14
April 2005
1. "Will Öcalan be retried?", the European Court of Human Rights will announce its decision on complaints filed by PKK leader Öcalan’s lawyers. What will the decision entail? What will Turkey be asked to do? I have drawn up a few scenarios for those interested.
2. "PM: No official information on Ocalan issue", Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan yesterday said that no official information was available regarding a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling on the retrial of leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan.
3. "Pitfalls And Opportunities For The US-Turkish Alliance", a Turkish Policy Quarterly exclusive interview with Richard Perle*. In the interview, Mr. Perle makes an assessment of the state of the US-Turkey relationship in which he has figured prominently over the years. Mr. Perle evaluates the recent decisions and public sentiments in Turkey as they relate to the future of the relationship with the United States. He also reflects upon various issues including Turkey’s relationship with Israel and journey towards EU membership.
4. "Turkish president boosts ties with Syria in defiance of US", both Syria and Turkey, which have sizeable Kurdish minorities of their own, oppose moves toward greater autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq.
5. "Relatives of human rights defenders at risk in Turkey", report investigates extra-judicial killing in Turkey.
6. "Turkey says to sign customs protocol with EU, but not to recognize Cyprus", Turkey will sign and implement a protocol extending its customs union with all 25 EU members including Cyprus, but will not recognize the Greek Cypriot-ruled Republic of Cyprus, the semi-official Cyprus News Agency (CNA) reported Wednesday, citing a Turkish official.
7. "Turkey proposes joint study of genocide claims to Armenia", Turkey has formally proposed to Armenia the creation of a joint commission to study allegations of genocide against the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as a first step towards normalizing relations, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said here Wednesday.
8. "Kirkuk: Between Kurdish Separatism and Iraqi Federalism", ...the City of Kirkuk with its Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen population of 700,000 will serve as a critical test of the ability of the emerging democratic government in Iraq to fashion workable compromises among diverse populations and conflicting demands while preserving the country's national integrity... Special Report by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).
1. - The Turkish Daily News - "Will Öcalan be retried?":
The European Court of Human Rights will announce its decision on complaints filed by PKK leader Öcalan’s lawyers. What will the decision entail? What will Turkey be asked to do? I have drawn up a few scenarios for those interested.
14 April 2005 / by Mehmet Ali BIRAND
The European Court of Human Rights will most probably announce its decision on a complaint filed by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK/Kongra-Gel) leader Abdullah Öcalan's lawyers in the next week or 10 days. Actually, the decision has already been made but hasn't been officially announced. Öcalan's lawyers had argued that Öcalan's trial was not fair.
The European Court of Human Rights could make two decisions.
The first possibility is the court saying, “Öcalan's right to a fair trial was violated.”
In addition to this decision, sometimes the court proposes ways to alleviate this violation. For example, it may say, “The best way to address this situation is to hold a retrial.” However, this is just a recommendation. It's not binding. The final decision on the court decision will be made at the ministerial conference with all European Council members, including Turkey, present. This committee is responsible for the implementation of European Court of Human Rights decisions. The court behaved the same way to Italy and other European countries, and the inclusion of military judges in the State Security Courts (DGM) was a note of contention. If the ministerial committee decides that Öcalan's retrial is necessary, a new process will start for Ankara.
Turkey will be forced to annul the exception noted:
The government will find it very hard to cope with this process because the exception noted in 2003 needs to be annulled.
In 2003, as the fourth harmonization package was being drafted, an exception was introduced to an article that said if there was a contradiction between the European Convention on Human Rights and national laws, the European Court of Human Rights decision for a retrial would take precedence. The exception to the rule was Öcalan. This article did not cover him. The text of the article reads as follows: “This article is applicable for European Court of Human Rights decisions that are finalized and the applications lodged after February 2003.”
A technical maneuver was used to keep Öcalan out.
Legal experts differ on this issue. The recently amended Article 90 of the Constitution stipulates that international laws take precedence. In other words, the European Court of Human Rights may be accepted.
This leaves Turkey with two options.
- The exception included in the fourth Harmonization Package will be annulled and Öcalan will be retried.
- If the exception is retained, Öcalan's lawyers will use Article 90 of the Constitution to lodge a new application with the European Court of Human Rights. This article will make sure they will easily get the decision for a retrial.
Second possibility would be better for Turkey:
There is also the possibility of the European Court of Human Rights recommending a reopening of the Öcalan case. This wwould change the process somewhat. This will give Öcalan the right to file an petition arguing he was unfairly tried. It will mean that the court is recommending Turkey not block such an application.
This possibility will open the way for the Ankara Criminal Court, which is looking into the cases left over from the DGMs, to consider and decide on Öcalan's application. The court will have the right to accept or reject it. If the court rejects their petition, Öcalan's lawyers will have the right to contest the decision at the Supreme Court of Appeals. However, the European Court of Human Rights will care what happens. For it, the right to lodge a petition with the court will be enough. Consequently, it will be easier for Turkey to deal with the second possibility.
Öcalan problem persists:
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is aware that the decision is soon to come and that's why it approached the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), requesting its help in removing the exception in the fourth harmonization package to open the way for Öcalan's retrial. According to information we received, CHP leader Deniz Baykal was not adverse to the proposal at first, but it appears after the recent flag incidents, the CHP doesn't want to be involved in the matter. Many sources even claim that the recent incidents are being incited by certain groups to create an opposition block against the retrial of Öcalan. They say these groups are trying to hurt the AKP by using the government's obligation to choose between European law and domestic political considerations.
We now must wait for the European Court of Human Rights'
decision. The trouble the government will face will depend on the content
of that decision. 
2. - The New Anatolian - "PM: No official information on Ocalan issue":
ANKARA / 14 April 2005
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan yesterday said that no official
information was available regarding a European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) ruling on the retrial of leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK), Abdullah Ocalan.
In response to opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal's claims earlier this week, Erdogan told reporters yesterday that when the government receives any information, it will make it public.
Baykal claimed on Tuesday that the ECHR has decided to order a retrial of Ocalan, currently serving a life sentence on Imrali Island.
Although the ECHR hasn't officially announced the decision, Baykal said that the Turkish government has already been informed.
Baykal claimed that although the Justice and Development (AK) Party government is "timid" about speaking frankly to the public on the issue, "the ECHR has made a decision. It says, 'Ocalan will be retried'." Baykal stated that Ocalan's retrial will be made public in the next few days.
Baykal also stated that Ocalan, who once clung tenaciously to a dream of Kurdish independence, has come to a new political understanding. Baykal said that Ocalan now believes that Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey should work for a confederation through solidarity under a common flag.
For any retrial of Ocalan to take place, an item from Penal Procedural Code (CMK) must be abolished.
AK Party Deputy Group Chairman Faruk Celik yesterday called on Baykal to give the source of the information he received about the ECHR decision.
“We haven't received any information. Mr. Baykal
should reveal his source. He gave no explanation on this issue,”
he added.
3. - Turkish Policy Quarterly - "Pitfalls And Opportunities For The US-Turkish Alliance":
A Turkish Policy Quarterly exclusive interview with Richard Perle*. In the interview, Mr. Perle makes an assessment of the state of the US-Turkey relationship in which he has figured prominently over the years. Mr. Perle evaluates the recent decisions and public sentiments in Turkey as they relate to the future of the relationship with the United States. He also reflects upon various issues including Turkey’s relationship with Israel and journey towards EU membership.
14 April 2005 / by Nigar Göksel
TPQ: Could you describe how the US-Turkey relationship is different from the year 2000 - at the beginning of the first administration of George W. Bush?
Perle: I don’t believe that the state of the relationship relates to the election of the Bush administration. The two large events have been the war in Iraq, and the AK party coming into power. Bush Administration policy toward Turkey did not differ from the previous administration. As a matter of fact, a number of the incoming officials of the Bush administration had always regarded themselves, and had been regarded as, good friends of Turkey. I’m thinking Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney…
TPQ: And yourself…
Perle: And myself, although I was not officially in the administration. Doug Feith, also. There was a lot of, and still is a lot of, goodwill and respect for Turkey.
TPQ: Losing the parliamentary vote to support the US in Iraq on March 1st, 2003 was a surprise. Both yourself and others had predicted that Turkey would go along. What is your analysis of what happened? What lessons can be learned?
Perle: If the Turkish government had the experience it does now, March 1st wouldn’t have happened as it did, the resolution would have passed. I believe that the failure to get support for the vote had a lot to do with the inexperience of the government at the time. They supported the motion in assembly and they expected it to prevail. There were obviously some divisions but that is normal and I do believe that the government expected the vote to pass, and was surprised when it did not. This was, in my view, a matter of experience rather than intent.
TPQ: A number of individuals, including yourself, spent a lot of time and effort, as well as their personal capital investing in the US-Turkey relationship. Today, a significant percentage of the population in Turkey perceives the US as a threat to the country. Was the potential for this kind of a fallout seen? Could it have been prevented?
Perle: I don’t think we had a choice. What was at stake in the view of the administration was the security of the country. After September 11, the president looked at the world with a very different perspective. And he said to himself, “if the next act of terror involved a weapon of mass destruction, what would the consequences be?” And then he looked at who had a history of weapons of mass destruction. And when you put those two things together, you produced a list on which Iraq was near the top of the list. So this was something that the United States believed was essential for its security. I believe the president would have gone ahead even if he had understood that it would be unpopular. And of course, if there had not been the threat of a French veto, the support of the United Nations would have been possible. In the end it didn’t but that was a matter of one vote; hard to predict.
TPQ: People have said in the past that US-Turkey relations were too narrowly founded on defense and security matters, as a military-to-military relationship. Would you say that’s the case today? If not, what changed?
Perle: There has been a good relationship between the United States and Turkish Armed Forces during the Cold War. That is true of our relation with all of our NATO allies, based on a common threat. We are part of an organization dedicated to dealing with that threat. So it was perfectly natural. I think the importance of the military relationship declined since the end of the Cold War. But the relations are much broader than that, and they have always been broader than that. The relationship includes an important economic dimension; the United States has been a consistent supporter of Turkey in the International Monetary Fund. NATO was obviously an important aspect of the relationship however it also included a political dimension. It has been a good relationship. I certainly understand that at the moment the United States is unpopular in Turkey and it is also unpopular in some other countries. This happens from time to time and we have got to deal with it.
TPQ: You mentioned a few issues on which the US has supported Turkey and in which Turkey has needed US support. Are there any issues for which the US needs Turkey, or in other words, does Turkey have any leverage over America today?
Perle: I don’t think it’s a hostile relationship so I don’t think Turkey needs a leverage. When there were specific issues, we have never found it necessary to solve them by exerting leverage. We don’t have any major differences with Turkey. We really don’t. And I think a lot of what now appears to be a difficult moment in the relationship has to do with what is appearing in the press. There is disapproval in Turkey about what we are doing in Iraq. I think that will change eventually. When Iraq emerges into a decent democratic order, people will see that is a vast improvement over the days of Saddam Hussein.
TPQ: What about the Incirlik Base? Is the US’ need for the Incirlik Base decreasing?
Perle: Yes, of course it is decreasing. Incirlik, for the US, has always been more than some runways. It has been, among other things, an expression of our close collaboration. I was involved in the negotiation back in the early 1980’s and it was not simply a matter of a piece of real estate. We had other bases at the time. We were not dependent on Incirlik. Incirlik is a good base and we valued it, but it wasn’t vital for our security even during the Cold War. There were many restrictions placed on our use of Incirlik, down to numbers of aircraft based there and the number of aircrafts that could be flown through Incirlik and so forth. But there was always a strong desire to keep that connection as an expression of the close working relationship between the US Air Force and the Turkish Armed Forces. I know it was often seen on the Turkish side as a source of leverage.
TPQ: On March 23rd you mentioned that the Bush Administration does not embrace the policy of supporting “the lesser of evils.” Do you believe that Turkey, prioritizing stability, opts for the “the lesser of evils” specifically, in the Middle East?
Perle: It is natural to fear instability. Most governments fear instability most of the time. And it is certainly true that President Bush believes that if stability in the short term comes at the price of dictatorship, than over the long term, it is in fact damaging. The terrorists that we are concerned about arise in circumstances as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and elsewhere, where young people, often idealistic and impressionable, have no outlet because they live in repressive societies. That is where the terrorists have been coming from. So promoting democracy is part of the war against terror. I think this will even turn out to be true with respect to the PKK. The PKK is going to have a more difficult time recruiting people to join it when there is a democracy in Iraq.
TPQ: At the American Turkish Council conference in 2002 you suggested that instead of pursuing EU membership, Turkey should focus on working more closely with the United States. Do you still think so and in what specific ways do you think that the US would be a better partner to Turkey than the European Union?
Perle: Well, I think we are more open to all cultures. I think Europe is in fact much more inward looking. And it’s going to be quite a long time before Turkey achieves membership. I also think the heavy emphasis within Europe on the involvement of government in the daily lives of citizens and their economy is a less effective environment for economic growth and development. The prevailing attitudes in the US are more conducive to growth and development. There are deeply entrenched interests in Europe that are not terribly competitive and depend on government to protect them. And for a rising, young economy like Turkey’s, that’s not good. That being said, Turkey needs some serious reforms in the economic sense as well; the heavy involvement of the state in Turkey’s economy is not good for economic growth.
TPQ: Recently Turkey’s relationship with Israel seems to have cooled, certain problems have been experienced. What, in your view, is the cause for this trend? Do you think it could be related in any way to the Turkish government seeking a more ambitious role in the Arab world?
Perle: I don’t know. It seems to me unfortunate because there are only two democracies now in the region, Turkey and Israel. A third democracy, we hope, is on the way, namely Iraq. I believe Turkey and Israel have important common interests. This was certainly President Özal’s vision and it has been sustained by successive Turkish governments. There is important economic potential, some of which has already been realized, between Israel and Turkey. I think the tension in the relationship probably has something to do with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute due to sympathy in Turkey for the Palestinians. It is difficult to assess the Israeli-Palestinian issues when the principal source of news is the terrible images of the fighting between Israel and Palestinians. But I think that has now subsided and I would hope that in this optimistic moment with respect to Israel and Palestinians, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relationship would be reversed.
TPQ: The 90th anniversary of the “so-called Armenian genocide” is nearing. There is concern in Turkey that this year might be the year when the Congress recognizes the tragic events of the beginning of the 20th century as genocide. What is your opinion as to what the Congress will do?
Perle: I don’t think it is likely that there will be any major action but in our Congress -we have 535 members of Congress – any one of them is able to put forward a resolution. So it is impossible for the Administration to prevent resolutions from being introduced. Now, we have always been able in the past to defeat them, and if it happens again, I believe it will be defeated again.
TPQ: The President’s Inauguration speech covered the Greater Middle East Initiative extensively. As a friend of Turkey, you must have put a lot of thought into how Turkey fits into this initiative. How did you envision Turkey’s role in this initiative then, and how do you see the prospects today?
Perle: Turkey could make a very substantial contribution because Turkey clearly has earned, by virtue of its democratic institutions, and its weight in the region, the right to demonstrate real leadership. I think Turkey could play a very important role by energetically supporting the kind of change that this initiative aims to bring about. It’s good for Turkey; it’s good for the region. I see no downside, I see only benefits.
TPQ: Would you go so far to say Turkey could play a role in mediation between the Arab countries and Israel or is that unrealistic?
Perle: I think the best way for Israel to resolve its dispute is with the Palestinians and not with the Arab world as a whole. The reason for that is that I believe that a number of countries in the Arab world have actually exploited the relationship between Israel and Palestinians for their own purposes. I don’t assume goodwill on the part of the number of dictatorships. They’re quite happy for there to be a bad relationship between Israel and Palestinians, partly because it helps them remain in power. So I think bringing the Arab world as such into this dispute will not help. What will help is a direct relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. There may be a role for Turkey in encouraging that. I have never understood why it is helpful to invite the dictators in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran to resolve disputes between Israelis and Palestinians. The dictators always found it very useful for themselves. If you want a dictatorship, you have to find a way to mobilize the people, thus you develop enemies, internal and external. I don’t think there has ever been a dictatorship that did not use the fears of foreign enemies and internal enemies to remain in power. This is the point which is argued very eloquently in a book by Natan Sharansky, called The Case for Democracy. It would be an important book anyway but it is a particularly important book because President Bush has read it and asked his cabinet officers to read it, given copies of it to friends and associates. He has said that it reflects his views and thinking. I don’t know whether there are plans to publish it in Turkish but it’s a very good book.
TPQ: In my discussion with you, I do not get the feeling that you perceive a dramatic fallout between Turkey and the United States?
Perle: I don’t think it is dramatic at all. There are some things that are troubling. For example, the apparent popularity of a book like Mein Kampf. I mean, that’s really troubling. If I were a Turk, I would be embarrassed by it. It reminds me of Das Kapital. In the Soviet days, millions and millions of copies were printed; very few copies were actually read because it was such a boring, ponderous book. Mein Kampf, except for historians, is in a similar category. But it has certainly caused people to say “What is going on?” I gather it is being published by more than four, and according to some sources, more than nine publishing houses. It is very unusual that this many publishing houses simultaneously bring out a book written by Hitler in 1925, over three quarters of a century ago. I think some enterprising journalists should talk to the publishing houses and ask how and when and why they have focused on this book. I have written some books and I have dealt with publishers and the idea that these publishers are all sitting around and saying “Oh we can make some money off Mein Kampf, all about the same time, strikes me as highly questionable. The appeal of a book like Mein Kampf in a country that is definitely not Arian is really puzzling, because Hitler’s vision was the enslavement of non-Arian world which would have enslaved Turkey. Turks are among the people who have suffered from ethnic prejudice. And to read a book, the essence of which is the demented ambitions of a racist dictator, is very puzzling. Jews have been victims of prejudice and so have the Turks. The history of the Jewish-Turkish relationship is a proud history for Turks.
TPQ: Do you believe, in retrospect, that America had too much confidence in the ability of the AKP?
Perle: I think the US government took the pragmatic view: “Let’s wait and see what the government does.” There were many people who feared that the AKP was another version of the Welfare Party and would attempt an extreme Islamist transformation. There were others who did not agree. We listened to what Tayyip Erdogan was saying and he wasn’t endorsing the radical agenda, neither were other leaders of the AKP. Therefore we decided to wait and see what would happen. So far I have not seen a basis for expecting the extreme policies that some people feared.
TPQ: You mentioned at a recent event that you did not observe a dramatic shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. In terms of Cyprus, the government in fact did take dramatic steps, in a positive sense. Do you think that during Great Britain’s presidency of the EU, the US will become more active with regard to the Cyprus problem?
Perle: I think what was done on Cyprus was very positive and it deserved a much stronger positive response, especially from the European Union. Admitting Cyprus as a member, Greece being a member, I think they had a real obligation to recognize and reward what the Turkish Cypriots have done (OR reassure Turkish Cypriots are not ignored). But they didn’t and I think that’s disappointing. I think we as the US should have done more too. As for whether the US is waiting for the UK presidency, I do not have such a sense. However I do not know because I am not currently in government. It is sometimes easier to do things depending on who has the presidency and what their objective is. When you serve as president for six months, your own agenda can sometimes crowd out other worthwhile projects. But I would think that if the British presidency were prepared to take an initiative, the US would certainly be strongly supportive
TPQ: It is frequently repeated that Turkey and the US still have many common interests. Could you offer some concrete ideas as to which interests Turkey and the US share and what the agenda of the relationship is? Also, what would your suggestions be for the two countries to be cautious about regarding their relationship?
Perle: Well, the list is long. The first item on it has, in my lifetime, been the natural solidarity of two democratic and secularist allies. I know that sounds insubstantial, it sounds even romantic, but in fact if you look at the American relationships, you’ll find that our closest relationships are all with like-minded political cultures, with democracies, such as the UK, Canada and Australia. Australia is two-thirds of the way around the world, yet we have a very close relationship. Whereas, 90 miles away, there is Cuba, which we have a hostile relationship with. There is a sense of solidarity among democracies, among countries in which people choose their governments and the rule of law prevails. It always makes Americans uncomfortable when for reasons of real-politik, we end up having close relations with dictatorships. During the Cold War, certain lessons were learned. And since then conditions have changed. We can express our sentiments more profoundly. We have an obvious interest in protecting the integrity of the newly independent states of the Caucasus. No one wants to see another imperial drive by the successor to the Soviet Union and those states often feel quite vulnerable. As President Özal understood, a close relationship with Turkey would be very helpful for these nations. Such a relationship should not be anti-Russian, but based on positive values and mutual interests. We have huge interest in the continuing demonstration that a country that is predominantly Muslim can be a democratic and secular state and can enjoy good relations with the US. The idea of Turkey as a model and example is an important theme in American policy. We have good trading relationships. American companies invest in Turkey, we import from Turkey. I think there’re going to be some difficulties because the textile situation changes. We will have to work on that. On most issues, we have seen things pretty much the same way. Turkey was with us in some notable and very difficult situations, throughout the Cold War and during the first Gulf War. We have always wound up on the same side, going in the same direction.
In my experience Americans who have been to Turkey come away with real affection to Turks. They like the Turks. This doesn’t usually enter the textbooks about politics but it’s certainly a factor. When I was in the Pentagon, I tried to bring as many people to Turkey as I could. It always had a positive effect.
* Richard Perle is Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research. Previously Richard Perle served as Chairman
of the Defense Policy Board (2001-2003); Member of the Defense Policy
Board (1987-2004); Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy (1981-87); and served on the US Senate Staff (1960-1980).
He is a leading authority on national security, military requirements,
arms proliferation, defense and regional conflicts.
4. - AFP - "Turkish president boosts ties with
Syria in defiance of US":
DAMASCUS / 13 April 2005
Presidents Ahmet Necdet Sezer of Turkey and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad on Wednesday agreed to boost links between their countries despite US pressure for Ankara to keep its distance from Damascus.
Turkey and Syria will "develop cooperation and bilateral relations in all economic and commercial domains", Sezer said after meeting Assad in Damascus.
However, the political crisis in their regional neighbour Lebanon since the assassination of that country’s former premier Rafiq Hariri in mid-February also dominated the talks.
Damascus and Ankara are "profoundly attached" to stability and unity in Lebanon, Assad said in a statement. Sezer expressed "satisfaction" with the ongoing Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon.
The two-day visit, a first to Syria for the Turkish leader, follows a visit by Assad to Turkey last year.
The two presidents also discussed the situation in Iraq and the Middle East conflict, they said, issues on which they have shared points of view.
Assad hailed "Turkey’s constructive role in favour of a just and far-reaching peace in the region".
The leaders held one-on-one talks before being joined by Syrian Prime Minister Naji Otri and their delegations.
Government newspaper Tishrin earlier praised Sezer for his "courageous, bold and wise" trip in the face of the "crude pressure exercised by the United States and its flagrant interference in the affairs of a great regional country."
The United States had asked Turkey to side with its Western allies over calls for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon following the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri in February.
"What can be said on Syria is that the international community is completely unanimous" on a Syrian withdrawal, US ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman, said last month. "We hope Turkey will join the international community."
Turkey supports the withdrawal, but also says it wants to contribute to developing good neighbourly ties in the conflict-torn Middle East.
Edelman’s call, which came at a cool period in Turkish-US relations due to differences over Iraq, was largely interpreted as a warning for Sezer to drop plans to visit Damascus, which Washington accuses of supporting terrorism.
The Syrian leader had previously hinted that he would discuss with Sezer the role of the United States and European countries in the region, in developments which he said recalled "the colonial era."
"We can reduce the dangers to a minimum only if we act together. The dangers are threatening all of us. They started with Iraq, now they are threatening Syria and other countries ... They are trying to interfere in Turkey’s affairs," he told CNN-Turk.
Otri said on Tuesday that he welcomed the "important visit ... and its impact on consolidation of ties and cooperation between the two neighbourly and friendly countries."
Turkey and Syria have greatly improved their stormy ties since 1998, when they came to the brink of war over Ankara’s accusations that Damascus was sheltering separatist Kurdish militants fighting the Turkish government.
Tensions eased when Damascus expelled Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan and signed a security deal with Ankara, pledging to stop supporting Ocalan’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The high point in the improved relationship was an Ankara visit of Assad in January 2004, the first to Turkey by a Syrian head of state.
Turkey has made increasing overtures to Syria since the US-led invasion of Iraq, both neighbors sharing concerns that post-war Iraq may break up and spark new turmoil in the region.
Both Syria and Turkey, which have sizeable Kurdish minorities of their own, oppose moves toward greater autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq.
Despite the improved ties, two sticking points remain:
the waters of the Euphrates, which has its source in Turkey, and the
status of Turkey’s southern Hatay province, formerly Alexandretta,
which Syria still claims.
5. - KHRP - "Relatives of human rights defenders at risk in Turkey":
Relatives of human rights defenders at risk: report
investigates extra-judicial killing in Turkey
13 April 2005
A new report published today presents the findings of a joint mission by Kurdish Human Rights Project and the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales to observe the trial of three security officers for an alleged extra-judicial killing and the torture or ill-treatment of a key witness.
Siyar Perincek was the son of a member of the Insan Haklari Dernegi (Human Rights Association) board of directors. IHD is the largest human rights organisation in Turkey and a partner organisation of KHRP. Siyar was on a motorbike opposite the Adana branch of IHD on 28 May 2004. According to witnesses, he fell to the ground when approached by security officers whereupon an officer shot him in the back. He died later at hospital. A key witness Nurettin Basci was arrested and is currently on remand in Adana Kurkculer F-type prison, where he alleges being subjected to torture or ill-treatment.
The trial of three security officers took place on 21 December 2004. The case has not yet reached judgment. The mission expressed concern over failures to comply with domestic legislation as well as a breach of several international legal standards. Among other breaches, the delegation noted the lack of co-operation from authorities on issues including the disappearance of key evidence; the non-attendance of the officers on trial; and the failure to provide a fair and impartial hearing for the complainants. One judge was observed to sleep through most of the hearing.
Interviewees expressed concern over continuing violations of the prohibition of torture or ill-treatment, and the implications of this on Turkey’s EU accession. Appended to the report is a presentation given by KHRP, ‘The EU, Turkey and the Kurds’, presented at its European Parliament conference in Brussels in November 2004.
Contact:
Kerim Yildiz / Rochelle Harris, Kurdish Human Rights Project, London, Tel: +44 (0)207 287-2772. Email: khrp@khrp.org Url: www.khrp.org
*** Please note our email addresses have changed ***
Notes
[1] The report ‘Trial Observation - Relatives
of human rights defenders at risk: the extra-judicial killing of Siyar
Perincek’ (ISBN 1 900175819) is available from Kurdish Human Rights
Project (www.khrp.org or +44 (0)207287-2772)
6. - Xinhuanet - "Turkey says to sign customs
protocol with EU, but not to recognize Cyprus":
NICOSIA / 13 April 2005
Turkey will sign and implement a protocol extending its customs union with all 25 EU members including Cyprus, but will not recognize the Greek Cypriot-ruled Republic of Cyprus, the semi-official Cyprus News Agency (CNA) reported Wednesday, citing a Turkish official.
Turkey will implement the protocol after its signature in order to avoid "problems with the EU" during accession negotiations set to open on Oct. 3 this year, Engin Solakoglou, first secretary of Turkey's Permanent Mission to the EU was quoted as saying.
Solakoglou announced that the Turkish government will at the time of signing the protocol issue a declaration to the EU on non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
The customs union protocol was a technical document while the declaration of non-recognition was a political statement, said the Turkish diplomat.
Regarding Turkey's refusal to grant ships carrying the Cyprus flag entry into Turkish ports and Cyprus commercial aircraft use of Turkish airspace, Solakoglou said both were considered by Turkey as "services" and therefore not included in the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU.
For the moment, Turkey has no intention to change this approach, he added.
After signing the protocol, Turkey will wait for any developments in efforts for a Cyprus settlement, he said, adding "before that, do not expect huge leaps from us."
The Cyprus government has strongly requested the signature of the protocol and its recognition by Turkey and the free docking of Cypriot ships in Turkish ports, the use of its airspace as well as direct trade and movement of goods.
Ankara is the only country to recognize the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) where it maintains some 35,000 troops.
Cyprus has been divided into Greek Cypriot south and Turkish Cypriot north since 1974 when Turkish troops entered the northern third of the island in the wake of an abortive coup seeking union with Greece.
The latest efforts to reunite the island grounded to a halt after Greek Cypriots rejected UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's reunification blueprint in a referendum in April last year.
The outcome ensured that the Greek Cypriots alone joined
the EU on May 1, 2004.
7. - AFP - "Turkey proposes joint study of genocide
claims to Armenia":
ANKARA / 13 April 2005
Turkey has formally proposed to Armenia the creation of a joint commission to study allegations of genocide against the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as a first step towards normalizing relations, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said here Wednesday.
The proposal was outlined in a recent letter by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Armenian President Robert Kocharian, Gul told parliament during a special session on a damaging Armenian campaign for the recognition of the controversial World War I massacres as genocide.
"We informed them that if our proposal is accepted, we are ready to negotiate with Armenia on how the commission will be established and how it will work and that such an initiative will serve to normalize relations between the two countries.
"I repeat this appeal once again... Turkey is ready to face its history, Turkey has no problem with its history," Gul said.
Ankara has refused to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan since the former Soviet republic gained independence in 1991 because of Armenian efforts to secure international condemnation of the massacres as genocide.
In 1993, Turkey shut its border with Armenia in a show of solidarity with its close ally Azerbaijan, which was at war with Armenia over the Nagorny-Karabakh enclave, dealing a heavy economic blow on the impoverished nation.
Gul urged the international community to press Yerevan to accept Turkey’s proposal for a joint study of the genocide allegations.
The Armenian massacres of World War I are one of the most controversial episodes in Turkish history.
Armenians say up to 1.5 million of their kinsmen died in orchestrated killings nine decades ago during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of modern Turkey.
Turkey, on the other hand, argues that 300,000 Armenians
and thousands of Turks were killed in what was civil strife during World
War I when the Armenians, backed by Russia, rose against their Ottoman
rulers.
8. - MEMRI - "Kirkuk: Between Kurdish Separatism and Iraqi Federalism":
31 March 2005 / No.215 / by Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli*
Introduction
The City of Kirkuk with its Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen population of 700,000 will serve as a critical test of the ability of the emerging democratic government in Iraq to fashion workable compromises among diverse populations and conflicting demands while preserving the country's national integrity.
The Kurds maintain that the city is the heart of Kurdistan and should be integrated into the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which currently comprises the three governorates of Dahouk, Irbil and Sulaymaniya. The two minorities in the city, the Arabs and the Turkmen, wish to keep Kirkuk as part of the Governorate of Ta'mim, which is not part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Some key Iraqi political forces, as well as three neighboring countries with Kurdish minorities — mainly Turkey but also, to a lesser extent, Iran and Syria — favor the exclusion of Kirkuk from Kurdish control. The controversy surrounding Kirkuk is well summarized in a statement by the London daily Al-Hayat: "Kirkuk is the jewel in the Kurdish throne and a powder keg with respect to the unity of Iraq." [1]
Recent History of Iraqi Kurdistan
The two principal Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan under Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party under Mas'oud Barzani ran a joint list of candidates in the recent Iraqi elections, held on January 30, 2005. The joint list received a little over 25 percent of the votes, which translated into 75 seats in the 275 seat National Assembly. The Kurdish group emerged as the second largest in the new National Assembly, second only to the Shi'ite United Iraqi Alliance, which gained 140 seats.
The two Kurdish parties have not always been on good terms. In fact, in 1994 the two camps battled one another for control of the Kurdish region. In August 1996, Barzani sought the help of Saddam Hussein, who readily sent an army of 30,000 in support of Barzani's camp. Then, under pressure from the United States, which had been providing air cover under the no-fly zone policy in northern Iraq since the defeat of the Saddam military in Kuwait in 1991, the two Kurdish parties signed an agreement in Washington in 1998 to end the civil war. Under the agreement Kurdistan was divided into two zones: a western zone, with its capital at Irbil, came under the control of Barzani, and an eastern zone, with its capital at Sulaymania, came under the control of Talabani. Each zone had its own government, prime minister and democratically elected parliament. Eventually a joint parliament emerged whose members were also democratically elected. By all accounts, the two Kurdish zones have prospered economically under democratically elected governments. Kurdistan also remains the sole area in Iraq that has been able to shield itself, almost completely, against acts of terrorism. Kurdistan remains a popular vacation spot for many Baghdadis seeking to escape the debilitating heat of the summer months in their city.
The Arabization of Kirkuk
Traditionally Kurdish, the city of Kirkuk began to undergo a process of Arabization in the mid-1930s when the discovery of oil in the city generated a flow of Arabs and Turkmen into the burgeoning oil industry. The process of Arabization, namely the settling of Iraqi Arabs in the city to change its demographic structure, continued throughout the reign of the Hashemite monarchy, but was greatly accelerated under the Ba'thist regime of Saddam Hussein with the introduction of new and extreme measures to destroy Kurdish villages and to force deportation of their people to other parts of Iraq under the "Anfal" operation in the 1990s. [2]
At the height of the Anfal operation, Saddam expelled as many as 150,000 (some say 250,000) Kurds and Turkmen to the southern regions of Iraq and replaced them with Iraqi Arabs. Those who resisted the relocation were dealt with harshly, as evidenced by the mass graves discovered following the collapse of the regime.
As a result of the Arabization policy, hundred of thousands of Kurds and Turkomen have been forced to live in tents for several years and many of them, to this day, living in poor conditions waiting to be restored to their old homes. For the Kurds, this is human rights issue.
The Kurds insist that the consequences of Arabization must be reversed by resettling the Arabs in their provinces of origin, primarily in southern Iraq; this would restore to the Kurds their historical demographic weight. In the words of Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the former Iraqi Governing Council, the annexation of Kirkuk into a Kurdish region is not meant to "Kurdicize" the city but to remove the relics of its Arabization. According to Othman, the 1959 census had shown a majority of Kurds in Kirkuk and that majority should be the sole criterion in determining its future. [3] By contrast, the Turkmen, working closely with the Arabs, argue that Kirkuk is a predominantly Turkmen city and should remain part of a unified Iraq. Turkey supports their claims and has threatened to use force to frustrate Kurdish claims to Kirkuk.
Kirkuk's Symbolic Importance
In a statement carried by the Iraqi weekly Al-Shahid Al-Mustaqill ("The Independent Witness") Talabani argued that Kirkuk had "a symbolic importance" because of the ethnic cleansing policies practiced by the previous regime. "Our struggle for Kirkuk," he asserted, "is a struggle for destiny" to restore all the liberated Kurdish areas, including Kirkuk and its surroundings, "to the bosom of Kurdistan." Emphasizing the newly acquired political weight of the Kurds, bolstered in part by their alliance with the United States, Talabani said "the time of betraying the Kurds has gone forever." [4] A photograph of Talabani displaying to Iraq's Governing Council an early twentieth century-map showing Kirkuk as part of Kurdistan adorns many walls and public buildings in Kurdistan. [5]
Mas'oud Barzani, the other Kurdish leader, has gone even further. In a meeting with members of his party, Barzani has said Kirkuk is "the heart of Kurdistan" and expressed the willingness of the Kurds to go to war "for the sake of protecting this identity and [retaining] the benefits the Kurds have gained since the end of the [2003] war." [6]
In an interview with the London daily Al-Hayat, Barzani stated: "My father sacrificed himself and his revolution in 1974 for the sake of Kirkuk. If we should be forced to fight and lose everything we have accomplished we [still] would not bargain over Kirkuk's identity—the heart of Kurdistan." [7]
The Legal Foundation for Kurdish Demands
Apart from their historical claims for Kirkuk, the Kurds invoke Article 58 of the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period," also known as the State Administrative Law, of March 8, 2004 which is considered the interim constitution of Iraq, approved by the now-dissolved Iraqi Governing Council.
Article 58 states in part: "The Iraqi Transitional Government … shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and changing nationality."
The article recommends four specific measures:
Restore the original residents to their homes and property
Compensate those who were introduced to specific regions [e.g., Arabs in Kurdistan] and resettle them in or near the district from which they came
Provide compensation for those who lost their jobs by being forced to emigrate
Allow individuals to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress [again, this applies primarily to Kurds who were forced to declare themselves as Arabs for the purpose of population census] [8]
The Economic Dimension
There are also practical reasons underlying the Kurdish position with regard to Kirkuk. The city and its surroundings sit on approximately 15-20 percent of Iraq's vast oil reserves estimated at a minimum of 112 billion barrels of oil. The area could produce as much as 800,000 barrels of oil a day and thus generate a significant stream of income for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. Should the Kurds secede from Iraq they would need the oil revenues to protect and sustain their independence. Without oil revenues of their own (as opposed to oil revenues earmarked for them by the central government) the Kurds' room for maneuver would diminish appreciably. Kurdistan's neighbors – Turkey, Iran and Syria – concerned about the effects of an independent Kurdistan would have on their own Kurdish populations, oppose the Iraqi Kurds having control of these oil revenues. In the eyes of an Iraqi daily, the controversy over Kirkuk has to do with its oil: "Oil alone is the reason for the Kurdish insistence, Arab refusal, Turkmen protests and the regional austerity. If Kirkuk were not an oil city we would not have heard all the historical and geographical arguments from all sides." [9]
While the Kurds could negotiate with the central government an agreement that would guarantee them a reasonable percentage of oil revenues earned by Iraq as a whole and consistent with their size in the population, such an agreement would make them dependent on political forces that could turn against them as the Kurds have often experienced during their affiliation with Iraq.
Appointment of an Independent Committee
The Shi'ite and Kurdish factions in the Iraqi National Assembly have been negotiating a coalition agreement that would establish the form and modalities of the new government and the distribution of its portfolios. Meanwhile, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has appointed an independent committee to resolve the issues surrounding the future of Kirkuk. The committee is chaired by the Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party Hamid Majid Mousa. Mousa recently told the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat that his committee had been established "to assure the political forces in Kurdistan that the central Iraqi government is serious and committed to the normalization of the situation in the Kirkuk area in accordance with article 58 of the State Administrative Law." He indicated that the committee will seek to resolve the problems in four steps: eliminating the consequences of Saddam's dictatorship; mending the (results of) ethnic cleansing, drawing the boundaries of the area, and carrying out a population census, "followed by a referendum of the local population" to gauge their political preferences. [10]
Other Kurdish Demands
The issue of Kirkuk should be considered within the context of other Kurdish demands. Central to these demands is the creation of a federal system of government for the Kurdish region within some structure that would essentially guarantee the Kurds sovereignty in everything but name, and would leave them the option of gaining full independence in the future. The Kurds are asking for guarantees that that federalism will be anchored in the new constitution that has yet to be drafted and should not be arbitrarily changed or abrogated.
Regional Federalism vs. Provincial Federalism
While there is a consensus among most Iraqi political groups about the establishment of a federal form of government to be anchored in the new constitution, there is disagreement as to the exact nature of this federal arrangement. Without exception, the non-Kurdish Iraqi majority favors a federalism based on provinces. Iraq is divided into 18 provinces and, according to this view, each province should have some degree of autonomy within a federal framework that leaves much of the power at the center in Baghdad. Since most provinces, especially those in the north, have a mixture of ethnic groups including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Christians, this scheme would somewhat limit Kurdish control over three provinces - Sulaymaniya, Irbil, and Dahouk - that have enjoyed political autonomy since 1991. [11]
By contrast, the Kurds have insisted on regional or ethnic federalism that would bring into one region, and one political framework, all the provinces with substantial Kurdish populations, including the oil-producing city of Kirkuk. The idea of the federation of provinces is rejected, according to Jalal Talabani because "throughout their history, the Kurdish people have struggled to prevent the separation of the Kurdish provinces from each other and to protect the integrity of the historical Kurdish borders…" [12]
The Integration of the Peshmerga into the Iraqi Army
The Kurds demand the integration of 100,000 Peshmerga (Kurdish militia forces) into the Iraqi army, meaning that their salaries should be paid by the Iraqi treasury while at the same time restricting the entry of the regular Iraqi army into Kurdistan without the regional parliament's prior approval. In the words of the Kurdish leader Barzani, "the Peshmerga is a tree that has borne fruit by the blood and tears of a people. It was not established by the order of a state, a political party or an individual. Without it, the Kurds would have had no existence." [13]
Secular Legislation
The Kurds are also persistent in their demand for a secular rather than an Islamist state. They demand that Islam become one source of legislation but not the only one. Ideally, they would like the separation of state and religion. [14]
The Return of Kurds to Their Cities and Villages
While the discussion about the future of Kirkuk is still ongoing the Kurds have been trying to create a new reality on the ground. By September 2004, 80,000 Iraqi Kurds had returned from Iran and another 30,000 had returned from Turkey. [15] It may be assumed that many more have since relocated in the Kurdish region, and Kirkuk in particular, from others parts of Iraq and from across the border. The Kurdish leaders have continually sought a legal process for the return of the Internally Displaced Peoples - IDPs - for without a legal process some of these peoples may take it upon themselves to restore their lost property with extra-legal measures.
Relations Between the Iraqi Kurds and Neighboring Countries
The Kurds understand the potential danger to themselves that would result from military action undertaken separately or jointly by Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Turkey has repeatedly announced that it is committed to the protection of the large Turkmen minority in Kirkuk and has threatened to intervene militarily if Kirkuk should be annexed to Kurdistan or if Kurdistan should declare independence. Turkish concerns about an independent Kurdistan have been echoed by Iran and Syria. All three countries have Kurdish minorities with varying degrees of separatist aspirations. [16] Recently, however, Turkey has shown a new flexibility in dealing with the Kirkuk issue.
A delegation representing both the Turkish foreign ministry and the military high command and headed by Ambassador Othman Kurtuk visited Sulaymaniya in northern Iraq for talks with Jalal Talabani, who was seen at the time as the emerging consensus candidate for the post of president of Iraq. Talabani urged Turkey to refrain from turning its concern about the future of Kirkuk into threats to intervene in Iraq and reminded the Turkish delegation that the Turkmen are Iraqi, not Turkish citizens. On its part, the Turkish delegation agreed with its Kurdish interlocutors about the need to establish a secular regime in Iraq supported by the Kurds and by other important politicians such as Ayad Allawi and the Sunni political leader Adnan al-Pachachi. The two parties have also agreed to try to smooth over their differences. [17]
There are at least three reasons for Turkey to behave with restraint with regard to Iraqi Kurdistan. First, Turkey will have to weigh the consequences of any military action in northern Iraq against the damage this would do to its hopes of obtaining membership in the European Union. Second, at a time of severe pressure on oil supply, oil from Kirkuk could provide Turkey with a reliable source of supply. Third, the Kurds with their well-armed and battle-hardened Peshmerga could provide problems even for the large Turkish military. In the words of the 19th century German General Helmut von Moltke: "It is impossible to triumph over the Kurds when they are united." [18]
As for Syria, it is in no position, at least for now, to undertake any adventure outside its borders. Iran for its part will probably choose to influence the policies of a Shi'ite government in Iraq through subversion and other non-military means. In short, the threats of foreign military action against an independent Kurdistan in the end may prove to be hollow.
* Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI's Middle East Economic Studies Program.
[1] Al-Hayat (London), February 4, 2004.
[2] Nouri Talabani, "The Arabization of Kirkuk," Uppsala (Sweden), 2001, pp.20-38.
[3] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 12, 2004.
[4] Al-Shahid Al-Mustaqill (Baghdad), October 30, 2004.
[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 23, 2005.
[6] Al-Hayat (London), September 9, 2004.
[7] Al-Hayat (London),October 20, 2004.
[8] Saddam Hussein's government issued an order on September 6, 2001 allowing the change of nationality from non-Arab to Arab in an effort to change the demographic structure of Kirkuk. Al-Zaman (Baghdad), October 24, 2004.
[9] Al-Shiraa (Baghdad). January 10, 2004.
[10] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), March 14, 2005.
[11] Al-Zaman (Baghdad), January 9, 2004.
[12] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 21, 2003.
[13] Al-Hayat (London), March 16, 2005.
[14] Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 16, 2005.
[15] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 21, 2004
[16] Al-Furat (Baghdad), November 30, 2004.
[17] Al-Hayat (London), February 25, 2005.
[18] Al-Hayat (London), October 14, 2002.