurds?"

For more information on PJAK, including how some in the US have already tried to use PJAK for their own interests, see the Middle East Foundation blog. Keep in mind that, like the PKK, PJAK has never targeted Americans, unlike the MEK, to whom it is compared by certain ignoramuses (i.e. US congressmen and the author of that blog entry) at that blog. Check the links in that blog article, too. An interesting read can be found at a Caucaz article, from August, 2005, on PJAK. Last August, during the serhildan in Rojhelat, it was PJAK who actively engaged Teheran's dirty security forces. Everyone else stood around and watched.

In the meantime, the KRG announces that it's waiting to issue a statement on Iran's bombing, a bombing which, so far, has resulted in the death of one civilian Kurd. Instead of sending pêsmerge to defend Kurdish lives and property against an aggressor who has committed an act of war, why is the KRG still unable to decide what position to take? Does it need Rice's approval?

There is one other interesting item of note from the Regnum article:

Turkey’s key argument is the fear of its generals that a nuclear bomb in the hands of Iran may break the balance of forces between Ankara and Tehran.

Pakistan is in the nuclear club. Iran claims to be in the nuclear club. Turkey has recently begun propagandizing its desire for "nuclear energy." Isn't that the excuse Iran uses? The truth is expressed in the fear of the pashas, and it should be seriously suspected at this point, that the pashas want nuclear parity with the neighbors. They will use the US to keep Iran off balance until they have at least achieved the same level of nuclear capacity that Iran claims to have. They are not interested in nuclear energy. They want a bomb.

Last item: Turkish propaganda for this, the most recent betrayal of Kurds by the US, has already hit the American media. The Turkish propagandist, Tulin Daloglu was last heard from during the flurry of Washington/Ankara visits last December. Lo and behold, she turns up again, at The Washington Times to propagandize Rice's recent visit. This piece of propaganda is in the critical mode, in order to appeal to American fears of terrorists (i.e. Kurds). Her last line gives away Turkey's objective:

Iranian cooperation with Turkey, a NATO country, against a terrorist organization recognized by both the United States and the EU could open an unprecedented dialogue.

5. - The New Anatolian - "ECHR fines Turkey in former DEP deputies' case":

ANKARA / 5 May 2006

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) yesterday ruled against Turkey in a case filed against the state by former deputies of the now defunct pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP).

The court ruled that Turkey must pay 26,500 euros to four former DEP deputies, Mahmut Alinak, Sedat Yurttas, Sirri Sakik and Ahmet Turk.

In March 1994, the Turkish Parliament lifted the parliamentary immunity of some of the DEP's members of Parliament. The applicants were among those affected. Three months later the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the DEP on the grounds that it undermined the territorial integrity of the state and national unity.

In December of that same year, the now-defunct Ankara State Security Court (DGM) sentenced Sakik and Alinak to three years each in prison, Turk to 15 years and Yurttas to seven-and-a-half years on the grounds that they had engaged in intensive separatist activity. More specifically, they had all given speeches under the banner of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In April 1996, the same court, following the remittal of the case by the Court of Cassation, reduced the applicants' sentences to 14 months.

The four applicants filed their cases with the ECHR on the grounds that their convictions interfered with their right to the freedom of expression, and constituted a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, they also complained under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) that the proceedings resulting in their conviction had been unfair.

The court noted that, in the speeches, the applicants had mainly been calling for recognition of their Kurdish identity and had condemned the "policy of violence" implemented by Turkey in areas of the country where the majority of citizens were of Kurdish origin. The court reiterated that while freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially true for an elected representative of the people who drew attention to their concerns and defended their interests.

The court ruled that the reasons given by the Turkish courts could not, in themselves, be regarded as sufficient to justify interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression.

6. - Bianet - "Appeals Court Quashes Dink Verdict":

Court of Appeals overrules verdict deferring 6 months jail term for bilingual Armenian Turkish Agos newspaper editor Hrank Dink. Journalist-writer may be retried on charges of insulting Turkish identity.

ANKARA / 4 May 2006

The Court of Appeals has quashed a verdict deferring a 6 months jail sentence for Hrant Dink, editor of the bilingual Armenian Turkish “Agos” newspaper convicted originally for “insulting Turkish identity”.

The 9th Department of the Appeals Court on Wednesday cited “procedural deficiencies” in the original sentence as reason to overrule the verdict, pointing out that Dink’s remarks “The poisoned blood that will spill from Turks will be replaced by noble blood of the Armenians who will create Armenia” constituted the offence of “insulting Turkish identity”.

The decision said Dink’s remarks did not fall under the scope of the freedom of expression as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights and disagreed with the Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor’s previous evaluation that a local court verdict against Dink should be overruled on grounds that the physical and moral conditions of an offence had not taken place.

The court also found a procedural flaw in the Sisli 2nd Court of First Instance trial of Dink where lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz and his colleagues were not accepted by the court as complainants as they were not directly affected by the offence. It also cited these individuals being paid representation fees as part of its decision to overrule the verdict.

Following this decision the case file is to be submitted to the Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor’s office. If the Chief Prosecutor’s Office does not appeal against the decision, the case will be re-sent to a local court where Dink is to be retried. If the decision is appealed, the case file will then be submitted for a decision to the General Commission of the Council of State .