31 March 2003

1. "Doubts Haunt Turkey's Kurds", throughout modern Turkish history, Kurds have revolted against Turkish rule for 27 times. The last insurrection was quelled in 1938 and was followed by coercive assimilation of Kurdish identity, to the extent of denying the existence of Kurds - even in language.

2. "Kurds face deliverance, devastation", war may aid their revival - or revive old conflicts

3. "Own interests, US ties divide Turkey", under enormous pressure from the United States, Turkey has declared that, at least for now, it will put aside its desire to send thousands of troops deep inside northern Iraq. But behind the scenes, officials and analysts say the longer the war goes on, the more likely Turkey could change its mind.

4. "Temperature rises in the north", with the war on Iraq entering its second week, there is still no signs of large-scale combat operations north of Baghdad.

5. "Missteps With Turkey Prove Costly", diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. a Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq

6. "Turkey's Economy likely tor survive war, but what next?", for the first time in years, Turkey's government enjoys the backing of a sizeable parliamentary majority, instead of a relying on a fragile coalition.

1. - Interpress Servica - "Doubts Haunt Turkey's Kurds":

ISTANBUL / 29 March 2003 / by Nadire Mater

"For the first time in world history Kurds will gain international recognition," says Umit Firat an independent Kurdish intellectual from Istanbul, predicting the outcome of the U.S. war on Iraq.

"At least Kurdish autonomy in Iraq will have international guarantors such as United States and Britain, instead of Iraq's ruling Baath Party's broken promises of 1970s," says an optimistic Firat, who believes United States' hold on Iraq will remain unaffected even if the U.S. war plans do not unfold as foreseen by Washington.

Firat's words reflect general feelings in the Kurdish world that the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime will bring Northern Iraqi Kurds further autonomy and even greater say in a future Iraq.

However Turkey's strong opposition to a Kurdish independence state narrows the limits of Kurdish optimism, bringing their aspirations down to expectations of recognition on a local level in a future multi-ethnic Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds, alarmed at an imminent Turkish army incursion into Northern Iraq, have this week breathed a sigh of relief at the denial issued by Turkey's chief of staff General Hilmi Ozkok.

"Unless our forces in Northern Iraq are attacked, there is a massive emigration or the armed groups in the region engage in fighting, there is no reason for us to send additional troops in the area," Ozkok assured.

"This wise and courageous decision would certainly pave the way for a better understanding and cooperation to address all the legitimate concerns of Turkey and the local Kurdish population," said KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) leader Mesoud Barzani in a public statement.

This "would lead to more stability and security in the region, first and foremost for Turkey's own interests," he told journalists.

Iraqi Kurds, who are now calling for the attention of the Kurdish world for international recognition, inhabit a relatively small chunk of the Kurdish lands divided into four parts after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Most of the 12 million former Ottoman Kurds now live in southeastern Turkey. An additional two million Kurds live in northern Iraq, one million in Iran and fewer than one million in Syria. Small Kurdish populations also exist in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Russia.

Kurds are the sole ethnic group of the former Ottoman Empire who have failed to regroup themselves around a nation-state after the disintegration of the empire during and after the First World War.

While the Arabs of Maghreb and the East, Bulgarians and Armenians have gained independence, Kurds suffer from tribal divides and live in four different states under 'foreign' rule. The only exception was the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in the aftermath of the Second World War, now part of Iranian territory.

For the region's rival nation-states, and particularly for Turkey, Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish independence have always comprised a security threat that the government fears may end up with disintegration of the country.

Throughout modern Turkish history, Kurds have revolted against Turkish rule for 27 times. The last insurrection was quelled in 1938 and was followed by coercive assimilation of Kurdish identity, to the extent of denying the existence of Kurds - even in language.

However, long decades of Kurdish silence ended in 1984 in Turkey when the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) launched guerrilla war in a country where the majority of divided Kurdish people lived.

The insurgency and the ruthless crackdown have cost the lives of 30,000 people - 20,000 of whom are Kurdish guerrillas, 5,000 Turkish security force members and 5,000 civilians.

Until 1999 when Kurdish guerrilla PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was extradited from his hideout in the Syrian capital of Damascus and handed over to Turkey by the Kenyan police under apparent U.S. supervision, the PKK's struggle for "self-determination" from Turkey had become the major focus for the Kurds of the region.

Albeit militarily defeated the PKK's struggle had a major significance for the revival of Kurdish identity, flourishing of the suppressed Kurdish language and customs, increased open political activity among Turkey's Kurds in the country and in exile.

Particularly after the abortive Kurdish uprisings which followed the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, PKK influence in northern Iraq grew considerably compelling Ankara extend its operations deep into northern Iraq. Turkish forces staged countless cross-border operations, the biggest in 1996 when Turkish troops inflicted around 2,000 PKK casualties.

Already 15,000 Turkish troops remain in Northern Iraq and have a hold over two airstrips. They justify their presence by claiming to protect Turkish border security against PKK infiltration.

PKK leader Ocalan, sentenced to life imprisonment, has criticised both Turkey's and Iraqi Kurds' stance in a letter smuggled out of a prison cell on the Imrali Island, some 30 miles south of Istanbul.

"Both the Kurds and Turkey are asking what the United States may give them," observes Ocalan, who now holds the title of the head of KADEK (Kurdistan Democracy and Freedom Congress) that has replaced the PKK after it disbanding itself and declared a unilateral ceasefire with Turkey.

"The U.S. may give you nothing but bloodshed and exploitation," he says, adding: "They will give you one, and get back ten. The only way out is to establish a firm democracy of your own and then engage in cautious relations with the U.S."

According to Ocalan, two paths remain open for the future of Kurds: "One is the path of Kurdish nationalism led by Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Mesoud Barzani's KDP. And the other one is the path of democracy led by me," he claimed.

Turkey could have taken the lead in the region if its government had adopted the 'democratic' path, a democratic solution to Turkey's Kurdish question. "But they failed, and now they are isolated. They should relieve themselves of the 'Kurdish' phobia." The alterative was the "democracy of Bush, which boils down to nothing but imperialism," warns Ocalan.

Baskin Oran, an international relations analyst from Ankara's Political Sciences Faculty, criticises Turkey for inciting fears about an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.

"This would not be the end of the world," Oran says. "Imagine if there emerges a 3 million strong independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, could they annex the south-eastern provinces of 70 million strong Turkey? Or, vice versa, would Turkey's Kurds leave European Union's membership candidate Turkey, for a landlocked and impoverished Kurdistan?"

However, "Turkey still fears", Oran observes. "For, successive Turkish governments have not been able to please their Kurdish citizens economically and politically and they are now haunted by doubts about the fidelity of their citizens."

Criticizing the United States for deserting the Kurds three times in their history, in 1918, in 1975 and in 1991, he says: "It is almost certain that Bush Jr. will desert them for a fourth time should the Kurds present a problem for a future puppet government in Baghdad."

2. - The Baltimore Sun - "Kurds face deliverance, devastation":

War may aid their revival - or revive old conflicts

HENDIK / 31 March 2003 / by Douglas Birch

In the stony mountains of southeast Anatolia, an ancient Kurdish village echoes with the rasp of a saw on wood, the shouts of children, the laughter of an elderly couple.

All these sounds are fast fading from the hills.

The Kurds have lived in this region for 4,000 years. But their language, culture and traditions have been eroded by almost two decades of civil conflict, poverty and political repression.

Now America's war in Iraq could signal the revival of Kurdish society. Or it could plunge millions of Kurds in this region into another devastating conflict.

Once, Hendek, which overlooks the Tigris River as it flows into the plains of Mesopotamia, was a thriving hamlet. But residents here say two-thirds of their neighbors fled over the past two decades. Hundreds of other villages like Hendek were emptied, bombed and torched as Turkish soldiers fought separatist guerrillas. Hundreds of thousands of Turkish Kurds were driven from their homes.

The Kurds of northern Iraq, perhaps an hour's drive south, have suffered their own series of massacres, expulsions and consignment to "Victory Cities" - virtual concentration camps - at the hands of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Today, about half of the world's 25 million Kurds are thought to live outside their ancestral lands.

Despite chaos and episodes of vicious infighting, the Kurds of northern Iraq have ruled themselves for more than a decade, and have recently achieved a measure of economic and social stability.

If the United States and Britain defeat Hussein's Baathist regime, the Kurds are poised to create an internationally recognized, semi-autonomous region inside Iraq that would serve as a haven for one of Middle East's oldest cultures.

But if the Kurds seek to create a full-fledged independent state, experts fear, they could trigger a devastating regional conflict. All of Iraq's northern neighbors - Turkey, Syria and Iran - have Kurdish minorities. All of these neighbors fear that an independent Kurdistan would trigger unrest or even insurrections.

"The Kurds will be very vulnerable" if they move to create an independent state in northern Iraq, said Dogu Ergil, professor of political science at Ankara University. "This time, it will not be the Iraqi Arabs whom the Kurds will be fighting with. This time it will be all the neighboring countries that have Kurdish enclaves and see an unruly Iraqi Kurdistan as a threat."

There are 12 million Kurds in Turkey, the largest Kurdish population in the world. The Turkish military has stationed troops just inside Iraq since 1997 to hunt down the remnants of the Kurdish Marxist guerrillas hiding in the mountains. In the past few months, the number of Turkish troops has swelled to 20,000, according to news accounts. Generally, they have remained within about 10 miles of the border.

But if the Kurds move toward independence, Turkish military authorities threaten to dispatch 80,000 troops about 170 miles into Iraq, according to some reports. And, Ergil said, Syria and Iran could decide to follow Turkey's lead.

The trigger for intervention, experts say, would be the Kurds' seizure of Iraqi oil fields near the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, which would provide a strong economic foundation for an independent state.

Now it is up to the United States to restrain the Kurds, their staunchest allies inside Iraq. If they don't, northern Iraq could dissolve in ethnic conflict. U.S. troops could be caught in the crossfire, and the war effort could be jeopardized.

The Iraqi Kurdish fighters, called the pesh merga, have fought effectively under the direction of American special forces. In recent days, they have used overwhelming firepower to rout Ansar al-Islam, a Taliban-style group of about 650 Kurdish Islamic radicals who have attacked mainstream Kurdish groups opposed to Baghdad.

By Friday the Kurds had also moved to within 12 miles of Kirkuk, the strategically important center of Iraq's oil industry.

Seizure of the city could trigger intervention by Turkey and other states. BBC television reported Saturday that the Kurds have told reporters in northern Iraq that the Americans have asked them not to advance on the city.

Back in Hendek, war has been a constant companion. One more just south of here doesn't seem all that remarkable.

Femseddin, 56, who wears a red-checked kaffiyeh, is the mukhtar, or head man, in Hendek.

He invited strangers to tea but did not offer them his family name. (He said the commander of a nearby military base has questioned him about earlier visits by foreigners.)

Femseddin opposed military action against Baghdad because of the suffering he knew it would bring. Neither is he surprised at the tenacity of Iraqi troops. "Saddam's troops are more experienced," he said. "They waged war against Iran. They waged war against the Kurds.

The Iraqis don't have the equipment to fight. "But this is their land," he said.

He expects a U.S. victory, and will not mourn the toppling of Hussein. But his real concerns are closer to home.

Three of his four sons fled their village in the early 1990s, during the height of fighting between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish military. He doesn't expect them to return. "There is nothing to come back to," he said. "It's not the land of my childhood.

"Now, we are not a family. So we are suffering."

So are his neighbors. About a mile away stand the ruins of the village of Keraso, which residents said was evacuated in the 1990s during fighting between the Turkish army and the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, guerrillas.

After the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the United Nations imposed a trade embargo on Iraq. A lively and illegal oil trade grew, winding through Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq and into Turkey.

Drivers from Turkey delivered potatoes, flour and cement to Iraq, and returned with oil. The trade undermined the sanctions, but it also formed the basis of the economy of northern Iraq and southeast Turkey.

Most fighting with the PKK ended with a cease-fire in 1999. But two years after the war halted, in September 2001, Turkey's Kurdish region was hit by another calamity - the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States.

Under pressure from Washington, the Turkish government drastically restricted traffic at the border here six days after the Sept. 11 attacks. Former farmers are trying to sell their trucks for scrap, for perhaps 23 cents on the pound. Many have little to do but play cards and backgammon at teahouses.

Despite its remote location and miserable economy, Hendek is a tidy place. It has electricity and gravel roads. White television satellite dishes sit on the roofs of mud-brick homes. At the bottom of the hill are a one-room school and the home provided to the teacher.

But these amenities carry a price.

Turkish television broadcasts in Turkish: It rarely carries programs in Kurdish.

Schoolchildren here, like all other public school students, are taught by a Turkish teacher in Turkish, not in Kurdish.

Until recently, the Turkish state did not recognize the Kurds' right to openly manifest their culture, teach their language or assert their identity - referring to them, officially, as "Mountain Turks." Emblazoned on a hillside near Turkey's unofficial Kurdish capital of Diyarbakir is the slogan: "How happy is he who says he is a Turk."

Under pressure from the European Union, Ankara last year eased some of its cultural restrictions - allowing limited television and radio broadcasts in Kurdish, and the teaching of the Kurdish language in private schools.

But so far, these reforms are only on paper. And the government still appears eager to crack down on any activity that hints at support for an independent Kurdish state.

After the Kurdish Workers Party called on Kurds in late 2001 to give their children Kurdish names, the Turkish Interior Ministry ordered regional governors to make sure parents named their children "in a manner appropriate to our national culture, moral values and customs." Authorities in Diyarbakir annulled registration of 600 children's Kurdish names.

The Kurds are familiar with repression and betrayal. "They've been gassed, massacred, exiled," said Ergil, the political scientist. Twice in the past 28 years, he pointed out, the Kurds were betrayed by the United States, which reneged on assurances of support for Kurdish independence to pursue grander geopolitical goals.

To win Turkish support for basing 62,000 American soldiers on Turkish soil a few weeks ago, Washington agreed to let 40,000 more Turkish troops move into northern Iraq. That deal fell apart because the Turkish parliament rejected it. The Kurds are disappointed that any Turks are moving in. "But now the Kurds have no choice but to depend on the United States, which seems to be more serious than ever," Ergil said.

Some analysts here believe the United States would have a hard time directing the Kurds in battle in northern Iraq. "Kurds are good, perhaps, at fighting for their own cause, but when it comes to wider political aims which require vision, leadership, discipline and perseverance in diplomatic terms, they may be a liability," Ergil said.

For now, Iraq's Kurds face a perilous moment of truth. Turkey's Kurds, too, seem to be holding their breath, hoping that years of repression will soon come to an end.

3. - Times of Asia - "Own interests, US ties divide Turkey":

ANKARA / 31 March 2003 / by Geneive Abdo

Under enormous pressure from the United States, Turkey has declared that, at least for now, it will put aside its desire to send thousands of troops deep inside northern Iraq. But behind the scenes, officials and analysts say the longer the war goes on, the more likely Turkey could change its mind.

With the US-led assault on Iraq nearing the end of its second week, Turkey says it is one of the regional states with the most to lose. As a result, it is torn between its 50-year relationship with the United States -- already frail from Turkey's refusal to allow US troops to use its territory to launch a massive ground attack on Iraq from the north -- and its determination to act in its national interest.

Times have changed in Turkey since the 1991 Gulf War, when Ankara offered solid support for the US-led coalition. For the first time in its 80-year history as a secular state, predominantly Muslim Turkey finds itself in agreement with neighboring Arab states, which view the war as an unjustified assault on the entire Islamic world.

''The United States is in a position to consider Turkey's concerns. But if these concerns are not taken care of, we will take action ourselves,'' warned a Turkish official involved in foreign policymaking.

Some analysts were more blunt, saying Turkey's pledge to stay out of northern Iraq for now is far more conditional than the Americans and the Turks admit publicly. ''Turkey's position is simply that it will go in, if and when it believes it must, and it doesn't need approval from other countries,'' said Akif Beki, a senior journalist and commentator.

Washington fears that a Turkish incursion deep inside northern Iraq, now under Kurdish control, could spark a conflict with Kurdish groups aiding US troops as they work to secure the area.

Kurdish militias have made it clear to Washington that they will be less cooperative if Turkish troops enter the territory. They fear Turkey's underlying motivation behind a military presence is to halt Kurdish attempts at autonomy -- independence Turkey says could encourage secessionist moves from among its own restive Kurds, numbering between 15 million and 20 million of Turkey's 70 million people.

This complex web of state interests and interlocking ethnic groups has kept US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad shuttling between Turkey and northern Iraq to keep the lid on things.

Khalilzad, who arrived in Ankara Saturday after talks with the Kurds in northern Iraq earlier last week, said the Turks have assured Washington that they will not send in tens of thousands of troops. Turkey already has between 3,000 and 17,000 troops in northern Iraq as part of operations conducted since the 1990s to fight Turkish Kurds hiding in the mountains. Parliament has approved plans to send in large numbers of extra troops to operate in a 12-mile border buffer zone and, if necessary, beyond it.

Khalilzad said he also received assurances from Kurdish groups that they will not attempt to establish an independent state nor take over oil fields in the northern Iraqi town of Kirkuk, in exchange for helping US forces in the war.

''The Turks understand how much we have helped them over the years,'' Khalilzad said, ''and if we saw something happening that was negative for Turkey, we would want to deal with this and change our plan.''

But like the hundreds of thousands of Arabs who have staged anti-American demonstrations in numerous countries and like the Shi'ites in Iraq, who have failed to welcome American troops with open arms as US military planners had expected, the Turks have far less trust in Washington than during the Gulf War.

In addition, Turkey's newly elected Islamist government, unlike staunchly secular governments of the past, must answer to its Muslim supporters who overwhelmingly oppose the war. An estimated 94 percent of Turks are against the war. Even Turkey's traditionally pro-American military, which wields enormous power, is lukewarm about the conflict, according to military sources.

The great possibility of a flood of Kurdish refugees pouring across the border is one of Turkey's major concerns. Approximately 500,000 refugees made their way into Turkey during the Gulf War. This exodus and a dramatic decline in tourist revenue crippled the Turkish economy with losses in the billions. In recent days, Turkish markets have plummeted in response to the start of the war.

An unprecedented shift in Turkish politics has strengthened the government's resolve to defend its national interests, even at the risk of increased tensions with the United States. Historically, the Kemalists, (named for Kemal Ataturk, Turkey's founder) who dominate the military establishment, were pro-Western, while Islamic-oriented politicians were anti-Western.

Over the last 10 years, say analysts, a transformation has occurred. The military establishment has become more skeptical of Washington and Turkey's other Western allies. Now, at least some parts of the military establishment are in agreement with the Islamist politicians running the government.

''When Bush came to power, anti-Americanism started to rise in Turkey and now it is only getting worse,'' said Beki, the journalist and commentator. ''The Kemalists started to say, `The US is not serious about democracy and promoting human rights in the region.' And the Islamic community sees the Kemalists were right. Now, they are standing side by side in the campaign against the war.''

This subtle alliance, said Beki, was a significant factor in the Turkish Parliament's decision earlier this month to reject a US proposal to allow US troops to open a northern front through Turkey to attack Iraq. The absence of this front is widely regarded as a serious handicap in the war against Saddam Hussein.

''Turkey is putting its national interest over its relationship with the United States,'' Beki said. ''The US can't risk losing Turkey and Ankara knows this. But at the same time, Turkey needs Washington's military support, especially now that the region is so unstable.''

Mehmet Ali Birand, another journalist, said Turkey feels even more pressured now that its relationship with the United States is strained. ''There is a general feeling in policymaking circles that the Turks shouldn't do anything to annoy the Americans. But everything depends upon the pace of the war.''

4. - Radio Free Europe - "Temperature rises in the north":

PRAGUE / 28 March 2003 / by Jean-Christophe Peuch

With the war on Iraq entering its second week, there is still no signs of large-scale combat operations north of Baghdad.

For the past six days or so, US warplanes and cruise missiles have been pounding Iraqi positions around the industrial cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, southwest of the country's predominantly Kurdish region. The US Air Force has also carried out several raids on Iraqi army bunkers near Chamchamal, on the road that links Kirkuk to the Kurdish town of Suleymaniah.

Further east, Kurdish peshmergas (fighters) and US Special Forces have been battling against a small, hard-line Islamic group allegedly linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network. Ansar al-Islam, also known as Pishtiwanani Islam la Kurdistan, is holding a string of villages located between Halabjah and the Iranian border. Last week, the group reportedly suffered a number of casualties inflicted by US bombing. Another Islamic group, Komala Islami Kurdistan, also came under coalition air raids, which eyewitness say claimed the lives of up to 100 people.

Despite an increasing military presence, it seems that Washington has decided to put the capture of Mosul, Kirkuk and their large oil fields on the back burner. The military command of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two main factions that have been effectively running Iraq's north since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, has said it has no immediate plan to cross the demarcation line that separates the region from Baghdad-controlled areas. Press reports coming from the region suggest the peshmerga rank-and-file, who earlier this week sounded upbeat at the imminence of a northern assault, are getting frustrated at the delay.

Phillip Mitchell is a retired British career officer who now works as a ground-forces analyst at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). He says that one of the main missions assigned to US forces is to assist PUK fighters in attacking Ansar al-Islam's positions in Khurmal, near the Iranian border.

Another aim, Mitchell believes, is to plan and carry out sabotage raids against Iraqi positions south of the demarcation line. "With the special forces in that area, what [the Americans] will be able to do is to carry out guerrilla raids using the Kurds for local knowledge of both the Iraqi locations and terrain, harass [Iraqi soldiers], keep them on their toes, and by doing this, by destroying bridges, command-and-control sites, and that sort of things, hopefully, prevent them from reinforcing the Baghdad area," Mitchell said.

Ellie Goldsworthy runs the UK Armed Forces Program at the London-based Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI). This former army commanding officer believes coalition troops posted in northern Iraq will make an important contribution to the upcoming battle. "I think that one way or another these troops are going to contribute to an element of surprise, whether that is deception, diversion or whatever it is. But it is going to contribute to the problems that Saddam is going to face when the [battle] for Baghdad happens," Goldsworthy said.

Goldsworthy believes that contrary to what scarce reports coming from northern Iraq suggest, the area is the scene of intense military preparations. In confirmation of Goldsworthy's comments, the Pentagon said that some 1,000 paratroopers had been dropped south of the Turkish border. Tanks and armored vehicles will follow soon to reinforce what a US official quoted as "the first sizable force in northern Iraq".

The possibility of an airlift operation was suggested immediately after NATO member Turkey earlier this month (March 1) denied the US authorization to deploy tens of thousands of troops on its soil. Opening a second front from neighboring Turkey to take the heat off a primary invasion from Kuwait was part of Washington's original war plans.

Confronted with Ankara's refusal, however, the Pentagon had to adjust, diverting dozens of warships anchored off Turkey's Mediterranean coast to the Red Sea and recalling most of the military equipment it had amassed north of the Iraqi border. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division, which was originally set to enter Iraq from Turkey, is expected to deploy in the Persian Gulf region in the coming days. Putting a bold face on Turkey's surprise rebuke, US defense officials have been saying that they have alternative northern options, including plans that entail airlifting troops from other countries in the region.

IISS analyst Mitchell said an airborne assault on Iraqi positions theoretically remains on the table, although he believes any tactical aim would be difficult to achieve under present circumstances. "There is a possibility that [an] air-assault division will be used, but that's predicated on all the Iraqi air defenses being almost totally destroyed. We've seen in the past that the Iraqis have substantial quantities of 'triple A' - anti-aircraft artillery - and if it is still operational, that would take a heavy toll, and probably a disastrous toll, on any airborne forces or on any attempt to drop airborne troops into that area. So it is problematical. I have my doubts, but it is possible," Mitchell said.

Pressed by the White House, Turkey on March 21 reluctantly opened its airspace to US warplanes and cruise missiles for strikes on Iraq. Much to Washington's dismay, Ankara has been considering sending a large military force into northern Iraq, officially to stem any influx of refugees and prevent armed militants of the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from crossing the border.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish army led a successful, though costly, campaign against outlawed PKK militants in southeastern Anatolia. Many separatist fighters have sought refuge in Iraq, prompting the Turkish army to carry out cross-border forays and maintain hundreds of troops in northern Iraq on a more-or-less permanent basis with the assent of local Kurdish factions.

Ankara fears that, with war in Iraq, PKK fighters might attempt to infiltrate Iraqi Kurdish refugees to reignite separatism in Anatolia. It is also concerned at the prospect of Iraq's Kurdistan gaining official autonomy - a development it says might politically impact on its 12 million-strong Kurdish minority.

US-Turkish talks on Ankara's planned troop deployment have so far yielded no result, causing worry in Washington, which fears possible clashes between peshmergas and Turkish soldiers if Ankara beefs up its military presence deep into Iraqi territory.

Turkish Army Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok has reiterated that Turkish reinforcements will enter northern Iraq strictly for humanitarian and security purposes and will not fight unless they are fired at. He also pledged that any troop movement will be coordinated with Washington.

The RUSI's Goldsworthy said that all the US can hope for is that Ankara does not enter the region before Baghdad is secured and Saddam's regime collapses. Otherwise, she said, Washington's northern plans might be disrupted. "If Turkey pushes its forces more into Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, that could cause problems for [US forces positioned there] because instead of facing forward - facing southwards and concentrating on Baghdad - they're going to have to look over their shoulders to see what they've left behind and to put troops in the rear. That would tie up some of the American forces," Goldsworthy said.

Goldsworthy believes that Washington will be able to concentrate on coping with any new situation rising from Turkish troop deployment in Kurdish areas only after the fall of the Iraqi capital. "But at the moment," she said, "it would be an unfortunate diversion for the battle for Baghdad."

5. - The Washington Post - "Missteps With Turkey Prove Costly":

Diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. a Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq

ANKARA / 28 March 2003 / by Glenn Kessler and Philip P. Pan

Under the original Pentagon war plan, a powerful force of Army tanks and tens of thousands of troops now would be bearing down on Baghdad from northern Iraq as other heavily armored troops converged on the capital from the south.

Neither is happening. In the south, Army troops and Marines are bogged down by supply problems and unexpected Iraqi resistance. In the north, 1,000 lightly armed U.S. paratroopers only arrived Wednesday night, not enough to seriously challenge the Iraqi government. The reason is that Turkey, a close NATO ally that shares a 218-mile border with Iraq, earlier this month refused a Bush administration request to permit the armored troop deployment from its soil.

One week into the war, the administration's inability to win Turkey's approval has emerged as an important turning point in the U.S. confrontation with Iraq that senior U.S. officials now acknowledge may ultimately prolong the length of the conflict. It is a story of clumsy diplomacy and mutual misunderstanding, U.S. and Turkish officials said. It also illustrates how the administration undercut its own efforts to broaden international support for war by allowing its war plan to dictate the pace of its diplomacy, diplomats and other experts in U.S.-Turkish relations said.

Turkey's rejection was especially surprising to administration officials because Turkey has loyally backed U.S. military actions since the Korean War a half-century ago. In retrospect, U.S. officials say, they made unrealistic demands on the new government of Turkey, which was installed only in November, insisting on a vote on whether it would accept as many as 90,000 U.S. troops even as President Bush was still publicly claiming he had made no decision to attack Iraq. U.S. officials repeatedly set deadlines for action, but then took no action when the deadlines passed, costing the administration credibility and inflating Turkey's sense of importance.

Some senior officials in Turkey, where 94 percent of the population opposed the war, even began to believe they could halt a military conflict through inaction on the U.S. request. The Turkish prime minister at the time, Abdullah Gul, appeared racked with doubts about a war, and Turkish officials suggest he secretly opposed the American troop request.

The deadlines were never real, U.S. officials admit now, but merely a feint to keep pressure on Turkey. The Pentagon augmented the pressure by keeping three dozen ships packed with tanks and heavy equipment for the Army's 4th Infantry Division bobbing off the Turkish coast in the eastern Mediterranean awaiting permission to offload.

When the Turkish government finally agreed to schedule a vote on the U.S. request on March 1, parliament voted it down.

The State Department and Vice President Cheney's office both pushed to send the ships to Kuwait to shore up the Marines and Army forces assembling there for a southern invasion. Bush, in fact, had warned Turkish officials that the United States did not need a northern front for a successful war, according to a senior administration official.

But the military, in particular Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the head of U.S. Central Command and one of the chief architects of the war plan, clung to the idea that Turkey ultimately would accept the troops, officials said. The Pentagon insisted that administration diplomats press the government in Ankara to reverse the vote.

The ships started moving through the Red Sea to Kuwait only after the war started last week, and the 4th Infantry Division will not be ready to move into Iraq until at least mid-April.

"The Turks came to think we would pay anything for their cooperation," a senior U.S. official said. "The Turks got to believe they were indispensable, and it colored their capacity to decide when they had negotiated enough."

Yasir Yakis, the former Turkish foreign minister who played a key role in the talks with the United States, was quoted saying as much last week in the newspaper Vatan. "We thought the United States needed the northern front. We made bargaining plans based on this. We did not consider the possibility that they would apply Plan B," he said, using the phrase for an invasion of Iraq without Turkish cooperation.

Turkey's rejection not only forced a rewrite of the war plan, but it undercut the administration's broader diplomatic efforts to win international support for an invasion. Diplomats said the image of Turkey resisting U.S. pressure emboldened smaller countries on the U.N. Security Council to reject a proposed U.S.-British resolution authorizing military action. The failure of that resolution in turn made it impossible for the United States to recruit such close allies as Canada and Mexico to join the fight against Iraq, since they had tied their support to a new resolution.

Moreover, the impasse seriously damaged U.S.-Turkish relations, administration officials now acknowledge. Turkey was the last NATO ally to grant permission for U.S. warplanes to enter its airspace for the war, and a U.S. special envoy has been in and out of Ankara this week to prevent Turkey from sending its own troops into northern Iraq. Once portrayed as an indispensable ally and the U.S. model for a Muslim democracy, Turkey now finds itself scorned by Washington and in a position to be blamed if the war goes poorly.

Both sides clearly failed to see that the other had changed in important ways since they cooperated during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, analysts said. More broadly, two countries that forged a Cold War alliance against a common Soviet threat found their interests diverging sharply in the case of a war in Iraq.

"The relationship with the United States, which had at one time seemed so special and fundamental, has been badly frayed," said Morton Abramowitz, who was U.S. ambassador to Turkey during the first Gulf War. "There is unhappiness and frustration in the U.S. government."

'Support Is Assured'

In early December, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz flew into Ankara for talks with Turkish leaders. He emerged exuberant. "Turkish support is assured" for a war with Iraq, Wolfowitz told reporters. "Turkey has been with us always in the past, and they will be with us now."

Despite Wolfowitz's enthusiasm, however, the undercurrents of a debacle were already in motion. Polls showed more than 90 percent of the Turkish public opposed a war. Some U.S. officials, meanwhile, were uncomfortable with the size of the request contemplated by the Pentagon -- originally 90,000 troops, later dropped to 62,000 -- because they were worried that it was too much for Turkey, a Muslim country being asked to support a war against a Muslim neighbor.

But most U.S. officials took comfort in the judgment that Turkey's political establishment, especially the influential military, could be relied on to support the United States. Historically, the military and the political elite have been at the forefront of Turkey's westernization and modernization. But the Bush administration failed to recognize the tremendous changes that have swept Turkish society, including the military, over the past decade, as well as the country's deep frustration with how it fared after the 1991 Gulf War.

Turgut Ozal, the popular Turkish president, strongly backed the United States in the 1991 war, opening Turkish airspace and air bases and even pushing to send Turkish troops to help expel Iraq from Kuwait. Afterward, however, the United States failed to come through with all its promises of economic aid in return for Turkey's support. Because Iraq was Turkey's largest trading partner, the Turkish economy suffered, beginning a slide that culminated in 2000 with a financial crisis in which the currency collapsed and unemployment skyrocketed.

Equally important, Turks blamed the Gulf War for emboldening Kurdish separatists, who began using northern Iraq as a base of operations to attack Turkey from their strongholds in the country's southeast. More than 30,000 people died in the ensuing conflict, perhaps half of them Turkish soldiers, before the 1999 cease-fire that followed the capture of Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish special forces in Kenya.

Though the United States helped capture Ocalan and condemned his Kurdistan Workers' Party as a terrorist group, it also criticized Turkey's human rights record during the war and its refusal to grant Kurds full cultural rights. These criticisms, and U.S. assistance to the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq, fueled suspicions in the Turkish military about U.S. intentions.

Mumtaz Soysal, a former Turkish foreign minister, said the military resisted the current Bush administration's plan to attack Iraq because it was worried the United States might allow Iraqi Kurds to establish an independent state, which could encourage more separatist fighting in Turkey. "This was our Vietnam War," he said. "The military took all risks, and at a high cost in lives, they finally succeeded. It was an expensive victory, and they don't want that victory to be wasted."

At the same time, Turkey's military and political elite is not as powerful as it once was. In November's elections, voters threw out all of the previous governing parties and allowed the fledgling, anti-establishment Justice and Development Party to form a government on its own. The military, which has long viewed itself as the guardian of a secular Turkish state, viewed the result with alarm because the party has roots in political Islam. The military therefore had its own reasons for wanting the country's new leaders to fail in their first major test with Washington.

The new government, beset with crises involving the country's efforts to gain entry into the European Union and U.N. attempts to negotiate a peace settlement in Cyprus, dragged its feet on dealing with the troop request. In early February, Cheney called Gul and urged him to call a vote in parliament within days, just before the Muslim holiday of Bayram, Turkish officials said. Gul said no -- he said he would try to arrange it by Feb. 18 -- but word of the phone call spread and contributed to a belief in Ankara that the United States was oblivious to the political predicament faced by the Justice and Development Party.

'Do This Ourselves'

The week before the parliamentary vote that U.S. officials expected on Feb. 18, a delegation led by Yakis arrived in Washington to discuss Turkey's financial package for agreeing to the troop request. The administration had offered $4 billion -- $2 billion in grants and $2 billion in military credits. But a day of negotiations went nowhere.

Administration officials even arranged a meeting between the Turks and House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.), who assured them Congress would honor the president's budget request for Turkey. Yakis preferred a written commitment, but the Turkish ambassador, Faruk Logoglu, told him Hastert's word was the best they could get under the U.S. system.

That night, at 9, Yakis called Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at home and insisted he had to see him. Powell was due to fly early the next morning to New York to haggle with France and other U.N. Security Council members over whether to continue weapons inspections in Iraq. But he agreed that Yakis and the Turkish economics minister could come to his spacious McLean home at 10:30. When they arrived, Powell, still dressed in jacket and tie, ushered them into his dining room, according to an official who was present. He didn't offer them food or a drink.

Yakis told Powell the $4 billion offer wasn't enough. He had consulted with Ankara and his government had decided to ask for $92 billion over five years, the official said. Failing that, Ankara wanted $22 billion in the first year.

Powell noted that the entire foreign aid budget for the United States was $18.5 billion. As the clock neared midnight, Powell told them he would ask Bush to raise the U.S. offer to $6 billion, with $1 billion that could be used immediately for a loan of $8 billion to $10 billion.

During the negotiations, Bush had made only a handful of calls on the troop request. U.S. officials more or less expected the Turkish delegation's meeting with the president in the Oval Office the following day would seal the deal. Bush told Yakis he would agree to Powell's $6 billion offer, but that was the maximum. "You are great negotiators," Bush said, according to U.S. and Turkish officials. "You got me to my top line. But it really is my top line."

Bush added that the decision was now up to Turkey. "We'd like you to be with us," he said. "But if you decide not to be with us, that's okay. We can do this ourselves."

'Time Ran Out'

The Feb. 18 date came and went. No vote took place. U.S. officials announced the equipment-laden ships would begin moving from the Mediterranean to Kuwait in 48 hours. But they didn't move, and in fact, more started to gather off the coast.

In Turkey, senior party officials said, a significant faction within the government believed Turkey could prevent a war by dragging out the negotiations and voting no if necessary. This view was reinforced by resistance to U.S. plans at the United Nations, and also by a meeting on Feb. 18 between Gul and French President Jacques Chirac during which Chirac praised the Turkish position, the officials said. Chirac was spearheading efforts at the United Nations to continue inspections and avoid a war.

"We tried very hard to prevent the war," acknowledged one senior Turkish official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Many believed it was possible. They didn't understand the Bush administration wouldn't listen."

Gul was strongly influenced by this faction, officials said. He visited Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran in a regional peace effort, and hosted a conference of foreign ministers in Istanbul. He also dispatched a minister to Baghdad for talks with Iraqi officials, and sent a plane to bring the Iraqi vice president to Ankara.

"Up to some point, he believed in the notion that Turkey could do something to stop the war," said Fehmi Koru, a popular antiwar columnist and a former classmate of Gul's. "But when time ran out, and the U.S. pressure increased, he realized it was impossible."

"As one after another after another deadline passed, they couldn't understand what we were all about, and figured they could just keep this going on forever," acknowledged a senior administration official.

By the time the vote was finally scheduled on March 1, party officials said Gul's qualms about the war were so obvious, he was unable to persuade parliament to approve the U.S. deployment. Speaking to parliament before the vote, lawmakers said, Gul failed to make a convincing case. "We could tell his heart wasn't in it," said one lawmaker.

M. Akif Beki, a senior journalist in Ankara, said the Bush administration failed to see that its request came at a juncture in Turkish history when the military and political establishment was turning away from the West while the country's Muslim traditionalists were embracing Western democratic values.

After all the months of delays and negotiations, U.S. officials themselves were split on how the vote would turn. "Some were absolutely convinced it would pass. It was Turkey and we are the United States," said a senior administration official. "The people who understood how arrogant we were, they understood it was a dicey vote."

The motion failed by three votes.

On Capitol Hill yesterday, Wolfowitz acknowledged that the parliamentary rejection made a "big difference" in the war. "There is no question," he said, "that if we had a U.S. armored force in northern Iraq right now, the end would be closer."

6. - Eurasianet - "Turkey's Economy likely tor survive war, but what next?":

28 March 2003 / by Mevlut Katik *

For the first time in years, Turkey's government enjoys the backing of a sizeable parliamentary majority, instead of a relying on a fragile coalition. The solid governing majority had raised hopes for Turkey's economic recovery, easing the concerns of investors watching the due dates on the country's roughly $160 billion in domestic and foreign debt. But economic calculations have been upset by the Turkish parliament's refusal to grant basing rights to US forces ahead of the Iraq conflict. The ensuing US-Turkish political row has Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government scrambling to develop an emergency economic strategy.

Parliament, which is dominated by Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), rejected the American basing rights proposal March 1. It later approved a much more limited plan that allows US forces to utilize Turkish airspace. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Turkey's stance prompted the Bush administration to take an aid package worth potentially $30 billion off the table.

News that the aid would not be forthcoming sent Turkish currency and stock markets plummeting. To protect against similar future shocks, Turkey has taken measures to raise revenues from taxes, rather than borrowing new money at a time when investors have little faith in its credit or its currency. Analysts are not sure that these measures will raise enough money to keep Turkey's economy stable over the next several years.

Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan tried to promote confidence while outlining new measures on March 28. "We stand up on our feet," he said. "I am not pessimistic at all. I am hopeful." The minister said the government had submitted a budget amendment to Parliament that hopes to promote a surplus in fiscal 2003.

In seeking to offset the potential budget hit caused by the Iraq conflict, the government is also trying to raise taxes on cars and homes, and calling for public-sector cost savings. The government wants parliament to ratify the budget on March 29, bringing it closer to satisfying a schedule set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Turkey drew $9.9 billion from the IMF in 2002. By seeking money from tax collection rather than new debt, Turkey can keep a cap on the costs of paying back its debt. As part of this push, the government passed a plan it calls "tax peace" on January 16, before Erdogan became prime minister. This partial tax amnesty, according to sponsors, could bring an estimated 24 percent of Turkey's unpaid taxes into the treasury.

Erdogan's government still must show that it can reform finances enough to attract investors after the war ends. On March 25, Fitch Ratings, the international credit rating agency, downgraded Turkey's long term debt with a negative outlook. In a March 26 conference call with investors, Fitch Ratings' lead Turkey analyst Nick Eisinger said the next several months would be suspenseful times for investors. Without the expectation of the American $30 billion, he said, "the margin for error has become very, very limited indeed."

The short duration of many domestic loans leave the treasury "vulnerable to adverse market sentiment," Eisinger said. If investors become pessimistic, Fitch analysts have calculated that a sudden increase in interest rates, combined with a worsening of the Turkish lira's exchange rate, could create a gap of $9 billion to $16 billion between what Turkey owes and what it has on hand.

Eisinger stressed that Fitch expects the government to "muddle through" the current crisis without defaulting on debts. One reason for cautious optimism is that both Turkey and the United States have taken steps to reconcile. US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared on March 25: "Turkey is a great friend." Turkish Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok, who visited Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, announced March 26 that Turkey would coordinate with coalition forces before sending its own troops into northern Iraq.

A statement issued by Turkey's National Security Council on March 28 also sought to reassure both a domestic and international audience. "There should be no doubt that mutual and multilateral cooperation with the United States, which has been mutually beneficial to both sides, will continue," the statement said. "With this understanding of cooperation, a close dialogue with the United States concerning northern Iraq is being maintained."

In Washington, the Bush administration is reportedly mulling a $1 billion grant package that could support up to $8.5 billion in loan guarantees. Such aid would go a long way towards ensuring Turkish economic stability in 2003.

However, observers worry about what happens next. Sudden developments, especially concerning northern Iraq, could easily deal a new blow to US-Turkish relations. Turkey is vigorously defending its self-proclaimed right to enter northern Iraq, despite strong US objections. "Turkey is determined to take necessary measures to provide humanitarian aid, prevent a mass refugee influx and make sure a conflict will not break out between different groups in northern Iraq," the Turkish National Security Council statement said. "Suffering from terror that is a global threat, Turkey will not hesitate to take necessary measures against the terror threat that may emanate from the PKK [Kurdistan Worker's Party]." [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Another concern is that lingering resentment may prompt the Bush administration to exert influence on the lending practices of international financial institutions. In the past, the IMF in particular has readily extended credit to Turkey.

Eisinger of Fitch Ratings said that Erdogan's team seems "serious" about complying with IMF demands on privatization and government efficiency. However, with Turkey due to pay at least $9 billion back to the fund by 2005, investors and officials want to see concrete changes before feeling secure that the IMF will remain a funding source. "We have yet to see any shred of evidence that Turkey has taken ownership of its IMF program," Eisinger told investors on March 26.

While the IMF similarly welcomed fiscal measures announced by Turkish officials on March 23 and 24, its officers have said that they need to see further reform progress before completing a review that would ease the release of a fresh $1.6 billion tranche. On March 27, Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan promised that the government and the Central Bank would keep the economy going while war fears and IMF scrutiny delay new funds. "We are prepared for weeks for a scenario in which there would be no [foreign] economic support during the course of war," he said. "We will finish off the debt by repaying, step by step."

Eisinger shared that sentiment: "Banks continue to be willing to fund the government," he said. This is a short-term solution, though, since over-reliance on Turkish banks can inflate the currency and discourage foreign investment.

Even if the Iraq conflict comes to a quick conclusion, without significant numbers of refugees in Turkey needing vital services, Ankara will need foreign revenues to offset what it loses in tourism and what it pays for energy. Turkey and the United States will surely cooperate on some level as the war continues. Turkish soil will probably provide a channel for aid to get to Iraq, and allied planes may eventually seek to refuel at Turkish bases. US-Turkish discussions on military cooperation were scheduled to resume March 29, when the Bush administration special envoy Zalmay Khalizad is expected to arrive in Turkey.

* Editor's Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and has also worked for The Economist.