15
April 2005
2. "Conditional Re-trial Leads to Injustice", Turkey has adopted in 2003 the right to re-trial right in cases of violation of rights. The main problem regarding the issue is that the law conditions the right with an eye to exempt Ocalan of this right.
3. "Öcalan will not be allowed to see his lawyers today", the founder of Kurdistan Democratic Confederalism Abdullah Öcalan’s lawyer Aysel Tugluk stated that they will not be able to see their client today either due to ‘the boat being unfit to travel’. Tugluk stated that there is a connection between the possible re-trial decision of the EHRC and the prevention of the visitation.
4. "Three Soldiers Killed in Clash with Rebels", Kurdish rebels have killed three Turkish soldiers in an overnight clash in Turkey, reports said today.
5. "Turkey's Euro-Skeptic Ranks Swell", is the EU-Turkish relationship one of reluctance on both sides?
6. "A new age for Turkey-Syria relations", Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit to Damascus, despite United States ambassador to Ankara Eric Edelman's public stand against it, highlights the churning of regional strategic relationships in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, and more recently the September 11 attacks on the US and its illegal invasion of Iraq.
7. "Genocide Acknowledgment: A Dead Ende?", worldwide Armenian political demands on Turkey have always included land, restitution, and Genocide acknowledgment.
8. "Election of Talabani marks victory for Middle East’s Kurds", the appointment of Jalal Talabani, a prominent Kurdish politician, as Iraqi president last week was widely celebrated by millions of Kurds scattered across the Middle East. The move could have two divergent effects: it might encourage Kurds to integrate better in the countries they live in, but it might also raise their aspirations for a Kurdish state.
1. - Bianet - "Ocalan's Retrial On Turkey's Agenda":
According to legal experts, Turkey is not legally obliged to retry Ocalan. Yet, there exist flaws in terms of "fair trial" in Ocalan case. Law specialist Sözüer: "Ocalan should be retried even before EHCR decison."
ISTANBUL / 14 April 2005 / by Tolga Korkut
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) will most probably decide that Kurdish armed separatist group PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan’s right to a fair trial is violated, believe poliitical and legal analysts here. However, the controversy concerns whether he should be re-tried or not.
Öcalan remains imprisoned since 6 years in an island-prison in the Sea of Marmara serving his life-time sentence. He was captured in Kenya after a highly publicized chase between him and the secret services of several countries in 1999. An infamous public figure for Turkish nationalists, he is still respected by Turkey’s Kurds.
The ECHR, upon the appeal of Ocalan’s lawyers, is reportedly prepared to rule out that his “right to fair trial” was violated.
Legal analysts generally agree that since Turkey has ruled out certain conditions for cases of re-trial, what practically exempts Ocalan, Ankara is not bound by any legal obligation for retrial. However, this situation as such might bring about a case before the ECHR, they say, as the provisions of re-trial clause of the law are themselves unfair.
On the other hand, if Turkey abstains from re-trying Öcalan, but prefers paying compensations, this might lead to troubles in terms of both international law and international politics.
Ozan Özerden, a law specialist from the Yildiz University of Istanbul avows that the path Turkey must pursue is evident; “If the right to a fair trial is violated, then the trial is repeated and the problem is resolved”.
Likewise, Assistant Prof. Adem Sözüer from Istanbul University says that, “there is no need to fear re-trial”, and that conditioning the right to a fair trial leads to inequality. Sözüer believes that, regardless of the ECHR’s decision, the trial must be repeated, as this is the best course possible in legal sense. He also states that in Öcalan’s case, there is legal reasoning behind supporting to right to re-trial as the defendant was not brought before the court in delay and the required files are not given on time.
Meanwhile, Marmara University’s Professor Sibel Inceoglu believes that denial of re-trial and abstinence from reviewing the existing clauses on re-trial will become an obstacle to Turkey in international community.
Re-trial is a legal, not a political issue
Professor Özerden points out to the fact Turkey does not have the choice of avoiding the implantation of the ECHR’s decisions.
Author and civic activist Ümit Firat is of the opinion
that re-trying Öcalan does not yield to declaration of his innocence.
Firat observes that the issue is not political, but legal in nature.
He says that, the whole case is not viewed a criticism against Turkey’s
justice system, but a calculated attempt to hinder social harmony. Firat
cautions that the issue must not be perceived from nationalist lenses;
as such perceptions distort international and objective assessment of
the problem. 
2. - Bianet - "Conditional Re-trial Leads to Injustice":
Turkey has adopted in 2003 the right to re-trial right in cases of violation of rights. The main problem regarding the issue is that the law conditions the right with an eye to exempt Ocalan of this right.
ISTANBUL / 14 April 2005 / by Tolga Korkut
Turkey has recognized the right to re-trial with the 6th and 7th legal amendments packages adopted in 2003 for the EU accession bid. According to the amendments made, the violations of the Declaration on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols provide the ground for re-trial.
However, the 6th Harmonization Package relieves Turkey of the obligation of re-trying PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. According to this Package, “The provisions concerned will apply to ECHR decisions finalized at the time this Law enters into force and to applications made after that date. For finalized ECHR decisions, applications for retrial have to be made within one year of the date on which this Law enters into force. For the applications made to the ECHR after this Law’s entry into force, the retrial applications have to be made within one year of the finalization of the ECHR decision”.
Marmara University Professor Sibel Inceoglu and Istanbul University’s Adem Sözüer say that Öcalan’s case before the ECHR does not fit to neither of the conditions. Hence, Turkey does not have to re-try Öcalan.
Sözüer adds that re-trial depends on country’s self-declarations and Turkey decided upon shaping the re-trial clause after the examples of France and Germany.
However, this clause creates injustice due to its conditionality
states Inceoglu. The legal experts say that the clause of conditionality
was a product of the conviction to bar Öcalan’s possible re-trial.
3. - Özgür Politika - "Öcalan will not be allowed to see his lawyers today":
The founder of Kurdistan Democratic Confederalism Abdullah Öcalan’s lawyer Aysel Tugluk stated that they will not be able to see their client today either due to ‘the boat being unfit to travel’. Tugluk stated that there is a connection between the possible re-trial decision of the EHRC and the prevention of the visitation.
FRANKFURT / 13 April 2005
There will be no visitation of the founder of Kurdistan Democratic Confederalism, Abdullah Öcalan, this week, either, by his lawyers. One of the lawyers of Öcalan, Ms. Tugluk said that the ordinary weekly visitation has been prevented on the grounds that the ship was unfit. Ms. Tugluk said ‘we believe that the prevention of the visitation is connected to the EHCR.’
Ms. Tugluk said, in her briefing to MHA, that they were not able to see their client for the last 4 (four) weeks and they expected to be notified of the decision of the EHCR within a week.
For the last four weeks we are unable to visit him
Ms. Tugluk said that they were unable to get any results from their efforts and initiatives to see Öcalan. She continued : ‘We got in touch with the public prosecutor because the ship had broken down. We asked when it would be repaired and also conveyed that if possible we would like to see our client on Thursday or Friday. But the prosecutor told us that it would not be possible to repair the vehicle until Friday. He added that the Imrali military centre had a planning of their own and it would not be possible to interrupt that programme. We also lodged in our wish to visit him this week as well, but they replied saying that the vehicle was not yet repaired and would not be ready before the weekend.
The decision is to be announced very soon
Ms Tugluk drew attention to Öcalan’s appeal at the EHRC and said that they have told the prosecutor it is urgent and compulsory that they see their client in regards to the latest developments on that front, but that their request was not met with.
Ms Tugluk stated that they believed the prevention of visitations for this last month is in connection with the case pending in EHRC and she said ‘the isolation on Öcalan is another dimension of the appeal at the EHRC’.
Ms. Tugluk said that no information has reached them from the EHRC in relation to the case and said ‘but the widely held belief is that the decision may reach us within this week. There are many news articles published on the matter. We expect such a decision to be given in a short period of time, but we have not received any information up until now’.
'If the state wants to resolve the issue it can'
Öcalan’s lawyer Ms. Tugluk stated that the problems
experienced in visitations are continuous and repetitive. She stated
‘if our client is placed at the Imrali Island then they must provide
us with vehicles that can get there. We repeatedly have told this to
the Justice Ministry as well as EHRC in the last six (6) years through
various ways’. She underlined the fact that these were not problems
which can not be solved and continued : ‘If the state wants, it
can solve this problem in an hour, a day. With a new vehicle our transportation
can be arranged in an orderly manner. When we are unable to visit him,
they do not give our client the newspapers and the letters. The isolation
is on him, on us and his family. The fact that the boat is not working
is just an excuse put up front. It is not a problem without a solution’.
Ms. Tugluk also said that last week when there was about 10 minutes
to the island they were returned to mainland, before they were able
to see their client, due to the unfit condition of the boat’s motor
despite the captains approval to go ahead.
4. - The Press Assosiation - "Three Soldiers Killed in Clash with Rebels":
14 April 2005
Kurdish rebels have killed three Turkish soldiers in an overnight clash in Turkey, reports said today.
The clash occurred near the town of Pervari in Siirt province, the semi-official Anatolia news agency reported. Private CNN-Turk television said that Turkish troops killed 21 Kurdish rebels in the clashes but that report could not immediately be confirmed.
CNN-Turk said Turkish troops were pursuing rebels believed to have infiltrated into Turkey from neighbouring Iraq in the area during the past week and the clash erupted overnight.
The Turkish casualties were a lieutenant and two sergeants, the news channel reported. Military officials were not available for comment.
Violence has increased since June, when the rebels declared an end to a five-year old unilateral truce, saying that Turkey had not reciprocated. The rebels had declared the cease-fire in 1999, following the capture of their leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Earlier this month, Turkish troops killed nine rebels in a five-day clash on the Iraqi border.
The rebels belong to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,
or PKK, which has been seeking autonomy in Turkey’s south-east
and has battled government forces since 1984 – a conflict that
has killed more than 37,000 people.
5. - Deutsche Welle - "Turkey's Euro-Skeptic Ranks Swell":
Is the EU-Turkish relationship one of reluctance on both sides?
14 April 2005 / by Susanne Güsten
Turks are increasingly critical of the country's possible accession
to the EU as Euro-skeptics warn of a potential sell-out of national
interests.
Even though opinion polls regularly show that three-quarters of Turks favour their country joining the EU, increasing numbers are also becoming aware of drawbacks: Brussels is going to make increasing demands on Ankara and will have a bigger role in running the country. Many see this this as a threat to the Turkish state.
These warnings are also being voiced in other countries that are seeking EU membership but nowhere do they touch the nerve the way they do in Turkey. While the EU -- as a result of its experiences in the two world wars -- is trying to supress the individual nation-state by bringing member states closer together as one, many Turks consider the nation-state to be the greatest good.
"Sovereignty belongs unconditionally and unreservedly to the nation" was one of the principles of Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish state, whose image hangs on the end wall of the plenary chamber in the Turkish parliament.
A foreign toy?
Turkey arose out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, which was occupied by the Allied victors of World War I, in the 1920s. In a war that involved heavy losses, Atatürk succeeded in driving the Greek occupying powers -- in West Anatolia in particular -- out of the country.
In the early years of the republic, Turks feared that the country would be carved up and become a plaything of foreign powers.
As a result, it is unsurprising that nationalists are claiming that Turkish membership in the European Union would ultimately only benefit Europeans, not Turks. And they point to to the conflict over Cyprus as evidence.
The Cypress conflict
Turkey's Euro-skeptics criticize every step taken by the
government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding Cypress:
he hints that he is willing to make compromises in the search for a
peaceful solution for the divided Mediterranean island.
The fact that Erdogan's government is "selling" Cyprus in
order to show the EU how obedient Tukrkey is, is an image often peddled
by the right-wing nationalist MHP party.
But concern over the fate of the Turkish state in the upcoming membership negotiations with the EU is not only an issue for Turkey's right wing. Drawing attention to supposed threats to Turkey from outside its national borders is also part of the repertoire of the social democratic opposition party CHP.
The CHP recently and successfully challenged a law governing the sale of land and buildings to foreigners through the Constitutional Court. The CHP is part of Turkey's lay Kemalist establishment that considers all deviations from Atatürk's course to be wrong.
Because of this, Kemalists have terrible difficulty accepting
some of the European Union's key demands. They even have trouble opening
Turkey up to foreign investors – a fact demonstrated by more than
just the fate of the real estate law.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a leading Kemalist, recently vetoed a
law that would have allowed foreigners to buy television stations in
Turkey. The president explained that he had taken this action because
a law of this sort would not have been in the "national interest".
Sensitive minority policy
If ground-breaking economic policies such as this are viewed with such suspicion, it is no wonder that the resistance to more sensitive issues, such as policies on minorities, is even more fierce.
The alleged attempts of young Kurds to burn a Turkish flag triggered nationalist hysteria across the country over the past few weeks. Tens of thousands demonstratively draped their homes with Turkish flags while the Turkish police marched through Istanbul bearing a 1.5-kilometre long flag.
Meanwhile, both the nationalists and Kemalists are being joined by a growing number of Turkish Islamists who are also sceptical about their country's EU application. Over the past few years, Turkey's Islamists has accounted for some of the country's greatest Europhiles because they hoped that moving closer to the EU would bring more freedom of religion.
But the introduction of headscarf bans in several EU states and other similar developments have dashed these hopes. A recent report published by the Independent Industrialist & Businessmen's Association, MÜSIAD, concluded that the basic values on which the EU is built are a "strait-jacket" for Muslims.
Even though Erdogan's government has more than a two-thirds
majority in parliament, it says that EU skepticism must be taken seriously.
The nationalist and Islamist wing of the ruling AKP ensures that this
mistrust is not restricted to the opposition both inside and outside
the parliament. The debate as to what other demands the EU has yet to
make on Turkey and how the country should react to them is only likely
to really start once accession negotiations begin October 3.
6. - Al-Jazeerah - "A new age for Turkey-Syria relations":
14 April 2005 / by K Gajendra Singh*
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit to Damascus, despite United States ambassador to Ankara Eric Edelman's public stand against it, highlights the churning of regional strategic relationships in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, and more recently the September 11 attacks on the US and its illegal invasion of Iraq.
Sezer's visit this week is a reciprocation of Syrian President Bashar Assad's visit to Ankara in January 2004, the first ever such visit since Syria broke away from Ottoman Turkey after World War I. As recently as 1998, Turkey had threatened to invade Syria unless it expelled Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Marxist Kurdish Workers party (PKK), sheltered by Damascus as a lever against Turkey for its share of Euphrates waters and irredentist claims over Hatay province, which was annexed to Turkey in 1939.
Its patron the Soviet Union having collapsed, Syria expelled Ocalan, who first looked to Russia for asylum, and then to Italy, but was finally nabbed in Kenya and brought in chains to Turkey, where after a trial he was imprisoned.
Today, relations are steadily improving. The historical disputes over Euphrates waters and Hatay province have been put on the back burner, and Ankara has kept quiet on the sale of short-range Russian missiles to Damascus, a deal it would have howled over in the past.
During his visit, Sezer is expected to discuss - apart from blossoming bilateral relations - regional and international issues that have implications for both sides. They aim to step up their dialogue to promote stability and reduce tensions in the region. In this regard, Turkey is pleased that Syria has begun the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Building on trade
In December 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visited Damascus, where a f! ree trade agreement, which was under negotiation for several years, was signed by Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart Mohammed Naji Otri. "Our links will develop in all fields in the future, especially in trade," Otri said at a joint news conference, while Erdogan said it "shows how far relations have come between the two countries".
A Turkish diplomatic source said that Damascus had withdrawn its reservations on signing the agreement "after a certain accord" was reached on Turkey's sovereignty in the southern province of Hatay, formerly Alexandretta, on which Syria also laid claims.
Otri said "other problems are now forgotten", apparently referring to another key obstacle to a full normalization of relations, ie the sharing of the Euphrates River, which has its sources in Turkey.
"We are in agreement. We want a comprehensive cooperation in the region," said Otri, adding that Erdogan had agreed to increase the flow of water into Syria. Turkey used to blame Syria for not having built enough dams to store water.
The free trade agreement will form the cornerstone of the friendship. Trade between the two countries amounted to US$1 billion dollars in 2003. When this author visited Mardin in southeast Turkey, situated at a height that offers a panoramic view of the north Mesopotamian plains in Syria and Nusaybin, another historic city just bordering Syria, there was considerable illegal trade. The trade agreement and improved relations will help develop the region, which is being revived economically with the construction of power and irrigation projects . It will also help neutralize the Kurdish insurgency in the region.
Since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq , Turkey and Syria have signed a series of economic and security agreements, including one to jointly combat crime and terrorism.
Assad's 2004 visit to Turkey
Assad's landmark visit to Turkey last year took place following many steps to bring the two countries closer, both wanting to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East. Turkey even offered to help Syria make progress with its overtures toward Israel. Later, when Turkey found out about Israeli interference in Kurdish north Iraq, there was a precipitous decline in the almost allied-like relations between Turkey and Israel, which were maintained during the Cold War and even improved in 1990s. Erdogan has repeatedly accused Israel of state terrorism in Gaza.
Bashar Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez Assad five years ago, also took a series of steps to repair relations with Turkey during the visit. "We have moved together from an atmosphere of distrust to one of trust," he said. "We must create stability from a regional atmosphere of instability." Sezer responded that "no time can be lost in replacing the atmosphere of enmity, distrust and instability which unfortunately prevails in our region with one of peace, stability and prosperity". Both countries remain opposed to the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.
"We condemn all approaches that pose a threat to Iraq's territorial integrity," Sezer said. Syria and Turkey have a common objective in a stable Iraq. They both have sizeable Kurdish populations and if Iraqi Kurds win political and economic autonomy or independence in the new constitution, it would adversely affect them. The two countries have also demanded that foreign troops leave Iraq as soon as possible.
The US, meanwhile, has accused Syria of everything, including guarding Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, seeking weapons of mass destruction, and encouraging insurgents in Iraq. With support from France, the former colonial power in Syria and Lebanon, the US pushed through Resolution 1559 in the Security Council last November, which required that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon and the disarming of Hezbollah in the south, which has support from both Syria and Iran.
Assad announced in Ankara that Damascus would only renounce its weapons of mass destruction programs in tandem with similar dismantling by Israel. It was "natural", Assad said, for his country to defend itself with coordinated disarmament throughout the Middle East. Israel is widely believed to hold a nuclear arsenal, but has never admitted it. And no one ever mentions it in the Western media or at the international nuclear agency in Vienna .
"If Iraq breaks up, we will pay a very heavy bill. It is difficult even to guess what dangers we may encounter," Assad told CNN Turk.
The Iraq invasion and regional cooperation
There are many problems in the region left over from when the Arabs revolted against Sultan Caliph in Istanbul following unfulfilled promises of freedom at the time of World War I. They were betrayed by Western Christian powers. In 1921, when the French government became the mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon, it hurt Syrian interests by taking away its territory and joining it to a Christian-dominated Lebanon .
Turkey's boundaries with Iraq and Syria, which were part of the Ottoman Empire up to 1918, were fixed by the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey ceded all its claims to these two countries, which were placed under the League of Nations mandates under Britain and France, respectively. Turkey and Britain agreed on the 331 kilometer boundary between Turkey and Iraq by the 1926 Treaty of Angora (Ankara). Turkey's 822 kilometer boundary with Syria was not fixed by Damascus. The Treaty of Lausanne gave the former Ottoman Sanjak (sub-province) of Alexandretta (present-day Hatay province) to Syria, but France agreed in June 1939 to transfer Hatay province to Turkish sovereignty after a hasty referendum, despite strong objections from Syrian leaders.
It has been claimed that the Syrian protests would have been louder if the majority of the Arabs in Hatay were not Alawites. At that time - unlike now, with the ruling elite in Damascus being Alawite, led by Assads - it was the Sunnis, a majority, who were the ruling elite. Syria, which became independent in 1946, did not really reconcile to the loss of the province and its principal towns of Antakya and Iskenderun port (formerly Antioch and Alexandretta).
France gifted Turkey with Alexandretta for Ankara's signing of a non-aggression pact and in the fond hope that Turkey would join England and France against Nazi Germany in World War II. Turkish president Ismet Inonu faithfully implemented the advice of Kemal Ataturk - the founder of the Turkish republic and its first president - given even before the war clouds were on the horizon, not to join a coalition against Britain. But it has also been put differently. By joining Britain, Turkey did not want to be devastated first by the Nazis and then liberated by the Soviet troops. Meanwhile, Antakya (Hatay) remained in Syrian consciousness. Whenever this author visited Syria from Jordan between 1989-92, on all official Syrian maps Hatay appeared as part of Syria, along with the Golan Heights, Syrian territory that was to be recovered.
Similarly, Turkey has also not given up its claim over Iraqi Kurdistan. Britain had denied Ataturk's new Turkish republic, the oil-rich Kurdish areas of Mosul and Kirkuk, now in northern Iraq. British forces occupied the area after the armistice, because of its oil reserves around Kirkuk.
But, by constructing a number of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, including the giant Southeast Anatolia Development Project, Turkey gave itself control over how much of the Euphrates waters flow into Syria and then to Iraq. Still, it is a strategic threat with major political implications. Ankara could withhold water from Syria, which Turkish politicians threatened to do publicly. Or it could flood Syria. Former prime minister Suleiman Demirel even claimed that as Arabs had their oil, Turkey owned the waters of its rivers.
But the main bone of conflict was the sheltering by Syria of Ocalan. A rebellion led by him against the Turkish state since 1984 cost over 35,000 lives, including 5,000 soldiers. To control and neutralize the rebellion, thousands of Kurdish villages were bombed, destroyed, abandoned or relocated. Millions of Kurds were moved to shanty towns in the south and east or migrated westwards. The economy of the region was shattered. With a third of the Turkish army tied up in the southeast, the cost of countering the insurgency at its height amounted to between US$6 billion and $8 billion a year. But Syria was careful. The PKK cadre always entered Turkey from north Iraq and Syrian Kurds were generally not allowed to join the PKK.
Until 1987, Damascus even denied Ocalan's presence in Syria or any support for the PKK. But only when Turkey gave the address of Ocalan's residence in Damascus did the Syrians acknowledge his presence. In July 1987, the two governments signed a security protocol during a state visit by former prime minister Turgut Ozal to Damascus, in which they promised to "obstruct groups engaged in destructive activities directed against one another on their own territory and would not turn a blind eye to them in any way". But the Syrians did not keep that promise, or others made in August 1988, April 1992, November 1993, and April 1994.
It was Syria's way of interlinking Turkish control of Euphrates waters and Syrian sponsorship of the PKK as a pressure point for getting their share of water. In November 1995, Turkey transferred a full division of troops to its border region with Syria. Arab countries Iraq, Egypt and Gulf Cooperation Council members supported the Syrian position and in December 1995 they called on Ankara to reach "a just and acceptable agreement on the sharing of Euphrates waters". But Turkey insisted on Ocalan's extradition from Damascus before discussing the water issue. It also initiated its own water campaign concerning the Orontes River, which begins in Lebanon, passes through Syria and ends up in Hatay, with a "meager" 10% of the river's waters reaching Turkey, but Damascus refused even to discuss this matter, on the plea that Hatay was a part of Syria and thus it was an internal affair of Syria.
Withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon
Syrians are nimble footed. When faced with intense US-led pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, Syria first orchestrated a huge show of support on the streets of Beirut and Damascus to counter US-sponsored street crowds with ready-made tent cities, similar to what took place in Georgia and Ukraine.
Buthaina Shaaban, the Syrian minister for expatriate affairs, said that "the army will be in the Bekaa Valley by the end of March and ... could be back [in Syria] by the end of April". It was a military decision and not a political one, said Walid Mouallem, the Syrian vice minister for foreign affairs. He added, "I imagine that the American pressure on Syria will not end, because every time you fulfill a demand, they bring you another three. It is an open-ended list. What next? We want you to change the color of your eyes?"
Washington will maintain the pressure, because it wants to "change the regime's attitude". But, it has climbed down from the requirement of Resolution 1559 that armed militias, including Hezbollah, disarm after a massive show of support, with over a million people brought into Beirut. It is strange that not only Lebanon but even Iraq now has had armed militias for decades. There are the Kurdish peshmergas, the al-Badr militia, and the Mehdi army of young Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. US double-talk exposes its own double standards and further reduces its already tattered credibility. The US also demanded that Syria not harbor militant Palestinian leaders, which was a doubtful allegation, and end its chemical weapons program, without reciprocal steps from the Israelis. Perhaps in its zeal of promoting democracy, it would want Syria to liberalize its institutions and finally agree to a peace deal with Israel on the latter's terms.
And then there is the Israeli and US opposition to Russian plans to supply short-range missiles to Damascus. It is a ridiculous concern, as Israel flies over Syrian space at will and even buzzes Assad in his Damascus residential palace.
But, like his father Hafiz Assad, called the "Sphinx of Damascus", Bashar Assad will wait and watch and most probably survive. Many US secretaries of state sat on the same Damascene sofa next to Hafez Assad, however Syria remained steadfast in its objectives and adroitly handled the situations. When US President George W Bush leaves the White House, it is quite likely that Bashar will still be in Damascus to wave goodbye to him, just as his father did to the senior George Bush.
* K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served
as ambassador to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that,
he served terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He is
currently chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. Email:
Gajendrak@hotmail.com
7. - Armenian Daily - "Genocide Acknowledgment: A Dead Ende?":
14 April 2005
Worldwide Armenian political demands on Turkey have always included land, restitution, and Genocide acknowledgment. Over time, however, the demand for acknowledgment has eclipsed the other demands. In view of the obvious obstacles the land and restitution issues have faced, that's understandable.
Genocide acknowledgment is different. Armenians, and many non-Armenians, have readily rallied around such a straightforward and relatively non-aggressive demand. Moreover, a Turkish confession - apparently a mere sentence or two - has seemed achievable.
Suppose, therefore, that Turkey’s Prime Minister announced today that "Turkey acknowledges that 90 years ago, during a time in which both Turks and Armenians were murdered, some individuals in the Ottoman regime committed genocide against Armenians. Let us and Armenia now begin a new era."
Dead End
Would that really heal our collective psyche? Would it be sincere and signify a genuine shift in Turkish attitudes? Would Turkish organizations and individuals cease their Genocide denial? Would the remaining survivors and their descendants receive restitution/reparations?
Would Armenia's security be measurably enhanced? Would Turkey open its border with Armenia? Would it end its pan-Turkic thrust - similar to the one that spawned the Genocide - into the Caucasus and Central Asia? Could Armenians resettle in Anatolia/Western Armenia? Would Armenia recover even small amounts of that territory?
That the likely answer to each question is "No" should cause us to rethink our emphasis on acknowledgment. Among the political scientists doing that are Dr. Simon Payaslian, Nicolas Tavitian MS, and Dr. Khatchik Der Ghougassian (Armenian Forum, Vol. 2, No. 3, Gomidas.org).
Rethinking Acknowledgment
The "essential component" of "historic Armenian lands," says Payaslian, has been "redefined as, or totally replaced by, recognition." Western countries' "commemorative statements that ignore the territorial issue should be rejected." He lists four goals of acknowledgment: territory, emotional healing, restitution, and enhanced international standing for Armenia. Only the last, Payaslian concludes, is realistically achievable through acknowledgment. He is troubled by "the lack of public debate" on the "purposes and problems" of "Genocide recognition."
So is Tavitian: "Striving for genocide recognition has long been a reflex rather than an action toward a goal ... Armenians should rethink their approach."
However, acknowledgment could be a "security guarantee" for Armenia if it can "transform Turkey [and] the West's understanding of Armenia’s security." The quest for acknowledgment, Der Ghougassian believes, maintains "vigilance against the Turkish threat." Acknowledgment might be a "first step" towards "normalization of relations." Nevertheless, "A response to the Genocide must deprive Turkey" of the land it took in the genocide. Clearly, then, we need to rethink the pursuit of acknowledgment. If not, we may regret it.
Land and Restitution
The European Union (EU), which Turkey aspires to join, is asking Turkey to recognize the Genocide. Suppose Turkey complies. The EU and the US would likely conclude, since the land and restitution issues are not now prominently on the table, that Armenians had received everything they had asked for. For Armenians to subsequently try to drag those two issues into the spotlight would be difficult. And, as argued above, acknowledgment alone is unlikely to benefit Armenia much anyway. Worse, an educated guess is that the West would accept a sham acknowledgment, such as "Turkey regrets the wrongful murder of Armenians in 1915 by the old Ottoman regime."
Frankly, acknowledgment, in the absence of the restoration of Armenian rights, may be undesirable. The pursuit of acknowledgment, rather than acknowledgment itself, helps to maintain a strong defensive posture against Turkey and is a valuable tool to keep Armenia’s foe off balance.
Placing restitution and territory near the front of our agenda, therefore, serves two purposes. First, Turkey is unlikely to issue an acknowledgment at all, for fear of the consequences. Second, if an acknowledgment does come, Turkey and the West would less able to close the book on the Armenian case. In the meantime, efforts are underway to undermine the restitution and land issues.
State Department Trap
John Evans, the US Ambassador to Armenia, and David L. Phillips, a State Department consultant and moderator of the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), recently toured the US gleefully claiming that Armenians cannot ask for restitution or land from Turkey.
They cite a 2003 "report" sponsored by TARC. The report affirmed the factuality of the genocide, but deviously asserted that the UN's1948 Genocide Treaty cannot be applied retroactively to 1915 and that "legal, financial, or territorial" claims are invalid.
Indeed, Phillips hints that four years ago it was he who arranged for President Robert Kocharian to tell Turkish TV that Armenia will not press for restitution or territory.
This, then, is the trap being laid for us: the US, and possibly Turkey, may someday issue a Genocide "acknowledgment", but Armenians must abandon all claims, particularly territorial ones, against Turkey.
Why is America worried about Turkish territory? Because the State Department, not to mention Europe and Israel, regards eastern Turkey as a vital path to the Caspian Sea region's oil and gas. By disposing of Genocide acknowledgment and trashing Armenian land claims, the State Department hopes to both protect eastern Turkey and more easily penetrate the Caucasus.
The Future
Genocide acknowledgment is a vital, and perhaps permanent, weapon in Armenia and the Diaspora's arsenals. It must not be dealt away cheaply. Armenia and the traditional Diasporan political parties should immediately place land and restitution alongside, or close to, the acknowledgment demand.
Realistically, of course, Armenia cannot recover territory anytime soon. Still, that territory is vital for long-term security. For example, Armenia requires a secure path to the Black Sea and, therefore, to Europe and Russia. Needless to say, to attain that goal, Armenia must become much stronger. (See "The Armenian Land Question: Misunderstood Terrain," Armenian Mirror Spectator, Boston, July 31, 2004.)
Recovering territory and obtaining material restitution someday will heal our wounds more than all the Turkish acknowledgments in the world. Notice, for example, that as Armenians now control Karabagh and the surrounding territory, the repression and massacres that Azerbaijan inflicted on Armenians in the last 100 years take a back seat.
Winning, therefore, is the best revenge, though we will always honor those who perished and suffered in the Genocide.
Lastly, we need to better educate ourselves about land and restitution. Genocide related commemorations, lectures, and conferences should emphasize the ongoing geopolitical consequences of 1915: loss of historic lands and individual and historical property, and an adversary that remains committed to a dangerous, pan-Turkic philosophy. Younger generations, particularly - by nature action-oriented - crave such meaty political issues.
And if Turkey never acknowledges the Genocide? Security,
and the restoration of rights and the Armenian homeland are more important.
8. - RFE/RL - "Election of Talabani marks victory
for Middle East’s Kurds":
The appointment of Jalal Talabani, a prominent Kurdish politician, as
Iraqi president last week was widely celebrated by millions of Kurds
scattered across the Middle East. The move could have two divergent
effects: it might encourage Kurds to integrate better in the countries
they live in, but it might also raise their aspirations for a Kurdish
state.
PRAGUE / 14 April 2005 / by Valentinas Mite
Jalal Talabani is the first leader of a Kurdish party to become a president of a major country in the Middle East.
Alireza Nourizadeh, director of the Center for Arab and Iranian Studies in London, told RFE/RL that the election of Talabani is hugely important for the Kurds and for the whole region.
"I think electing President Talabani is also as important as the fall of the Berlin Wall. It affected all the Kurds in the area. Once the Kurds were thinking about a separatist state in order to fulfill their dreams to have an independent state," Nourizadeh said.
Nourizadeh said that Kurds were celebrating Talabani’s election throughout the region, starting with Iran and ending with Syria. “The Kurds in Iran were celebrating in the streets of Mahabad and Sar Dasht; also the Kurds in Syria, in Turkey [were celebrating]," he said. "Therefore, I think it [sends] a very strong message to all Kurds: ’Do not go for separation but try to have democracy.’”
There are thought to be nearly 30 million Kurds living in the region divided among Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. A separate Kurdish state could threaten the territorial integrity of these countries and potentially destabilize the region.
However, Nourizadeh said that Talabani’s election is unlikely to encourage Kurdish separatism. He said that the Iraqi example has shown Kurds that they can achieve their national dreams through democracy -- without having a separate state. That, he said, could have a powerful impact on local communities.
Kamran al-Karadaghi, a Kurd, is an expert on Iraq who works at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in London. He agrees that Talabani’s appointment was greeted as a national victory across the region, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan.
However, al-Karadagdi is not certain the appointment will bury Kurdish hopes for an independent state. "The Kurdish population in Iraq made a point during the elections, when they voted at the same time, unofficially, in a referendum on independence," he said. "Almost 97 or 98 percent of the people voted for independence."
Al- Karadaghi said the referendum clearly indicated that independence is a goal of the Iraqi Kurds -- more so than just having important governmental posts. He said Talabani’s appointment will not change this trend.
Aspirations are one thing, however, the political reality another. Al- Karadaghi said Kurdish politicians clearly see that "at this stage, independence is impossible because of the geopolitical situation." Talabani has stated publicly that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan is not viable. The president has also insisted he is representing all groups in Iraq, not just the Kurds.
Meanwhile, al-Karadaghi said, the Iraqi Kurds believe President Talabani will help to consolidate their gains in Iraqi Kurdistan -- and in the federal state as a whole.
One of the aims of the Iraqi Kurds -- what al-Karadaghi calls "consolidation" -- might be achieved by including oil-rich Kirkuk in the Kurdish region. However, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Arabs, neither Sunni nor Shi’ite, would agree. Such a move could further damage regional relations between Arabs and Kurds.
Talabani has not announced such plans and, as Nourizadeh said, many Arabs across the Middle East trust his common sense. "He had very good relations with the late President [Gamal Abdel] Nasser of Egypt and with the Jordanian kings and with all the Arab countries," he said. "That’s why he was accepted. He even had good relations with the Syrians."
Nourizadeh said Iraqi Arabs trust him. He added that another
Kurdish politician, if elected president, might be treated differently.