3 March 2005

1. "US: Torture still widespread in Turkey", the United States said Turkey had achieved improvements in its human rights record in 2004 due to Ankara's continuing reform efforts but complained problems remained, including widespread torture by security forces, insufficient freedom of speech, restrictions in freedom of religion and violence against women.

2. "Turkey acquits 'insulting' writer", a prominent Turkish academic charged with insulting the Turkish authorities has been acquitted by an Ankara court. Fikret Baskaya had been charged over an article asking if police could have done more to prevent an arson attack by Islamist activists which left 37 dead.

3. "Turkey Playing with Fire", since coming into power of the Islamists in Turkey in 2002, the Turkish and American relations has started a steady decline. This has opened a window of opportunity for Kurds in Iraq and in the region. What is the future of Kurdish, Turkish and US relations in the region?

4. "EU Commission presses Turkey to sign Cyprus protocol", top Commission official in Ankara complains pre-Dec. 17 enthusiasm is now gone.

5. "Cold Turkey", Turkey and its front did not take into account the historical development and momentum which post-Saddam era has ushered in South Kurdistan and Iraq as a whole. Without flexible tactics it is impossible to win or gain the trust of Turkoman community who understand well the suffering of the Kurds and the real history of Kirkuk, a city that has always been part of Kurdistan region. Then again, wooing Turkoman votes can’t be attained by waging a hate campaign, incitement to violence against Kurds and by recruiting the service of every self-serving racist Arab and Turkish writers or indeed by importing Turkey’s unique product, Kurdophobia.

6. "Turkey’s bad export, damaged good: The ITF", Turkish paranoia fed suspicions the U.S. wants to create an independent and oil-rich Kurdish state. Turkish journalists convinced themselves, in turn, that Turkey's restive Kurds would then seek to secede. Bush has reassured Erdogan time and again the United States is firmly committed to Iraq's territorial integrity. But time and again, disinformation about U.S. intentions resurfaces courtesy of the wild bunch in the Turkish media.

7. "Though battle-hardened, Iraq's Kurdish militia struggles for role", a key question is whether the 'peshmerga', who have defended key cities, will disband under last year's accord.

8. "Unease Among Kurds As Leaders Eye Baghdad Power", Jalal Talabani, at 72 one of the great survivors of Kurdish politics, is likely to become president of Iraq after the main Kurdish parties took 75 of 275 seats in Iraq's new assembly.

1. - Turkish Daily News - "US: Torture still widespread in Turkey":

ANKARA / 2 March 2005

The United States said Turkey had achieved improvements in its human rights record in 2004 due to Ankara's continuing reform efforts but complained problems remained, including widespread torture by security forces, insufficient freedom of speech, restrictions in freedom of religion and violence against women.

“Courts investigate many allegations of ill treatment and torture by security forces, however they rarely convicted or punished offenders,” said an annual global human rights report released by the State Department in its Turkey part. But it noted that there was a decrease in the overall use of torture last year, despite continuing problems.

According to the report, security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention and trafficking in persons, particularly women, remained a problem.

2. - BBC - "Turkey acquits 'insulting' writer":

2 March 2005 / by Pam O'Toole

A prominent Turkish academic charged with insulting the Turkish authorities has been acquitted by an Ankara court.

Fikret Baskaya had been charged over an article asking if police could have done more to prevent an arson attack by Islamist activists which left 37 dead.

He was charged after the article - originally published 11 years ago - was republished in an anthology.

International human rights groups monitoring the trial have welcomed the decision to acquit him.

The Turkish courts have yet to announce exactly why they decided to acquit Mr Baskaya.

James Logan, researcher on Turkey for Amnesty International, says there are other concerns.

"While the decision was a very welcome one and the spotlight of international opinion was on this case, many other such writings could potentially be criminalised - writings which, we consider, should be protected under the right of freedom of expression," he said.

"And while this provision remains in law - that people can be prosecuted for criticising the military, the state, judges or presidents - we will still have major concerns about the full enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression in Turkey."

More needed

Amnesty International says it is also concerned about the ongoing case of a Turkish publisher, Ragip Zarakolu, who appeared in court on Wednesday accused of inciting hatred over an article in which he criticised Ankara's policies regarding largely-Kurdish Northern Iraq.

Over recent years, Ankara has introduced a raft of reforms intended to smooth Turkey's way to eventual EU membership.

Human rights groups recognise that these have amended some laws restricting freedom of expression, or led to reductions in sentences meted out.

But they say more needs to be done. Some Turkish politicians agree.

After Mr Baskaya's acquittal, the head of the Turkish parliament's human rights commission said that the part of the penal code used to prosecute him was undemocratic and should be abolished.

3. - Kurdistan Observer - "Turkey Playing with Fire":

2 March 2005 / by Prof Goran Nowicki

Since coming into power of the Islamists in Turkey in 2002, the Turkish and American relations has started a steady decline. This has opened a window of opportunity for Kurds in Iraq and in the region. What is the future of Kurdish, Turkish and US relations in the region?

TURKEY, KURDS AND TURKMEN

600 years before coming into power of Erdogan, the Ottaman's first empire collapsed. in 1402, the Ottomans were defeated by Taimur lang, another Turkish-Mongol leader. Taimur who is now the national hero of Uzbakistan was helped by the Turkmen principalities in defeating the Ottomans. The same Turkmen that Turkey is now crying for. The humiliating treatment of the Ottoman sultan Bayazid by Taimur is documented in history. The sultan was put into an iron cage and was witness to his naked wife(s) serving the Taimour army and the Turkmen and his wives being debauched by them. The sultan did last for a year and after that he committed suicide.

Contrast this stormy relations of Ottomans and Turkmen with the relations that the Ottomans enjoyed with the Kurds in their second period after 1500. The resurrection of Ottoman and defeat of Persia and later expansion of Ottomans as far as Tabriz and Baghdad was not possible without the assistance of Kurds. In the last two centuries of Ottoman rule, the Kurdish-Ottoman relations started to deteriote and the Ottomans decided to put an end to the autonomy that the Kurds enjoyed under their rule.

In the Ottoman era, the Sunni Kurds and Ottomans saw the shiite safavids in Iran as their enemies. In contrast those Turkmen who were shiites and Alavi sided with the shiite enemies of Ottomans. The Ottomans main progress was westward and in Europe they were blocked by the Polish hero Jan Sobiesky in 1683. After 1683, the decline of Ottoman started and it reached to the point that the over extended empire turned into the sickman of Europe. The Ottoman records in its final decades show a series of financial deficits and the disastrous mistake of the Ottoman sultan in WWI put an end to a decling empire which was extended over three continents. Have the Ottomans not sided with the German-Russia axis in WWI, the Ottomans would have continued to progress and economically recover by the discovery of oil in Iraq and middle east.

TURKISH COLD WAR HANG OVER

After WWI, Turkey inherited the Ottoman legacy and with the rise of Bolsheviks and Communism in Russia, Turkey under Ataturk turned into an ally for the west. Ataturk's bold attempt ended the religious rule of Ottoman Sultan and replaced the religious monarchy with a republic. One can contrast the success and speed of the implementation of these reforms in Turkey and in Europe. Perhaps the main weakness of the republic was the failure of it to incorporate the successful multilevel structure of the Ottoman's federal structure to deal with the Kurdish subjects of the republic.

After WWII and creation of NATO, Turkey turned into an important front against the Soviet Union and blocking it from accessing the warm waters. The special status that Turkey enjoyed in its cold war era was a major factor in US and west's support for it in the region. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the mistreatment of Kurds in Turkey was tolerated by US because of this special status. Turkey was treated like a spoiled child in the cold war period and especially after the stormy relations of the US and Saudi Arabia and the Iranian revolution in the 70's, Turkish importance soared.

With the fall of Soviet Union and the incorporation of Warsaw pact countries into NATO and the newly created structure of EU, the special status of Turkey was affected and it is time for Turkey to get used to its new status. The rise of Islamists in Turkey and the cooling of relation between Ankara and Israel was another blow to the declining status of Turkey. In the post cold war era, Turkey is caught in the competition between US and EU in the region and it can no longer play the partner role that it played for both in the cold war. Geographically, Turkey cannot ignore the EU which is its immediate neighbor and the EU cannot ignore Turkey because Turkey is "the port" and the bridge between Europe and Asia. Islamic Turkey and Christian Orthodox Russia are now competing with each other as the gateway of the Christian Europe to the east. But the more Turkey gets closer to EU (or even to Russia), the more it moves from the US orbit. The Turks are now in a dilemma, should they follow the US or the EU? After cold war, the Turk's are moving towards replacing US with Russia and going towards EU membership at the same time.

The Turks would like to join the EU, but at present they are too big and too underdeveloped for EU and EU may reject them. For joining the EU, the Turks need to bring their regulations in line with the EU and give the same special status that the Kurds and European subjects enjoyed during the Ottoman era. The Kurds in Turkey would like to join the EU structure and their leaders such as Leyla Zana are aware that the implementation of EU reforms by Turkey is in line with Kurdish interests in Turkey. Ironically, Kurds need Turkey to get into the EU structure, but Turkey without Kurds has a better chance to get into the EU. The population of Turkey (without Kurds) is less than the population of Germany and France and without Kurds in Turkey, the Turks would not have many problems in terms of minorities. But Kurds need Turkey.

KURDISH TURKISH RELATIONS

The reality is that any confrontation between the Turks and Kurds will damage their chances for getting on board the EU train. If Turkey joins EU, the Kurds will gain a status in EU too, so the Kurds in Turkey should put on hold the Kurdish separation file and do their best to bring Turkey and Kurds into the EU structure. The Turks should appreciate and acknowledge this period of calm and both Kurds and Turks in Turkey should realize that they are in the same boat heading towards the EU and do not try to shake the boat.

But the more the Turks get closer to the EU, the more they move away from the US orbit, although some US Politicians look at the enlargement of the EU as a way for EU becoming weaker in terms of its unity. With Iran (under the rule of Mollas) in the orbit of EU, a window of opportunity has opened for the collaboration between US and the Kurds in Iraq and in the region. In US war in Iraq, the Kurds saw the opportunity that the Turks provided and helped the US to succeed in its war. The success in this war in Iraq has become a legacy for the US president George Bush and the Kurdish support helped him to defeat Saddam, calm Iraq and get re-elected for a second term.

The next two targets of the US, Syria and Iran have both a Kurdish minority who can help the US in a possible war with Syria or Iran. The collapse of the Syrian minority shiite regime in the Sunni dominated Syria is much easier than a US war with Iran in which the Kurds will again play a major role. In the absence of Turkey, the role that Kurds can play increases and Turkey will face the double wrath of US if it tries to harm the only ally of the US in the region.

The Kurdish leadership has played its cards very well in supporting US. By jockeying for power in Baghdad, Kurds are expected to win the presidency of Iraq. A Kurdish president in Baghdad means that any confrontation between Turkey and Kurds in Iraq will automatically turn into a war between Turkey and Iraq: an Iraq which has the history of attacking its two neigbours Iran and Kuwait in the past for territorial expansion. An Iraq-Turkey war will turn into a united Arab-Turkish confrontation because the Arabs are fully aware that once the Turks pass the Kurdish mountains and reach Kirkuk, there is no barrier that stops them from resurrecting the Ottoman rule in the region. The Kurds should also be careful to fully synchronize and align their moves in the region with the US policy in the region and at the same time bargaining with the US over the re-unification of Kurdish lands as the opportunity arises in Syria and then Iran. With the death of Arafat, Iran have managed to open a new front in Palestine against US and this will further delay the US war against Iran.

One can clearly see that by threatening Kurds in Iraq, Turks are going towards a confrontation with the US and Arabs. Any confrontation will de-stablize Turkey and may even cause an early disintegration of Turkey. The Turks are playing with fire and damaging their own EU chances.

The present focus of Turkey on Kurdish land and Kurdish oil is against Turkish interests in the region and Turkey instead should focus on its 30 Millions Azeri kins in Iran, a policy which is more in line with the developments in the region. In this century what is expected is that the Kurds will form their own state like the Azeris, and the Kurds in Turkey will separate from Turkey the same way that the Azeris will separate from Iran. Will Turkey be linked to Azeri regions and Azeri oil will depend on Kurdish and Turkish relations and a drastic change in Kurdish policy of Turkey in the coming years. What the Kurds and Turks should realize is that Turkey is the potential bridge between Kurds and their Indo-European kins in Europe and the Kurds are also the potential bridge between Turkey and their Turkic kins in Asia. This is not a zero sum game and both Kurds and Turks can win in the region if they learn to play the game together and learn lessons from the 400 Ottoman history of Turkish Kurdish relations in the region.

4. - Turkish Daily News - "EU Commission presses Turkey to sign Cyprus protocol":

Top Commission official in Ankara complains pre-Dec. 17 enthusiasm is now gone

ANKARA / 2 March 2005

The reform process in Turkey has slowed down in the aftermath of a landmark summit of European Union leaders that gave the go-ahead for opening of accession talks with Turkey on Oct. 3, top official of the EU Commission representation in Ankara said.

Hansjoerg Kretschmer, head of the EU Delegation in Ankara, also urged Ankara to sign a protocol extending its 1963 Association Agreement with the European Union to ten new members, including Greek Cyprus, which Turkey does not recognize.

Turkish government has dismissed charges of losing momentum in the reform process and said the EU membership remained a priority. EU diplomats in Ankara, on the other hand, say Brussels wants to see visible steps being taken as the entry negotiation date approaches.

Among other things, Turkey needs to appoint a chief negotiator and a negotiating team and sign the protocol to include Greek Cyprus in its Association Agreement with the EU before entry talks start on Oct. 3.

Kretschmer, in an interview with private CNN Türk television, said Turkey should act quickly to sign the protocol because the protocol would have to be ratified by the 25 member states of the EU as well as the European Parliament. “Therefore, there is much to do. And we have little time until October,” he was quoted as saying.

A delegation of Turkish diplomats is expected to head to Brussels today for talks with EU Commission officials over the signing of the protocol. Kretschmer said there was not much to negotiate on the protocol, because the text was quite simple.

Turkish government gave assurances to EU leaders that the protocol would be signed before Oct. 3 but it wants to make sure that the signing of the protocol would not mean recognition of the Greek Cypriot government.

Enthusiasm lost:

Despite government's insistence that EU process was a priority for Turkey, Kretschmer also complained that not many things had happened in Turkey to push the process forward over the past three months, since the December summit. He said there was no progress, for instance, concerning status and rights of minority foundations and gender rights. “We cannot see the same enthusiasm that was in place before Dec. 17,” he was quoted as saying.

5. - UPI - "Cold Turkey":

WASHINGTON / 2 March 2005 / by Arnaud de Borchgrave

No one noticed as Turkey, an erstwhile ally, nabbed the gold medal recently in the global anti-American stakes. Those with the most negative views of the Bush administration's policies are (1) Turks with 82 percent; (2) Indonesians, 81 percent; (3) Lebanese, 80 percent; (4) Argentines, 79 percent; (5) Brazilians, 78 percent. Mercifully, half the 22,000 people surveyed in 21 countries by the BBC around the world did not agree, "America's influence on the world is very negative."

For those who see thousands of demonstrators in Beirut excoriating Syria as pro-American voices for freedom, think again. In Egypt, there are far more people angry with President Hosni Mubarak for his close alliance with the U.S. than for denying them their political freedom.

After reading a long list of lies and distortions published by the Turkish media, the gold medal is hardly surprising. From left to right, and from centrist to Islamist, the United States is raked over hot coals with odious comparisons to Nazi Germany. The Middle East Media Research Institute has once again scored in bringing to our attention trends our mainstream media has ignored. The difference between what Osama bin Laden said in his 19 audio and videotapes since 9/11, and what some Turkish journalists write, is hard to detect. If anything, the Turks out-venom bin Laden.

Columnist Suleyman Arif Emre wrote in the pan-Islamist daily Milli Gazette, "As we know, Germany's Hitler started World War II, and about 50 million people perished because of his ambitions. Bush is America's Hitler. Like Hitler, he too has become a curse for the world. If the world's sensible leaders don't unite against Bush to stop him, a great number of people will die because of his ambitions."

"Bush," the venomous Turk continued, "who is an ally of the Zionists, belongs to the racist philosophy too. The beliefs of Bush's evangelical church coupled with Jewish racism, which exceeds Hitler's, are sufficient proof that the 'Sharon-Bush duo' is militants of the same fanatical philosophy. Hitler said he would establish a new order if Germany won. Bush is after similar invasions."

Following Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush's map of invasions, columnist Emre says, includes 22 additional Islamic countries. And how did he reach this figure? Because Bush is carrying out a 5,000-year-old Zionist dream to conquer everything between the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates. Bush has already "blurted out the names of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Nuray Mert, another columnist for the center-left liberal daily Radikal, described Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as "one of the leading architects of the American project to push the world into chaos and carry it out in the most barbaric way." Burhan Bozgeyik, in Milli Gazette, added the Bush administration is in the hands of the worst enemies of Islam. Their hate is so deep no amount of Muslim blood (spilled by them) satisfies them...even hundreds of thousands of dead seem little for them."

The "evil triangle" -- U.S., UK and Israel -- whose "hatred for Muslims has reached the point of madness, pretends to be Turkey's ally, but in fact it is weakening her foundations and planning to destroy her...The so-called 'elections' were nothing but the first step toward dividing Iraq."

This would be hilarious if it weren't for the incontrovertible fact it is believed not only by Islamist extremists, but by countless millions of Muslim fundamentalists, including all those who subscribe to Wahhabi tenets. And we only have ourselves to blame. America's public policy voice is pathetically defensive. It lacks credibility. Even al-Hurrah, the federally funded U.S. satellite feed to the Arab world has at times sounded overly critical of the Bush administration. This, monitors reported back to Pentagon inquiries, was "to gain credibility."

Burhan Ozfatura, a former mayor of Izmir and a columnist for the business daily Dunya, writes, "It is my sincere belief...the U.S. is run by an incompetent, very aggressive, true enemy of Islam, brainwashed with evangelical nonsense, a blood-thirsty team that is a loyal link in Israel's command and control system." The U.S., he concludes, is the "biggest danger for Turkey, today and in the future."

Anti-Americanism is a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey. Throughout the 1990s, 60 percent of Turkish people had favorable views about the U.S. and its policies. The 2003 Iraq war closed many minds. The mood began to sour with the advent of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning ruling party.

The low point came when the Turkish parliament rejected the U.S. plan to open a northern front against Iraq. A $6 billion sweetener plus more billions in credit didn't change any minds. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division that was to spearhead the northern offensive was confined to the troopships offshore. Eventually, they sailed around the Arabian peninsula and entered Iraq from Kuwait.

Turkish paranoia fed suspicions the U.S. wants to create an independent and oil-rich Kurdish state. Turkish journalists convinced themselves, in turn, that Turkey's restive Kurds would then seek to secede. Bush has reassured Erdogan time and again the United States is firmly committed to Iraq's territorial integrity. But time and again, disinformation about U.S. intentions resurfaces courtesy of the wild bunch in the Turkish media.

Turkey's bid to join the European Union has also lost momentum over Ankara's reluctance to recognize Cyprus, an island nation Turkish troops invaded in 1974 to block a Greek Cypriot coup that sought a total union with Greece. EU says it's a sine qua non. The Turks still occupy the northern third of the country.

Negotiations for EU membership are expected to take 10 to 15 years -- and the first session isn't scheduled till next Oct. 3.

6. - KurdishMedia.com - "Turkey’s bad export, damaged good: The ITF":

BRUSSELS / 2 March 2005 / by Adil Al-Baghdadi

In memory of Musa Anter, a great Kurdish writer and patriot[1]

It is necessary, at various stages, to re-examine and analyze the principles, policies and tactics of a political party or movement and to consolidate and refresh the ideas of basic cadres and its leaders. But this only holds true if the political party in question is a genuine, bona fide, and most importantly independent entity.

In the light of the very poor showing at the polls - some might even say heavy defeat - by the Turkey’s front, the Iraqi Turkoman Front, ITF, and the shock this has caused to its members after seeing how unpopular their front is among Turkoman electorates, this seems to be a suitable time to re-examine some of its basic conceptions and misconception, regarding its position within Iraq and South Kurdistan.

To the real Turkoman voters, or those who have not voted and other Turkoman groups, the problem is posed in the simplest terms: the policy pursued by Turkey’s proxy have betrayed the Turkomans, therefore an independent new party free of Turkish influence must be immediately built on ashes of the front.

Turkey and its front did not take into account the historical development and momentum which post-Saddam era has ushered in South Kurdistan and Iraq as a whole. Without flexible tactics it is impossible to win or gain the trust of Turkoman community who understand well the suffering of the Kurds and the real history of Kirkuk, a city that has always been part of Kurdistan region. Then again, wooing Turkoman votes can’t be attained by waging a hate campaign, incitement to violence against Kurds and by recruiting the service of every self-serving racist Arab and Turkish writers or indeed by importing Turkey’s unique product, Kurdophobia.

Turkey’s ready made export package of hate and racism towards non-Turkic ethnic groups, which was enthusiastically exported and successfully adopted in Azerbaijan [2], has failed to produce same result among patriotic Turkomans. The century old racist practice by Turkey against Kurds in North Kurdistan and Armenians, which still is gripping the Turkish establishment and civil institutions, and sadly academic circles, has been despised by the Turkoman community who lived in solidarity with Kurds for centuries.

The self-declared custodian of the rights of Turkomans in South Kurdistan imposed itself on the true will of Turkomans and did not proceed in a straight line or had a clear objective other than permeating MIT[3] the sole wish and desire that is to hamper the orderly and natural process of Kurds mastering their own destiny. Indeed, the lack of vision and tact by members of Turkey’s front, who seem to be quite conversant with reciting anti-Kurdish Ba’thist slogans than making a single campaign pledge, has done little in serving the real interests of the Turkoman community. Thus, the degeneration of the front and the subsequent disloyalty of Turkomans to Turkey’s ill designs had as its consequence that the anti-Kurds elements disorientated.

Perhaps this was the reason behind one of other interfering Turkish directive to its fallen comrades which was to join the Shiite Alliance in the hope to salvage and repair its damaged good. However, the victory of Kurdistan Alliance list in Iraq and Brotherhood list in Kirkuk and the failure of Turkey and its front to learn the lessons of the tumultuous events in Iraq and Kurdistan marked the end of this bad Turkish export.

The sudden false rise and quick demise of Turkey’s front in Iraq is a window of opportunity for the Turkomans to join the real democratic political process along with original Arabs and Kurds in Kirkuk, in order work together to achieve their rights within the federalist state of South Kurdistan.

7. - Christian Sience Monitor - "Though battle-hardened, Iraq's Kurdish militia struggles for role":

A key question is whether the 'peshmerga', who have defended key cities, will disband under last year's accord.

1 March 2005 / by Annia Ciezadlo

As Iraq's fledgling security forces prepare to take over the country's defense, a crucial question is emerging: what will happen to Iraq's 80,000 or so pesh merga, the battle- hardened Kurdish militia?

Under an agreement hammered out last June, the pesh merga - meaning "those who face death" - and other militias are supposed to be disbanded and absorbed into Iraq's various security forces. But in turbulent northern Iraqi towns like Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tal Afar, the legendary mountain warriors have continued to fight - not as members of the Iraqi Army or national guard, but as pesh merga under the command of Kurdish political parties.

"Officially, there is no pesh merga, only the Iraqi Army," says Fareed Asasard, director of the Kurdistan Strategic Studies Center. "But still, you can see that the pesh merga remain. Maybe in some countries they have succeeded in changing militias into an army, but here, we continue to have pesh merga."

The pesh merga's role in defending key cities like Mosul, and the growing influence of Iraq's Kurdish minority, have revived the delicate question of how - and where - to use the storied guerrillas. In recent battles, they proved to be an invaluable counterinsurgency force, capturing many insurgents and defending strategic locations. But whether they remain in Kurdistan, or deploy throughout Iraq, their future promises to be a politically explosive issue that could heighten ethnic tensions.

Iraq has two main Kurdish parties: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP. Since 1991, each party has controlled an area of northern Iraq's semiautonomous Kurdish region. The two parties fought a four-year civil war in the mid-1990s, during which the KDP invited Saddam Hussein's troops into the region to drive back PUK forces. The two parties have agreed to unify the Kurdish region under a single government, but each maintains its own band of armed pesh merga with separate command structures.

A key question is whether the pesh merga will have to disband, under the June agreement. If they don't, that could cause tensions with other forces like the Shiite Badr Brigade, the private army of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

But some Kurdish officials have maintained that the agreement does not apply to them. With Iraq's two main Kurdish parties gaining clout, it's increasingly likely that the Kurdish parties will want to keep some of their pesh merga intact.

The question is where. One option is to keep the pesh merga where they have always been: strictly to defend Kurdistan. But as the Kurds gain stature within Iraq, the Turkish government is cranking up its alarms against Kurdish independence. A powerful autonomous region on Turkey's borders, with its own fighting force, would be hard for Ankara to stomach.

Another option is to disperse the pesh merga commanders throughout Iraq's Army. That way, the Iraqi Army gains a trained and loyal fighting force, skilled in counterinsurgency and guerrilla tactics. Not all of Iraq's pesh merga are well-trained. But those who attended the Qala Cholan officer school, founded after the 1991 Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein, form an experienced officer corps that Iraq's beleaguered forces need.

"From the very beginning of forming the New Iraqi Army, they have had problems building these new units," says Kosrat Rasul, a pesh merga commander who is now a top PUK leader. "The Americans should bring the Iraqi leaders and put them in the forefront, put more Iraqi commanders in charge of the forces."

But putting Kurdish officers in charge, no matter how experienced, could also increase ethnic friction. "What worries me are the consequences within Iraq," says an Iraqi political analyst who is close to the Kurdish leadership. "I think it's in the interests of Iraq to integrate the pesh merga into the Iraqi Army. But the ... way it's being done, with the Kurds in the forefront, is dangerous."

In interview after interview, Kurdish leaders declare their eagerness to keep fighting - not just in Kurdistan, but throughout Iraq. "The pesh merga is not a militia, it's a legitimate fighting force," says Dana Ahmed Majid, head of security for the PUK, hammering his fist in the air for emphasis. "How can the terrorists be able to operate throughout Iraq, and we, as Iraqis, not have the right to defend all of Iraq?"

Pesh merga commanders say that they are waiting for the central Iraqi government to ask them, publicly and unequivocally, to fight outside Kurdistan. "If the Americans and the Iraqi government ask us to deploy pesh merga, we are ready to do that," says Gen. Mustapha Said Qadir, the PUK's top pesh merga commander. "We are ready to deploy them even in Baghdad."

Others caution that the militia will not be as effective outside its own turf. Mosul is not within the Kurdish region, but it is almost half Kurdish, and even Kurds who don't live there know the city well. "Don't think that because the pesh merga succeeded in Mosul, they know Anbar," says Asasard. "I don't think they would be successful in Fallujah or Ramadi. Personally, I have never seen Samarra or Ramadi or Fallujah - but I have seen Mosul."

Some leaders think the best solution would be to use pesh merga only in Baghdad, a heterogeneous city of 5 million, about 20 percent of whom are Kurdish. "We are part of the government that rules in Baghdad, and it's the focal point of the economy, so the pesh merga should take part in defending it," says Rasul. "But in other provinces, they should provide their own security."

An embarrassing incident last December underscored the difficulty of using pesh merga outside Kurdistan. Many Iraqi politicians, both Arab and Kurdish, use the fiercely loyal fighters for their personal security details. At Baghdad International Airport, a lunchtime argument turned into a full-blown melee after Arab and Kurdish guards for several top politicians started hurling ethnic slurs at each other.

The pesh merga's successes in Mosul and Tal Afar have only increased Arab resentment. "The Arabs are just recruits brought hastily - they flee because they do not believe in what they are doing," says the Arab analyst, who asked not to be named. "So the perception that the Arabs are getting - and not just Sunni Arabs - is that it's not an Iraqi Army fighting terrorists, but Kurds fighting against Arabs."

8. - The Financial Times - "Unease Among Kurds As Leaders Eye Baghdad Power":

SULEIMANIA / 1 March 2005 / by Gareth Smyth in Suleimania

Jalal Talabani, at 72 one of the great survivors of Kurdish politics, is likely to become president of Iraq after the main Kurdish parties took 75 of 275 seats in Iraq's new assembly.

But Iraq's 5m-6m Kurds are at a testing time in their troubled history.

There is little jubilation within the Kurdish heartland, where many people express scepticism at their leaders' talk of the “big prize” of constitutional autonomy that has always eluded the 25m Kurds spread across Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran.

The roots of the scepticism are a sense that Kurdish energies should not be diverted into propping up Iraq, and a frustration at the behaviour of the Kurdish leaders.

Just after the election on January 30, Mr Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and Massoud Barzani, who heads the Kurdistan Democratic Party, jointly proclaimed Mr Talabani as the Kurds' choice for a top post in Baghdad.

Mr Barzani, in turn, would be “president of Kurdistan”, a position yet to be defined by either the Kurdish parliament or in the new Iraqi constitution.

“Kurdistan TV reported Massoud was elected president with the votes still not yet announced,” said a young man in Suleimania. “It's tribalism, not democracy, and I regret voting.”

While most Kurds welcomed the parties' common list for the Iraq-wide assembly, many felt a common list for the Kurdish regional assembly left them with no choice at all.

The parties used nationalist sentiment and tribal patronage to motivate voters, but some, especially the young, wanted to pass a verdict on the way the PUK and the KDP have run separate administrations since their brutal civil war of 1994-1997.

The parties' two zones have separate armed forces and television stations. Distinct cellular networks force users to switch Sim cards as they cross from one checkpoint to another.

Mr Barzani and Mr Talabani have pledged to merge the administrations, and Nichervan Barzani, prime minister in the KDP administration and Massoud Barzani's nephew, recently said unification could be complete by May.

“It will be easier in health and education than in security and military affairs,” said a senior PUK official.

But the real obstacle is vested interests, said Zirak Abdullah, a journalist with Hawlati, an independent newspaper. “Government, party and business are all mixed up.”

Both parties have assets once owned by the Iraqi government including hotels and villas and are becoming entangled in a web of trade and construction projects as the region begins to develop.

“There is a lack of transparency,” said Asos Hardi, Hawlati's editor. “It's hard to find out who owns what and people suspect the parties are often hiding behind the scenes.”

In October leading PUK members secured a commitment from Mr Talabani that financial decisions required approval by the party's political bureau.

Officials said this resulted from concern over the business affairs of Mr Talabani's sons and brother-in-law. “We have dealt with this,” said one. “The PUK, unlike the KDP, is not a family party.”

The PUK's media gave wide local publicity to December's FT report that the KDP-run administration had sent abroad $500m in hard currency, transferred from the US-led administration in Baghdad.

And the Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK) while joining the Kurdish lists for Baghdad and the regional assembly attacked nepotism in an independent campaign for provincial councils.

“We promised to investigate any official who suddenly became rich,” said Salahadin Babakr, spokesman for the IUK. “This is what people complain about.”

But with violence continuing in Iraq and Kurdish self-rule insecure, the struggle for pluralism and transparency in Kurdistan remains in its infancy.

“When there is no security, there can be no other life,” says Nawsherwan Mustapha, a senior PUK official. “Where security does exist, as in Suleimania [in the PUK-run zone], then people ask for other things.”

When Bashiqa, a town 15km northeast of Mosul and outside the Kurdish-run zone, was left short of ballot papers in the election, Zuhair Qaisar Khalaf was very angry.

“My 22-year-old nephew was tortured and beheaded in December by Arab terrorists,” he said. “I wanted to vote to be in Kurdistan, because only the Kurdish parties will protect us.”