22 February 2005

1. "Riots Rock Three Kurdish Towns in Iran", heavy clashes between Iranian Kurds and security agents erupted on Friday in three towns in western Iran, leaving dozens injured and hundreds arrested.

2. "Anti-Americanism", the issue began to be debated with the release of concrete data yielded by two public opinion polls conducted in a number of countries by the Marshall Fund and the BBC, consecutively.

3. "US Asks Anti-Americanism to Be Stopped in Turkey", a debate on anti-Americanism in Turkey, started by Robert L. Pollock's article in the Wall Street Journal, was deepened by the intervention of the US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith yesterday.

4. "There should be two official languages in Turkey", Turkey’s reaction to the emergence of a possibility for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq again pointed to the existence of the Kurdish question in Turkey.

5. "All Not Quiet On The Northern Front", Turkey holds the option of unilateral intervention in northern Iraq if Kurds declare independence and claim the oil wealth of disputed Kirkuk, considered the main spoils in the uncertain Iraqi equation.

6. "Kurds hope for their say", as part of alliance with victorious Shia, Kurdish leader could gain platform as new president of Iraq.

1. - iranfocus.com - "Riots Rock Three Kurdish Towns in Iran":

TEHRAN / 21 February 2005

Heavy clashes between Iranian Kurds and security agents erupted on Friday in three towns in western Iran, leaving dozens injured and hundreds arrested.

Clashes broke out after State Security Forces agents used force to disperse demonstrations taking place simultaneously in the towns of Sardasht, Saqqez, and Baneh in protest against severe fuel shortages in the area, eye-witnesses reported.

The demonstrations quickly turned violent as protestors fought back and shouted slogans against Iran's ruling clerics.

In Sardasht, residents came to the aid of protestors during clashes as the SSF attempted to arrest anyone in the vicinity of the demonstration. At least 200 people, mostly youths, were arrested.

In Saqqez, residents reportedly forced SSF agents to flee the scene after serious scuffles.

In Baneh, hundreds of protesting youths were reportedly detained by security forces and taken for questioning.

Iranian Kurds have been at loggerheads with the Islamic fundamentalist regime that has been in power for 26 years.

2. - Turkish Daily News - "Anti-Americanism":

21 February 2005 / Opinion by Dogu Ergil

The issue began to be debated with the release of concrete data yielded by two public opinion polls conducted in a number of countries by the Marshall Fund and the BBC, consecutively. On both occasions Turks scored the highest in anti-American sentiment, or perhaps more accurately, current U.S. foreign policy. The score that was circulated in the press was so high (82 percent) that the issue not only begs a fair analysis but also affirmative action to curb it.

Although official Turkish circles remain silent and indifferent to this poisonous atmosphere, Americans are apprehensive. The newly appointed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as well as former Undersecretary Strobe Talbot, who both have visited Turkey in the last couple of weeks, have voiced the United States' concern. Then came The Wall Street Journal article written by Robert L. Pollock on Feb. 16 whereby Turkey was labeled as the “Sick Man of Europe – Again.” A recently published book in Turkey titled “Metal Storm” preceded this insulting article. Two young men, Orkun Uçar and Burak Turna, authored this instant bestseller. The book is a political fiction based on a scenario whereby U.S. troops stationed in Iraq clash with a Turkish military unit, leading to an all-out war between the United States and Turkey. While Turkey is bombarded and invaded by the U.S. Army, a Turkish spy retaliates by detonating two briefcase-sized nuclear bombs in Washington D.C. and New York City. The book is not only selling much better than expected, it is also received as a possible scenario, a political manifesto that satisfies the psychological mood and desire of Turks to vent their sentiments against American politics in their part of their world where words of morality and action do not fit. Indeed, Turks are suspicious of American political and military intentions in the Middle East as well as their own country. They feel indignant because of the insulting and highbrow attitude of American diplomats since the rejection of the resolution by the Turkish Parliament to allow the passage of American troops into Iraq through Turkey, back in March of 2003.

It was only a few years ago when president Bill Clinton visited Turkey following the devastating earthquake that shook the country and took the lives of thousands of people. Commentators went as far as to claim that if Clinton ran in the coming Turkish national elections he would have won. There was no obvious anti-Americanism at the time, at the popular level, although there were differing groups who were traditionally anti-American, but now this obtuse sentiment is widespread and shared by groups other than the “usual suspects.” Why?

First of all, criticism of present American foreign policy, born out of unilateralist intervention without knowing the local complexities that cause more instability than status quo ante; regime change by military means due to threat perception, legitimized by intentions expressed as “liberation, liberalization and democratization,” while oil-rich or friendly despotisms are nurtured, must be noted. Different circles in Turkey (elite or non-elite) have begun to think that sooner or later regime change and the re-mapping of the region will affect their country. Secondly, the naivety of removing rough if not rogue regimes and expecting democracy to take their place has been interpreted by local populations as an excuse for American domination and exploitation of regional and national natural resources that the United States could not do under previous dictatorships.

It is hard for Americans to understand these points when they believe their administration when it states that military intervention is a surgical operation performed to remove obstacles to democracy and underdevelopment, and that bombing is done in order to restore popular will. However, when whole cities are bombed, not only the military forces of the dictatorial regime are knocked off, innocent people die as well. Military facilities as well as municipal facilities are destroyed. When “liberators” torture individuals, a whole nation is defiled in its own homeland. When oppressors are punished people expect consistency not leniency in favor of America's friends in the region, but these are the realities of distant lands for Americans who only see supporting their president and their boys fighting for the liberty and deliverance of a captive people halfway around the world.

These factors may explain the indifference of Americans to the actions of their administration, as well as the rise of a considerable degree of anti-American feelings in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. But they do not explain why anti-Americanism is most rampant in Turkey especially when the past record of U.S.-Turkish relations is considered: Turkey was taken under U.S. and later NATO protection when Stalinist Russia began to claim territory from Turkey after World War II. This protection continued until the end of the Cold War. The United States influenced international monetary and financial organizations to help Turkey overcome the deluge of bankruptcies caused by the constant depletion of its economic resources by its corrupt politicians and bureaucrats in legal and illegal partnerships with businessmen. American diplomats acted as lobbyists in European centers for years on end to get a date for Turkey to start membership talks with the EU, consistent with their government's policy to back Turkey in her EU aspirations. The American intelligence community tracked down Turkey's “public enemy number one,” Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the notorious PKK and delivered him to Turkey. Furthermore, if Turkey is getting a part of the oil distribution scheme (Baku-Ceyhan pipeline) regarding oil from the Caucuses, it will be with U.S. backing. What then?

These points are all true and under normal circumstances the United States would be the most favored country among Turks, but three things have converged to change this:

1- Diverse and conflicting groups converged on the criticism of American policies. A) Turkey's officials have never been so critical of the United States. The military bureaucracy is very much offended by the insulting treatment of Turkish Special Forces officers by the American rangers in Suleimania, in northern Iraq. Those officers who avoided an armed conflict that could have evolved into an uncontrolled one, much like the one mentioned in the fiction titled “Metal Storm,” were later scolded for complacency. However, the insult has never been forgotten and it is doubtful that it will ever be. The army is larger-than-life in Turkey and it is the bearer of national honor. The event has showed that American priorities may be diametrically opposed to Turkey's priorities and the second will always be sacrificed to the first. B) The majority of the military bureaucracy in Turkey is critical of U.S. aid and support of the Kurds of Iraq with the rationale that eventually a Kurdish state will emerge and be manipulated as an American protectorate. Such a state sooner or later will lure Turkey's Kurds. When Turkey's Kurds are mobilized, the likelihood of a civil war will not only divides Turkey, but will also create overarching instability in the whole region. C) At no time has the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been so vocal in its critique of U.S. policies. U.S. Turkish diplomats find American policies in the Middle East unresponsive to local circumstances; military/security oriented rather than human and diplomatic oriented. They see American policies to be too high browed, insolent at times and less flexible because it is supported by military muscle. They believe that the United States is endangering Turkey's security as well as sewing the seeds of future conflict in the Middle East, thinking they are acting on behalf of their own country's interests.

2- The right wing is divided into two: nationalists and religionists. Once the nationalists were very much pro-American because of the communist threat. Today they are far from their old position. The nationalist right believes that the United States is adamant to create a Kurdish state that will eventually be carved out of eastern Turkey. The fact that several thousand PKK militants are able to live in the mountains of north Iraq is blamed on the United States and its intentions to keep them there as a trump card against Turkey if she gets too unruly or threatens the newly created Iraqi administration in north Iraq. Furthermore, the United States does not need the right any more to suppress leftist movements and has stopped aiding them. The religious right has never been pro-American because it has never been pro-West. Their leaning is to religion (Islam) and their religious brethren in the Middle East. So what happens to the Iraqis and to the Palestinians is their main concern without distinguishing acts of terrorism, which they see as acts of national liberation. Islamists live in an intellectual world that allows no affinity to different value systems other than their own. Temporary deviations from this position are only for reasons of expediency.

3- The secularists come as leftists and rightists. The basic political reflex of the left in Turkey has always been anti-Americanism because of their socialist and past pro-Soviet stance. Although the latter has disappeared, they still label the United States as imperialist and base their worldview on that steadfast ideological position. The secular right-wingers are very much offended by some of the American officials' statements that Kemalism has served its historical purpose and Turkey should move on. Turkish secularists believe that in the framework of creating moderate Islamic regimes to reconcile with the Islamic world, the United States hopes to convert Turkey into a moderate Islamic country. The proof of this, they believe, is the United States' support of the AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan, whose platform is the offspring of an Islamic legacy. From the secularists' point of view, this perceived motivation and U.S. support threatens the very essence of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, unwavering Pro-Israeli U.S. policy has alienated secular and non-secular right-wingers equally because they identify with the misery of the Palestinians and they blame Israeli intransigence on unfaltering U.S. backing. They see an obvious moral flaw in U.S. support of Israel that breeds anti-American feelings. All of these groups have, for the first time, converged on one political agenda: suspicion of and resistance to American policies.

Each of these groups has a social hinterland and they wield considerable influence. This power is not only in the form of emulation but rather constant indoctrination that keeps the flame of anti-Americanism burning. That is the reason why anti-American feelings are higher here than any place else in the world except, of course, for the war zones where the United States is combatant. This is dangerous and unhealthy for a people and government who have to reconcile with the United States and vice versa.

What can be done? Starting from the government, leaders of all social formations, civilian or official, must be aware that if they do not reverse their systematic negative influence (indoctrination for some of them) on their followers, anti-Americanism may reach pathological levels. This would not only isolate Turkey but would weaken her hand in her relations with the EU as well. Turkey's sensitive economic balance that could be struck with so much misery and hardship can be easily disrupted again. Conversely, the U.S. administration must turn to itself and ask why its policies have alienated even the most loyal and grateful of its allies, including most of the European countries, and start making some amendments. Morality cuts both ways. What is morally right and legitimate for the Americans may be quite the opposite for others. This is the dilemma that the present American administration must see and share with its people. Otherwise, this socio-pathology may lead all of us to intractable conflicts and balkanization of the North Atlantic Alliance at a time when the world needs more sanity, understanding and solidarity.

3. - Zaman Online - "US Asks Anti-Americanism to Be Stopped in Turkey":

21 February 2005

A debate on anti-Americanism in Turkey, started by Robert L. Pollock's article in the Wall Street Journal, was deepened by the intervention of the US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith yesterday.

Noting that Ankara should take action in order to stop anti-Americanism, Feith warned that otherwise relations between the two countries might suffer. Expressing that the US highly values good relations with its allies and wants to preserve them, Feith said, with reference to Turkey, that they hope their allies would also try hard to provide public opinion support regarding this relation as they have provided it in their country. Feith stressed that without the necessary sensitivity to maintain strong ties between the two countries, the relations could no longer be sustained.

President of the Federation of Turkish American Associations Ata Erim has sent an official letter to the Wall Street Journal expressing the strong reaction of the Turkish community against the article titled "The Sick Man of Europe-Again". Erim underlined that a false portrayal of Turkey through news or editorials in some newspapers as if they represented the views of all segments of society is neither right nor fair.

A survey broadcast by the BBC including a question on how the re-election of Bush was viewed showed the most negative answer to this question from Turkey causing speculation that Turkey is the strongest anti-American country. In the survey conducted by GlobeScan for the International Policy Attitudes Program at the University of Maryland in 21 countries, 82 percent of respondents in Turkey said that the re-election of Bush is dangerous for global security. The survey, which was held between November 15th 2004 and January 3rd 2005, also included another question about how the re-election of Bush affected their opinions about Americans. 72 percent of Turks answered "negatively", which also made Turkey the country expressing the most negative opinion on the question.

4. - Radikal - "There should be two official languages in Turkey":

- For Turkish-Kurdish equality, there is no other way than a federation. This is not division, but the sharing of power. It is the stage before an independent state. It gives the right to separate.

- The mentality that relies on Turkish dominance in Turkey will not ease the tension. At the same time, no one will accept a mentality that limits Turkish dominance. This is where the real problem lies. I do not have any doubts that Turkey wants to take Kirkuk. If Turkey thinks she is strong enough she won’t hesitate. This is a very clear intention. Kurds think like this as well.

18 February 2004 / by Nese Duzel / translated by KurdishMedia.com

WHY? Serafettin Elci

Turkey’s reaction to the emergence of a possibility for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq again pointed to the existence of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Ankara, and those who support its official policy, expressed their opinions on the events in Northern Iraq. Many opinions from the Turkish perspective were publicised in the media regarding this matter. However, the opinions of Kurds in Turkey on this matter were not publicised on the same scale. Perhaps this single truth itself was revealing enough of the seriousness of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Therefore, we talked to Serafettin Elci, who is among the most prominent Kurdish intellectuals and well known for being frank and honest; who once both served as minister during a period and then was ‘sentenced’ as a minister for saying “I am Kurdish’, about how Kurds in Turkey viewed the possibility of an independent Kurdish state being set up in Northern Iraq, what they were expecting to be done in Turkey, what their complaints were and what they thought of Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy. The Democratic Mass Party, of which Serafettin Elci was founder and chairman, was recently closed and he is currently in preparation to set up a new party.

Turkey is preparing to become a member of the European Union. This means, “all citizens will definitely be equal.” Within such conditions, do you still find a Kurdish-Turkish differentiation important?

If the state represents all its citizens and protects everyone’s rights on an equal level, then a differentiation among citizens won’t be necessary.

Don’t you support the idea of federalism anymore?

No, I still do. Peoples have the right to govern themselves. Different peoples can live under the same roof as partners of the state.

Isn’t the understanding of statehood based on ethnicity, an understanding of statehood that is outdated in this day and age?

The individuals who will best rule a certain people in a region are the individuals who are members of that people. Because, they will best understand that people. They will know the circumstances, the past [and] the geography of that people.

Can a race only be governed best by someone from the same race?

There is no rule that a race is best governed by someone from the same race? The model of government is important. Because, dictators that oppress humans also emerge from within the people. The best model of government in our times is democracy. Within a democratic framework, if a race is best governed by someone from that race, than this would be the ideal situation, instead of a foreigner governing.

If the best model of government is democracy, why is additionally moving towards a federation the best solution?

Equality cannot be achieved without a federation. Because, the central government has a single official language and a single language in education. If you impose the language of the dominant on the whole society as the language of education, then there is no equality.

Wouldn’t it be enough for Turkish-Kurdish equality if citizens whose mother tongue is not Turkish are able to open schools that provide education in their own languages or take it as optional subjects like the “cultural rights” that are in currency in the EU countries?

No, it wouldn’t be. The equality in the European Union is in basic human rights. The recognised rights are individual rights. These are the equal human rights that can be required by every citizen. Yet, one should understand the importance of group rights. These rights should be used collectively. If you can’t use them collectively, then you can’t say, “You go and open your own school, if you can’t go as an individual, and undertake your education.”

What you call an individual right, such as the right to education in one’s mother tongue, which is a cultural right, is already at its basic a group right. Isn’t the most important thing that all citizens have equal rights?

Equality can’t be achieved through empty talk. You tell a group, “Go and carry out education with your money in your language.” To the language and culture of the other group, you give all the resources of the state and the valid education in the country is the education carried out in that language. And your diploma has no value at all. This is not equality. The language of that group and the education carried out in that language has to be valid as well. In the areas where Kurds are majority, the state should carry out the education in Kurdish.

Would not this create a state with two official languages?

That is the end result anyway. There will be two official languages. This can only happen in a federation. There can be two official languages in a federal system. Currently, the Iraqi state has two official languages. The language of the Catalans in Spain is the official language only in their own region but the Walloon and Flemish in Belgium are both official languages. One of these paths could be taken.

Isn’t the federal formula you are suggesting the phase before independence? Federalism, isn’t it the road to independence?

Of course. Federalism is the phase before an independent state. A mutual union is established with a free will and this also includes the right to separate with a free will from the state. But even if you told a citizen, who is happy with the state, to separate, that citizen wouldn’t. Referendums were held in Scotland and Wales and the people rejected separation because people wanted to together benefit from Britain’s blessings. People will look to separate when they are uncomfortable with their state.

During a period where states are transferring their sovereignty, the EU being an example, how reasonable is it to move towards tiny new states?

If everyone accepts concepts such as a European state, European nation, or a global state and global nation, then there won’t be any problems. But what you suggest is, “Turks should enter the EU by protecting their Turkishness and Kurds should enter by abandoning their Kurdishness.”

But that is not what the EU process is about. This is a process that changes and democratises the structure of the state in Turkey. A system will be established where all the citizens are equal. Isn’t it like that?

Can you even consider the thought of Turks abandoning their language? Would the Turks ever say that they want English to be their language?

Why should they? Doesn’t every state in the EU have an official language?

Exactly. If the Turks are not abandoning their language, why shouldn’t the Kurds also want their language to be an official language? Turkey can be an applicant to the EU partnership as much as it wants; Turkey does not share the same mentality with Europe. If the European mentality becomes dominant in Turkey as well, like in Spain then these issues will already cease to be subject of debate.

You are Kurdish, a politician and Turkish citizen. Your…

I am not a Turkish citizen; I am a citizen of the Turkish Republic.

Shouldn’t you have projects and suggestions on behalf of everyone living in the country instead of only the Kurds? Don’t you see a lack in the assertion, “I only produce political projects for the Kurds.”

To defend the Kurdish cause doesn’t mean neglecting the problems of other citizens of Turkey. But the state has made itself such a prisoner of the Kurdish question that, even an implementation that is known for sure to be for the benefit of the country is viewed with the anxiety of whether it will benefit the Kurds as well. The mentality that relies on Turkish dominance in Turkey will not ease the tension. At the same time, no one will accept a mentality that limits Turkish dominance. This is where the real problem lies.

Is independence a secret wish of all the Kurds?

In my opinion, it is a secret wish. If every nation has a state, this is also the wish of the Kurds. But if within a state you have everything you think you should have, than there is also no need for an independent state. To have all the rights is possible in a federal system. At any rate, federalism is the sharing of the capacity to use power, not the division of the state.

Kirkuk emerged as a serious problem. In your opinion, should Kurds in Northern Iraq establish a state that also includes Kirkuk?

Wishes and reel politics are different matters. At this moment, reel politics is not in favour of the Kurds establishing an independent Kurdistan. Kurds won’t try to establish an independent Kurdistan that America doesn’t approve. Currently, the USA does not support an independent Kurdish state. In any case, the Kurds in Iraq want important functions in the central government in Baghdad. But, the Kurds have certain demands. If these demands are met, they won’t consider separating from Iraq.

If these demands are not met?

Then they will push for independence. The first demand is, Kurds will not accept a state model that is not secular, democratic and federal. The second demand is regarding the borders of the Kurdistan federal state. 45 thousand square km of the total 85 thousand of Kurdistan’s geography in Iraq is today administered by the Kurds. The Kurds want the Kurdistan geography to be within the border of the Kurdish federal state. Kurds in Iraq will not concede on the issue of the Kurds’ ownership of Kirkuk. But this doesn’t mean Kirkuk will completely become a Kurdish city. All the groups living in Kirkuk should have a say in the Kirkuk administration in accordance with its population.

It looks like the rights of the Turkmen population in Kirkuk are being sidelined. Attempts are being made to alter the demographics of the region through bringing in Kurds from the outside. Talking about Kurds being oppressed, are the Kurds with their first chance now preparing to oppress others?

I don’t think so. Barzani says, “If no one defends Turkmen rights then I will defend it.” Majority of Turkmens did not have any disagreement with Saddam’s regime. Turkmens are careful not to end up in disagreement with dominant powers. This was the case both during period of British administration and the monarchy. The dangerous element for Iraq’s central government is the Kurds. If the number of Kurds expelled by Saddam is two hundred thousand, the number of expelled Turkmens is five, ten thousand. No one is attempting to change the demographics of Kirkuk.

If the demographics are not being changed, then why was the first thing the Kurds did after the USA occupied Iraq to loot the records of the population registry in Kirkuk?

We don’t know if this is true or not. It is a certain group that claims this.

Didn’t we watch this looting on the TV?

Now, something like that can happen during the conditions that prevailed in those days. A lot of placed were looted in Iraq. My observation based both on my personal talks with the Kurdish leaders and their statements is that except for the Turkmen Front, which is a spy of Turkey, and the Turkmen Nationalist Action Party, which is organised by the MHP [Turkey’s Nationalist action Party, WL], Kurds don’t have any problems at all with the Turkmen.

In that case, the federal solution you propose for Turkey, would you propose a Kurdish-Turkmen federation in Northern Iraq?

The condition for the Turkmen to establish a federal structure does not exist. Because they do not have a geographic area where they are the majority and where they can say, “The administration of this place should be mine.” They do not historically have a region of which they can claim the rights. The Turkmens are a national minority there. They cannot be the principal founders.

Doesn’t looking at every problem through the perspective of nationalism and race, in an age where the world is changing rapidly, blind people in a sense? Is it easy to grasp such a complex world by looking at it from a single perspective?

The nation and race is a reality. The existence of nations and races doesn’t mean the elimination of other races. Working for the benefit of your people and nation is a legitimate action.

Do the Kurds think that Turkey wants to take Kirkuk?

I do not have any doubts on this matter. Kurds believe this as well. If Turkey thinks she is strong enough she won’t hesitate. This is a very clear intention. The concept of retrieving lost Ottoman lands is very widespread on both the state and public level.

Have you considered the possibility that by emphasising your Kurdishness like this and talking about a federation, you have become an ally of Turkish nationalism in a sense and established a conservative alliance of different races?

I would not even dream of allying myself with conservative nationalists elements. When Kurds put forward their legitimate and just demands, there is a type of understanding that tends to label them as a version of Kurdish nationalism. I am of an understanding, which is liberal social democrat.

Can’t rights be defended without emphasising race and as “equal human rights, equal citizenship rights?”

If this perception is correct, then there should not be any states in the world. While some have states, why should others be deprived? Why shouldn’t it be one’s right to have a state?

If a Kurdish state is established in Northern Iraq, will Turkey’s Kurdish citizens want to join that state?

If the Kurdish citizens would be in their current miserable state, obviously they would prefer to be the citizens of a state just next-door belonging to the same people. There could be those who join if there is a developed, peaceful Kurdish state there. But if one is happy in the current state, if one can benefit equally from all the blessings of the state and especially if this state is a candidate to the EU and Kurds are able to benefit from the blessings of Europe, why would a Kurd go and become the citizen of a less developed small state?

There are many Turkish intellectuals who say let’s abandoned the Kurd-Turk division and everyone becomes equal. You,…

No there aren’t. There are many Turkish intellectuals who do not pursue racist nationalism but they are in reality “cultural nationalists.” Because the argument they defend is, “Okay Kurds are our equal brothers but they should be like Turks. Everyone should be equal as Turks.” However, the issue is to see as equal what is different from you, to be equals as Kurds and Turks.

Many Turkish intellectuals defend equality without at all emphasising their Turkishness. Among Kurdish intellectuals on the other hand these kinds of inclusive opinions are not heard that much. In your opinion, why is it so important to be a Kurd?
It is a matter of belonging, defending your nation.

Kurds do not like Turkish nationalism and have suffered immensely from it, yet isn’t there a double standard in the way Kurdish nationalism is exalted?

There is nothing like exalting nationalism among Kurds. Kurds do not claim to be dominant over others.

Will the Kurdish nationalists in Northern Iraq do to Turkmens what Turkish nationalist have done to the Kurds, once they become dominant?

If they do, then we will before everyone and more than anyone be against this. We won’t be quite just because we are Kurds.

As a Kurdish politician and citizen of Turkey, would you prefer the dream of becoming the president of the Turkish Republic to the dream of becoming the president of a federal Kurdish state?

If as a Kurd, I have the possibility of becoming the president of the Republic of Turkey, than I would prefer this to becoming the president of a Kurdish federal state. But as a Kurd, not by becoming a Turk. Saying, “I am Kurdish, my origins are Kurdish” is not enough. My language should be valid like Turkish. In a federal system, Kurds will get the chance to become Turkey’s president. Look at Talabani, he is saying, “I want to become the president of Iraq.”

Isn’t there any other way than the federal system to achieve Turkish-Kurdish equality?

I don’t think there is. As long as the official ideology based on the state’s Turkism ideology is not abandoned, talking about Turkish-Kurdish equality is absurd…

The above interview was published in the Turkish daily Radikal on the 14th of February, 2005, and was translated for KurdishMedia.com from the Turkish original by Welat Lezgin.

5. - Dawn - "All Not Quiet On The Northern Front":

ISTANBUL / 20 February 2005 / by By Hilmi Toros

Turkey holds the option of unilateral intervention in northern Iraq if Kurds declare independence and claim the oil wealth of disputed Kirkuk, considered the main spoils in the uncertain Iraqi equation.

In bellicose tones, Turkish officials have served notice that Kirkuk, with 40 percent of Iraqi petroleum and 6 percent of the world's known oil reserves, is a multi-ethnic city and the home of Turkomens (northern Iraqis of Turkish stock), and as such should have a "special status".

Turkey's sharp reaction challenges claims by Kurdish leaders that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city destined to be the capital of an autonomous Kurdish entity in a federated Iraq - or a fully independent one.

"Kirkuk is the Jerusalem of Kurdistan," Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani has publicly announced. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) calls Kirkuk the heart of Kurdistan. "We are ready to fight and sacrifice our soul to preserve its identity," he said.

Turkey officially alleges "manipulations and irregularities" in the Jan. 30 elections where a unified Kurdish ticket claimed 59 percent of the vote in Kirkuk, with Turkomens gaining only 18 percent.

It cites reports that Kurds from other areas were brought to Kirkuk to boost their votes against Turkomens and Arabs. Kurds say that their people driven out of Kirkuk in Saddam Hussein's "Arabization" drive are coming back.

"Some people are looking the other way while mass migration takes place," Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan said recently, referring to the United States. "This is going to create major difficulties in the future. Everyone must know that Turkey...won't allow this geography to be delivered to chaos that will last for many years."

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has said that "in case of fighting in Kirkuk, Turkey cannot remain a spectator." Kurdish leaders have warned Turkey that any intervention would lead to disaster.

Modern Turkey's predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, ruled both Kirkuk and Mosul, another oil-rich city in the north, until they were ceded to Britain in the 1920s. Although it had legal right to a share of the oil wealth, Turkey gave it up for a lump sum in a decision Turks still regret.

How credible is the Turkish threat of military intervention in northern Iraq? Can it risk confrontation with the United States, still smarting over Turkey's refusal to open a "northern front" against Saddam? On the other hand, the United States enjoys cordial relations with Kurds who backed it against Saddam.

Early sabre-rattling is soothing a Turkish populace concerned that their country is a mere spectator to vital developments in bordering Iraq. But a military strike is "highly unlikely", says Swedish expert Henrik Liljegren.

There are significant "restraining factors", said Liljegren, former diplomat and now senior associate at the Istanbul Policy Centre. He cited them as damage to Turkey's bid to join the European Union, international law, public opinion (particularly in Muslim countries) and above all the United States.

Turkey appears to be having as much trouble with the United States as with Kurds in northern Iraq. Its traditional "strategic partnership", while still active on paper, suffered a serious blow when the Turkish parliament voted against Turkey joining the war on Saddam, or allowing US troops to cross its territory.

Recent opinion polls indicate that 60 percent of Turks are anti-American. Turks are particularly irked by the US refusal to move against about 5,000 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas holed up in mountains in northern Iraq bordering Turkey, despite declaring the PKK a terrorist organization.

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said she sees no difference between Kurdish PKK guerrillas and Al Qaeda, Turkish columnist Semih Idiz wrote: "If that is the case, why aren't you going after the PKK like you are going after Al Qaeda?"

The United States has said the PKK will be dealt with later, and that the current priority is developments in Iraq. But Liljegren believes that should PKK guerrillas slip back into Turkey, re-kindling fears of civil strife that took 30,000 lives in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey can strike at them in Iraq in "self-defence" or "hot pursuit". Turkey has maintained a few thousand troops inside northern Iraq for years.

The Turkish foreign ministry says its approach to Iraq has "a strategic perspective" and is not confined to PKK guerrillas, Turkomens or Kirkuk. But some analysts say the Turkish establishment, both military and political, suffers from a "Kurdish phobia" that drives it to seek military solutions.

Turkish analyst Dogu Ergil says Turkey should encourage Turkomen-Kurdish reconciliation rather than "driving a wedge between them". Iraqi Kurds say publicly they do not harbour anti-Turkish designs, while never hiding the fact that full independence remains their ultimate ideal.

In an unofficial ballot accompanying the Jan. 30 elections, some 95 percent of Iraqi Kurdish voters are reported to have favoured independence. "When the right time comes, it will be a reality," Barzani has said.

Whatever form its takes, a strong Kurdish entity in land-locked northern Iraq would need friendly relations with Turkey, observers say. "Despite mutual distrust, ours and the future of Kurds are inter linked," says Mehmet Ali Birand, a leading Turkish commentator on Kurdish affairs.

"Kurds should know that without Turkey they will never ensure their security. On the other hand, Turkey should realise that without the Kurds, Turkey cannot influence what's happening in Iraq. It might be a historic joke, but Turks and Kurds need each other."

6. - New York Newsday - "Kurds hope for their say":

As part of alliance with victorious Shia, Kurdish leader could gain platform as new president of Iraq

SULAIMANIYAH / 21 February 2005 / by Mohamad Bazzi

The picture hangs in homes, offices and buildings all over Iraq's Kurdish region: A pear-shaped man with wire-rimmed glasses is brandishing a map at a table full of politicians.

It is Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani waving an early-1900s map of Iraq at a meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council. Talabani declared the document proved that Kirkuk - an oil-rich city of 1 million that Saddam Hussein "Arabized" through forced migration - had always been part of Iraq's Kurdish region.

At that moment, on Feb. 9, 2004, control of Kirkuk became a centerpiece of the political struggle over a new Iraq. The issue is so significant for Kurds that some can describe exactly what they were doing on the day Talabani brought their demands before the Governing Council.

Today, Talabani is the leading candidate to become Iraq's new president. Although the job is largely ceremonial, with few defined responsibilities, it would give Talabani a national platform to push two major Kurdish aspirations: greater autonomy in northern Iraq and control over Kirkuk, a mixed city of Arabs, Kurds and Turkomen.

"The presidency is a symbolic post, but Talabani will use it effectively to advance Kurdish demands," said Fareed Asasard, director of the Kurdish Strategic Studies Center, an independent think tank based in Sulaimaniyah. "He is a masterful politician."

In last month's parliamentary election, an alliance of Kurdish parties won 75 seats - the second-largest bloc - in the 275-member National Assembly. A coalition of Shia Muslim parties won a slim majority of 140 seats, but that is not enough for the two-thirds vote needed for most decisions in parliament. Kurds and Shias are expected to form an alliance. In exchange for supporting a Shia candidate for the powerful post of prime minister, the Kurds have demanded that Talabani be named president when parliament convenes later this week.

"Kurds are in a very strong position politically because Shias need the Kurdish bloc in parliament," said Hiwa Osman, a Kurdish political analyst. "Without the Kurds, there can be no agreement on a new government."

Beyond naming a government, the future of the Shia-Kurdish alliance is shaky. The Kurds, who make up a fifth of the country's 25 million people, are worried about Shia religious parties trying to impose Islamic laws during the drafting of Iraq's new constitution. For their part, Shias are resistant to Kurdish demands for greater autonomy and for control over Kirkuk, home to a tenth of Iraq's oil reserves.

The conflict over Kirkuk is one of the most explosive in Iraq. It pits Kurds who were expelled from the city against Arabs who were brought in by Hussein's regime to change the ethnic balance. More broadly, the Kurds' demand to absorb Kirkuk into their autonomous region is viewed by Arabs as a threat to Iraq's unity. Iraq's neighbors also see it as the first step toward Kurdish independence, something that Turkey, Syria and Iran would never allow.

As president, Talabani would play a key role in mediating over Kirkuk. But Kurdish ambitions would not rest solely in his hands. There are two main Kurdish leaders in Iraq: Talabani, 71, who heads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, known as PUK; and Massoud Barzani, 56, who leads the Kurdistan Democratic Party, known as KDP.

Since 1991, the two parties have controlled an autonomous Kurdish region of 3.5 million people in northern Iraq. During Hussein's regime, the area was protected by a "no-fly" zone patrolled by U.S. and British warplanes. Combined, the two Kurdish parties control about 100,000 militiamen.

The two groups have a bloody rivalry, and their leaders spent 20 years trying to kill each other. In 1994, a civil war erupted in the Kurdish self-rule area, and it claimed thousands of lives over the next four years. In August 1996, as the PUK was routing the KDP, Barzani invited Hussein back into the Kurdish region. More than 30,000 Iraqi troops swept into the area to save the KDP from destruction.

The fighting effectively divided the Kurdish region into two zones: a western section controlled by the KDP, with Irbil as its capital, and an eastern region controlled by the PUK, with Sulaimaniyah as its center. The two parties established parallel civil administrations, each with its own cabinet headed by a prime minister. Under U.S. pressure, the two parties agreed to end their civil war in 1998. But the cease-fire deal could not pave the way for Barzani and Talabani to combine their governments.

In last month's election, the Kurdish parties fielded a unified slate of candidates for parliament. As part of their deal, the two leaders agreed that Talabani would take any national post given to the Kurds, while Barzani would become president of the Kurdish region.

"The two leaders were able to put aside their history to ensure that the Kurdish vote would not be split," said Shwan Mahmood, political editor of Hawlati, an independent Kurdish newspaper. "There is hope that they will finally be able to unify the Kurdish region ... That's the only way to protect the Kurds' interests."

Other analysts say the two leaders realize that they can win control of Kirkuk only if they suppress intra-Kurdish rivalries. For Kurdish politicians, Kirkuk carries the kind of symbolic weight and pitfalls that Jerusalem has for Palestinian leaders.

"Even with Talabani as president, it's going to be major struggle to regain Kirkuk," Osman said. "Talabani and Barzani have to stay united."

Beneath Kirkuk, there are 10 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The area can produce 800,000 barrels per day, and it is also the origin of the Iraqi pipeline that pumps oil to the Mediterranean coast. Kirkuk is a tangle of ethnic grievances among its Arab, Kurdish and Turkomen residents. Arab leaders say Kurdish gunmen have expelled hundreds of Arab families from their homes since the fall of Hussein's regime in April 2003.

Between 1991 and 2002, according to Human Rights Watch, about 120,000 Kurds were forced out of the city and surrounding villages in a campaign of "Arabization" intended to populate the area with those loyal to Hussein. Kurdish leaders estimate more than 300,000 Kurds were expelled from Kirkuk starting in the 1980s.

Kurds view Kirkuk as the ancient seat of Kurdistan and believe it should be the capital of their region in a newly formed Iraqi federation. But neighboring Turkey fears that, if Iraqi Kurds expand their autonomous zone to Kirkuk, they would be closer to declaring independence, and that could trigger similar aspirations among the 12 million Kurds in Turkey.

Turkish officials warn that they would respond with force if Kurds gained control of Kirkuk. A Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq would create regional instability, and could prompt Iraq's other neighbors - especially Syria and Iran, which have large Kurdish minorities - to send their own troops into Iraq.

Despite the desire of most Iraqi Kurds to seek independence, Kurdish leaders have vowed they will remain an autonomous region of Iraq. But most Kurds would not accept autonomy without control over Kirkuk.

Even as he is set to become the first Kurdish president in Iraq's history, Talabani's legacy will be judged by whether he is able to deliver on Kirkuk. "The old generation of leaders spent their lives fighting to create what we have now," Asasard said. "Still, everyone is waiting to see if they will be able to win back Kirkuk."