20 March 2003

1. "Transatlantic rivalry has put the Turks in a bind their allies", under normal circumstances, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's elevation to the post of prime minister would have been seen as a significant political event in Turkey. After all, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) overcame all the barriers and obstacles put in his path since 1997.

2. "Turkey's new leader promises internal stability while facing external chaos", Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's new prime minister, is facing the daunting task of reviving the Turkish economy while imminent conflict looms in neighboring Iraq.

3. "WAR IN IRAQ: Turkey likely to grant US overflight rights", the Turkish parliament is today expected to give overflight rights to the US after its earlier failure to approve the deployment of 62,000 US troops cost it the loss of a big war compensation package equivalent to up to $24bn (£15.3bn, €22.6bn) in cheap loans.

4. "Kurds' precarious freedom may be early casualty of conflict", if there has been one fixed point in debate about war with Iraq, it has been that Iraqis deserve deliverance from Saddam Hussein, and that the Iraqi Kurds in particular - who now have a precarious freedom - should have it confirmed.

5. "Iraqi Kurd armies to aid Allies in bid to rebuff Turkey", Iraqi Kurds agreed yesterday that their 100,000 soldiers would co-operate with the United States-led coalition as hundreds of thousands of people fled the Kurdish capital, Arbil, fearing a chemical attack.

6. "Ankara set to quash Kurdish ambitions", from Richard Lloyd Parry.

7. "The Kurds: a catastrophe waiting to happen", of all the eruptions that a U.S.-led war on Iraq may unleash, none is more urgent to address than that between Iraqi Kurds and their Turkish neighbor.

8. "Time to bury Sykes-Picot", in 1916 Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and M. George Picot, of France, right in the Middle of the First World War signed an agreement which has carried their names ever since.

1. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "Transatlantic rivalry has put the Turks in a bind their allies":

20 March 2003 / by Mohammad Noureddine *

Under normal circumstances, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's elevation to the post of prime minister would have been seen as a significant political event in Turkey. After all, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) overcame all the barriers and obstacles put in his path since 1997.

But in recent days, Turkey has had more important concerns to contend with. The country has become a stage for an international tug-of-war between Europe (France and Germany) and the United States. Both sides have been competing to win over Turkey.

The problem is that neither side has been trying to persuade Turkey by way of offers and favors, but rather by means of coercion and pressures that have touched upon issues Turkey considers sacrosanct.
Turkey has never been subjected to such intense pressures in all its history. Its only consolation is that such intense pressure from different directions proves how important the country's role is in the future of Iraq and the Middle East. It sometimes seems that the keys to war and peace are in Ankara's hands rather than in those of Washington and Baghdad!

Turkey is confused. It cannot seem to choose between Europe, the US and the Muslim world. In fact, it has never been as confused, despite suffering from an identity crisis since the modern republic was founded back in 1923.

It is certainly in Ankara's interests for the current state of peace to continue; this would put Turkey in the same camp as France, Germany, Russia and Turkish public opinion. On the other hand, Turkey cannot remain aloof if war breaks out, since that would deprive it of a role in post-war arrangements and marginalize it in the region. Turkey is therefore also part of the pro-war US and British camp.

That is why Turkey is so confused. How can it take part in a war that is not sanctioned by the UN? How can it go to war without coordinating with Washington, risking clashes with US and Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq? How can it coordinate with the US after the Turkish Parliament rejected a bill calling for just that?

How can the new Erdogan government push the same bill through Parliament when the circumstances that led to its rejection the first time are unchanged (the Turks have still not received "adequate" American guarantees about the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, Mosul, Kirkuk and the Turcomans)?

Many crucial and sensitive questions remain unanswered. In the midst of this confusion and perhaps because of it, Turkey has taken center stage in the current "game of nations."

Under the pretext that the Parliament agreed last month for the Americans to upgrade military bases in the country, the US has been moving heavy equipment from ships anchored in the Mediterranean off Iskenderun to towns near the Iraqi border. Southeastern Turkey began to appear like it was under foreign occupation, which prompted Speaker Bulent Arinc to protest.

To reinforce this fait accompli, US President George W. Bush sent Erdogan a letter that was more of an ultimatum than anything else. Bush reminded the Turkish premier of the dangers to US interests of Turkish non-cooperation. He asked that Ankara "at least" allow the military to use Turkish airspace, making the point that Turkey was the only NATO member not to have done that as yet.

America's impatience to secure overflight rights was stressed by US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson, who said after meeting with Erdogan that Bush wanted Turkish airspace opened "immediately," a word he repeated four times.

American diplomatic pressure on Turkey has been unrelenting. US diplomats including Pearson have been busy visiting and hosting Turkish MPs around the clock.

Washington has also been pressuring Turkey economically. Moody's investment services declared that if the Parliament failed to approve a second bill authorizing the deployment of US forces, the promised $30 billion aid package would evaporate and Turkey's credit rating would be downgraded.

On the other hand, Europe has been exerting pressure on Ankara to dissuade it from taking part in the war. The Europeans know that Turkish non-participation would at least cause Washington to postpone its plans, if not call them off completely. The Europeans have thus been prodding Turkey where it really hurts: on Cyprus, on accession to the EU and on the Kurdish issue.

Cyprus was never a foreign policy issue for the Turks; it has always been an integral part of Turkish national security. The proposals announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan last November were mainly seen in Ankara, especially by the National Security Council from the viewpoint of their possible effects on the future of the Turkish Cypriots and on Turkish national security. The Turkish military concluded that Annan's proposals would undermine the future of the Turkish Cypriots in favor of their Greek compatriots, and would remove Ankara's role (guaranteed by the 1959 treaty of Zurich) as guardian of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The talks of March 11 thus failed, and Annan announced that they had arrived at a dead end.
There was nothing really surprising about that. What made this occasion particularly ominous was the statement by EU Commissioner for Expansion Gunter Verheugen that if a settlement were not forthcoming by 2004, the Turkish Army on Cyprus would be seen as an occupying force. Needless to say, Ankara can then kiss EU membership goodbye.

To add to the pressure on Ankara, the European Court of Human Rights announced in Strasbourg the very next day (March 12) that the Ankara State Security Court, which convicted PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, "had not been an independent and impartial tribunal."

Turkey interpreted this ruling as encouraging the Kurds to secede. In order to deprive its own 12 million Turkish Kurds of the opportunity to gain from the ruling, the Turkish Constitutional Court hurriedly took the steps necessary to close down the (Kurdish) People's Democracy Party (HADEP) and ban its leaders from political activity. Attorney-General Sabih Kanadoglu then initiated proceedings against HADEP's successor, DEMAP, in what was seen as a direct response to European pressure.

Turkey thus finds itself in an extremely difficult position, between an American rock and a European hard place. Following the arguments raging in Turkey, one would be excused for believing that the Tower of Babel is not in Iraq but in Turkey. It was not therefore strange that forming a new government in which there were only two new ministers should have taken three days, or indeed that Erdogan should have chosen March 23 as a date for a confidence vote in Parliament in his new cabinet, nine whole days after its formation.

It is a given that a new bill on US troop deployment (albeit only for using Turkish airspace) could only be submitted to Parliament after a vote of confidence, if at all.
All these delaying tactics were used to give the government, Parliament, and the army more time to decide on the most appropriate way to extricate Turkey from its dilemma.

The Turks realize that if they side with the US that would mean the end of their dream to be part of Europe. If they side with the anti-war camp that would spell disaster where Iraq, the Kurds and the Turkish economy are concerned.

In short, Ankara is in a bind. Which way is it going to jump?

* Mohammad Noureddine is a Beirut-based expert on Turkish affairs.

2. - Eurasianet - "Turkey's new leader promises internal stability while facing external chaos":

19 March 2003 / by Mevlut Katik

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's new prime minister, is facing the daunting task of reviving the Turkish economy while imminent conflict looms in neighboring Iraq. The Turkish parliament's reluctance to grant the US military basing rights for its Iraq offensive may make Erdogan's task more difficult by potentially depriving Ankara of billions of dollars in American assistance.

Erdogan became prime minister on March 11, two days after winning a parliamentary seat in a by-election. Prior to that he served as the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which dominates parliament. Erdogan had been barred from holding elective office because of an earlier criminal conviction for anti-secular political activity. A recent change in the constitution made Erdogan's return to parliament possible.

In farewell remarks, Abdullah Gul, the outgoing prime minister, outlined the ongoing challenge for Turkey. "Our priority was to solve economic problems when we came to power. But … developments in the European Union, Cyprus and Iraq, has prevented us doing that," Gul said.

Gul asserted that Erdogan would handle the expected turbulence in the days ahead, stressing that the new premier enjoys his party's support. "Stable one-party rule prevented the economy plunging into chaos as would have been the case in the past in such moments of crises," he said. "With the by-election [in which Erdogan gained his parliamentary seat], a democratic contradiction has been corrected in Turkey."

Now serving as foreign minister, Gul tied stability and democracy to creditworthiness at his March 11 news conference. "With the Justice and Development Party coming to power, markets have been stabilized and it has become possible again to borrow in international markets," he said. "We have declared to people what we will do in one, six and 12 months."

Since the AKP swept to power in November parliamentary elections, the government has confronted adversity. The Turkish government's reform hopes have suffered several blows in addition to parliament's rejection of US troops. For example, a European Union snub in December appears to have drastically reduced Turkey's accession chances. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Iraq crisis has heaped new pressure on the government. From the start of Erdogan's tenure, the question of access by the United States and its allies to Turkish military facilities has caused strains within the governing party. Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc and Deputy Prime Minister Ertugrul Yalcinbayir, whom Erdogan dropped from his government, both made theatrical speeches opposing basing rights.

A compromise plan being prepared by Erdogan reportedly would have Turkey permit American and allied forces to use Turkish airspace, but not have access to its bases. US officials have indicated that the Turkish stance could result in a reduction of American aid. In addition, a State Department spokesman on March 19 cautioned that Turkey should not expect any quid pro for granting overflight rights.

There is some concern in Ankara about an Iraq war's duration. A lengthy conflict could lead to a damaging reduction in Turkish tourism and trade revenues. Large losses could make it difficult for Erdogan's government to maintain a stable currency and steady revenues, or to meet International Monetary Fund reform goals.

The future status of northern Iraq, a Kurdish stronghold, also may pose an important diplomatic test for Turkey. The United States announced on March 19 that it would vigorously oppose any unilateral move by Turkish soldiers into northern Iraq. Turkish planners have asserted that Ankara reserves the right to make such a move to defend vital national security interests. Turkish military and political leaders are concerned that, amid a possible power vacuum created by Saddam Hussein's ouster, Kurdish leaders might attempt to establish an independent state. Such a development could re-ignite a Kurdish separatist struggle in Turkey, leaders in Ankara worry.

Despite parliament's opposition to US basing rights, Turkish leaders believe Ankara will eventually have a role in either military operations or in the reconstruction of Iraq. "If a war becomes inevitable, Turkey cannot sit with its eyes closed," Gul said March 11. Turkey will in all likelihood seek as large a role as possible in issues concerning post-war Iraq. A prominent reconstruction role could help Erdogan's government contain Kurdish ambitions in northern Iraq, seek investment opportunities for Turkish businesses, and improve Turkey's image with both the United States and European Union.

Editor's Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group.

3. - The Financial Times - "WAR IN IRAQ: Turkey likely to grant US overflight rights":

ANKARA / 20 March 2003 / by Leyla Boulton

The Turkish parliament is today expected to give overflight rights to the US after its earlier failure to approve the deployment of 62,000 US troops cost it the loss of a big war compensation package equivalent to up to $24bn (£15.3bn, €22.6bn) in cheap loans.

As Turkey's currency and bonds weakened sharply on the US withdrawal of the financial offer, Abdullah Gul, the respected new foreign minister and deputy prime minister, yesterday vowed that the government would pursue as tough an economic stabilisation programme as required to avoid a default on an unwieldy $100bn debt.

Mr Gul, who ceded the premiership last week to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the previously banned leader of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), told the Financial Times that approving an urgent US request for overflight rights "should not be underestimated". Turkey's difficulties in securing more support for Washington's unpopular war plans should "also be understood", given the reservations of other US partners ranging from Mexico to Britain.

Mr Gul kept the door open to broader military help for the US in Iraq, hours after Turkey offered a basic package allowing America to use only air corridors for attacks.

If the issue of greater help involving deployment of troops arose, he said, US financial aid might be discussed again.

In Washington, Ari Fleischer, White House spokesman, said the US had not ruled out providing financial assistance to Turkey, but did not give any details.

Mr Fleischer said an initial economic aid package, which included $6bn in direct aid and up to $24bn in US-backed loans, was no longer viable because the Turkish parliament had refused to allow the 62,000 US troops into Turkey.

Mr Gul also saw continuing grounds for optimism over Turkey's bid to join the European Union in spite of the damaging failure of efforts by Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary-general, to enable a reunited Cyprus join the EU. "The EU [bid] is not about one shot. It is a continuous process," he said, noting that the Ankara government had passed sweeping human rights reforms required for EU membership and would continue on this path.

Mr Gul apportioned some blame for recent setbacks on the fact that "very difficult issues" - Iraq, Cyprus, and the EU accession bid - all came to a head at the same time, immediately after the AKP took power in November.

But with a smile and a lack of self-pity, he added: "That was unfortunate, of course, but that is the reality."

A trained economist with foreign policy expertise, Mr Gul said the US money was less important for the debt-ridden economy than the pursuit of unpopular but sound economic policies spelled out in Turkey's $16bn standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

In a gentle hint of earlier divisions within the AKP - distracted by hopes of a big US package - Mr Gul said that "all the government" were now committed to pursuing the IMF-backed programme.

He also asserted that political and military agreements negotiated with the US would still go into effect.

The political accord included undertakings by the US to avoid an independent Kurdish state and to promote, in a post-Saddam Iraq, the rights of non-Kurdish groups alongside the Kurdish groups that currently control the autonomous enclave of northern Iraq.


Proving his point, a joint statement issued yesterday by Iraqi opposition groups, Turkey and the US promised to preserve "Iraq's territorial integrity and to build a fully representative and democratic government".

The military accord allowed an unspecified number of Turkish troops, some of whom were already in place, to be deployed in northern Iraq with a mission to stop refugees crossing the border.

But Mr Gul was keen to stress that Turkey had no ill intent in an area still viewed by some Turkish politicians and generals as a dangerous cauldron of Kurdish nationalism.

"We don't have a secret agenda over there and neighbouring countries and the Americans know this," he said, adding, in a reference to refugees and possible trouble from Turkey's Kurdish separatist guerrillas: "We don't want to see negative effects. on our side."

4. - The Guardian - "Kurds' precarious freedom may be early casualty of conflict":

20 March 2003 / by Martin Woollacott

If there has been one fixed point in debate about war with Iraq, it has been that Iraqis deserve deliverance from Saddam Hussein, and that the Iraqi Kurds in particular - who now have a precarious freedom - should have it confirmed.

Some see the price to the world for that deliverance as far too high, some see it as bearable. But there is agreement that a war which ends in a worse situation for the Kurds would be the worst of all possible wars. Men and women would have died, and dangerous consequences risked by the US and Britain, and yet the one group of people who had already been partially rescued would be thrust back into the fire.

That is why the way in which American plans for the northern front have unravelled in recent weeks has been so alarming.

The vote in the Turkish parliament which blocked the passage of American troops knocked strategy sideways, leaving a whole division of American troops floating disconsolately offshore in the eastern Mediterranean. And not just any division. The Fourth Mechanised Infantry Division is the most advanced formation in the American army, fully "digitalised", as today's electronic soldiers say, and possessing a formidable mixture of tanks and helicopters.

"This is the best we've got," says the military analyst Anthony Cordesman. It is the most potent expression of the technological superiority which the United States expects will allow it to wage war with maximum speed and minimum casualties.

The Turks may change their minds, and if they do the Fourth may yet reach northern Iraq, to join the lighter forces America is inserting into the region. But it will be very, very late, and that lessens the chance of fixing Iraqi divisions which might otherwise retreat, and thus make the final fight for Tikrit and Baghdad harder.

In its anxiety to get troops into northern Iraq, the United States was not only ready to pay a high price in cash, but it appeared, to bargain with the political future of the Kurds. The Turks demanded, and got, American agreement that they could put large forces into northern Iraq and have a voice in determining what kind of system Iraq would have after Saddam.

Having failed to secure a passage for its troops, and still uncertain whether it will be allowed to use Turkish air space, the US is now arguing that Turkish troops should keep out of Iraq, but the Turks are not listening.

Turkey's supposed main fear, apart from its concerns about Turkish Kurdish rebels who operate from northern Iraq, is that the Iraqi Kurds want their own state and might try to seize the oil resources of the north to give that state an economic basis.

This is nonsense and the Turks are well aware that it is nonsense, because Iraqi Kurdish leaders know that a landlocked mini-state, even if it somehow did get hold of the northern oil, which is in any case running out, is neither a realistic nor a desirable prospect. The real fear of the Turks is rather that the Iraqi Kurds would be able succesfully to combine a degree of autonomy for their region, including an agreement on oil resources, with participation in an Iraqi central government.

This "loyal autonomy" would be a model to which Kurds in Turkey might then aspire, and that is a concept which Ankara would find incredibly hard to accommodate, given the fiction of homogeneity upon which its nationalism is based. The clear danger arises that a Turkish military presence and a supposed "right" to be consulted on political matters, would be used to spoil the chances of a successful political outcome in northern Iraq, and thus might damage the prospects for Iraq as a whole.

All that the United States and the Kurdish parties could wrest out of the Turks at a meeting in Ankara two days ago was a vague agreement to take part in a committee to minimise friction between the forces the Turks insist they will put into Iraq and American and Kurdish units.

The fact that America will have weaker forces in northern Iraq than it expected at the start of hostilities will make it more difficult for Washington to exert leverage on Turkey, but not of course impossible. More US troops will come later, and in any case Turkey is enormously dependent, politically and economically, on its relationship with America.

But it is another index of how much the Iraq conflict has overturned the certainties of the past that it is not entirely sure that American leverage will prevail.

5. - The Independent - "Iraqi Kurd armies to aid Allies in bid to rebuff Turkey":

ARBIL / 20 March 2003 / by Patrick Cockburn

Iraqi Kurds agreed yesterday that their 100,000 soldiers would co-operate with the United States-led coalition as hundreds of thousands of people fled the Kurdish capital, Arbil, fearing a chemical attack.

Meanwhile, the Turkish parliament is to consider today whether to grant the US military the right to use Turkish air space in the Iraq war. Under the agreement, the US would not be able to use Incirlik air base, a sprawling facility that already houses 50 American fighters used to patrol a no-fly zone over Iraq. Turkish officials said the latest resolution would allow Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq. Washington has so far failed to convince Turkey not to cross into Iraqi Kurdistan.

Arbil was plunged into darkness last night when the electricity was cut off - presumably by the Iraqi government. Most shops had already closed as their owners took refuge in mountain villages far from the front line.

There were few overt signs of military preparation apart from peshmerga - Kurdish soldiers - pitching tents outside the city. American special forces have joined other peshmerga to make forays behind Iraqi lines, but the Kurdish forces will not come under direct US command.

In the run-up to war, leaders of the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have been negotiating in the Turkish capital, Ankara, in an attempt to prevent Turkish troops entering northern Iraq. The Kurds, part of an Iraqi opposition delegation which they dominate, want to use their leverage with the US to prevent or at least limit a Turkish incursion.

The Kurdish negotiating position was strengthened when Turkey turned down a request from America to use the country as a launch-pad for a land invasion of northern Iraq. This has left the US more reliant on the 62,000-strong army of the KDP and the 40,000 PUK fighters. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, said last night that a broad measure of agreement had been reached.

Previously, the Kurdish leaders had threatened that there would be military clashes if the Turks entered Iraqi Kurdistan - which has had de facto independence since 1991 - even if the soldiers were part of a coalition force.

Kamran Karadaghi, a veteran commentator on Kurdish affairs, said: "I think the Turks will cross the border but not come as far as we feared and the Kurdish reaction will be less than they threatened."

The fate of Kirkuk, the northern Iraqi oil province, is crucial. Kurds were once in the majority here before Saddam Hussein ethnically cleansed the area. Kurdish leaders have pledged that 300,000 Kurdish refugees will return, evicting the Arab settlers who replaced them. Turkey is adamant that the Kurds must not get Kirkuk, whose oil wealth might be the basis for an independent state.

Turkey is supporting the rights of the Turkoman minority, also expelled from Kirkuk by President Saddam. Mr Karadaghi said: "It is important that there are no clashes between the returning Turkomans and Kurds."

Kurdish military commanders say they are under orders not to attack the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, but to take the surrounding countryside. Over the next week there is likely to be an uprising by Kurds living in Iraqi-controlled areas supported by the returning refugees, many of whom are peshmerga.

It will be difficult for the US to prevent this even if it wanted to do so. Kurdish leaders claim that Arab settlers will automatically return to their homes elsewhere in Iraq, but some of them have been in Kirkuk or Mosul for 40 years and have nowhere else to go.

This could have bloody consequences for Arabs in Kirkuk province, some of whom have pledged to remain and fight.

The state of morale of the Iraqi regular army in the north is unclear, but Kurdish military officers believe they will not fight if they are subjected to an intense air bombardment. But one Republican Guard infantry division, the Nebuchadnezzar, is in Kirkuk and it might put up stiffer resistance.

Kurdish officials in Arbil denied reports last night that Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minster, had fled to the city. An earlier report, broadcast by the Iraqi Communist Party, said Mr Aziz, Taha Yassin Ramadan, another politician, and a son of Ali Hassan al-Majid, the Iraqi official in charge of Basra, had been executed.

Mr Aziz later turned up at a press conference in Baghdad to prove that he was neither dead nor a defector. President Saddam has succeeded in preventing important defections from his immediate circle in the run-up to the war. This has been easier than it was during the 1991 Gulf War because few senior Iraqis now travel abroad.

6. - The Times - "Ankara set to quash Kurdish ambitions":

SILOPI / 20 March 2003 / from Richard Lloyd Parry

SILOPI is the last town in Turkey, and long before you get there it is obvious that something here is wrong.

The thousands of ramshackle oil lorries that used to rumble along 24 hours a day stand idle.

Bad-tempered soldiers stop cars three times on the approach to the town.

And Silopi itself has been transformed from a quiet border town, nine miles from Iraq, into the launch pad for one of Turkey's riskiest military adventures.

There are soldiers every few hundred yards. On the edge of town is the final checkpoint, past which no outsider can go, and beyond here a powerful army has gathered.

Lorries of commandos head past the checkpoint, towards tanks and artillery.

Exact numbers are hard to determine, but Turkish security sources say that 10,000 commandos are in position close to the border, with 50,000 regular troops on standby across the southeast region.

Turkey's intentions are clear: to enter northern Iraq in force within hours of the start of war.

And for days the rest of the world has been pleading with it to change its mind.

For the reason for this sinister build-up is the same one that brought death and misery to this region throughout the 1990s: the Kurdish problem.

Denied their own nation after the First World War, the Kurdish people found themselves divided between six nations, including Turkey and northern Iraq. For a decade the Turkish Army fought Kurdish rebels until the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the guerrilla leader, brought a ceasefire in 1999.

Now even that fragile stability has begun to crumble.

Turkey is afraid that, once liberated, the Kurds of northern Iraq will declare an independent state, inspiring an upsurge of Kurdish nationalism within Turkey itself.

Kurdish leaders in Iraq say that they have no such intentions. But just in case, the Turkish Army is poised to make a powerful statement of its own.

This week Turkey's parliament will consider a proposal to allow coalition aircraft to fly across its territory, but also to authorise its own forces to enter Iraq.

It is a prospect which terrifies foreign governments.

Massoud Barzani is the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, which governs the western half of Iraqi Kurdistan nearest to the Turkish border.

Yesterday he said: "Our position is very clear when we say we are opposed to Turkish intervention. It's not for fun we are saying this; we are not bluffing. Whatever happens, we will not accept Turkish troops in Kurdistan."

The worst situation as far as Western diplomats in Ankara are concerned has Turkish troops, harried and ambushed by lightly armed Kurdish guerrillas, fighting back in force.

The presence of the Turks, moreover, could inspire Iran to send in a force of its own to deal with Saddam-backed insurgents based across the border.

American troops could find therefore themselves struggling to keep apart the squabbling sides, while simultaneously taking on the Iraqi Army.

"The US and Britain would be seen as liberators," one diplomat said. "The Turks would be seen as occupiers."

The overwhelmingly Kurdish population of Silopi is well aware of the risks associated with war, but for them the danger is more personal.

The dispatch of Nato Patriot missiles has brought home the prospect of attack by Iraqi Scuds, potentially equipped with chemical warheads.

At a primary school on the outskirts of Silopi right opposite the final checkpoint, a group of little boys in blue uniforms watch the army roll by. "When will the war start?" one of them asks. "And will they try to kill us with gas?"

Nasty rumours have been doing with the rounds, of cattle and chickens, mysteriously found dead by the side of the road. A few people have sent their families to safer parts of the country.

But the region has already been punished in more palpable ways. Southeast Turkey has always been poor but, in the three years since the ceasefire, it had begun to make a recovery.

Some 370,000 tourists visited the biggest regional city, Diyarbakir, last year, including 20,000 foreigners.

This year, all but a tiny handful have cancelled. And the militarisation and sealing off of the Iraqi border has deprived the region of one of its biggest sources of income.

Until the crisis, many families supplemented their poor income from cotton, watermelon and lentils by making runs across the border, returning with a tank of crude oil which they could sell at $110 a time.

"Every day, everything is becoming more expensive," said Osman Kilig, village head of the hamlet of Doyuran. "These are poor people, and we are in despair." Behind the scene efforts now will be to secure a compromise - a limited Turkish force, perhaps, in close liaison with the US and its allies.

The polls show that Turks want this war even less than most Europeans. And unlike Europeans, the people of Silopi stand to lose a great deal of the little they have got.

7. - The International Herald Tribune - "The Kurds: a catastrophe waiting to happen":

BRUSSELS / 20 March 2003 / by Gareth Evans and Joost Hiltermann

Of all the eruptions that a U.S.-led war on Iraq may unleash, none is more urgent to address than that between Iraqi Kurds and their Turkish neighbor. Turkey stands poised to enter Iraq with military might to prevent the Kurds from making any move toward statehood, with control of the city of Kirkuk and its oil-rich environs seen as the key. The Kurds, in turn, have threatened to transform their native land into a graveyard for Turkish soldiers. Whether the United States will be able to keep them apart is an open question.

For both sides the stakes are enormous. Turkey fears that the emergence of a sovereign Kurdish entity across the border may inflame its own Kurds, a sizable minority that has long sought greater recognition of its national identity.

Turkey has brought its own troops into a state of preparedness, both to keep Iraqi refugees out and pre-empt a Kurdish dash for Kirkuk. It already has several thousand troops stationed at a small airfield in northern Iraq - over the Kurds' vociferous protests - and tens of thousands more are set to pour into the area.

To the Kurds, the road to independence - or at least a much enhanced degree of autonomy in a post-Saddam Iraq - runs through Kirkuk.

Their sense of entitlement is immensely strong and needs to be better understood in the West. Denied statehood after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and spread among a number of countries, the Kurds became an instrument in the hands of more powerful players, led along a trail of broken promises and agreements with many attempts to assert their nationhood brutally suppressed.

Iraq's 1988 Anfal counter-insurgency campaign, in which an estimated 100,000 Kurdish men, women and children were systematically murdered by the Iraqi regime, is barely known to anyone but regional experts.

Nearly another 7 000 died in Saddam's much better known chemical strike on Halabja in March 1988, but the historical record has been contested by revisionists, despite the evidence, and the extent of the suffering not fully acknowledged.

The international community's inability to comprehend the transformative significance of Anfal and Halabja to the Kurds is roughly equivalent to failing to grasp how the events of Sept. 11 affected the American psyche.

It is out of such deep emotions and national traumas that identities are forged or reinforced and, sometimes, nations are born. If in the chaos of war the Kurds make a sprint for Kirkuk, it will be less out of an opportunistic calculation of probable gain than out of a profound urge for national survival.

Between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds stands the United States. The Bush administration has publicly expressed its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, making it abundantly clear that independence for the Kurds is not for the United States an acceptable outcome.

But having now brought on the war, Washington must address two big challenges: to prevent a potentially catastrophic confrontation between Kurds and Turks while the war goes on, and to help put together a post-war structure for the Iraqi state that, while preserving its territorial integrity, really does address the legitimate aspirations of the Kurdish people.

To meet these challenges, three things must happen, all made extremely urgent by the imminence - as we write this - of not only war in Iraq but votes in the Turkish Parliament authorising the deployment both of US troops into Turkey and more Turkish troops into Iraq.

First, it is imperative that U.S. forces get to Kirkuk fast - before the Turks and before Kurdish forces.

Second, the United States must make abundantly clear to Turkey that it has to show restraint, avoiding any unilateral military moves in northern Iraq.

Third, Washington must simultaneously make clear to the Kurds that they should take no action that risks provoking Turkey: that they must refrain from unilateral military steps and consent to a temporary international presence in Kirkuk.

In exchange, America needs to give an explicit, public guarantee to the Kurds that it will protect them from attack (from either Turkey or a post-Saddam regime in Baghdad) and support their fair expectation of greater freedom to govern themselves during negotiations over the future of Iraq, including - crucially - an active Kurdish role in the central government.

The Kurdish parties have much deep suspicion to overcome, born of their historical dealings with the United States and the wider international community. If they are ever to live in peace and security and in full enjoyment of their human rights, they must agree to work with both for a better post-war Iraq.

But Iraqi Kurds can reasonably ask to be given some clearer and firmer grounds for confidence about the outcome than have so far emerged from Washington.

Gareth Evans is president and Joost Hiltermann is Middle East project director of the International Crisis Group. ICG's new report on Iraq's Kurds is available on its website, www.crisisweb.org.

8. - KurdishMedia.com - "Time to bury Sykes-Picot":

19 March 2003 / by Dr Fereydun Hilmi

In 1916 Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and M. George Picot, of France, right in the Middle of the First World War signed an agreement which has carried their names ever since. The agreement which divided up the rump of the Ottoman Empire, by then reduced to a mere weak and malaised Caliphate, in a strange and devious way as shown in the map below. The shape of the Middle East was determined from that moment onward and both superpowers of the time have adhered to this piece of curiosity to this day.

As can, also, be seen from the map there are no state borders and neither Turkey's nor Iran's borders are taken into account. The map, therefore, is one describing what is intended to become colonial territory and not what is already theirs. But if anyone believes that it was designed at the time to carry out some nation-building then it shows clearly that the role of the people is quite absent judging by the random and ad-hoc way the lines are drawn right across racial and ethnic divides. If the two loot-seeking leaders had any notion of who and what ethnicity the peoples of the region represented then the map belies that. But if it is not deliberately devious then far from it, the map shows a complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the region and disregard for the populations covered by it.

Just under a century has now passed and Britain and France have benefited greatly from the wealth and buying power of the region, while the peoples of the region have lagged behind barely able to feed and educate themselves. But completely lost in the deal have been the Kurds, whose homeland was sacrificed and torn up to make artificial limbs for the new states created as a result of these lines, even though they were modified several times afterwards.

But the Sykes-Picot agreement was combined with two other agreements, that between the Britain and Turkey and another between the Arabs and Britain. These agreements are still being regarded as sacrosanct as far as the British are concerned at least. The British also managed to convince most of their satellite Arabs leaders of that too. The French too consider them beyond reproach and tantamount to "International Law". And although covert, the United Nations regards them as such also. The UN considers that International Law is made up of the UN Charter, Principles, Conventions and Protocols, Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions and International Agreements. The League of Nations had, also, accepted them as such but, of course, the League of Nations just as its successor was the creation of the victorious superpowers of the time.

When the United States proved its power and military and economic capabilities and as a reward for her vital help and assistance the two main imperialist powers Britain and France had to make some room for her to share the colonial cake in case they needed her again and so America acquired some influence which she exploited through her technology, scientific achievements and economic clout. Knowing that it was "permitted" by their colonial ex-masters, many of the world's ex-colonies opted to establish their ties with the United States which made Britain and France highly resentful of the muscling in process which was going on. However the USA was vital in countering the threat of communism and the old Soviet Union and so they reluctantly tolerated her.

The rise of Hitler which many attributed to the indignation inflicted upon the Germans, harsh and strict sanctions against Germany which had lost the First World War and the subsequent devastating Second World War for the control of the natural resources of the Middle East and its hungry markets taught the western colonial powers a lesson and the conclusions of that lesson were applied to the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Russia has been made a favoured nation and its payroll guaranteed by the USA. It has also been allowed some involvement in NATO and generally participates in world affairs as an understanding and tolerated colleague if not true friend. As a result, Russian technology is being absorbed into the USA and many technological and space-exploration projects are carried out jointly.

That same policy was applied to the Turks which kept them alive but inert, incapable of any progress or advancement apart from the bare minimum. But for some reason, the West treated Iraq in a completely different way. I believe that this was partly because Iraq is a single member of a large number of Arab and Islamic states which if harmed the whole of the Arab world would be hurting. This fact does not and did not bother the Americans for two reasons; A) the strength of the US economy which is not dependent on Arab resources and B) because of America's arrogance and gun-hoe diplomacy which makes it difficult for them to backtrack on anything no matter how wrong they are.

The West Europeans, however, and in particular Britain and France are much more amenable to compromise and deals and wanted to "contain" Iraq until either the leadership died away or someone else took over and did the job for them without the loss of face and faith before the Arab and Muslim worlds which act like the digestive system of European and South East Asian states, much of whose multinationals are also owned by the West.

Over the past sixty to seventy years the British have been the prime movers of the policy of drowning all Kurdish aspirations and human rights. They were responsible for the creation of Iraq and the abandonment of the creation of Kurdistan also mandated to them for that purpose (see Arnold Wilson's Loyalties Mesopotamia). Just as they created Israel and are now pretending to be shocked at its existence and pretending to be doing all in their power to create an Independent Palestinian State, they were behind all the treaties and pacts which were signed by Baghdad and its neighbours in the fifties before the14 th. July Qassim Revolution which toppled the Royal system in Iraq.

As two colonial powers who fought each other over land and property for centuries Britain and France are bitter rivals and would dearly like to weaken each other and usurp each other's economic territories short of going to war over them. We have seen this well demonstrated in the recent game played by these two geriatric imperial powers. Britain being of an Anglo-Saxon race are nevertheless closer to the USA whose majority ethnicity is the same and will always side with their own kind. The Anglo-French resentment is apparent in everything they do often causing them to appear on different sides even in the EU. The French who realise they cannot compete with Britain over American favours and love have always sought refuge among the Europeans nations making the English Channel a much bigger divide fro the British than it actually is. This does not mean that Britain has all that love or respect reciprocated for the USA. Ever since the inception of the European Union, Britain has suffered from a debilitating schizophrenia not knowing quite how to behave towards the USA and its own European neighbours.

Thus in the recent months the British did all they could to persuade their colonial partners, France, to join in the war as they did when Iraq invaded Kuwait but failed. This is a worrying development as it could mean possible conflict in future over other secret agreements where France, this time, may be the one wanting to go to war and Britain feeling its interests may be threatened by it.

The Americans, who have now realised that their population and very well-being are threatened, are determined to do something about it. What's more, they have realised that all the threats are coming from people who are extremely unhappy and aggrieved by British and French policies which started in1916 and with the Sykes-Picot agreement and continue in the Third Millennium.

Nevertheless, both Britain and France have managed to blame everything on the Americans with such subtlety that neither America nor those aggrieved have fully realised why and how this has been achieved. In Palestine, you will see American flags being burnt but not a single British or French flag is burnt. The same is true in the Islamic and African states. The Americans too have not realised what is going on and still trust their British and French allies (well not the French at the moment). The British also managed to isolate the French and Germans by gambling on the certain winner, at the risk of turning those two European States into the Arab and Islamic states' best friend.

The Sykes-Picot agreement has thus been at the heart of the Kurdish problem and the refusal of the British and French to entertain any notion of freedom and independence for them.

If there is one thing which brings a slight glimmer of hope from a possible rearrangement in the Middle East is the fact that now at least the USA does not need to abide by the Infamous Sykes-Picot agreement. Why should they when it has been the cause of the horrendous anti-American feelings among most of the nations of the Middle East, Turkey and France's refusal to assist them not to mentions the actual attacks on the Twin-Towers and the other attacks all over the world. Britain too may feel that Sykes-Picot is dead and may pursue a new line and interest with its senior new partner and therefore would worry less about France and Turkey and be more agreeable to consider drastic changes which one would hope would include the liberation of Kurdistan.

I believe that the American/French/British/Turkish split is a great opportunity for the Kurds to achieve their freedom if the Kurdish politicians can play their cards right and exploit it. We should hope and pray that Sykes/Picot is buried completely and for ever. Then and only then the talisman of the sanctity and territorial integrity farce could be exorcised and removed and the USA may think straight and prefer the side of free nations to that of the Geriatric Colonial powers.