Untitled Document

1 September 2005

1. "The Ceasefire This Time", ...thus did the Turkish chief of staff, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, brusquely dismiss the one-month ceasefire announced on August 19, 2005 by the Kurdistan People's Congress (or Kongra-Gel). Kongra-Gel is the name adopted in 2003 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which had renewed its armed struggle with the Turkish state just over one year before proclaiming its latest truce.

2. "The U.S. and Turkey may soon clash over the PKK", a few months ago, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stunned observers when he remarked that six years after the capture of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, he still did not really know why it was that the United States had delivered him to the Turkish authorities in Kenya.

3. "Novelist in Turkey said to be charged with insulting nation", Orhan Pamuk, one of Turkey's best-known novelists, has been charged with insulting the nation and its people by speaking out against the mass deaths of Armenians during and after World War I and the more recent killings of Kurds, his publisher said yesterday.

4. "Roadblocks for Turkey's EU Dream", German Conservative leader Angela Merkel has proposed that Turkey should be offered "privileged partnership" status rather than full membership in the European Union.

5. "Cyprus threatens to block start of EU-Turkey talks", Brussels pressures Ankara to clear its position.

6. "Europe may change relationship with Turkey", European Union leaders said Wednesday they want to expand options for the results of upcoming talks about Turkey's membership, the EU Observer reports.

7. "PJAK, the unknown entity of the Kurdish resistance in Iran", PJAK: For several weeks now, this name has been regularly cropping up in dispatches from press agencies covering Iranian Kurdistan. This coverage has turned the 'Party for free life in Kurdistan' (PJAK) into a very real fact. What is hiding behind this evanescent army network that is depicted as the new and vibrant force of the Kurdish resistance in Iran?

8. "Kurdistan: between Iran and Iraq, a permeable border", sixty years have passed since the fleeting existence of the Kurdish republic of Mahabad. It was a welcome interlude as, since 1946, it has mobilised a stateless population to dream of history one day repeating itself.

1. - Media Monitors Network - "The Ceasefire This Time":

31 August 2005 / by Evren Balta-Paker

(Evren Balta-Paker is a doctoral candidate in political science at CUNY-Graduate Center, New York.)

"The aim of the Turkish armed forces is to ensure that the separatist terrorist organization bows down to the law and the mercy of the nation."
Thus did the Turkish chief of staff, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, brusquely dismiss the one-month ceasefire announced on August 19, 2005 by the Kurdistan People's Congress (or Kongra-Gel). Kongra-Gel is the name adopted in 2003 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which had renewed its armed struggle with the Turkish state just over one year before proclaiming its latest truce.

The ceasefire came in response to an August 12 speech by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Diyarbakir, a city nestled in the rugged southeast where much of Turkey's Kurdish population lives. Under strong European pressure not to intensify military action in the southeast, Erdogan promised to handle Turkey's "Kurdish question" with more "democracy." Since it was swept into power by November 2002 elections, Erdogan's neo-Islamist party has affected a somewhat softer attitude toward the Kurdish question than the secular hardliners who have traditionally dominated Turkey's military and
civilian elite. Anxious to meet the human rights benchmarks for talks on Turkey's desired accession to the European Union, the new government used its parliamentary majority to ram through a reform package that legalized Kurdish-language instruction and broadcasting. Though this reform has been unevenly implemented at best, it was de facto recognition of the distinct culture of the people the Turkish state had long called "mountain Turks."
The speech in Diyarbakir, a town long regarded as the center of Kurdish opposition, was a sign that the neo-Islamist government is prepared to extend its reforms.

But rather than ease the government's task, the ceasefire may have complicated it, because the neo-Islamists are under equally strong pressure from the military-civilian elite not even to appear to negotiate with Kurdish nationalism, and especially not the PKK, as everyone still calls the group. Echoing Ozkok, the National Security Council urged the government in Ankara to brush off the Kurdish party's overture in order to preserve "the independence of the nation and the indivisibility of the country." An
unnamed "senior foreign ministry official" hastened to tell Agence France Presse: "Those people [the PKK] are terrorists and it is not possible for us to qualify their actions either as positive or negative." At Ankara's behest, Belgium blocked a PKK press conference.

The ceasefire has underlined how Turkey is caught between the demands of a rocky EU accession process and the vested interests of domestic groups. Over it all looms the torturous political transition of neighboring Iraq.

UNEASY TRUCE

From 1984-1999, the Turkish armed forces waged war on the separatist PKK militia in the east and southeast of the country. Some 37,000 people died in the course of the campaign, and hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of villagers were forcibly resettled as the military and its allied "village guards" burned and razed hamlets suspected of harboring or aiding Kurdish guerrillas. Fighting in Turkey stopped after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999. The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, never recognized by Ankara, and its remaining 3,000 to 5,000 militants moved into Iraqi Kurdistan, which had long been a base for PKK activity and consequently became the site of constant Turkish incursions tolerated by Saddam Hussein and, later, the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties.

During the 1999-2004 unilateral ceasefire, southeastern Turkey enjoyed a relatively violence-free period and experienced improvements in the quality of political and social life. Some of the displaced villagers were slowly permitted to return to their lands, though they were faced with numerous obstacles, and though others remain stuck in shantytowns around major Turkish cities. The state of emergency, which was originally declared in 1987 in eight southeastern provinces and was gradually expanded to cover 13,
was lifted in the last remaining two provinces in November 2002.

In local elections in 1999, HADEP, a pro-Kurdish party, won control of 37 municipalities in southeastern and eastern Turkey, including major cities such as Diyarbakir, Batman, Siirt and Bingol. From that time, the mayors of these cities entered the political arena as the elected spokespersons of the Kurds. The state elites, confident in their military victory over the PKK, either studiously ignored these emerging Kurdish representatives, refusing to meet with them, or accused them of being PKK sympathizers. On one occasion, Osman Baydemir, the mayor of Diyarbakir, paid a visit of condolence to the family of a PKK militant who had been killed in a 2004 clash with Turkish troops. Although Baydemir later stated that he also visited a wounded policeman and offered his condolences to the family of a killed officer to acknowledge the suffering of mothers on both sides, the
images beamed to every television in Turkey showed only his visit to "the mother of a terrorist." Upon the broadcasting of these images, which apparently were recorded and distributed by the police, the military and local state officials cracked down on Baydemir. The Diyarbakir governor's office even filed a legal action against him.

TWO YEARS OF REFORM

The real push for democratization of the southeast came from outside Turkey, from Brussels in Belgium. Victorious in elections, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (or AKP, by its Turkish acronym) was able to pursue the EU membership that Turkey has long coveted in part because the quiet in the southeast had dampened European criticism of Turkey's human rights record. When they were supporters of more openly Islamist parties in the 1990s, the AKP deputies were elbowed out of politics by military intervention or various anti-democratic laws. Accordingly, the AKP leaders looked favorably upon the requirement of the EU membership process that the role of the
military be reduced. With 65 percent of the seats in Parliament, the AKP was the first party in almost two decades to be able to govern without coalition partners -- meaning that legislative measures necessary for EU accession were passed quickly.

In less than two years, the AKP pushed through major reforms, including abolition of the death penalty and a clampdown on police use of torture; the release of political prisoners; greater freedom of expression and protection for the media; and very limited cultural, educational and language rights for minority groups, in particular for the Kurds. Most importantly, curbs on the excessive power of the military sailed through. The National Security Council, previously the main institution of army influence, was transformed into a purely advisory body; its secretariat, which had been held by a
high-ranking general, was handed over to a diplomat. Military spending was placed under parliamentary control, sowing great discontent among the army brass. During these two years of sweeping change, analysts were convinced that, if the pace of reform did not slow, Turkish membership in the EU would be possible sooner rather than later.

The prospect of joining the EU raised hopes among the Kurdish population as well. The legal representatives of the Kurds, such as the southeastern mayors, as well as the still armed Kurdish opposition, repeatedly expressed their enthusiasm for EU membership, which they believed would pave the way for more cultural and political rights for the Kurds, including regional autonomy. These high hopes were soon to diminish.

ACUTE DILEMMA

In early 2003, even as the AKP was passing the EU-inspired reform packages, Washington asked Ankara to allow US troops to invade Iraq from bases in Turkey. After the Turkish parliament voted to deny this request on March 1, 2003, the United States threw its weight behind an invasion and occupation strategy involving the Iraqi Kurds, posing an acute dilemma long feared by the Turkish state. As the US allied itself ever more closely with the Iraqi Kurds, first against Hussein's regime and then against the insurgency raging in Iraq since June 2003, an independent Kurdish state in Iraq or a federated Iraq in which the Kurds were both autonomous in their region and powerful in
Baghdad came to seem like real possibilities. It was obvious to Ankara that if such a state or federation were established, the Kurds of Turkey, who live in one of the poorest regions of the country and have scant economic prospects, would fall under the influence of their fellow Kurds to the south. Ankara's fears increased as the Iraqi Kurdish parties began moving to annex oil-rich Kirkuk to their hoped-for mega-province.

Adding to the Turkish state's trepidation were the estimated 3,000 PKK militants who still took refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. After the US-British invasion of Iraq, the Turkish army stated that its soldiers on the border of northern Iraq would stay there as long as the militants stayed in their Iraqi camps. Washington assured Ankara that the PKK would not be tolerated in northern Iraq and vowed repeatedly to disarm all armed elements in Iraq, including the PKK militants. However, to this day the PKK guerrillas continue to move about freely in northern Iraq, from whence they have infiltrated into Turkey to conduct operations.

Acknowledging the crucial importance of US tolerance for its activities, the PKK explicitly endorsed the US adventure in Iraq. In 2003, a party manifesto declared that "by intervening against the Saddam regime, which so severely suppressed the Kurds and the entire population, the US has played an important role at the dawn of a new era. Kongra-Gel welcomes this intervention by the US, but wants to point out that constructive results can only be achieved if the Kurdish question is permanently solved." Rather than risk alienating the friendly Kurdish parties of Iraq, the US has opted not to act against the PKK and not to allow Turkey to launch cross-border raids.
Prime Minister Erdogan visited Washington in June 2005 to implore President George W. Bush to revise this policy, but he returned home empty-handed.

BITTER MIX

Meanwhile, Turkish expectations of swift approval for EU membership had begun to fade. On December 17, 2004, the EU's executive body, the European Council, granted Turkey a date for opening accession negotiations: October 3, 2005. Celebrations in Turkey were tempered as the strings attached to the EU decision became apparent. The EU has asked, for instance, that Turkey indirectly recognize the Republic of Cyprus -- a condition perceived as impossible to meet by Turkish elites, one of the reasons being that denizens of the majority-Greek south of the island had voted heavily against
reunifying with the majority-Turkish north of the island in a 2004 referendum.

Turkish Europhilia soured further at the close of February 2005, when the French national assembly amended the French constitution to specify that every future expansion of the EU must be subject to a referendum by the French electorate. But it was mainly the late spring's "no" votes upon the proposed EU constitution in France and the Netherlands that effected a sharp switch in Turkish feelings toward the EU. Turkish media presented the "no" campaign almost exclusively as opposition to the enlargement of the bloc --particularly to the membership of Turkey. Posters plastered on walls in
France reading "Turkey in Europe -- I vote no" were published on the front pages of Turkish newspapers. It has not escaped Turkish notice that European politicians have started taking a firmer stance against Turkey's membership since the no votes. "Privileged partnership" began to gain support as an alternative to full membership among European politicians, on both left and right. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union and the Left Party began openly to oppose full EU membership for Turkey.

As hopes for EU membership sharply declined, the Turks realized two things: Iraq will soon be a federal state in which Kurds will be recognized as a constituent people, and the US will not make good on its promises to confront PKK forces in Iraq. This bitter mix of realizations fueled the recrudescence of a strident Turkish nationalism. The notion of Kurds as non-loyal citizens of the republic seeking opportunities to betray the Turkish state became a major feature of public discourse, and was perhaps expressed even more aggressively than it was when the conflict in the southeast was at its peak.

The nationalist wave crested after Kurdish children claiming to be PKK sympathizers attempted to burn the Turkish flag during the Kurdish New Year's celebration in Mersin on March 21, 2005. Two days later, the army issued a statement denouncing this act of "treason" by "so-called citizens."
The army, the statement added, would stand ready to "fight until the last drop of blood to protect the country and its flag." Beginning the next day, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest, burning Abdullah Ocalan in effigy. The country was virtually covered with Turkish flags.
Shortly thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Ocalan's 1999 trial had been unfair because of the participation of an impartial military judge. Although the Court is not an EU institution, and although the decision had been long anticipated, there was a furor in Turkey. The EU stood accused of defending a "terrorist" and a "baby killer."

With Turkish nationalism on the rise, the PKK again resorted to violence. Small guerrilla bands sneaked back across the heavily fortified Iraqi border and reports of fighting between the army and the militants began appearing in Turkish newspapers. On August 5, PKK militants using rockets killed five Turkish soldiers and injured six more in an attack on a police station in Semdinli. The incident was symbolic in that the 1984 war against the presence of the Turkish state in what the PKK called "Turkish Kurdistan" was announced with attacks on military guardhouses in Eruh and Semdinli. Summer bombings in tourist areas have also been laid at the PKK's doorstep.

A "NEW PAGE"

Already before the PKK attacks, the judiciary and the military were resisting the application of the EU-inspired laws. With the EU euphoria disappearing, tensions between army leadership and the AKP, which ties its political future to EU membership, developed into an open struggle. On April 20, Chief of General Staff Ozkok gave a speech at the War Academy in Istanbul. His remarks covered every major issue of domestic and foreign
policy, and focused especially on the Kurdish question and the EU. He claimed that the activities of the PKK had increased dramatically and accused the EU of acting as a mediator for the PKK. EU accession would be "no blessing," he said, and it would not be "the end of the world" if Turkey did not become a member.

Recent statements by Ozkok also suggest that hardliners in the military are trying to regain the influence they had prior to the EU-related democratization reforms of the AKP government. On August 5, Ozkok complained about the army's lack of sway. "Despite reduced authority," he said, "the Turkish armed forces are continuing and will continue to fight, with self-sacrifice, the terrorist organization which aims to take our nation
back to painful days in the past." In the following days, it became clear that Ozkok was complaining about amendments to the "anti-terror" law that limited the authority of security forces and increased civilian control of the army.

Caught between the generals' demands for wider authority to deal with terrorism and EU pressure to solve the Kurdish problem by non-military means, Erdogan clearly sided with the EU. In a meeting with representatives of 150 intellectuals who had called on the PKK and the government to end the ongoing conflict in the southeast, he declared that his government would not step back from the democratization process. The meeting had historical value in and of itself; it was almost the first time a Turkish prime minister had agreed to meet with a group of citizens on the Kurdish issue. A couple days later, Erdogan paid his visit to Diyarbakir. In his speech there, he acknowledged, for the first time, that previous Turkish governments had mishandled relations with the nation's minority Kurds. The Kurdish community applauded the statement. Osman Baydemir declared that it "constitutes the foundation for turning a new page in relations between Kurds and the government."

FRAGILE PEACE

Since the unilateral PKK ceasefire, the conciliatory tone toward the Kurdish question writ large has persisted in AKP statements. On August 21, Erdogan said on Turkish television: "The Kurdish problem and PKK terrorism or terrorism are two different things. We must not confuse the two. We must separate the two. The Kurdish citizens are my citizens. [Kurdishness] is a sub-identity. We must not confuse sub-identity with supra-identity. They must all be viewed as a whole, as citizens of the Republic of Turkey."

Until recently, the AKP did not have a Kurdish policy of substance. The reforms that affected the Kurds in Turkey were designed to meet the bare minimum required by EU membership criteria. The recent AKP declarations arean acknowledgement that developments in Iraq and internationally have created a favorable environment for the rise of PKK activity, which the neo-Islamist party seeks to forestall lest the army seize the opportunity to reassert itself further in Turkish politics. Rhetoric about terrorism
notwithstanding, the AKP is trying to find a viable solution for the Kurdish question that does not include military confrontation.

Before and after it announced the ceasefire, however, the PKK made it clear that the necessary condition for a continued truce is a general amnesty for PKK militants and the release of their imprisoned leader Ocalan. Their campaign for "the release of Abdullah Ocalan" began in June.

On August 23, the National Security Council held its monthly meeting after Erdogan's Diyarbakir visit and the ceasefire announcement. At the meeting, the general staff urged the prime minister to clarify his statements about the Kurdish issue, warning him not to use the phrase "the Kurdish problem" again. Erdogan responded that his government was not planning to make concessions to terrorism and added that the only purpose of the "steps" he has been talking about is to win the hearts and minds of Kurdish citizens.
The content of these steps has not yet been specified.

In Turkey's present political climate, the AKP government can go only slightly further than its acknowledgement of past "mishandling" of the Kurdish question. Erdogan's steps will probably be limited to pushing state offices, local administrations and the judiciary to apply the EU-inspired laws that grant cultural rights to Kurdish citizens. Directly after the National Security Council meeting, the government asked the Supreme Radio and Television Board to reply to the applications of local radio and TV channels to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. Favorable replies would remove the bureaucratic barriers to broadcasting in Kurdish. The apparent purpose of the AKP government is to satisfy the EU before accession negotiations open on October 3, while neither alienating the military nor offending the rising Turkish nationalist sensibility on "the street." The two conditions of the PKK truce, meanwhile, are perceived by the government as impossible even to discuss. Although the AKP appears determined to avoid
a descent into guerrilla warfare, the peace is fragile.

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For background on the new Kurdish politicians, see Nicole F. Watts, "Turkey's Tentative Opening to Kurdishness," Middle East Report Online, June 14, 2004.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061404.html <https://email.t-online.de/index.php?ctl=dereferer&to=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5tZXJpcC5vcmcvbWVyby9tZXJvMDYxNDA0Lmh0bWw%3D>

For background on the PKK in Iraq, see Quil Lawrence, "Kurdish Green Line, Turkish Red Line," Middle East Report Online, March 11, 2005.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031105.html <https://email.t-online.de/index.php?ctl=dereferer&to=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5tZXJpcC5vcmcvbWVyby9tZXJvMDMxMTA1Lmh0bWw%3D>

For background on the Cyprus issue, see Rebecca Bryant, "A Dangerous Trend
in Cyprus," Middle East Report 235 (Summer 2005). The article is accessible
online at:
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer235/bryant.html <https://email.t-online.de/index.php?ctl=dereferer&to=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5tZXJpcC5vcmcvbWVyL21lcjIzNS9icnlhbnQuaHRtbA%3D%3D>

2. - The Daily Star - "The U.S. and Turkey may soon clash over the PKK":

1 September 2005 / by Henri J. Barkey

A few months ago, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stunned observers when he remarked that six years after the capture of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, he still did not really know why it was that the United States had delivered him to the Turkish authorities in Kenya. Considering Washington's unwavering support for Turkey's anti-PKK campaign, Ecevit's comments were mostly interpreted as the ruminations of an ailing and defeated nationalist politician.

Two weeks ago, however, Aytac Yalman, a recently retired Land Forces commander known for his hard-line views on relations with the U.S. and on Kurdish issues, stepped up to the plate to provide Ecevit with an answer: the real reason why the U.S. had engineered Ocalan's delivery was part of a larger master plan that aimed to remove him as a potential rival to the two Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. With Ocalan eliminated, reasoned Yalman, the two Kurdish leaders' room to maneuver would substantially be enhanced, as would their dependency on Washington.

While many columnists ridiculed both Ecevit and Yalman, the fact of the matter is that these two were giving expression to a deep sense of insecurity many Turks, especially nationalists, feel at the onslaught of change in their neighborhood and at home. Change at home is being driven by European Union-induced reforms and the prospect of EU accession negotiations. The war in Iraq, which was opposed by many in Turkey and semi-publicly by Yalman in his capacity as Land Forces commander, has upended many of Turkey's regional calculations. As the constitutional process in Iraq comes to fruition, the future there still remains very much in doubt. The only sure development is at the very least the emergence of a robust Kurdish autonomous or federal entity, or perhaps even an independent Kurdish state.

Turkey has always feared the contagion effect from Iraqi Kurds. Therefore, both outcomes are perceived as potentially destabilizing by Ankara. After all, a PKK-led Turkish Kurdish insurgency that lasted well over a decade only ended with Ocalan's 1999 capture. The PKK, which had gone into hibernation since, has now abandoned its self-imposed unilateral cease-fire. The renewed violence, associated with better and deadlier tactics perhaps learned from anti-American Iraqi insurgents, is renewing fears that the insurgency is making a comeback.

Complicating matters is the fact that a significant segment of the PKK fighting force is ensconced in northern Iraq. The fact that the U.S. military, as the occupying force in Iraq, has not done away with an organization the U.S. government calls terrorist has been particularly galling to Turks. The U.S. military in Iraq has, understandably, been unwilling to divert troops to fight the PKK from the current effort to combat the insurgency. Northern Iraq has been relatively calm and not in need of a U.S. presence, as local Kurdish forces have been delegated the job of maintaining security. The PKK presence is clearly not a priority.

This American unwillingness has been at the heart of accusations in the Turkish media and elsewhere that Washington is at best dismissive of its erstwhile ally in Ankara, or at worst is in bed with Kurdish groups who want to carve out an ethnic homeland in the Middle East. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the U.S. has a serious credibility problem. Sooner or later it will have to act against the PKK - especially if the latter persists with its military campaign - or risk a major crisis with Turkey. The Turkish government has come under increasing pressure from domestic civilian and military circles to intervene where it can in northern Iraq. Should the PKK, for instance, inadvertently or deliberately cause large numbers of casualties in a incident, the Turkish government would feel obliged to demonstrate that it can act to protect its citizens by mounting a cross-border operation. This could potentially entail a clash with Iraqi Kurds and undermine the stability of the one region in Iraq that Washington has so far taken for granted.

This said, the Turkish official position until recently that the country has no Kurdish problem of its own but only one of 'terrorism', has not won Ankara much respect in Europe or America. Recently, however, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to journey into Turkey's Kurdish heartland to pronounce that Turkey had a "Kurdish problem" that needed attention. His decision to tackle this issue head on caused consternation among Turkish hard-liners and conservatives. As much as Erdogan made his pronouncement with an eye on the upcoming start of EU accession negotiations, it remains a risky move in view of the rising PKK violence and political worries over northern Iraq.

Erdogan has raised the ante for himself by creating expectations among Kurds - such expectations have been dashed many times by Turkish politicians in the recent past - while turning the tables on the PKK. This has created an opportunity for the U.S. to engage in a three-way diplomatic initiative that would include Turks, Americans and Iraqis (especially Iraqi Kurds) to come up with a game plan to eliminate the PKK presence in northern Iraq.

* Henri J. Barkey is chair of the International Relations Department at Lehigh University and a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. He is the author most recently of "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity," (U.S. Institute of Peace). This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter on Middle Eastern issues.

3. - Los Angeles Times - "Novelist in Turkey said to be charged with insulting nation":

ANKARA / 1 September 2005 / by Amberin Zaman

Orhan Pamuk, one of Turkey's best-known novelists, has been charged with insulting the nation and its people by speaking out against the mass deaths of Armenians during and after World War I and the more recent killings of Kurds, his publisher said yesterday.

Turkish officials declined to comment on the charges. Another law prohibits Pamuk from commenting on his case while it is still pending.

Pamuk drew nationalist ire here and received anonymous death threats after he told the Swiss daily Tagesanzeiger in an interview published Feb. 6 that ''30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians were killed . . . and nobody but me dares to talk about it."

Turkey has long denied that more than 1 million members of its once thriving Armenian community were the victims of systematic annihilation, a campaign that Armenians and many others have labeled genocide. The government position is that several hundred thousand died as a result of exposure, famine, and disease as they journeyed to Syria after being deported for collaborating with invading Russian forces.

Pamuk's most recent best-selling novel, ''Snow," explores tensions between Turkey's secular elite and religious conservatives.

News of Pamuk's case came a day before European Union foreign ministers were to meet in Wales, primarily to discuss Turkey. The EU has long cited Turkey's checkered record on human rights as the chief obstacle to its membership in the 25-nation bloc.

Turkey won a date to open membership talks after its parliament passed numerous reforms that, among other steps, eased restrictions on the language spoken by the country's large Kurdish minority. The talks are scheduled to begin Oct. 3. Several countries, including France, are seeking to block Turkey's entry amid mounting public opposition to the inclusion of a large, poor, and predominantly Muslim country.

Other critics charge that Turkey's new penal code, which came into force in June, still falls short of EU standards by proscribing free debate of the Armenian tragedy and criticism of Turkey's 1974 invasion of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus.

4. - The Epoch Times - "Roadblocks for Turkey's EU Dream":

31 August 2005 / by Denis Charleton

German Conservative leader Angela Merkel has proposed that Turkey should be offered "privileged partnership" status rather than full membership in the European Union.

"We are firmly convinced that Turkey's membership would overtax the EU economically and socially and endanger the process of European integration," said Merkel.

Last December, Europe's leaders agreed that the talks would lead to full membership with something similar to Mrs. Merkel's proposal only being offered as a last resort in the event of an impasse. However, if Mrs. Merkel's campaign is successful her option will be on the table right at the outset. Britain would not be in favour of such an approach, but it now seems likely that the idea would receive backing from Greece and France, and possibly Austria, Italy and Holland. Greek Government spokesman Theodorus Rusopulos has declared solidarity with Greek Cypriot leaders in condemning Turkey's reluctance to recognise the Cyprus government.

Opposition to Turkey's membership was widely seen as a factor in the rejection of the proposed new EU constitution in both France and Holland.

Consequently the governments of both those countries see this as an opportunity to win over a section of public opinion. French Prime Minister de Villepin said it was "inconceivable" that talks could start while Turkey refused to recognise Cyprus, while President Chirac declared Turkey's attitude to be "not in the spirit expected of a candidate to the union".

Approximately 1.7 million Turks currently live in Germany, the majority of whom migrated as "guest workers". Opinion polls show that a majority of ethnic Germans believe there are already too many.

Angela Merkel therefore sees opposing Turkey's bid as a sure-fire vote winner, particularly since Social Democrat leader Gerhard Schroeder has to date been one of Turkey's prime advocates.

Mrs. Merkel's strategy appears to be working, as her Christian Democratic party is currently 13 percentage points ahead in the polls. However, if elected she may find herself on a collision course with fellow conservative George W Bush who strongly supports Turkey joining the EU as an important step in the stabilisation of the near eastern region.

5. - Finacial Mirror - "Cyprus threatens to block start of EU-Turkey talks":

Brussels pressures Ankara to clear its position

BRUSSELS / 1 September 2005

Cyprus threatened Wedneday to block the start of Turkey's European Union accession negotiations if it was not satisfied with an E.U. response to Ankara's refusal to recognise the eastern Mediterranean island.

"If it is not satisfactory then the negotiating framework of the EU with Turkey will not be discussed," Government Spokesperson Kypros Chrysostomides was quoted by the Cyprus News Agency as saying.

"If there is no debate and agreement on the negotiating framework the negotiations will not start," he said.

Turkey signed a protocol extending its E.U. customs union to include all 10 new member states in July. Ankara went on to state that its custom union did not specify recognition of Cyprus.

Nicosia wants the E.U. to clearly state that Turkey's non- recognition declaration has no legal standing.

"The British EU presidency presented a draft of a counter declaration...in our opinion, despite some of the positive elements it contains, the draft is unacceptable and not satisfactory at all," Chrysostomides said.

E.U. puts pressure on Turkey to clarify position on Cyprus

Meanwhile, in Brussels, the European Commission was upping pressure on Turkey to clarify its position on the contentious issue of whether it intends to extend its customs union to Cyprus.

With just over a month to go to the planned start of Turkey's E.U. accession talks the commission is urging Ankara to fulfil its obligations to Cyprus, including opening up Turkish ports to Cypriot ships, in line with a recent protocol extending Turkey's customs union to include the ten new E.U. member states.

Speaking ahead of the September 1-2 meeting of E.U. foreign ministers, where Turkey's E.U. ambitions are a central theme, a commission spokeswoman downplayed the idea of Turkish "concessions", saying "that is something Turkey is committed to anyway (opening its ports to Cypriot ships). The customs union foresees the unhindered traffic of goods."

Ankara, which refuses to recognize Cyprus as a legitimate country, issued a statement saying its signing of the customs union protocol did not amount to recognition of the Cypriot government.

European Commission legal experts are examining whether Turkey's statement is tantamount to refusing to meet its protocol obligations

Criticism of Turkey's stance is deepening in Brussels as E.U. foreign ministers prepare to meet in the Welsh town of Newport on Thursday and Friday in an attempt to reach an unanimous agreement on the framework for Turkey's E.U. negotiations.

France, Spain, Greece and Cyprus have called on the E.U. to rebuke Turkey for its statement on Cyprus while insisting that the Ankara government must clarify its stance on the Cyprus issue, diplomats said.

British Home Secretary Jack Straw, whose country currently holds the E.U. presidency, said he hoped the two-day meeting would yield an agreement that took into account all these objections.

While Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn is eager to begin accession talks with Turkey on October 3 as planned, he has, for the first time, publicly criticized Turkey's position, in an article in France's Le Monde newspaper Wednesday.

Meanwhile Germany's Christian Democrat faction in the European parliament has proposed that Turkey's accession talks be aimed at an "alternative form of partnership" rather than fully fledged membership. Austria's Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel shared this opinion in a recent television interview.

6. - Sience Daily - "Europe may change relationship with Turkey":

VIENNA / 31 Agust 2005 / source: UPI

European Union leaders said Wednesday they want to expand options for the results of upcoming talks about Turkey's membership, the EU Observer reports.

Formal EU-membership negotiations for Turkey are expected to start Oct. 3.

Informal talks begin Thursday in Wales with Turkey expected to dominate.

Austria's Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnik, echoed French officials calling for the possibility of a middle ground if full-fledged membership isn't given to Turkey.

They said they want a partnership between Turkey and the EU at a level below full membership to be an option.

The European Commission this summer called for eventual full Turkish membership without any middle ground.

All EU states have to approve the change.

France has criticized Turkey for refusing to officially recognize Cyprus, an EU member state.

Many EU states, including Cyprus, have said the recognition issue isn't a membership deal-breaker.

French Europe Minister Catherine Colonna said Tuesday the process for Turkey's full membership will be a long one.

7. - Caucaz - "PJAK, the unknown entity of the Kurdish resistance in Iran":

MAHABAD / 31 August / by Max Chamka / translated by Victoria Bryan

PJAK. For several weeks now, this name has been regularly cropping up in dispatches from press agencies covering Iranian Kurdistan. This coverage has turned the 'Party for free life in Kurdistan' (PJAK) into a very real fact. What is hiding behind this evanescent army network that is depicted as the new and vibrant force of the Kurdish resistance in Iran?

"Are you linked, either directly or indirectly, to the PJAK movement?" "Yes", confirms our interviewee, a student and young activist from Mahabad who wishes to remain anonymous. The speed and spontaneity of the answer stands in sharp contrast to the mistrust usually encountered during this sort of interview. It seems that the young guerrilla will use any available opportunity to publicise his organisation.

As far as Iranian Kurdistan news goes, PJAK is currently one of the most mentioned names in press dispatches and articles that have appeared over the last few days. But it is also mentioned in the accusations from Teheran against an organisation that it views as terrorism. PJAK needs to restore its reputation and who better than a partisan to do so?

Guerrilla under Iranian surveillance

"A few years ago, the Kurds from Iran took up arms alongside the PKK", continues the young man. "Today, the struggle takes place here, in Iran. The men of PJAK, who are fighting for the 'Resurrection of a free Kurdistan', are Kurds from this region. They hide in the surrounding mountains." The fighters get their weapons in Iraq. Arms dealing takes an uncontested route via Sardasth, or less frequently through Baneh or Marivan. Arms are then taken to Mahabad and sometimes to other towns in Iran.

Our interviewee declined to reveal the names of the local people in charge of PJAK. It would be pointless to openly fuel the hunt led by Teheran, or to encourage the resurgence of tension between the forces of law and order and the resistance fighters that has occurred over the past few days. The region has, after all, only just recovered from the round of skirmishes in July.

The Kurdish zones in west Iran, making up the provinces of Kurdistan and western Azerbaijan, were the scene of the troubles following the death of Shivan Qaderi, brought down at the time of his arrest at the start of July.
Demonstrations, clashes and heavy-handed arrests shook the region at the time. The Iranian military conducted various operations against the PJAK guerrillas in the Merivan region. On 26 July, four Iranian soldiers were killed near Oshnaviyeh, on the Iraqi border. The Iranian authorities blamed PJAK for the attack.

More recently, on 15 August, general Ishmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, the head of the Iranian police, announced that four police officers had been taken hostage by PJAK rebels in western Azerbaijan.

Iran-Iraq-Turkey, the divisions in the golden triangle of the Kurdish resistance

Divided, spilt and disunited, not to mention manipulated, the Kurdish resistance has been damaged by in-fighting and this has often been used by national governments as a lever in their fight against Kurdish 'terrorism'. It was reported that Teheran recently tried to persuade the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), lead by Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, to intervene by its side and stamp out the PJAK guerrillas. To put it clearly, encouraging already existing divisions within the cross-border Kurdish resistance would weaken it.

PJAK is described by some as being linked to the moderate and liberal current of the Kurdish resistance. Above all else, however, it is said to be connected to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Kurdish resistance in Turkey which is on the list of terrorist organisations drawn up by Brussels and Washington. Proof of this link is that one of the former PJAK leaders is none other than Shapour Badoshiveh, an Iranian Kurd and former Canadian citizen who went missing in 2004 and who is in charge of the western Kurdistan division within the PKK.

Having truly stepped into the limelight in 2005, PJAK held its first meeting on 25 March 2004 after having moved through several different forms. This branch of PKK remains an unknown entity and its set-up is still unclear. One of the theories bandied about and that has been backed up by different reports in Mahabad is that PJAK is based in Turkey, although its leader is an Iranian Kurd.

One party, five networks

Heading PJAK, Abdul-Rahman Haci Ahmedi used an official visit to Norway in June to hold an interview at the Institute of Human Rights in Oslo. It was his opportunity to publicly discuss his fears for Iran of mullahs and to set out the political views of his party. "PJAK distances itself from all the current forms of traditional Kurdish nationalism as it is convinced that it is better to favour peaceful coexistance and cooperation in order to achieve a true multi-ethnic democracy rather than dividing up the country into lots of small states."

This federal form of Kurdish resistance is divided up into five political and armed offshoots: The Union of Women in Western Kurdistan (YJKR), the Union for Youth in Western Kurdistan (YCR), the Union for the Democratic Press (YRD) and finally, political circles and military forces for self-defence.
Since the founding meeting was held, the armed division of PJAK has claimed responsibility for more than 80 military operations in Iranian Kurdistan, and thirty or so direct clashes with the forces of law and order of the Islamic regime.

Hypothetical PJAK

Back to Mahabad now. Our interviewee, although explaining that he is not very well informed, tells how the movement goes back to the days of the Mahabad republic and the charisma of president Qazi Mohammed, who has been set up as a hero by the Kurdish people. Is this a myth or a collective reality? For the time being, we do not know.

The organisation is then thought to have evolved along with the local political trends, before disappearing into the background. This is a plausible theory although vague. The one viable theory is that the armed division of PJAK is carrying out its fight in the name of a free Kurdistan. It itself says that it is "fighting a war against the Iranian government."

A young Kurd, who has sat by the side of our interviewee since the start of our conversation, admits that he does not believe in PJAK. "I'm not going to swell the ranks of PJAK. What good would it do? Even now, I don't wear traditional dress, so why should I take up arms too? The Iranian government has changed us irrevocably. My generation has been shaped by unemployment and has had neither the time nor the desire to talk politics when our overriding priority is to find a job. Teheran knows perfectly well that any attitudes are not inflexible."
An admission of failure, but an understandable one. And the PJAK fighters know this all too well.

8. - Caucaz - "Kurdistan: between Iran and Iraq, a permeable border":

SARDASHT / 31 August 2005 / by Max Chamka / translated by Victoria Bryan

Sixty years have passed since the fleeting existence of the Kurdish republic of Mahabad. It was a welcome interlude as, since 1946, it has mobilised a stateless population to dream of history one day repeating itself. However, the five to six million Kurds in Iran are still paying for this brief period of autonomy. The news reflects this - repression by the central authorities in Teheran, from the Shah of Iran thorugh to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has not relented in this sensitive and strategic region in the North-West of Iran.

A short stroll through the rows of the bazaar in Mahabad, in the heart of Iranian Kurdistan, is all that is required to pick up Chinese ceramics imported from Iraq, of all places. Or to be more precise, from Iraqi Kurdistan. Between Kurdish Iran and Iraq, the smuggling routes and small-time profiteers are many. The majority gain entry onto Iranian soil through two places - the towns of Sardasht in the south and Piranshahr further to the north.

On the hillside, Sardasht gives off the air of a picturesque village. Some of the women cover their glittery taffeta dresses with the black Islamic veil. As for the men, they wear traditional Kurdish dress - baggy trousers (pantol), shirts in identical colours (keva), together with silk shoes (klash). But this idyllic image is cut short once you notice the signs of endemic unemployment and lack of development.

Looking at road maps, you could be forgiven for thinking that Sardasht is more of a cul-de-sac. But the many dusty off-road vehicles, mainly Nissans and Toyotas, parked in the roads of Sardasht belie the fact that there are journeys underway across the mountain roads that link the two Kurdistans.

"We can get to Iraq without any problems at all, whether to go to Arbil, Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah", observes Jafar, a customer of one of the town's few tchaikana (tea-houses). "It takes just three hours to reach Iraqi Kurdistan from Sardasht via the side roads. You don't need a visa. If you get stopped by the police, a passport will do." It takes six hours to get from Mahabad to Arbil, the key point of Iraqi Kurdistan, on the monitored and tarmacked roads, twice as long as by the mountains.

Bananas from Iraq

Whether small-scale or organised, smuggling brings fruit, whiskey, vodka, tea and other foodstuffs manufactured in Iraqi Kurdish towns to Iranian Kurdistan. Whereas the majority of smuggled goods arrive via Sardasht, alcohol ends up in Iranian Kurdistan through the town of Piranshahr.

"Since the Kurd Talabani came to power in Iraq, relations between Teheran and Baghdad have become strained", adds Said, the brother of Jafar. "Iran is scared. The borders have been tightened and smuggling has increased."

Most Kurds in Iran have family in Iraq, particularly in the Arbil region. Iranian Kurds are permitted to visit Iraqi Kurdistan twice a year. It's the opportunity to renew family ties and make a profit from the trip.

Today, it is estimated that just 10% of trade volumes between the two Kurdistans is official. The submerged part of the iceberg, smuggling, is vital to prevent the economic asphyxiation of Iranian Kurdistan. "All the bananas that you see here on the shelves of our shops come from Iraq", explains Said, who is evidently proud to have identified a good example.

"Above all else, we are in contact with the Iraqi Kurds because they are so close to us geographically speaking and because of the pressure exerted on our people by the Turkish government. It's more difficult to get to Turkish Kurdistan than to Iraq. The reason is obvious: in Iraq, there is a Kurdish regional government that is more favourable to the free movement of people and goods."
However, links do exist between the Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan. Following the example of localised, but recognised, smuggling, creams, hair colours and other cosmetics arrive in Iranian Kurdistan from Turkey.

Crossing the checkpoints to reach Mahabad, around 50km from the Iraqi border, is more risky. The system of bribes is ever-present. But smugglers prefer to cross at night, as it is evidently easier.

And what of exports of products from Iranian Kurdistan to Kurdish Iraq? "Just look around you. What do we have to export?", concludes Said. "Nothing."