2 March 2006

1. "Turkey in Europe...", big political debate of instant to be for or against the entrance of Turkey in Europe.

2. "Valley of the Wolves: Or Art Deeply Mired in the Lexicon of Bigotry", a political culture that produces and consumes a movie like Valley of the Wolves is still a long way from realizing how deeply mired its lexicon is in bigotry.

3. "Top Turkey mafia boss gets further 11 years jail", Turkey's most notorious mafia leader was sentenced to nearly 11 years in jail on Tuesday for ordering the murder of a stockbroker, the Anatolia news agency reported.

4. "Foreign manufacturers seek share in Turk tank program", but questions remain as to what portion of the multi-billion-dollar contract will have to go to foreign tech suppliers.

5. "The Kurds and the US", when thinking about the Kurdish question in Iraq, it might be useful to examine the worldwide political status since the end of The First World War. By doing so, one can consider which factors helped internationalize the Kurdish question and examine whether this awareness was because of "Kurdish will ".

6. "Iraqi PM Satisfied With Outcome of Visit to Turkey", meanwhile, the Turkish government voiced once again its concerns regarding the activities of the outlawed Kurdish Workers'Party (PKK) in northern Iraq.

1. - Portage Emploi - "Turkey in Europe...":

1 March 2006

Big political debate of instant to be for or against the entrance of Turkey in Europe.

The EU it is also a political and social plan without having replaced this why CEE(European economic community) with the EU? Why to have created a constitution?

It is a secret for nobody, after the enlargement of the European Union in 25 countries, a 26th country gets ready, in coming decades, to unite with the Union, to know Turkey, all at once undoubtedly when some other countries as for instance Romania.

This possible - or even probable - additional extension of the EU rouses passions today. Some people think that Europe must keep a cultural unit{unity} - politically correct term to say "nun" - and therefore refuse the entrance of Turkey. This group gathers predominantly conservatives, present in all - mass media sectors, politics etc... Others, contrariwise, that they could qualify as "progressive", think contrariwise that Europe must be able to cultivate diversity, in this understanding cultural diversity, and therefore accept the entrance of Turkey in the EU.

Naturally, this second group does not pretend that the entrance of Turkey in the Union must become unquestioning. Indeed, it is clear{light} that Turkey, all over its difference, is going to have to apply some more reforms - that they are political, cultural, economic; let us not forget in effect that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime minister, comes from a party with distinctly religious vocation, what does not prevent Turkey from being one of the most nondenominational governments of the Muslim countries of all region.

But there will be no that reforms to be applied in Turkey: it will also be necessary to do a difficult job of conscience and memory regarding events ashamed of Turkish history, as Armenian genocide or else Cypriot problem - Cyprus being consequently member of the European Union - or even kurdish problem.

that these duties of memory can take place when they think on one hand of the evolution of relations between Germany and France, lethal enemies at the end of the Second world war, faithful friends at the dawn of the XXIth century, and on the other hand in view of the real realization of the duty of memory of Germany, which copes since a certain number of year.

Those who would accuse the European governments of not taking into account the opinion of their respective populations - opinion polls showing that there are more people compared to the membership of Turkey than of people approving this plan - I would answer that during the membership of other countries in the EU before, opinions were against also, and it for various motives, always recalled today - problems of immigration, impoverishment of the past members of the Union, division in a bigger number of parts of budgets for instance for PAC etc... And, today, who would go to say that it is against the presence of country as Italy or Greece within the European Union? The number of existent immigrants of these countries - however very poor they too during their membership - it really "exploded inside our borders, as well as they feared it?

Another argument often developed by the opponents in the membership of Turkey is the difficulty still augmented in 26 to make decisions. It I shall answer by a twirl: when the Union will find a system able of returning more harmonious and more common decisions - that it is about foreign policy, about common defence, about justice etc - then this system will be just as much applicable to 25 as to 26! Naturally, this system remains to find...

Finally, what shocks me, it is the lack of solidarity of the opponents in Turkish membership. Europe is one of the regions the richest in the world. During centuries - and even even nowadays - Europe used said countries " in process of development " by imposing on them political, economic, cultural systems favouring the Union. Currently, to us to return the elevator to a State which to was also considered her to be a developing country...

What also shocks me it is to determine the point of view according to which very new country - that it is about Turkey just as much as new European countries - brings out of necessity hard things only, even though the perspective of positive provisions (that they are cultural, economic, etc) is only seldom - or even ever - named...

In conclusion, I would say that I hope sincerely that Turkey will be able one day - around 2015 according to the heads of state - to be part of the European Union, after it applies reforms and performs the duties of requested memo.. Date in October, 2005 for the beginning of negotiations!

2. - Kurdistan Observer - "Valley of the Wolves: Or Art Deeply Mired in the Lexicon of Bigotry":

2 March 2006 / by Sabah Salih*

A political culture that produces and consumes a movie like Valley of the Wolves is still a long way from realizing how deeply mired its lexicon is in bigotry.

Movies, like advertising, are essentially social texts. Advertising does not just sell a product; it also promotes a style of living. Movies, likewise, do not just tell a story; they also play an important role in shaping a national identity. Like advertising, they do so through a process of promotion and demotion, or what Robert Scholes calls in The Protocols of Reading “cultural reinforcement,” that is, reassuring the viewers that the values and beliefs they hold are superior to those held by others. For movies, as for advertising, there is also the question of timing, or the historical moment: both tend to respond to key political or social developments in the life of a culture. Furthermore, because movies promise to satisfy our craving for stories the way mythology did for the ancients, we willingly allow our thinking to be saturated by them. Movies, thus, become a big player in the way today’s humans think about themselves and their world.

For all these reasons, and also because movies can be quite good at packaging complicated events as simple stories, movies can play a major role in shaping and policing the national culture, especially when they operate with an easily identifiable ideological bent. The aim of such movies is to turn a lie into a fact, or a stereotype into a piece of coveted wisdom, or racism into a love for one’s homeland. To that end, the viewer is bombarded with images, close-ups, and narrative bits and ends at an alarming rate.

Such is the case with the recently released Turkish movie, aggressively and suggestively titled Valley of the Wolves. Here propaganda crudely and nakedly masquerades as artistic material. This much is given to us right from the start by the title and then reinforced by the plot. The word “wolf” has been one of the key terms of self-definition in the racist vocabulary of Turkish ultra-nationalism. The wolf’s appeal to this nationalism stems from the beast’s legendary ability for strength, stamina, and ruthlessness; this is exactly how this nationalism sees and promotes itself, and it is exactly with opposite terms that this nationalism defines and demotes its opponents: in this case, the Kurds, the Jews, and the Americans. By demonizing these three, the movie confirms for its Turkish viewers the righteousness of the racist belief implanted into their heads by years and years of ideological indoctrination at school, at home, and at the workplace, namely, that to be a Turk is to be racially superior to others.

For the movie, the Kurds are the easiest of the three to be trashed. One reason is because the Kurds traditionally have had little power to define themselves by themselves; their enemies have done that for them in order to damage them, of course. Another is because Kurdish nationalism has been resolute in refusing to bow down to the Turkish state’s notion of Turkishness as a national ideology. Still another is because Turkish nationalism has yet to even admit the word Kurdistan into its vocabulary. In other words, within the Turkish national discourse the green light to say and believe in some of the most loathsome things about the Kurd is already there. As one fellow student years ago ruefully told me, “Growing up in Turkey as a Turk, it never occurred to me, even when I was in college, to stop and examine my racist thoughts about the Kurd; I grew up believing, like every one else, that the Kurd was really subhuman. Sadly, the situation is not all that different today.”

In its portrayal of the Kurd, therefore, the movie takes its cue from the storehouse of the national culture itself. The main reason why the Turks continue to be so strongly opposed to the American project in Iraq is because they are painfully aware that, whatever the outcome, Kurdistan in the end will be its biggest beneficiary. That this was not in the planning makes little difference to them. They view every American-Kurdish handshake as a move against them, and see in the dramatic rise of Southern Kurdistan as the mother of all conspiracies against them. Then came the shocking blow to their national pride early in the war when Turkish paratroopers were shown on television being arrested and humiliated by American troops near Slemani with the Kurds looking on in joyful disbelief.

So, not surprisingly, in trying to erase this national dishonor, Valley of the Wolves takes its revenge first and foremost on Kurdistan. The method of attack is the standard one, portraying the legitimate struggle of an oppressed people against their oppressors as a mercenary act. But the movie goes much further than just insulting the Kurd. The movie strips the Kurd of nationhood by imposing an embargo on its cultural and political narrative. The only approved Kurdish voice in the movie is the one certified to be politically acceptable by the Turks. Trashing the Kurd thus becomes the Turk’s way of feeling good about himself and is one reason for the movie’s huge popularity at home and among the two-million-plus Turks living in Germany. The movie, in short, gives voice to an anti-Kurd feeling already embedded in the culture, and in doing so the movie becomes both the endorser and the enforcer of that feeling. Is it any wonder then that even many in the Turkish political and military hierarchy have spoken approvingly of the movie?

In targeting America for abuse, the movie, likewise, taps into the anti-American feeling that has been brewing and intensifying in the country by the day since the Iraq invasion. Here too the movie works with the same set of stereotypes making the rounds all over the world: Americans are arrogant, Americans are stupid, Americans want to take over the world, America is anti-Muslim, America is anti-Europe. You know the rest. Such group thinking or stereotypes are, of course, the most common forms of thinking. Their simplicity makes them very appealing to the masses and the intellectually lazy. That is why demagogues love them; they know that such thinking, coupled with cinematic images, can be an effective tool of ideological manipulation, as was recently demonstrated by the Danish cartoon portrayal of Mohammed. (The cartoons offered an opportunity for liberating language from the tyranny of the sacred; Islamists responded with the tyranny of fatwas and blind rage, thus confirming once again that under them language will continue to be a prisoner.) The movie’s reliance on stock anti-American images is, therefore, calculated to have a similar effect: turning gross simplifications, prejudice, even falsehood into a blueprint for national thinking. But, with political Islam also lurking ominously in the background, America’s demonization will remain incomplete without the Jew. Here, again, there is no shortage of stock images to draw upon; the national culture endorses and openly circulates some of the most vicious ones. They all portray the Jew as the archetypal figure of deceit and greed responsible for everything from sucking children’s blood, to the horrific events of 9/11, to even epidemics and natural disasters.

In the end, Valley of the Wolves becomes the source of its own undoing: it never stops drawing attention to itself as a project devoted solely to ideological manipulation; and, as a consequence, the movie reveals a strong bond between itself and its many Turkish viewers. What easily emerges from this is that the movie and the people are actually of the same mind and are nourished by the same pattern of thinking.

* Dr. Sabah Salih is Professor of English at Bloomsburg University.

3. - Middle East Times - "Top Turkey mafia boss gets further 11 years jail":

ISTANBUL / 28 January 2006

Turkey's most notorious mafia leader was sentenced to nearly 11 years in jail on Tuesday for ordering the murder of a stockbroker, the Anatolia news agency reported.

The court determined that three men who fired on the victim in 1997 - but failed to kill him - were acting on Alaattin Cakici's orders, and handed down a sentence of 10 years and 10 months.

Extradited from Austria in 2004, the mafia boss had already been sentenced in December to more than 14 years for ordering an armed attack on a cafe frequented by a rival gang in which 15 people were injured. That attack occurred in 2000.

Cakici, 52, a former far-right militant who became a mob leader in the 1990s, is widely believed to be protected by high-level officials for alleged favors that he did for Turkish secret services in the past.

Cakici was also standing trial on Tuesday for his role in the failed privatization of the public Turkbank in 1998, which toppled the government then in power.

He has been indicted in several other cases, including for allegedly ordering the murder of his wife, among others.

4. - Turkish Daily News - "Foreign manufacturers seek share in Turk tank program":

But questions remain as to what portion of the multi-billion-dollar contract will have to go to foreign tech suppliers

ANKARA / 2 March 2006

Several foreign manufacturers are seeking a share in Turkey's indigenous main battle tank program, with emerging proposals ranging from limited off-the-shelf sales to major technology transfer.

Industry sources have said that U.S., Israeli, South Korean and European manufacturers would soon be vying to see what incumbent deals they may win as part of a highly ambitious Turkish program designed to locally build a new generation battle tank to meet the country's medium to long-term requirements.

“The proposed solutions will range from parts and technology sales to major technology transfer,” a source familiar with the program told the Turkish Daily News. “Before any foreign contender may see what deal it could sign with Turkey, Ankara must decide what foreign technology it would require to build its own tank.”

A defense procurement official said that the competition is limited to local manufacturers who will specify in their proposals what foreign technology they would have to need. “We are determined to go local for this program,” he said. “We intend to earn our local industry the critical capabilities of building a new generation tank, no matter how costly the idea may be. There will be several spillover benefits for the local industry.”

Last month, Turkey's defense procurement office, the Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM), formally launched a local competition for the design, development and manufacture of a main battle tank to meet the Turkish Armed Forces' (TSK) future requirement. Three companies with past experience in building armored vehicles have responded to the Request for Proposal (RfP): FNSS, Otokar and BMC.

The SSM expects the local contenders to build an indigenous model with “limited foreign technology.” “We may expect these companies to join their forces and offer a consortium solution,” an SSM official said. “The critical requirement is that we hope to have the systems integration job done locally.”

After years of zigzagging between two competing ideas, Turkey's procurement authorities last year decided to go for an indigenous model to meet the country's need for third generation main battle tanks, dropping the option of an off-the-shelf purchase from a foreign supplier.

A consortium of three private armored vehicle manufacturers (the aforementioned FNSS, Otokar and BMC) was commissioned by the government to draft a feasibility study on the optimum modality for the contract and submitted its report to the SSM last April.

The report suggests that Turkey's local industry could manage the task of developing and manufacturing a “national-design” model, with assistance from foreign manufacturers. It found out that the local industry was capable of doing the systems integration work although some sub-systems will have to be procured from foreign suppliers.

The program for the procurement of an eventual 1,000 third generation tanks is Turkey's largest ever single contract, worth over $10 billion. The program, originally launched in the mid-1990s, was indefinitely postponed in 2001 after a financial crisis chopped off a third of Turkey's national income.

In 2002, Turkey's military and procurement authorities resumed the program and began to weigh two options -- off-the-shelf purchase or local production with foreign tech support -- but failed to make a choice.

Last year, the SSM commissioned the Otokar-BMC-FNSS consortium to produce a feasibility study on the ideal modality for the tank program. With the findings of the report in hand, the SSM held a series of consultative meetings with the Turkish General Staff between May and July.

Analysts said that the final decision will be more strategic than commercial. “One thing is certain … that both the SSM and the military want to test the limits of going for the national model in order to gain capabilities to meet future needs,” said one analyst.

For the original contest in 2000-2001, four international contenders had teamed up with local sub-contractors: General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, Mich., and BMC, with the Abrams M1 A2 tank; the Munich-based Krauss-Maffei Weggmann and Otokar, with the Leopard 2 tank; GIAT, Paris, and Roketsan, with the Leclerc 2; and a team of Ukrspetsexport, Kiev and Asmas, Izmir, with the T-84.

Shelving the main battle tank program, Turkey awarded in March 2002 a $688 million contract to Israeli Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), Ramat Hasharon, Israel, for the upgrade of an initial batch of 170 M60 1A tanks that have been in the Turkish inventory for over three decades.

In addition to that and after on-and-off negotiations over the past years, Turkey and Germany last November sealed a contract for the sale to the Turkish Land Forces of 298 Leopard-2 A4 surplus battle tanks.

The contract will cost Ankara 365 million euros, and about 70 million euros of the price tag will go to German industry for the know-how, personnel training and the technology transfer for critical parts like electronics and the fire control unit. Deliveries under the program will start in the spring of 2006 and will be completed in about 12 months.

5. - Kurdish Media - "The Kurds and the US":

2 March 2006 / by Hishyar Barzani

When thinking about the Kurdish question in Iraq, it might be useful to examine the worldwide political status since the end of The First World War. By doing so, one can consider which factors helped internationalize the Kurdish question and examine whether this awareness was because of "Kurdish will ".

The Kurdish question has been dominated by the colonial division of Kurdistan and its forced annexation to four nation-states. However, after the fall of Hussein's regime this logic changed dramatically. It is useful, therefore, to consider the history of the Kurdish issue:

A. From 1918 -- 1946. Colonial powers helped regional nation states, crushing all Kurdish revolts, and denying Kurds the opportunity to establish their own state.

B. From 1946 -- 1990. The Kurdish question moved out of its regional framework to take an international dimension, as it happened during the Cold War. (1)

C. From 1991 -- 2003. The emergence of the "Safe Haven Zone" followed the second Gulf war.

D. 2003 -- Today. The fall of Hussein's regime in 2003.

During phase B, the Kurdish question evolved around the bipolar logic of the Cold War. It was used by USSR, and to a lesser but still significant degree, the USA. The "balance of power" was a "fixed structure" dominated by the White House and Kremlin. The political game largely exceeded the Kurds. The alliance of the Kurds with a super-power during the Cold War was a short-term alliance. The great powers had not intervened with militarily force in favor of the Kurds. Their reluctance to intervene had a diplomatic and financial nature, which came at a great cost to the Kurdish people: the Moscow -- Teheran agreement in 1946 led to the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad, which later contributed to Israel abandoning a revolt headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani in March 1975 after the Algerian Accord. The Westphalia Treaty (1648) was left to govern inter-state relations.

The fall of the Berlin led to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and with it, the eventual collapse of the Communist Soviet Union.

Hussein did not grasp the new changes in the balance of power and sent his armies to occupy Kuwait in August 1990. In 1991, Hussein's army was defeated and Kuwait was able to restore its sovereignty.

The impact of Hussein's defeat in Kuwait has brought radical changes inside Iraq. The Shia population in southern cities revolted, the Kurdish masses attacked Iraqi army garrisons, who controlled nearly the entire Kurdistan territory in Iraq. The Republican Guards crushed both revolts brutally. Allied forces watched the cruelty in silence. A massive exude of the Kurds towards the Iranian and Turkish frontiers began, becoming the focus of media attention worldwide. European public opinion sympathized with the plight of Kurdish refugees. The Allies, enabling the refugees regain their homes, created the Safe Haven Zone. An exceptional situation has emerged in Kurdistan. Gradually, the US became the main player in the Middle East politics.

Thanks pressure from America the internal bloody conflict among Kurdish chiefs ceased. With the tragedy of 9/11, the USA interest on Kurds increased, particularly after Turkey refused to allow US forces use of its airports to attack Iraq in 2003.

There is a basis for mutual interest. The Kurds are a faithful ally to the USA, in a region where enmity to USA policies is the main feature. For the last 15 years, the Allies protected the Kurds from the tyranny of the Baath Regime. The Kurds, in accordance with their limited means, helped US forces to defeat the Baath regime and helped capture Saddam Hussein, as well as some other dangerous criminals. Kurdistan is now a safe area, rich in oil, water and other minerals. Pipeline routes for oil and gas passes through Kurdish territory to Turkey, then on to Europe. There are, in general, no fanatics or dangerous extremism, despite the neighboring states' attempt to radicalize certain religious factions among Kurds. South Kurdistan has a demographic potential of 6 million; out of the 275 seats in the Iraqi National Assembly (INA), there are 52 seats for Kurdish Alliance, plus 5 seats for the Kurdish Islamic Alliance.

USA ambitions

According to oil industry experts, Iraq has the world's second largest oil reserves. A recent survey calculated that there were above 200 billion barrels of high-grade crude. The oil in Kurdistan and Iraq is attractive because it is plentiful and of high quality, the cost of production is exceptionally low and it is likely to become the number one holder of oil reserves in the world.

Throughout the 20th century, major powers have battled to seize these vital sources of energy. The main international oil companies, based in USA and UK were keen to regain control over Iraq's oil, including the oil of Kurdistan.

With the US in control of energy sources in the Middle East, it can sustain enormous economic pressure against Russia, China and even European countries that are unfriendly to USA policies. Furthermore, America will influence the OPEC quota system, by pulling out one of its main producers. The Anglo-American heavy military presence in Iraq, form a warning factor against Iran and Syria, enhancing at the same time, the security of Israel.

In order to strengthen peace and stability in the region, major oil companies should not be allowed to make a high rate of profit while the majority of people lives in poverty. Past errors of oil exploitation should not be repeated in Iraq and Kurdistan. For example, under the British and Arab rule from 1923-1991, oil in Kurdistan was a source of destruction and misery. Iraqi governments used oil profits for military equipment; the RAF and the Iraqi air forces bombed and destroyed thousands of villages, used chemical weapons. Iraqi army massacred thousands of Kurds, Shias and Assyrians. Oil is an effective weapon but extremely dangerous when it fall into the hands of a dictator. Let us take the example of oil-for-food program, handled by Hussein's regime and the United Nations, The goal was to provide food to impoverished Iraqis, "the arrangement became spectacularly corrupt, with U.N. officials receiving kickbacks from the Iraqi regime and the humanitarian supplies never reaching Iraqis"(2)

Investors would buy oil at low market so they could sell it at higher price; Hussein used his profit to buy political influence. Hussein, who controlled vast sums of money from Iraqi oil, would choose his partners for money distribution which led to a fight among Kurdish ruling parties.

In order to build a civilised, democratic and a stable state, oil revenues must be taken out of individual and political party monopoly. This cannot be achieved without a strong USA intervention in favour of real democracy in Kurdistan. Unfortunately, up to now, we are far from such trend an objective. Rubin Michael correctly pointed out, "When the West embraces stability instead of democracy, dictators triumph". This is what is happening now in Kurdistan.

Israeli goals

Historically, relations between Israelis and Kurds were good. The ancient Jewish of Kurdistan lived together in the same land and shared common life with the Kurds for centuries. When Hussein's army was defeated in March 1991, he used his forces to crush the Kurdish upheaval. Traumatised by past of chemical attacks, nearly 2 million people marched towards Turco-Iranian frontiers. Amid the harsh rain and snow, died from cold, many of whom were children or elderly. The Organization of Kurdish Jews in Israel began to mobilize, protesting against the inaction of the US. Me Haviv Shimon, the President of the Organization, declared to Jerusalem Post on April 8 1991: "This time, the Americans are to be blamed. They are advocating new world order and do not respect what they say". There were serious attempts to make Israeli government move in favour of Kurdish refugees. (3)

In July 2003, two months after President Bush declared his premature victory in Iraq, the Israeli intelligence was much less optimistic about the outcome of the war, warning the Americans that the insurgents had the support of Iranian intelligence and other foreign fighters. Israel has kept a watchful eye on Syrian and Iranian activities in Iraq because they were fearful that Iran and Syria would recruit armed militia among the Iraqis, linking Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hamas, Jihad and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hence, Israel has found the Kurds as a counter balance force against Damascus and Teheran policies. Israeli security vision necessitates its physical presence in the entire Middle East. Geographically, Kurdish land, borders Syria and Iran, from where Israel can have an observation on Iran's nuclear efforts. In fact, the relations between Israel and Kurds are a delicate matter; the weak point in Kurdo-Israeli relations is that, it has no geographical connection between Kurdistan and Israel. The contacts cannot be established without raising Turkish suspicions.

Regrettably, there is no unified and coherent Kurdish foreign policy, based on long-term Kurdish interest. Each of the Kurdish ruling party leaders has his own hidden foreign policy and connections, without the knowledge of the other.

We know now for sure that relations between Israel and the Kurdish revolt headed by late (Mullah Mustafa Barzani 1964-1975) were under Iran's close control. It could not move beyond the red line drawn by the Iranian authority. When the Shah reached an agreement with Hussein in Algeria in 1975, the USA and Israel withdrew their support. Today, under different circumstances, Turkey may be playing the same role, as did Iran, three decades ago.

Despite conflicting interests between Turkey, Syria and Iran, their mutual wariness of the "Kurdish peril", has always transcended their differences. For Israel, four major recent events rendered the Kurdish factor indispensable: the Shia majority have democratically dominated the Iraqi National Assembly as a result. Hams will form the new Palestinian government, the election of a radical personality, Ahmedinejad as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but more importantly, it seems that the US's occupation of Iraq is in real trouble.

Meanwhile, Turkish authorities view the Kurds as a threat. In many occasions, we have witnessed the eruption of mutual critics between Tel-Aviv and Ankara over Kurds and Hamas. The recent visit to Ankara, by a delegate from Hamas, exasperated Israelis. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, bowing to such concerns, called off plans to meet the Hamas delegation. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul held informal talks with the Hamas represantatives. It would be naïve if Kurds underestimate the security and trade ties between Turkey and Israel. It is unfortunate that in the Middle East, enter-state treaties are imposed by the logic of security and enmity. This is an offensive strategy, undemocratic and leads to distrust, antagonism and plotting in darkness.

Conclusion

At this historical juncture, a sectarian violence and terrorism are the main features dominating Iraq and the Middle East. We, the Kurds, should distance ourselves from inter-community wars, by calling for dialogue, peace and friendship between nations, communities and faiths. It might be wise for the Kurds to remain neutral and embark on a global political efforts, to convince states and international public opinion, to recognise "Kurdistan neutrality". The Kurdish Diaspora can play an important rule in such endeavours.

Notes

(1) On 9 July 1963, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, sent letters to Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria against any pro-Iraq military intervention in the war in Kurdistan.

(2) A briefing by Claudia Rosett May 3, 2005. (Iraq and the Importance of the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Scandal)

(3) Les Annales De L'autre Islam. No 5 (Islam des Kurdes) Paris 1998. Page 199

6. - Xinhuanet - "Iraqi PM Satisfied With Outcome of Visit to Turkey":

ANKARA / 1 March 2006

Visiting Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari said on Wednesday that he was satisfied with the outcome of his visit to Turkey.

Jaafari made the remark at the airport shortly before his departure home.

In response to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's criticism of his visit to Turkey, Jaafari insisted that the visit to Ankara was right, which strengthened relations between Turkey and Iraq.

Talabani on Tuesday sharply criticized Jaafari, saying his visit to Turkey came without the approval of the Iraqi government,the parliament or the president.

Jaafari "has no right to enter into talks or discussions with other countries while talks on forming a new government are still underway," said Talabani in a statement posted on his official website.

Jaafari was re-selected by the ruling Shiite bloc for the post of prime minister, but no agreement has yet been reached on setting up a new cabinet, more than two months after the Dec. 15 general elections.

Arguing that his visit to Ankara was legal, Jaafari said, "We are continuing talks with other parties and a new Iraqi government will be set up in the near future."

He stressed that the new government would be broad-based, which would represent all the sects within the society.

Jaafari, who arrived in Ankara on Tuesday on a formal visit,held talks with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on the same day over the latest development in Iraq as sectarian tensions soared after abomb attack on a major Shiite mosque on Feb. 22.

Turkish authorities hoped that the escalation of violence in Iraq should be avoided.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government voiced once again its concerns regarding the activities of the outlawed Kurdish Workers'Party (PKK) in northern Iraq.