19 April 2005

1. "Genocides recognised by the UN: from Armenia to Rwanda but not Sudan", it is almost 60 years since the word "genocide" entered the lexicon of international law, and it has been used to characterise officially the mass slaughter of Armenians, Jews and Rwandans in the 20th century.

2. "Syria loves Ankara but will the relationship last?", how quickly things change in the Middle East.

3. "No ECHR decision on the retrial of Öcalan yet: Çicek", everyone must wait for the ECHR to hadn down its decision on the possible retrial of imprisoned Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan, Justice Minister Çiçek said.

4. "Turkey's journalists condemn ‘limited' changes to penal code", the Turkish Journalists Federation (TGF) yesterday issued a declaration criticizing what they call "limited" changes to the new Turkish Penal Code (TCK).

5. "Kurdish rebel, Maoist militants killed in Turkey clashes", a Kurdish rebel and two far-left Maoist militants have been killed in separate clashes with government forces in Turkey, officials said Monday.

6. "Turkey's MGK discusses internal migration", among other issues covered in the meeting were incidents in Mersin and Trabzon that have spurred nationalist sentiment across the country.

1. - AFP - "Genocides recognised by the UN: from Armenia to Rwanda but not Sudan":

PARIS / 19 April 2005 / by Thibauld Malterre

It is almost 60 years since the word "genocide" entered the lexicon of international law, and it has been used to characterise officially the mass slaughter of Armenians, Jews and Rwandans in the 20th century.

It was first used at the military war crimes tribunal at Nuremburg in 1945 at the end of World War II, though in the end the Nazis on trial there were found guilty of "crimes against humanity".

The word was invented in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who found shelter in the United States. It is a hybrid, combining the Greek word "genos", meaning a race or people, and the Latin suffix "-cide" (as in fratricide or parricide), itself a formation from the Latin verb "caedere" to kill.

On December 11 1946 the United Nations gave the word a formal definition as "the denial of the right to existence of entire human groups" in reference to the killing of Jews during World War II.

On December 9 1948, the UN unanimously adopted a convention on genocide, identifying it as a crime "committed with the intention to destroy in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."

The UN recognised in 1985 the killing of hundreds of thousands of Armenians between 1915 and 1917 as a genocide, as well as the mass murder of Jews by Nazi Germany, and in June 1994 the killing of an estimated 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis by their Hutu compatriots that same year.

Beyond these three instances, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the UN Security Council, in 2001 sentenced a Bosnian Serb general to 35 years in jail for "complicity in genocide" in connection with the massacre of 7,000 Muslim cvilians in Srebenica in 1995.

The UN and Cambodia have agreed that former Khmer Rouge leaders of a regime that was responsible for the deaths of almost two million Cambodians (20 percent of the population) should face charges of crimes against humanity and genocide. Their trial could start in the coming months.

In January this year a UN committee decided that though crimes against humanity had been committed in the Darfur region of Sudan they did not amount to genocide in the absence of any evidence of central government genocidal intention.

Some historians argue that mass killings, such as those of Chinese by Mongols in the 13th century and of the indigenous peoples of the Americas by conquistadors and colonists are covered by the definition.

Armenians are preparing to mark the 90th anniversary on April 24 of the start of the controversial 1915-1917 massacres, which they say 1.5 million of their kinsmen perished.

Ankara argues that 300,000 Armenians and thousands of Turks were killed in what was civil strife during World War I when the Armenians rose against their Ottoman rulers and sided with invading Russian troops.

2. - The Daily Star - "Syria loves Ankara but will the relationship last?":

19 April 2005 / by Omer Taspinar and Emile El-Hokayem*

How quickly things change in the Middle East. In 1998, Turkey massed troops on its border with Syria to coerce the regime of President Hafez Assad into relinquishing its support for the Syria-based Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Within days, Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, was forced to leave Damascus and was eventually apprehended in Nairobi by Turkish intelligence officers tipped off by the CIA and the Mossad. Those were the good old days of the Turkish-Israeli-American strategic alliance in the Middle East.

That has changed. Turkey now makes the news because of its growing anti-American and anti-Israel feelings. The flashiest symptoms are the two bestselling books in the country: The first is a novel about a Turkish-American war depicting Washington's decision to use nuclear weapons. The second is Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf." In such atmospherics, it is no wonder that Syria and Iran have turned into natural allies. When Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Syria last week, he was hailed as a hero not only by Syrians but also by a Turkish public that admired his willingness to resist American pressure. No one in Turkey seems to remember that Syria is still governed by a regime that supported the PKK. Anti-American solidarity can indeed work wonders.

That Syria and Turkey now see convergent interests in the Middle East is an unexpected result of the war in Iraq. It is also an unpleasant surprise for Washington. Yet there should be nothing startling about Syria's attempt to forge better ties with Turkey. The regime of President Bashar Assad is facing unprecedented isolation. After being rebuked by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Assad is looking for a sense of legitimacy anywhere he can find it. What seems more astonishing is Turkey's willingness to play along.

For those confused about Turkish sympathy for Syria, it is important to understand that Turks never truly developed an interest in Arab politics. Turkey's focus has historically been on the West. The Middle East became relevant for Ankara only in the framework of two issues: Kurdish nationalism and great-power politics. The current malaise in Turkey, reflected by the growing anti-Americanism, is a direct result of these two dynamics interacting in the worst possible way. Almost all Turks believe that current U.S. policies in Iraq will end up creating an independent Kurdish state. Needless to say, this is a nightmare scenario for Turkey.

Although the Turkish government is now trying to warm up to Jalal Talabani's presidency in Iraq, the sad fact is that Ankara until very recently discounted Talabani and the other powerful Kurdish leader, Massoud Barzani, as "tribal leaders." So much for a visionary approach in Turkish foreign policy.

Syria's Kurdish problem captured the headlines in April 2004 when riots erupted in the northeast of the country. The regime quelled the uprising by combining force and compromise, including a recent decision to grant citizenship to 300,000 Kurds. Whether this solution will prove durable is far from certain. Syria's Kurds, like Kurds in Iran and Turkey, are watching the prospects of their Iraqi cousins improve with considerable envy. Syria's ethno-sectarian fabric is fragile, and tensions have so far been contained through a delicate mix of repression and cooptation. The Assad regime now fears that a combination of external and internal forces might bring it down.

Syria feels encircled these days. The consequences of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri have been very damaging. Under international pressure, Syria is withdrawing from Lebanon and is facing international scrutiny. Its relations with Iraq are at best frosty. Iraqi and coalition authorities complain about Syria's failure to prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters, and Damascus still harbors former Baathist officials. Even worse, the belief is strong in Washington and Baghdad that Syria is actively contributing to the Iraqi turmoil. Despite a thaw on border issues with Jordan, Syria is eying with great concern the strong relationship between U.S. President George W. Bush and Jordan's King Abdullah II.

Meanwhile, Israel is now in a stronger position vis-a-vis Damascus. Washington firmly supports Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's focus on the Palestinian track, and shares the view that Syrian calls for peace talks are just a ploy to buy time and counter mounting pressure. And, as usual, no help is to be expected from the Arab League, both because of its irrelevance and Arab fatigue with Syrian posturing.

There is some apparent justification for Syria's anxiousness about U.S. intentions toward Assad's regime. Reports that American officials have met with Syrian opposition members lend credence to Syrian suspicions that the crisis over Lebanon is more than that: in Syria's eyes, it is essentially an attempt to weaken and eventually overthrow its leadership. While it is clear that the Bush administration has decided to isolate Syria, whether induced regime change has become policy still remains unsure.

Syria's foreign-policy priority is regional relevance. This is a game that Damascus is losing. Without regional alliances or a strong voice in Middle Eastern politics through involvement in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs, Syria would no longer be an important player. The crisis over Lebanon has already cost Damascus its buttresses in the Sunni Arab world. However, because Syria is engaged in a subtle balancing act, tying its fortunes to Iran is not yet the preferred option in Damascus. Syrian officials worry this will be interpreted as an irreversible decision to join the dark side. But more importantly, Syria might learn the hard way that Iran's interests do not always intersect with Syria's, and that Tehran regards the present Syrian dilemma as secondary to the great power game in the Persian Gulf.

Because Syria currently feels insecure, it needs to illustrate a sense of regional importance. That's why Turkey's open arms were much appreciated. No wonder Syria's information minister, Mehdi Dakhlallah, described his country as Turkey's closest Arab ally. The Syrians probably believe that Turkey's important ties with the U.S. and NATO will help them avert a showdown with the West. But Damascus also has practical motives for deepening relations with Turkey: its economy is likely to become more dependent on trade with its northern neighbor, especially if sanctions are imposed on Syria.

Turkey and Syria are coming together because of shared concerns about U.S. policy in the region. Still, whether such courtship will turn into a more permanent alliance remains to be seen. After all, Turkey is still an official ally of the U.S. and has embarked on a historic journey into the Europe Union. Ankara has nothing to gain by cozying up to dictators. In contrast, the Assad regime may have already overplayed its hand in the current crisis. Because the stakes for Syria are much higher than what Turkey has to gain, the rupture between Damascus and Ankara might come more rapidly than expected.

Much depends on how the Kurdish question in the region will evolve. Iraq's Kurds will play a decisive role in this regard. Talabani's election as president is a sign that the Kurds see their future as part of a new Iraq. If Talabani wants, he could also win over Turkey by clearing northern Iraq of the PKK. This, after all, would be a small price to pay for pleasing a powerful regional state.

* Omer Taspinar is the director of the Turkey program at the Brookings Institution. Emile el-Hokayem is a Middle East security analyst at the Henry L. Stimson Center.

3. - NTV / MSNBC - "No ECHR decision on the retrial of Öcalan yet: Çicek":

Everyone must wait for the ECHR to hadn down its decision on the possible retrial of imprisoned Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan, Justice Minister Çiçek said.

18 April 2005

There has been no decision by the European Court of Human Rights on whether or not Abdullah Öcalan should be retried, Turkey’s Justice Minister and cabinet spokesman Cemil Çiçek said Monday.

Speaking at a press conference after a meeting of the cabinet meeting Çiçek said that it was wrong for criticism to be directed at the government over this issue.

“No one should make the mistake of perceiving this matter, which is an issue of state, as one of the government,” Çiçek said.

Although he did not directly name them, the minister criticised the far right National Movement Party (MHP) for trying to make use of the matter for their own interests.

Çiçek said that the cabinet had debated the draft law covering foundations which is being closely monitored by the European Union. Çiçek said that currently there were 10 laws, more than six regulations or statutes and more than 100 decrees and regulations on foundations, adding that the government aimed to unite these under the draft law 85.

4. - The New Anatolian - "Journalists condemn ‘limited' changes to penal code":

ANKARA / 18 April 2005

The Turkish Journalists Federation (TGF) yesterday issued a declaration criticizing what they call "limited" changes to the new Turkish Penal Code (TCK).

The 18th Chairmen Council meeting of the TGF was held yesterday in Kahramanmaras, where 60 chairmen and administrators of journalists' organizations issued a statement.

The new TCK which was earlier planned to go into effect this April 1, was postponed to June 1 following heavy criticism by press organizations and other groups. The new TCK was severely criticized for including changes which would restrict freedom of the press.

Following this criticism, the government made a last-minute postponement of the TCK, while a working group was set up by the Justice Ministry to tackle the changes related with the press.

Sunday's statement read that the TCK's postponement was welcomed but stressed that the work group had dealt with only six out of total 27 articles of the TCK related to the press.

“We cannot accept a partial change in only six articles," said the TGC statement. "We will continue to discuss and fight the new TCK, which will put an end to freedom of press if these troubling developments continue."

5. - AFP - "Kurdish rebel, Maoist militants killed in Turkey clashes":

DIYARBAKIR / 18 April 2005

A Kurdish rebel and two far-left Maoist militants have been killed in separate clashes with government forces in Turkey, officials said Monday.

The Kurdish rebel was shot dead in a rural area in the southeastern province of Mardin during a security operation against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Mardin Governor Temel Kocaklar said in a statement.

The man had been wanted for a January 26 attack on a local gendarmerie station which claimed the life of a soldier, he said.

The PKK, which waged a bloody campaign for self-rule in Turkey's mainly Kurdish southeastern corner between 1984 and 1999, ended a five-year unilateral ceasefire with the government last June.

In a separate incident, two members of the underground Maoist Communist Party (MKP) were killed and a soldier was slightly injured in a clash in the eastern province of Tunceli, a statement by the governor's office said.

The operation in the mountainous region, a hotbed of extreme-left militancy, was continuing with air support, it said.

6. - NTV / MSNBC - "Turkey's MGK discusses internal migration":

Among other issues covered in the meeting were incidents in Mersin and Trabzon that have spurred nationalist sentiment across the country.

19 April 2005

A report proposing consideration of placing limits on internal migration to certain regions was one of the main issues discussed in Monday’s meeting of Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK).

During the four and a half hour meeting, a report prepared by the para-military Gendarme, responsible for policing in non-urban areas in Turkey, was tabled.

The report identified a number of regions in Turkey where internal migration was becoming a matter of concern and suggested that internal visas may have to be considered for those moving to these areas.

Among the regions identified in the Gendarme report were Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Mersin, Antalya and Diyarbakir. The report said that most of the internal migration in Turkey came from the south east and Black Sea provinces.

The MGK, chaired by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, consists of the senior members of the government and the heads of the Turkish armed forces. Under reforms enacted last year, the council no longer has a policy making role and is advisory in nature.