9 January 2006

1. "Turkey minister urges novelist to apologize for remarks that put him on trial", seeking to end an unpopular case, the justice minister urged Turkey's best-known novelist Friday to apologize for remarks that led to charges of insulting the country. Orhan Pamuk went on trial Dec. 16 for saying "30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians were killed in these lands," but the proceeding was immediately stopped to await a ruling by the Justice Ministry on whether to proceed.

2. "Kurdish mayor of bird flu town complains of lack of support from Turkish government", Mukkades Kubilay, the Kurdish woman mayor of Dogubayazit, the town that is at the centre of the bird flu crisis in Turkey, has complained to the Turkish media that the Turkish authorities are not doing enough to combat the bird flu crisis and are leaving the local Kurdish council to struggle with limited resources. She is concerned that the virus could spread.

3. "Power and money in Turkey-EU relations", Turkey's identity, negative stereotypes, the Armenian and Kurdish questions, Greek opposition and the Cyprus issue, the extent of democracy in Turkey (forcing reforms that many Turks like) and not least of all the presence of a largely Muslim country in a mainly Christian club. This is quite a long list and can probably be extended with several more points as well.

4. "Europe should open itself to Turkey", but Turkey’s EU aspirations mean that it is now being forced to demilitarise its democracy and to find negotiated and peaceful agreements with all its neighbours and future partners—Armenians, Kurds, and Cypriots. Thus, if Europe manages to overcome its fears and hesitations and opens itself to a powerful Muslim state, it will consolidate peace in one of the world’s most dangerous regions.

5. "Pope Attacker To Be Released", a court in Turkey has approved the release of the man who shot Pope John Paul II in 1981, saying he completed his sentence for crimes he committed in Turkey.

6. "Dutch prosecutor appeals against businessman's Iraq war crimes conviction", the Dutch national prosecutor has appealed against a businessman's war crimes conviction for supplying chemicals used in gas attacks on Kurdish villages in Iraq in the 1980s, a judicial official said Friday.

7. "Kurds tap Talabani for Iraqi presidency", Iraq's powerful Kurdish Alliance has nominated Jalal Talabani to be the country's president for a second term.

8. "The Transformation of the Kurdish group Ansar al-Islam", Ansar al-Islam seems to have dropped off the radar screen, while an even more active and deadly terrorist organization with similar nomenclature, Ansar al-Sunna, has emerged in its place. With its membership scattered and installations decimated, has Ansar al-Islam disappeared as a coherent force?

1. - AP - "Turkey minister urges novelist to apologize for remarks that put him on trial":

ANKARA / 6 January 2006 / by Selcan Hacaoglu

Seeking to end an unpopular case, the justice minister urged Turkey's best-known novelist Friday to apologize for remarks that led to charges of insulting the country.

Orhan Pamuk went on trial Dec. 16 for saying "30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians were killed in these lands," but the proceeding was immediately stopped to await a ruling by the Justice Ministry on whether to proceed.

Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, who has the final say on halting the trial, said Friday he would rule before the next court date of Feb. 7 on whether to go ahead with the proceeding, which has divided the nation and brought Turkey international censure.

The controversy comes at a particularly sensitive time in the overwhelmingly Muslim country's push to join the European Union, which severely criticized the trial, questioning the commitment to freedom of expression in a country that opened membership negotiations with the bloc in October.

In urging Pamuk to apologize, the minister appeared to be looking for a way to end the case. Dozens of other people are facing similar charges.

"I wish he would" apologize, Cicek said on private NTV television, adding that he would like the writer to say: "I am sorry."

However, the decision to drop the case is likely to anger the government's conservative and nationalist grass roots, who were angered by Pamuk's remarks.

Pamuk was charged under a law that makes insulting Turkey a crime after a Swiss newspaper in February quoted him as saying: "30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians were killed in these lands, and nobody but me dares to talk about it."

Pamuk's remarks referred to two of the most painful episodes in recent Turkish history: the mass killings of Armenians during World War I, which Turkey insists was not a planned genocide, and recent guerrilla fighting in Turkey's overwhelmingly Kurdish southeast.

To many nationalists, Pamuk's remarks were especially upsetting because they were made to a foreign newspaper. Pamuk, the critically acclaimed author of "My Name is Red," "Snow" and "Istanbul," faces up to three years in prison if convicted.

Cicek criticized Pamuk for not making timely conciliatory remarks and not trying to clarify his comments, hinting that such a move would have prevented his trial.

"Why didn't he come out and say: 'I never said such a thing,"' Cicek asked. "He should have said: 'I apologize to my nation."'

European officials have demanded that Turkey drop the case against Pamuk and do more to protect freedom of expression.

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul acknowledged the case had tarnished the country's image abroad and said laws limiting freedom of expression may be changed.

In Pamuk's Dec. 16 trial appearance, EU legislators stood outside the courthouse and questioned the government's commitment to free speech.

But nationalists pelted Pamuk's car with eggs, shouting "Traitor!" and "Love it or leave it!" in reference to Turkey.

2. - KNK - "Kurdish mayor of bird flu town complains of lack of support from Turkish government":

6 January 2006

Mukkades Kubilay, the Kurdish woman mayor of Dogubayazit, the town that is at the centre of the bird flu crisis in Turkey, has complained to the Turkish media that the Turkish authorities are not doing enough to combat the bird flu crisis and are leaving the local Kurdish council to struggle with limited resources. She is concerned that the virus could spread.

In a phone conversation to a member of the Kurdish community in London, Mukkades complained that the Turkish authorities are leaving the local council to slaughter birds and doctors are demanding money before coming to the area. The council do not have the finances to deal with the bird flu and are concerned that not enough is being done. The Mayor has also complained that continued lack of resources to the Kurdish area have left the town in poverty and with no proper medical facilities. She said that if proper medical facilities had been in Dogubayazit the lives of those who died perhaps could have been saved.

The Halkevi condemns this discrimination of the Kurdish people in Turkey and is concerned that if proper resources are not made available to the local council this could threaten a further spread of the virus. We demand that further resources are made available to the local council immediately.

If you wish to speak to Mukkades Kubilay her telephone number is 0090 472 312 6396, 0090 5338140930 (You will need a Turkish/Kurdish interpreter).

For further information please contact:
Ibrahim Dogus: 020 7249 6980
Mark Campbell: 07865 079 415

3. - Turkish Daily News - "Power and money in Turkey-EU relations":

8 January 2006 / by Barry Rubin

I once asked a Turkish ambassador what he thought was the main reason that it was so hard for his country to get into the European Union. ”The problem,” he said, “is that each year they come up with a new reason.”

That was both a funny and an apt response. Over the years I have read dozens of articles about Turkish-EU issues to the point that I'm starting to think there is nothing more to say on the subject.

There is, after all, no great mystery here. We can all give a long list of the motives that have made many European governments, politicians, and average people oppose Turkish membership and also for EU bureaucrats to go slow in the process. After all, things are most likely to happen when there are a variety of factors pushing in the same direction, lots of reasons that appeal to different people or institutions.

Some of these factors are cultural and ideological: Turkey's identity, negative stereotypes, the Armenian and Kurdish questions, Greek opposition and the Cyprus issue, the extent of democracy in Turkey (forcing reforms that many Turks like) and not least of all the presence of a largely Muslim country in a mainly Christian club. This is quite a long list and can probably be extended with several more points as well.

Yet, I always suspect that the real, most powerful, barriers here are material ones. Ironically, even nowadays when “political correctness” supposedly discourages ethnic and religious slurs it is still easier to talk about such issues than to admit to motives based on self-interest.

Let me, then, suggest what I consider to be the most powerful factors making it harder for Turkey to get into the EU, which can be summed up as involving two of those great human motivations -- power and money.

First, let's consider power: To a large extent, the EU has been ruled by a French-German partnership. These two governments rightly expect that they will not be able to get Turkey to go along with all their wishes. The more countries that are admitted -- especially given the weight of Turkey's large population -- the greater the dilution of German-French control. In this context, Turkey's geographical location and its different historical experience make it even more of a potential wild card in terms of what leadership and policies it would support in the EU. Perhaps, too, Turkey's long and close alliance with the United States also makes the current rulers nervous.

Most obviously, Turkey would have a big say in the future EU parliament given its population. This would reduce the amount of power and bureaucratic jobs available to the traditional members. And anyone associated with the EU can easily imagine that Turkey's leverage would be used against any scheme that they happen to favor.

There is, of course, a close connection between power and money. Setting any EU policy is going to make some people and cost others a great deal of money. To a large extent, the EU has been a welfare state for France. The whole French lifestyle -- a large rural population; massive agricultural over-production; the un-economic (albeit pleasurable) duplication of wine, cheese and other luxuries; a short work week; and long vacations -- has been based on EU subsidies.

Given its lower living standards and high population, though, Turkey is going to pull at EU money like a vacuum cleaner. It will have a big incentive to favor policies that run directly counter to the interests of France and some other key members. As a country that exports food and cheap consumer goods, Turkey will directly challenge existing producers and undercut their profits.

In short, Turkish membership is going to take money out of the pockets of other states and could be the last straw that pushes France into a major crisis for which there is no visible solution. For a long time, an additional element in these material contradictions has been the question of Turkish labor mobility and now this aspect has assumed an even bigger role. Already, Western European members have large numbers of foreign or immigrant workers who they cannot absorb. In some cases, especially that of France, the country cannot even provide employment for the workers it already has living there. Thus, while one fear is the fact that Turkish workers are Muslims, even without this point the sheer numbers of those involved is a matter of deep concern.

Certainly, it is possible to think of ways to solve these problems. Equally, there are many ways to pretend that they do not even exist. Yet the sheer quantity and importance of such controversies show just how difficult it is going to be for Turkey to achieve full membership. None of these factors are going to disappear and, as the Turkish ambassador quoted above suggested, there might even be new reasons added in the years to come.

4. - The Financial Express - "Europe should open itself to Turkey":

It should show to the world that it’s not a ‘Christian Club’

7 January 2006 / by Michel Rocard*

Turkey is now, finally, negotiating with the European Commission, the terms of its possible membership in the European Union. But whether “possible” becomes “eventual” remains very much an open question. Indeed, completing the negotiations is likely to prove as difficult as the decision to start them.
Recall that Turkey made its first application to join in 1959, and that since 1963, the European Economic Community, the forerunner to today’s EU, responded with a delaying tactic: a request for a customs agreement. At the same time, having never had to take “no” for an answer—and after receiving a series of nods and winks that hinted that membership might one day come— Turkey’s expectation of eventual EU integration became increasingly palpable.

But ordinary Europeans have begun looking at maps, and the geography that they see cannot be denied: 95% of Turkey’s territory and 80% of its population is in Asia. As a result, the fierce and lively debate—in Turkey and much more emphatically in the EU—about whether Turkey really belongs to Europe has continued, despite the start of negotiations.

Of course, the question of Turkey’s European identity cannot be answered with geography lessons. At least half of the body of Greek theatre and philosophy was produced in Asia Minor. The first Christian evangelisation trips of Saint Peter and Saint Paul were to Turkey. Later, Ottoman Turkey was for centuries considered a part of the “concert of Europe,” proving indispensable in defining and securing the strategic balance among the European continent’s Great Powers.

Yet this historical evidence is not enough to unite European sentiment in favour of Turkey’s EU membership. On the contrary, “the Turkish Question” will be resolved on the basis of the current political preoccupations and concerns for the future. Fortunately, that choice was not settled prematurely and peremptorily: the process that will lead to a final decision was merely allowed to start with the opening of negotiations.

Membership talks can’t help but be long and arduous, if only because adopting the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law) requires that Turkey integrate around 10,000 pages of texts into its legislation. However, all this now seems to have a serious chance of succeeding.

And yet Turkey scares countless Europeans. With 67 million people today, and a population that will reach 80 million in 20 years and 100 million in 2050, Turkey is bound to become the most populous of all European nations. It is also a very poor Muslim country.

To be sure, a few countries in Europe, mainly Germany and Austria, have welcomed strong inflows of Turkish immigration. But the immigrants have been mostly poor peasants from Anatolia, whose integration has proven to be difficult. By contrast, Turkey’s large, secular intellectual community, whose cultural background is European, and from which the Turkish state recruits most of its executives, has remained in Istanbul and Ankara.

Europe, then, is frightened by the prospect of more immigration by Turks who find it almost impossible to assimilate. For the moment, such immigration has almost stopped, owing to rapid economic growth—indeed, the fastest in Europe—in recent years, which is absorbing the country’s available labour and has thus stemmed the flow of emigrants. Yet the fear remains that membership in the Union will unleash a new human tide.

Economic fears are not the only concern for EU citizens. Turkey was the theatre of exceptional violence in the 20th century: its participation in World War I fueled hatred and gigantic massacres with the genocide of the Armenians, the last vicious spasm of the Ottoman Empire’s brutal demise. Moreover, while Kemal Ataturk restored Turkish national pride by creating the secular Turkish republic, his legacy is mixed, for it includes both Turkey’s strong attraction to the West and a militarisation of public life. The latter explains much of the repressive attitude towards free speech and independent opinion that has characterised much of Turkish public life—a straitjacket that has left little room for real negotiations with Turkey’s restless Kurds or for resolving the division of Cyprus.

But Turkey’s EU aspirations mean that it is now being forced to demilitarise its democracy and to find negotiated and peaceful agreements with all its neighbours and future partners—Armenians, Kurds, and Cypriots. Thus, if Europe manages to overcome its fears and hesitations and opens itself to a powerful Muslim state, it will consolidate peace in one of the world’s most dangerous regions.

Indeed, by integrating Turkey, Europe would show that it is not a Christian club, that the supposed “clash of civilizations” need not be fatal, and that the European project, born out of a desire for reconciliation and the need to promote development, can spread its benefits far beyond the western half of Europe. In opening itself to Turkey, the EU would finally begin to play its proper role in confronting today’s most daunting political challenges.

* The writer, a former Prime Minister of France and leader of the Socialist Party, is a member of the European Parliament. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2005.

5. - World News - "Pope Attacker To Be Released":

9 January 2006

A court in Turkey has approved the release of the man who shot Pope John Paul II in 1981, saying he completed his sentence for crimes he committed in Turkey.

Mehmet Ali Agca, 46, was extradited to Turkey in 2000 after serving almost 20 years in prison in Italy for shooting and wounding the Pope in St Peter's Square in Rome. His motives for the attack remain unclear.

Agca was expected to be released as early as Moday, the semiofficial Anatolia news agency reported. But his lawyer and family said they were not aware of the court decision.

"I'm surprised," his lawyer Dogan Yildirim told The Associated
Press by telephone. "If it's true, justice will finally be served. He has been in prison for so long."

Agca's sister, Fatma Agca, was also surprised. "We did not hear it," said Fatma Agca from the family home in the southeastern city of Malatya.

Agca, a draft-dodger, was expected to be immediately enlisted by the military for obligatory military service, Anatolia said.

Upon his return to Turkey, Agca was sent to prison to serve a 10-year sentence for murdering Turkish journalist Abdi Ipekci in 1979. He was separately sentenced to seven years and four months for two robberies in Turkey the same year.

An Istanbul court ruled in 2004 that Agca should only serve the longest sentence, his conviction for killing Ipekci. That 10-year sentence was changed twice because of new Turkish laws.

Agca served less than six months in Turkish prison in 1979 for killing Ipekci before he escaped, resurfacing in 1981 in Rome.

Because of the time he served in the past, the Turkish prison asked for permission from a court to release Agca. The court ruled that Agca could now be freed within the next week, Anatolia said.

Vatican accepts decision

The Vatican said that it accepted the decision by the Turkish court to release Agca.

"With legal issues, the Holy See leaves it up to the courts with competence in these areas," Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls said.

He said the Vatican had only learned of the court's decision from press agencies and had not been given prior notice.

Agc was a 23-year-old far-right militant on the run from the Turkish police when he opened fire in Rome.

The pope suffered a serious wound to the abdomen. John Paul II forgave his attacker and even met him in prison.

Agca reportedly sympathised with the Gray Wolves, a far right-wing militant group that fought street battles against leftists in the 1970s.

6. - AFP - "Dutch prosecutor appeals against businessman's Iraq war crimes conviction":

THE HAGUE / 6 January 2006

The Dutch national prosecutor has appealed against a businessman's war crimes conviction for supplying chemicals used in gas attacks on Kurdish villages in Iraq in the 1980s, a judicial official said Friday.

Chemicals trader Frans van Anraat, 63, was sentenced to 15 years' jail on December 23 on charges of aiding war crimes but was acquitted of complicity in genocide over the 1988 massacre of 5,000 Kurds by dictator Saddam Hussein's regime.

The court in The Hague ruled that while the former Iraqi ruler committed genocide against Kurds in the 1980s, it had not been proven that Van Anraat knew of the regime's genocidal intentions.

"The ruling on the legal question of complicity in genocide requires, according to the prosecutor, the judgement of a higher legal authority," the national prosecutor said in a brief statement.

Van Anraat, who lived as a fugitive in Iraq for 14 years until the United States-led invasion in 2003, was prosecuted after the Dutch supreme court ruled that national courts could try Dutch residents over genocide and war crimes committed in other countries.

Under international law, genocide carries a special burden of proof showing that a suspect had a specific intent or knew of a specific intent to commit genocide. The burden of proof is less for war crimes.

Van Anraat's lawyer said after the verdict he would lodge an appeal.

7. - Reuters - "Kurds tap Talabani for Iraqi presidency":

9 January 2006

Iraq's powerful Kurdish Alliance has nominated Jalal Talabani to be the country's president for a second term.

"We had a meeting yesterday and we agreed to nominate President Talabani to one of the main posts in the country - the presidency," Kurdish official Barham Salih said.

Political sources say that Iraq's other main parties are unlikely to try to block the Kurdish nomination.

The country's main Shiite Islamist alliance, which dominated last month's election, has already made it clear that it is more interested in the prime ministership.

No other party or coalition is likely to have enough influence within the new government to thwart Mr Talabani.

However, it remains to be seen how powerful the new president will be.

Mr Talabani has repeatedly said he would not stand for re-election unless the post came with more powers.

That is interpreted by some as a call for a redrafting of Iraq's constitution, which will be reviewed once the new government comes to power.

But Mr Salih says that is not what Mr Talabani wants.

"He had never called for amending the constitution but rather for a political agreement in which the authorities of the president are reinforced," Mr Salih said.

"And in our meetings with the political blocs we are going to stress this."

In a statement issued later, Mr Talabani's spokesman said: "President Talabani has stressed many times that he must get more powers to accept this post."

Mr Talabani has hosted a series of bilateral talks in northern Iraq since the December 15 vote aimed at forming a national unity government.

The leader of one of Iraq's two main Kurdish parties, he has been president since early 2005 after being nominated by his one-time rival Massoud Barzani.

The pair had struck a deal allowing Mr Barzani to become president of Kurdistan for six years.

8. - Global Terrorism Analysis - "The Transformation of Ansar al-Islam":

8 January 2006 / by Lydia Khalil

Ansar al-Islam seems to have dropped off the radar screen, while an even more active and deadly terrorist organization with similar nomenclature, Ansar al-Sunna, has emerged in its place. With its membership scattered and installations decimated, has Ansar al-Islam disappeared as a coherent force?

Although not as strong as it once was, the arrest of Ansar al-Islam members in Kurdistan indicates that there are sleeper cells remaining in the area [1]. Ansar al-Islam members still operate inside Iraq but are now largely based in predominately Sunni Arab areas in central Iraq where they are able to operate more freely. Furthermore, Ansar al-Islam is active in Europe, recruiting, transporting and even training jihadists to fight in Iraq.

It has been widely reported that Ansar al-Sunna, a prolific and capable terrorist organization, is an offshoot of Ansar al-Islam. Yet the linkage between Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna is not as straightforward. Many security officials believe--and arrest patterns indicate--that Kurdish militants affiliated with Ansar al-Islam have dispersed in two directions within Iraq. Some Ansar members are now connected with Zarqawi’s Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq), and work out of central Iraq. Another wing operates under the rubric of Ansar al-Sunna [2]. Ansar al-Islam, for its part, continues to work as a separate entity within Europe.

Since their emergence in the late 1970s, Kurdish Salafists have organized themselves in a variety of different groups and networked with other militants. They have also easily reconstituted themselves in different groupings after the splinter or defeat of a particular organization. For example, Jund al-Islam reorganized itself as Ansar al-Islam after its defeat by PUK forces in 2001. Analysts are now wondering what has become of Ansar al-Islam.

Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna Connection

In keeping with their tradition of metamorphosis, remaining Ansar al-Islam jihadists dispersed into smaller sleeper cells in Iraqi Kurdistan, migrated into al-Qaeda-affiliated groups operating in Iraq, most notably Ansar al-Sunna, or fled to Iran [3]. Ansar al-Islam leaders, such as Abu Abdullah al-Shafei, Ayoub Afghani and Abu Wa'el, were seen in the Iranian border city of Sanandaj later that summer, regrouping their fighters and recruiting new men [4]. Those who found themselves in Arab Sunni areas managed to merge with Arab Salafists, marking the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna.

Ansar al-Sunna formed from an amalgam of jihadists, not just remnants of Ansar al-Islam. According to Michael Rubin, one of the first U.S. analysts to write on the subject, “Ansar al-Sunna, which officially declared its existence in a September 20, 2003 Internet statement, evolved from the coalescence of Kurdish Ansar al-Islam operatives, foreign al-Qaeda terrorists, and newly mobilized Iraqi Sunnis.”

Additionally, Ansar al-Islam’s casus belli was more limited than Ansar al-Sunna’s wider objectives. Ansar al-Islam was formed before the Coalition occupation of Iraq. It was not formed with the goal of dispelling the occupying forces, but rather the defeat of the secular Kurdish leadership. Ansar al-Islam’s objectives have since evolved to include resisting the foreign occupation.

There are also personnel and operational linkages between Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna. According to Kurdish intelligence sources, Abu Abdullah, the self-styled emir of Ansar al-Sunna, is also said to be an associate of Abdullah Shafe'ii, a leader of Ansar al-Islam. It is also reported that Abu Abdullah is the brother of Abdullah al Shami--an Ansar al-Islam leader killed while fighting PUK peshmerga in 2003 [5].

Since its inception, Ansar al-Sunna has been responsible for some of the most vicious attacks in Iraq, including the coordinated Irbil bombings in February 2004, the suicide bombing of the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, an ambush in which nine Spanish intelligence officers were killed and a suicide bombing at a U.S. army base near Mosul on December 21, 2004, which killed 22 people, including 14 U.S. military personnel.

Associations with the Wider Iraqi Insurgency

Not only is it reported that Ansar al-Islam is connected to Ansar al-Sunna, but as was the original claim, Ansar al-Islam is connected to al-Qaeda. Although Ansar al-Islam has denied this link, U.S. and European governments, Kurdish security officials, and journalistic reporting have found linkages between Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaeda. The New York Times discovered documents in an al-Qaeda guest house discussing the creation of an “Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Brigade” just weeks prior to the formation of Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam members in PUK custody have confessed to training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi also reportedly entered Iraq with the assistance of Ansar al-Islam. Italian investigators claim that Ansar provided a ready-made infrastructure for al-Qaeda in Iraq [6].

Through their connections with al-Qaeda and the broader Iraqi insurgency, Kurdish Salafists have gained strength militarily. The presence of al-Qaeda-affiliated Arab fighters in Iraq bolstered Kurdish militants who were demoralized by their military defeat and lack of popular support. Yet these connections have also alienated them further from the majority secular Kurdish population. Recent attacks perpetrated in Kurdistan have had to be ordered from bases elsewhere.

European Activities

After its military defeat in Kurdistan, Ansar al-Islam seemed to find its true calling. Instead of carrying out operations inside Iraq, those members who did not flee to Iran or take up with Ansar al-Sunna and other al-Qaeda affiliates, began putting out propaganda, and recruiting and smuggling Islamic militants from Europe to Iraq. It is unclear whether Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna cooperate in Europe, but Ansar al-Sunna is involved in European activities as well.

In recent years, security officials have tracked Ansar activities in Europe and uncovered an extensive European network that recruits and smuggles militants from Europe to Iraq via Turkey and Syria [7]. German federal prosecutors charged three Iraqi men earlier this month for plotting to kill former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi during his visit to Germany in December 2004. One of the men charged Ata R., is reportedly the senior-most member of Ansar al-Islam in Germany who coordinated activities in Germany and other European countries [8].

Ansar has been particularly active in Italy and Germany, but they have also surfaced in Scandinavia. The Finnish investigative program MOT reported that three men of Kurdish origin from Turku were arrested in Iraq for suspected contacts with Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna. The leader of the Turku cell reportedly came to Finland in 1996 and began raising funds for terrorist operations in Iraq soon after the war, transferring these funds in the form of cash transported by individual travelers.

Ansar has also operated in Sweden, raising funds and training recruits in remote locations, although Sweden is not a target of terrorist operations. Ansar al-Sunna released a statement reassuring the Swedish people that their country was not a target, but used only as a training base for mujahideen on their way to operations elsewhere. A September 2005 statement read, “We wish to assure the people of Sweden that they should not fear our activities in the country as we operate only training facilities here in order to prepare our great and Holy Mujahideen for combat.” Despite Ansar al-Sunna’s reassurances, two members of a Swedish cell were arrested and sentenced to prison terms of seven and six years in May 2005 for planning for terrorist crimes. Swedish police arrested four Ansar suspects, who were allegedly involved in the deadly Irbil bombings in February 2004.

Mullah Krekar

Ansar al-Islam’s spiritual leader Mullah Krekar is also based in Europe. He left Iraq in 1991 and has been living under asylum in Norway. Norwegian officials have accused Krekar of commanding Ansar militants in Iraq via the internet. Krekar has been detained a number of times by Norwegian police since 1991, but security officials never accumulated sufficient evidence to prosecute him.

Labeling him as a threat to national security, Norway finally revoked his refugee status in 2003 and ruled to extradite him to Iraq. He has repeatedly appealed the decision and the pending court cases have kept him in the country. Norwegian courts again rejected his latest appeal in September 2005, but gave him one month to appeal the decision again [9].

Threat to the Kurdish Regional Government

In the years after the first Persian Gulf War Ansar al-Islam posed a significant threat to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Iraqi Kurds were living under a precarious autonomy punctuated by a devastating civil war. Kurdish Salafists took advantage of the lax security and shifting political scene to stake out control of the Kurdish region.

The political security dynamic has changed in the north, however, and what little appeal Salafists had in Kurdistan is waning. The biggest obstacle to the growth of Kurdish Salafism is the Kurdish population itself ,as Salafism will always have limited appeal in Kurdistan. The PUK has also strengthened its relationship with Iran, urging it to increase pressure on displaced Ansar militants.

Despite this, both Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna remain a threat to the KRG, as both organizations have targeted KRG officials. Ansar al-Islam assassinated former Irbil governor Franso Hariri, killed KDP official Sami Abdul Rahman in the Irbil attack and attempted to assassinate Barham Salih, a top PUK official.

Kurdish officials are less concerned about the growth of Salafism in their region, but they are concerned about Kurdish militants who have moved out of Kurdistan to direct terrorist attacks from other locations [10]. The terrain in Kurdistan, like Afghanistan, is conducive to terrorist operations, making it difficult to root out militants from the forbidding Kurdish mountains. KRG control over outlying areas is still incomplete and will remain a challenge in the coming years.

Notes
1. Masrour Barzani, head of KDP security, interview by author, November 14, 2005.
2. Dr. Hani al-Siba'i, “Ansar Al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunna Army, Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and Abu-Hafs Brigades” 14 March 2004 Al-Basrah Net.
3. Masrour Barzani, head of KDP security, interview by author, November 14, 2005
4. “Ansar al-Islam Takes on the U.S.” Janes International Security News, March 8, 2004.
5. “Iraq’s New Terrorist Threat: Ansar al-Sunna” Middle East February 2005.
6. “Iraq: Alleged Terrorist Leader to be Deported from Norway,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, April 2, 2005.
7. “In Europe, New Force for Recruiting Radicals” Washington Post Foreign Service. February 18, 2005.
8. “Germany Accuses Three Iraqis of Allawi Death Plot.” Deutsche Welle, November 17, 2005.
9. “Norway Court Rules to Expel Muslim Leader to Iraq.” Gulf News September 30, 2005. www.gulfnews.com
10. Masrour Barzani, head of KDP security, interview by author, November 14, 2005.


*Lydia Khalil is an independent analyst affiliated with Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. She recently returned from Iraq where she as worked as policy advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Prior to that Lydia was appointed to the White House Office of Homeland Security.